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This thesis is a study of discourses of contemporary Bedouin identity and political 
economy in central Jordan. Drawing on 13 months of ethnographic fieldwork in the 
town of Madaba and its surrounding villages, it follows the experiences of young, 
mostly male, interlocutors from two largely settled but still discursively Bedouin 
‘ashā’ir (socio-political categories normally glossed in English as ‘tribes’); the Bani 
Sakhr and the Bani Hamida. It provides a new approach to wider processes of nation-
building, identity-formation, and state encompassment of marginal areas, in the face of 
mass forced migration, structural adjustment, the rise of new social forums (on- and off-
line), and widespread protests. It considers questions of land settlement, sovereignty and 
the politics of everyday life in a rural region from which the protest movement dubbed 
Jordan's 'Arab Spring' emerged among supposedly traditionalist and loyalist Bedouin. 
 I examine the historical context behind the current social, political and economic 
position of my interlocutors via histories of land settlement, sedenterisation initiatives, 
and changing political institutions through Ottoman rule and the British Mandate, 
examining various processes of frontier governmentality that sought to pacify and settle, 
but also define and repurpose Bedouin as a conceptual category. Making an intervention 
in the long-standing anthropological debate around the nature and analytical usage of 
tribalism and the role of colonial effect in its construction in the region, I suggest a new 
analytical lens. I consider tribes as political modalities existing in a relationship of co-
(re)production with the nation-state, within a political and moral economy of 
hospitality, protection and encompassment, which has also come to be used to 
symbolise the nation of Jordan itself. I analyse the processes that create and contest 
‘Bedouin’ and ‘tribal’ as categories through which solidarity and sovereignty are 
claimed and contested. 
 In the face of postcolonial critiques and challenges over representation and 
Orientalism, anthropologists have rightly called for greater reflexivity and attention to 
positionality. Yet, somewhat problematically, they have largely withdrawn from topics 
around tribe and Bedouin. These concepts, aside from their contested and critiqued 
construction, continue to have conceptual and political power in Jordan and elsewhere, 
and anthropology is at risk of leaving them to development practitioners and policy-
makers. Anthropologists might formerly have explained the social setting I study as one 
generated by agnatic kinship and segmentary lineage. I instead reconsider ‘ashā’ir as 
political responses centred on certain limited projects of representative sovereignty.  
Unsettling Times: land, political economy and protest in the Bedouin villages of central Jordan 
F.Wojnarowski 
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NOTE 
 The names of many of the people in this thesis are pseudonymised either at the request 
of participants or due to the sensitivities of the topics they discussed. Others, especially 
those with a high public profile and national reputation, have allowed me to quote them 
directly, and I have done so using their real names. Place names and tribal names are all 
real, except in rare cases where the specific information given would be enough for 
someone with local knowledge to identify a pseudonymised interlocutor, in which case 
other plausible place names have been used.  
 I have transliterated oral and written terms and quotations from Arabic using a 
simplified version of the IJMES system, and in general where I have deviated from this 
system it is for the sake of fidelity to actual pronunciation. For instance, I have given 
the definite article (al) as it is pronounced, so that where it elides with the first letter of 
the word, instead of writing ‘al-Salt’ the city on north-central Jordan, I have given it as 
pronounced; ‘as-Salt’. The exception are Arabic words widely known or used in English 
with another form of transliteration. All translations are my own, unless specifically 
attributed.  
 Quotes from fieldwork encounters are mostly from the local Jordanian variety of 
shāmy (Levantine) Arabic, often in particular the Bedouin version (al-‘amīyah al-
badawīyah) but on occasion use elements more associated with a wider educated 
spoken form. Where possible, I have tried to reproduce the colloquial pronunciations 
and particular linguistic choices of my interlocutors – for instance apart from formal or 
religiously charged words which tend to be pronounced ‘correctly’, I have transliterated 
the standard Arabic letter qaf as a hard ‘g’ rather than ‘q’, as this is how it is normally 
pronounced in everyday speech by rural Jordanian men (although women and some 
urban men may choose the Lebanese/Syrian pronunciation of qaf as a glottal stop), and 
the tā mabuta as ‘ah’, not ‘a’. 
 Some interviews where the participants wished were also conducted in English, 
or partly in English and partly in Arabic. Where this is the case, I make it clear in the 
text. Most of my informants belonged to two groups – the Bani Sakhr and the Bani 
Hamida who are both sufficiently large and politically important to have fairly standard 
transliterations used officially. However, when used as a descriptive term for that which 
is considered ‘of’ these groups, rather than the groups as entities themselves, local 
speakers use the nouns Sukhur and Hamaydah which I have also used on occasion. I 
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PROLOGUE: LEAVE-TAKING AND NAMING 
My experience of leave-taking at the end of my fieldwork in Jordan proved a revealing 
final encounter with the various concepts, discourses and dispositions to do with 
identity, politics, belonging and descent that came to dominate my fieldwork. My 
friends Hamid and Abdalaziz Dahamshah invited me to come and eat at their house 
before taking me to the airport for an early morning flight. These two young brothers, 
minor government employees from a rural village an hour south of the capital, are 
among many Jordanians who see themselves as meaningfully affiliated to a ‘tribe’, and 
who describe themselves as Bedouin, and in their case Bani Sakhr Bedouin. ‘You are 
our brother’ they told me at the airport and asked me when I would return. ‘Soon, God 
willing’ I said, ‘when I can afford it, I will certainly come’. We talked about them 
visiting me in Britain (a remote possibility given the UK’s visa system). ‘We must, we 
should know your family. Your father, your brothers, God willing soon your children. 
Really, next time you come you must come with your people [ahl]’. Saif, their older 
brother who had told me so much about Bani Sakhr genealogy and history added ‘Good 
luck with your book, God willing it will tell the truth… you are Sukhur [i.e., of the Bani 
Sakhr] now’.  
 These polite expressions of fictive kinship and of tribal association are 
commonly used and while flattering for foreigners (especially for anthropologists) they 
are not meant very seriously.1 I was largely confined to the role of guest, a recipient 
(and occasional clumsy reciprocator) of hospitality and gifts, including knowledge. I 
was at most a friend, perhaps. The rhetorical statement that I was more than this is in 
itself a marker that I was no such thing – as we both knew. However, the link to ‘my 
book’ and the idea that I had been given some knowledge of something important gave 
these expressions a curious weight that day. Obligations had been shared, even if these 
were not the obligations of kinship or intimacy.  
 The day before, when I had made my goodbyes to Osama al-Hīsa, a young 
activist and protester, from another major Bedouin category, the Bani Hamida, he 
afterwards posted a picture of us drinking coffee and eating kunafah (a popular sweet 
 
1 Apart from in the important sense that association with a foreign researcher is an affirmation both of 
their knowledge of their social world and of their own importance within it.  
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cheese-based pastry) on Facebook, with the caption ‘Our last talk on politics with Farīd 
[an Arabic name close to ‘Fred’]. British but naturalised Hamaydah [britāny mutajanis 
Hamaydy]’. Again the expression is not meant seriously, but illuminates an important 
point: that for Osama being Hamaydah was not merely like being part of a family but 
comparable to nationality, a matter of jans [‘nationality’ but also ‘type’ or ‘species’], 
something conceptually comparable to being British. On reflection, this sort of 
statement influenced my decision in this dissertation to focus on the political nature of 
such categorical affiliations, and also their depth, their capacity to generate dispositions 
and distinctions, as nationalisms do. It also encouraged me to take seriously the 
significance of naming and names. These friends, by Arabising my name had given me 
a name,2 a reputation, and even a weak and somewhat joking categorical affiliation and 
kinship tie. They were in effect offering me a limited and performative version of the 
incorporation and affiliation that I was trying to research. It was easy to imagine that in 
times past, and given a longer stay, these weak links might have solidified and come, 
within a few decades or at most a few generations, to be matters of blood and 
genealogy. My contention here is that possessing (or being associated with) a name, and 
with it a reputation, is as much a matter of politics, amity and of strategy as of blood.  
 My leave-taking reflected an acknowledgement of an important transaction (in 
the broadest sense) undertaken between us. I had been given knowledge that I should 
value, and which came with duties of representation and created obligations that 
extended both ways.  
 Earlier that day I had attended a goodbye lunch with another group of Bani 
Hamida interlocutors in a rural household in the remote and mountainous Jabal Bani 
Hamida area. It was organised by my key research collaborator Halima, manager of a 
Bani Hamida community NGO, and Ghazi Abu Qa’ūd, a Hamaydah Shaykh and village 
head who had helped facilitate my work in the Jabal Bani Hamida villages. I thanked 
him for all his help in a halting Arabic speech, and (perhaps getting carried away by my 
own rhetoric) I mirrored these sorts of farewell conversations professing exaggerated 
intimacy and regard. I thanked him for including me, and for teaching me about his 
family and about the Hamaydah, who I said were among the most hospitable people in 
Jordan. He thanked me but tutted and told me not to think too hard about the differences 
between people. ‘Yes, Hamaydah are generous, we were famous for karām [meaning 
 
2 As I was married but had no children despite my advanced age, they also gave me a somewhat mocking 
kunya (tekonym) of Abu Tumas, Thomas being a name chosen as stereotypically European and 
Christian. 
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valourised generosity and formal hospitality, associated with nobility in both senses]. 
But y’ani [a phrase of equivocation] this is not unique. We are all one. We are all Bani 
Adam [literally ‘the sons of Adam’, Bani being a common prefix to genealogical 
categories]’ he declared. The restive guestroom, where we sat on the floor around 
platters of rice and meat, had moments before been full of noisy discourse and 
argument. Now it quietened, and everyone nodded in profound agreement. ‘Listen to 
Abu Sultan (using Ghazi’s kunya or teknonym)’ they said, ‘he is respected, his advice is 
good’. The irony of their automatic deferral to him, based on personal characteristics 
entangled with wider projects of reputation and honour, as he claimed that all people 
were one, and that I should not focus only on difference, was still with me when later at 
the airport the Dahamshah brothers expressed a desire to meet my ‘people’. I felt I was 
in what Dresch (2000b) calls the ‘wilderness of mirrors’. Abu Qa’ūd’s ecumenical and 
universally encompassing vision of humanity might seem far removed from ideas of 
tribes and segmentation, however it was still posited as stemming from filiation; the 
sons of Adam had a common distant but ‘known’ apical point, a final agnatic progenitor 
of a name. This ecumenical vision is not, however, egalitarian; it partakes of lifeways 
defined by hierarchies of gender, age, and lineage. He was being generous to others, as 
fellow possessors of a tradition of honourable hospitality, but accepted the 
distinctiveness and perhaps implicitly the superiority of Bedouin, and especially 
Hamaydah, versions of it, and within this, especially that of influential senior men like 
him. This vision, as we shall see, has been adapted and reformed as a central image of 
the state, as the royal house has created Jordan along the lines of the patriarchal family. 
But this vision can also be used to criticise and resist the state, as a family where 
obligations are unmet and relations are not being acknowledged.  

Chapter 1: Introduction 
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 INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation explores how and why projects to create a modern nation-state in 
Jordan have become entangled with socio-political forms seemingly their antithesis. 
Jordan is often described both within and beyond the region as (perhaps exceptionally) 
‘tribal’, a descriptive tendency that has waxed and not waned with recent reforms and 
development within the Hashemite Kingdom. I explore through ethnographic 
encounters within an area of peri-urban and rural villages south of Amman, the capital 
city, something of what this ‘tribalism’ means to those whose lives are caught up in it. 
Talk of tribes persists because it has become inextricably linked to types of social 
identity and categorisation, national politics and models of society which people find 
meaningful to think with and to use in the present. I consider the language of putative 
tribal categories, of shared honour and outwardly extending networks of relation 
reckoned genealogically through which claims and obligations can be made. This is not 
merely an anachronous vestige of a disappearing tribal Bedouin world rooted in a 
political economy of nomadic pastoralism, on the cusp of disappearing below the rising 
and atomising waters of modernity. Anticipation of this future by proponents of 
modernisation theory in Jordan and elsewhere has long remained frustrated. Instead, 
such reckonings of the social and political have been continually reproduced by 
particular historical and political-economic circumstances, and as such are as 
contemporary as the protest movements and social media channels through which they 
are increasingly expressed.  
 This is not to deny that ideas of tribe draw potency through resonances with 
deep historical continuities. An imagined past, connected to an assemblage of material 
culture and genres of oral history, genealogy and poetry has become a national 
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imaginary and foundational symbol; serving as Sally Howell (2003:224) puts it, ‘to 
articulate an identity that is still viable and linked to power and resources in the 
present’. For many of my interlocutors being ‘Bedouin’ and being ‘of’ their specific 
named ‘tribal’ category (concepts that will be defined below) is a meaningful and 
important way of identifying themselves and others and the relationships that might link 
them, determining wider relations with the state and other groups, as well as implying 
certain social and moral characteristics and dispositions. I focus thus not so much on the 
constructed-ness of such an imaginary, but on its conditions of possibility and through 
this its affective and political qualities. Following Candea (2010:4-5) I interrogate the 
circumstances and conditions behind such phenomena not to ask whether they ‘“are 
real?” or “made up?”, but rather, “how have they been realized” and “of what are they 
made?”’ 
 Equally, I do not wish to overstate the degree to which such conceptions are 
inherently seen as meaningful, primary or authentic by Jordanians. Categories of 
identity like Bedouin and tribe are backed up by various types of infrastructural reality. 
Yael Navaro-Yashin (2002:162), writing on statehood in Turkey, documents the 
apparent ease with which people criticise the state and its ideology, and at the same 
time, continue to engage in practices which “reinstated it by default” – but crucially, 
without “turning into believers”, analysing this move via the concept of Lacanian 
cynicism. Similarly I note a certain ambivalence, if not usually cynicism, in some 
somewhat self-conscious and ironic performances of ‘tribe’ in contemporary Jordan. 
Yet these categories, for all that, are still taken very seriously. 
 The creation of a valorised and Bedouinised national culture in post-
Independence Jordan has historically overlapped with a project of state-expansion into 
previously lightly governed margins. Actual nomadic pastoralists and Bedouin polities 
across Bilad ash-Shām (greater Syria) have been partially pacified, sedenterised and 
recast as enmeshed citizens of nation-states. Yet the potency of these forms, both as 
nationalised symbol and as political modality, remains. This I argue is a consequence of 
a certain conception and practice of mediational or representative sovereignty; a concept 
that will slowly emerge ethnographically through the following chapters. This exercise 
of sovereignty is both generative of and generated by longue durée historical dynamics, 
and of more specific events.  
 Starting from the widespread usage in Jordanian political talk of ‘ashīrah (pl. 
‘ashā’ir) and qabīlah (pl. qaba’il), both often glossed in English as ‘tribe’, this thesis 
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gives an account of the everyday contestations that surround these terms, and their 
problematic association with the concept of ‘tribe’ as it has been deployed within and 
beyond anthropology. I consider these not as extended kinship networks or groups, but 
as potential categories within which claims to solidarity or group-ness can be made; 
resources to shape and contest shared subjectivities and loyalties.1 I consider two 
primary examples of these categories, the Bani Hamida and Bani Sakhr. These two are 
among a number of large ‘ashā’ir categories (of hundreds of thousands of people) in 
Jordan, and the largest two in the Madaba region, associated over time (but not 
unchangingly) with certain names as well as with certain specific places. Thus, 
following Paul Dresch (1986, 1991) and for reasons I discuss in Chapter 2 (hinging on 
escaping some of the anthropological baggage of ‘tribe’), while I mostly think the idea 
of tribe is inescapable in this concept, these categories can in the abstract (when not 
using their proper name or an appropriate Arabic term) be more accurately and precisely 
defined as categories of name/space. 
 In Jordan qabīlah and ‘ashīrah are both used for describing categories of people 
of various sizes and levels of importance, and quite different structures. In general, 
‘ashīrah is the more commonly used. Where Jordanians need to talk of ‘tribalism’ in the 
abstract in Arabic (which in my experience is not common, except in newspaper 
articles) they use the adjective ‘ashirī (‘tribal’) or as the concept noun ‘ashā’irīyah 
(‘tribalism’).2 In Jordan qabīlah is usually used theoretically for the very largest level 
categories (like Bani Sakhr) with ‘ashīrah a ‘level’ below. 3 In practice rather than 
qabīlah people talk of ‘ashā’ir Bani Sakhr – ‘the tribes of the Bani Sakhr’, maintaining 
a sense of plurality.4 Numerous other terms exist for describing smaller, more 
genealogically specific collections of families, and for those who live together now or 
historically camped together.5 Another important category is the khamsat ad-dam, ‘five 
of the blood’, made up of those sharing a paternal ancestor within five generations and 
 
1 Following Scholz et al’s (2017) exploration of resource as an analytical term, defined as ‘the means to 
create, sustain and alter social relations’ I have found it analytically useful to consider these 
categorical claims as resources. 
2 The term qabīly can also be used and is more common in Yemen (Dresch 2009).  
3 Hence the common Arabic Dictionary definition of ‘tribe’ and ‘clan/sub-tribe’ respectively, but this is 
not always the case as the scale of the phenomena they describe can vary dramatically.  
4 It is the plural nature of such terms that has led many scholars to call them in English ‘confederations’ 
(for instance, Musil 1928, Sweet 1976), problematic in its own way through the implied sense of 
free association between equal parties. 
5 These include hamulah (literally ‘lineage’, especially used by villagers and those of Palestinian origin) 
or fakhd (‘thigh’ – a narrower group of more genealogically known relation). In the past the term 
qum was commonly used for a group of followers or riders, referring to a group defined not directly 
by genealogy but by purpose, and also having an element of an age-set about it. 
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thus closely related enough to share responsibility in matters of honour, revenge and 
compensation money payment. Specific terms suggestive of different scales are 
frequently in speech also replaced with generic ones such as ‘aylah (nuclear family, and 
ahl (‘people’ or extended family).  
 While such ways of dividing and identifying people within the wider social 
setting are ubiquitous, there is an important difference between talking about ‘tribes’ 
and talking about tribalism. Being Bani Sakhr or more genealogically specifically 
Mutirāt or Dahamshah or Hagaish Bani Sakhr summons up over wide social and 
geographic distances associations with place, history and certain moral characteristics, 
and to various degrees so does associations with specific urban families or even 
residence in certain suburbs. Especially in the case of the former ‘asha’īr, it is true that 
the significance of these names comes from people knowing them to be Bedouin names 
from a ‘strong’ ‘ashīrah. However, outside specific formal or commercial contexts 
(joining the army, seeking election to Parliament, wooing tourists) being ‘Bedouin’ or 
‘tribal’ per se, in a generic, non-group-specific sense, was less emphasised, though 
significant at a discursive and national level. I encountered the word ‘ashā’irīyah rarely, 
and generally in ways informed by wider national and developmental discourses, in 
which cases the speakers also often used ‘tribal’ and ‘tribalism’ in English. The Arabic 
and the English terms have been in dialogue for a long time, as educated Jordanians 
know some of the wider associations of the English term, and as some Arab intellectuals 
have been influenced by modernisation theory.  
 My research question at its simplest is how, when and why do Jordanians (for 
instance the roughly 150,000 people who are identified contextually as Bani Sakhr) see 
such names as meaningful and useful as a resource to deploy in social life, and for what 
ends? Equally important, who controls this resource, how do they control it, and to what 
ends? The problem thus formulated may seem to suggest a national scale and a 
discursive mode of analysis. Yet, rather than a study of the formation of Jordan-as-
nation-state or of the royal house as reproducer of social categories (themes that will be 
dealt with at length), this is first and foremost an ethnographic account of how these 
things look from a particular perspective. 
 This thesis is not then per se a critique of the discourse of particularistic 
patrilineal tribal authority in contemporary Jordan. It might, at times, be read as a 
critique of the way the royal house has used such concepts to provide legitimacy and a 
national imaginary that reproduces established political economic interests, maintaining 
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ethno-national, gendered and gerontocratic hierarchies. This in itself is not new or 
original, and has already been eloquently put by Joseph Massad (2001). More 
ethnographically, and perhaps more importantly, this dissertation is a description of how 
certain forms glossed as tribal retain relevance in Jordan’s political economy even as 
they are reproduced and adapted to new contingencies. It explores the structures 
whereby even critiques of, and challenges to, the current order – such as labour unions, 
opposition politics, protest and alternative projects of power – find resonances and 
resources in the idioms of tribe and Bedouin.  
  In a recent volume on the problem of scale and historical continuity in the 
anthropology of the Middle East, Judith Scheele (2019a) argues that the ‘state’ as a 
conceptual field has come to dominate political anthropology so thoroughly that other 
political orders or logics are deferred to its margins or its failures. In many settings, 
including the Middle East, urban-based dynasties and later nation-states have coexisted 
with other political orders, coming into being through mutual recognition, and 
sometimes encompassment, of other types of political community. As such, Scheele 
states (2019b:188); 
we need to analyze the principles that underpin political action. These 
principles, in turn… produce their own kind of history and regional 
connectivity. 
I attempt this type of analysis here, and it is this I have in mind when talking of the 
political or moral economy of my area of research, not a bounded or national 
characteristic. The existence of these and other universalising analytics are not taken for 
granted but emerge from attention to experiential accounts of particular times and 
places.  
1.1 Orientation:	conceptual	geographies	of	fieldwork	
This thesis centres the experiences of a varied but interrelated set of people trying to 
make a life and a future within a particular geographic and historical setting. These 
people for the most part are young, economically precarious, and widely categorised as 
Bedouin. They are mostly men, but also include a few women, as well as their older 
family members and those in their wider social sphere. In contrast to traditional 
ethnographic ideals, I largely interacted with people via their public life, at university, at 
work, in the coffeehouse and the street. Only secondarily did I enter their domestic 
lives, and then usually in the carefully controlled role of guest. This focus on outer 
Unsettling Times: land, political economy and protest in the Bedouin villages of central Jordan 
6  Frederick Wojnarowski –April 2020 
faces, in part a recognition of ethnographic limitations and in part a deliberate decision, 
is, I argue, well suited to study the place and issues I have focused on.  
 The particular geographical setting is a swathe of small towns and villages to the 
south-east of the capital, slowly changing in character with increasing distance outwards 
from the city, from suburban and peri-urban to rural and finally arid steppe-land. Many 
inhabitants of these villages are families whose recent ancestors were nomadic or semi-
mobile pastoralists. Now settled and mostly drawing their living through other means, 
my interlocutors were still often keen to stress the importance to them of limited 
pastoral production (accounting in most families for less than a third of total income), 
and a certain ideal of mobility; between jobs, settings and in some cases houses. At the 
centre of this area is the town of Madaba, 35km south of the capital city Amman, with a 
population according to the 2015 census of 105,000 people, and the capital of the 
Madaba Governorate, which has a total population of around 190,000 people (Jordanian 
Department of Statistics 2017).  
 Madaba itself is often described as ‘a Christian city’. It has a large Christian 
minority, and much of the centre of the town is still owned by three Christian families. 
As an urban space it is less overwhelmingly ‘Islamic’ in aesthetics than most parts of 
Jordan, despite the building of a large, Ottoman-style mosque in the 1990s in the heart 
of the old town which dominates the landscape and soundscape, over-topping the 
church towers and with an adhan (call to prayer) far louder than the church bells. This 
notwithstanding, two large churches occupy prominent positions in the town centre and 
on top of the old Tell (whose famous late Antique mosaics attract tourists). Despite 
Christian anxieties over apparently increasing Islamisation, there are many visible 
markers that proclaim the town as Christian and thus in local discourse unusually open 
and cosmopolitan: the unveiled women, prominent liquor stores on most streets in the 
centre (although their clientele is far from exclusively Christian), hotels and tourist 
businesses.6  
 The town is growing rapidly in almost every direction, with new clusters of 
houses, family compounds and apartment blocks springing up on the surrounding hills 
and fields, as well as many small new mosques, whose minarets and green lights 
dominate the skyline for miles around. Outside the centre the town is now, like most of 
 
6 While most Muslims and Bedouin stressed the social and cultural unity and solidarity of people in the 
town – ‘we are all Madabans’ and ‘we are all Arabs’ – many Christians in Madaba feel excluded 
and minoritised within their own city, from which many have emigrated.  
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Jordan, inhabited by people who trace their origins back to a wide variety of sources.7 
Madaba has a large Mukhayam (‘camp’) district, a now regularised settlement formed 
by refugees from Palestine since 1948 and their descendants, as well as smaller more 
recent populations of forced migrants from Iraq, Yemen and Syria. Various poorer 
neighbourhoods have grown up east of the King’s Highway connecting Amman with 
Karak and the South, including Egyptian seasonal workers, Iraqi and Syrian refugees 
and labourers, agricultural workers and small business owners from across Jordan, and a 
small population of Dom.8  
 Much of the land outside the centre and throughout the surrounding countryside 
is owned and inhabited by people considered by the Madaba Christians to be, and often 
calling themselves, Badu, borrowed ino English and most European languages as 
Bedouin. The term comes from the Arabic Badawy – describing a dweller in the 
Bādīyah, the steppe or wasteland. 9 The term Badu has a historically and contextually 
varied area of meaning, and often is used relationally, but in general a broadly inclusive 
working definition might be Arabs who are seen as possessing or claim to possess 
recent descent from nomadic pastoralists, a certain genealogical status, and a tradition of 
honour and hospitality.10  
 In particular, much of the land around Madaba is considered the dira – a 
loosely-held notion of territory – of two specific named Bedouin categories: the Bani 
Sakhr (literally, the ‘sons of rock’) to the East of Madaba; and to south-west of the 
governorate the Bani Hamida (‘sons of benevolence’), both claiming long, noble 
genealogies and histories. Dira as a term combines the sense of an area under the 
(claimed) protection of a named ‘ashīrah, and their zone of permitted movement and of 
claimed usufructuary rights, often in this area between areas of summer and winter 
 
7 For political reasons, Jordan does not distinguish demographically in its census statistics between 
different identarian or sectarian categories.  
8 The Dom are a category of formerly nomadic non-Arab people who mostly work as scrap-metal 
workers, market traders, fortune tellers and entertainers widely considered to be related to European 
Romani. 
9 Literally ‘that which is visible’, the Bādīya is differentiated from the Arabic Sahrah, which refers to arid 
or sandy desert more specifically. I will discuss its more specific social, political and legal 
meanings in the next chapter.  
10 Badu, the plural of Badawy, has long been used as a group identifier, and when adopted into Medieval 
French was given the grammatically correct (but in this case not widely used) standard Arabic 
masculine plural ‘īyn’. I have used Bedouin, despite this second-hand quality, due to its familiarity 
among English-speakers. In Arabic literature on the topic meanwhile, attention is given to the 
shared trilateral roots (b-d-w) between this term and the Arabic word meaning ‘beginning’ – 
suggestive of the widely held idea that Bedouin are ancestral to settled folk (Oweidi, 1982). Both 
proponents and opponents of ‘tribalism’ in Jordan make ‘Bedouin’ a label both atavistic and 
valoruised, as a ‘repository of an ancient and unchanged way of life’ (Layne 1994:101). 
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camping and pasturage. In the winter, rainfall allowed pastoralists to take their animals 
far out east into the steppe, while in the summer, most stayed within areas with cooler 
temperatures, year-round pasture or good water supplies, further west. A long history of 
attempts at governing this latter area and imposing land registration and individual 
ownership (discussed in Chapter 3) has slowly weakened and mutated the concept of 
dira, but much of this land remains conceptually balad as-Sukhur (the country of the 
Bani Sakhr). This area is historically part of the broad region of Balga, stretching 
between the Wadi Zarqa and the Wadi Mujib, often described as ‘the land of a thousand 
‘ashā’ir’. With a claim to be the ‘original’ (meaning in this context pre-registration) 
owners of the land, once possessing customary grazing claims and semi-exploitative 
relationships of ‘protection’ with local cultivators, many of these Bedouin have 
maintained a sense of separateness from the peasantry and the Christians. This has 
remained through moving from camel-herding in the desert, via goat-herding at its 
margins, to first letting land to peasants to farming land themselves, and finally to 
working in government jobs. As such, as Chatty (2014) points out, Bedouin as a 
meaningful identity has persisted even as nomadic pastoralism has lost its economic 
importance.  
 Bedouin as a social category has always been applied relationally and reflects a 
spectrum, at the opposite end of which lies settled people, hadhar, either town-dwellers 
(madinīyn) or cultivators, fallahīyn (see for instance Burton 1858, Musil, cited in 
Tidrick 1990). Though most strongly associated with former camel-herders spending at 
least part of the year in the Bādīyah (who had greater range of movement and often 
were militarily more powerful), in some contexts nomadic, semi-nomadic and even 
settled sheep and goat-herders have also been called Bedouin. These terms have never 
been static, but nor are they merely descriptors of modes of livelihoods. People in this 
area have often varied their economic and subsistence activities depending on 
circumstances, and sometimes families or wider groups have pursued multiple modes at 
once. To townspeople (madinīyn) Badu could be any rough or ungoverned people, even 
villagers outside city walls. As people moved between various economic strategies over 
time, identity claims and the terminology used to describe them sometimes adapted or 
changed, but also sometimes long persisted, even when no longer entirely aligned to 
their current economic niche. As Stephan Leder (2015) argues, while ancient Arabic 
sources and European Orientalist scholarship both at times dwell on the dichotomy 
between the ‘desert and the sown’, and the people within them, interdependence and 
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movement has been more the norm than bounded categories where lifeway, socio-
political form and identity are all aligned. Leder makes the important point that while 
ideas of the Bedouin and the Bādīyah as in some ways differentiated and opposed to 
settled civilisation do have precedent, in	most	Arabic	discourse	‘the Bedouin constitute 
an intrinsic component of Arab society and history’, a differentiated but encompassed 
and integral part of a wider society, including people following different economic 
lifeways and with different socio-political structures.   
 There is a common discourse that (as Gubser’s (1973:28) interlocutor in Karak 
put it) ‘Bedouin are the true Arabs, from whom all Arab qualities are derived’. As well 
as referring to a former lifeway or economic niche, Bedouin origins are associated 
(though not exclusively) with being asīl – from a root meaning original or authentic, a 
property of lineages somewhat akin to nobility, and like the latter a property that can be 
claimed, contested and possessed to greater or lesser degrees. Such groups are the 
possessors of usūl (known origins and genealogy) and follow ‘awā’id (codes of conduct 
considered honourable).11 Alongside atavistic connotations, many Arabs believe in 
Bedouin origins from the time of the Islamic conquests.12 Theoretically Arab 
genealogists and poets often trace the origins of every known qabīlah back to the 
nomadic desert-dwelling Arabs, who remain their supposed exemplars.13 Many 
Jordanians regard Badawy dialects as closer to the ‘original’ Arabic. In Jordan, as in 
Iraq, the use of elements once associated with the Bedouin dialect, especially the 
pronunciation of the letter qaf as the English ‘g’, is considered more masculine and men 
from other backgrounds have increasingly adopted it (Suleiman 2004).14 
 The terminology used to describe these social categories then is important but 
not straightforward. Most of my interlocutors preferred to talk about themselves 
specifically as Sukhur, Hamyadah or even more specific terms, yet if needing a general 
 
11 ‘Awā’id (see Oweidi 1982) is part of the broader set of customary laws and dispute resolution 
procedures known in Arabic as urf wa āda which will be discussed in section 2.3 
12 A popular notion persists that the majority of the armies of the Arab conquests were made up of 
Bedouin, this despite the Qur’anic hostility to the ’arāb as it calls nomads, and the settled origins of 
most of the Sahaba, the companions of the Prophet (Asad 1973, Hourani 1981).  
13 Formally then to be ‘Arab’ can be seen as to be within such a reckoning of genealogy, and by extension 
to be part of a qabīlah. Those ‘ashā’ir and qaba’il who claim a known genealogy are asīl. ‘True’ 
Arab qaba’il are in formal genealogy all said to derive from two apical lineages, from Qahtan and 
Adnan, although in fact these meta-categories were probably the invention of Umayyad military 
reforms (Kennedy 1997), connected to the two ‘factions’ – Qais and Yaman that exist across the 
Arabic-speaking Middle East and which were used as frameworks for all manner of local disputes, 
much like the Ghibellines and Guelphs of Medieval Italy.  
14 This linguistic valourisation is not new. During the Abbasid Caliphate, the 9th CE century Basra school 
of grammarians and poets wrote that an essential part of becoming a scholar of Arabic was to spend 
time with nomadic Bedouin, whose Arabic was considered the purest (al-Asma’ī, 1953). 
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category below the admittedly highly significant ‘Jordanian’ or even ‘Arab’, they 
mostly used Badu, a term used proudly to claim continuity with a valourised past. 
Others in Jordan and elsewhere favour ‘A’rāb, the Qur’anic term for Arabic-speaking 
nomads, (etymologically related to ‘Arab’) or occasionally as Urbān. 15 In Jordan these 
have commonly though not universally come to refer to those with a longer history of 
settled life, or whose recent ancestors were nomadic or semi-nomadic sheep or goat-
herders, while only those with recent camel-herding, desert-dwelling origins are most 
properly Badu. Elsewhere and in other contexts the emphasis is not placed on 
nomadism but ‘tribalism’, with terms like qabīly or ‘ashirī favoured. As Chatty (2014) 
points out, this latter term is favoured by former mobile pastoralists in Lebanon’s Beqaa 
valley, where Badu is considered an insulting, primitivising term, in part as a response 
to the French colonial and Lebanese state’s greater developmental antipathy for 
nomadism. In Jordan, where various forms of tribe and family association are 
ubiquitous, being ‘ashirī has a very wide meaning, contextually applicable to much of 
the population.  
 Bedouin thus has a particular set of meanings in Jordan, emerging from 
particular histories and relationships discussed at length later, which makes it a quite 
different term here than in, say Lebanon or Egypt, where it is rarely used as a self-
identifier. In the south of Jordan, ideas of lawlessness, heritage, tourism work, and 
poverty might predominate, but in Madaba, more recent and material stereotypes are 
around social conservatism, rural life, large families, a supposed tendency to get things 
done through unofficial channels and to favour relatives and associates (though this is in 
no way unique to them, being common throughout Jordan) and yet conversely to rely on 
state employment. There are also associations with taking matters of ‘honour’ seriously, 
and potentially being more willing to commit organised acts of collective violence or 
resistance. Those identifying or identified as Bedouin are diverse in their practice of 
Islam, political orientation and socio-economic standing, and they are in most ways 
undifferentiated from other residents, notwithstanding some physical traits being 
 
15 Layne (1994) follows Lila Abu-Lughod in preferring the term ‘A’rāb rather than Bedouin (although the 
latter used both interchangeably) – a term with which Layne’s informants identified, but which also 
she suggests, has less baggage. Yet Layne at times follows a local distinction which treats Badu and 
‘A’rāb separately, as when she states ‘Agriculture played a greater role for the ‘arāb tribes who 
utilised the valley than for Bedouin tribes such as the Beni Sakhr or the Rwala’ (Layne, 1994:40). 
Unlike Abu-Lughod and Layne, I found my interlocutors used the term Badu much more frequently 
than ‘A’rāb, which may reflect a genuine difference in self-identification between Bani Sakhr and 
Layne’s hosts among the ‘Abbadi (the latter certainly practiced settled agriculture far earlier than 
the Bani Sakhr), but may also be in part a change in the emphasis of identity in contemporary 
Jordan, and may reflect my own positionality.  
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considered especially ‘Badawy’. Older practices of dress, and of men wearing their hair 
long, have largely disappeared in the Madaba region (unlike in the South), although 
older Bedouin men still wear traditional Arabic dress more commonly than many other 
Jordanians. Among the young men I knew best, certain cultural items, such as pop 
music from the Gulf, military style clothes, and even styles of facial hair were 
sometimes said, often half-jokingly, to be ‘Bedouin’, as were food preferences. Various 
Facebook groups, associated with specific ‘ashā’ir, make use of various Arabic phrases 
and images considered Bedouin, of horses, camels, 4x4 vehicles, guns, falcons. More 
than these loose associations though, is a widespread social knowledge that certain 
places ‘belong’ to or are strongly associated with named entities, and that if such an 
entity is Badawy this association is particularly important.  
 In Jordan the royal house has consistently favoured some Bedouin for military 
and government employment. Herders (or herd-owners, as shepherding was often an 
activity given to the poorest) seemed to have a set of military and cultural resources that 
made them both potentially dangerous and valuable to a would-be dynasty, and in 
Jordan they came to be cast in some ways as something akin to the loyalist ‘martial 
races’ of the Raj. As such, alongside the Christian property-owners, many (but by no-
means all) of the suburban Bedouin families in Madaba are economically-dependent on 
active or retired military officers, policemen and civil servants, and form a sort of 
heterogenous category of ‘respectable people’ roughly analogous to European concepts 
of an aspirational ‘middle class’, contextually distinguished from more recent arrivals.  
 Certain forms of hierarchical distinction and power relations have historically, 
held sway in the Bedouin villages, and these still have resonance around Madaba. An 
‘ashīrah generally possesses one or more lineages of particular prominence and from 
which leaders emerge. These leaders, called shaykh, wield influence at different scales 
and levels. 16 Shaykhs tended to serve as leaders in war but also as representatives and 
mediators with outside forces, on behalf of their categories, allowing them to claim to 
represent them in their dealings with states. It is thus often a dignitary that has been 
 
16 ‘Shaykh’ (plural shuyyukh/mashayakh) stems from an Arabic root meaning ‘elder’ and is used as a 
religious title across the Islamic world (shaykh ad-dīn). The title of shaykh is suggestive of an often 
loose and ill-defined type of conditional and consultative authority and status. The shaykh-hood is 
normally attached to certain lineages but not necessarily chosen by strict primogeniture, and the 
claim most widely acknowledged tended historically to be that of whoever within the lineage had 
the greatest reputation, wealth or success in war. These leaders are not evenly spread throughout the 
social structure of ‘ashā’ir; some ‘ashā’ir do not have a shaykh, or have several shaykhs at lower 
levels with none paramount. For instance among the Sukhur the Mutirāt have no shaykhs but 
several senior respected lineages, while the generally less powerful Dahamshah have several.  
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either awarded or ratified by urban governments, especially in the case of paramount 
shaykhs (shaykh mashayyakh).17 In the case of the Bani Sakhr, the ‘ashīrah al-Fayiz had 
this role, gained during the late Ottoman period due in part to their role in the Hajj 
caravan (Alon 2016), and then confirmed by the Mandate and the early independent 
state of Jordan. The king still has a role in legitimising these figures. The Bani Hamida 
have no paramount shaykh, unlike the Sukhur, but possess two widely known shaykhly 
lineages which are considered preeminent – the Ja’maani and the Brizāt. 
  Shaykhs were, and sometimes still are, also often involved prominently in 
dispute resolution, sometimes being known judges themselves, and as guarantors of 
contracts and oaths. While the role of the shaykh has become less central in recent 
years, the greater wealth, status, influence and reputation of those families descended 
from shaykhly lineages persists. Often the position of these families as claimed 
representatives of wider groups allowed them to gain favourable treatment and 
employment from the state, as well as benefiting particularly in some cases from land 
registration (discussed in Chapter 3). Alongside and sometimes overlapping with 
shaykhs, late Ottoman and colonial authorities made use of state-registered village 
notaries, often hereditary, known as a mukhtar (literally ‘chosen’), who in practice have 
by now become a non-specific title of dignity, much like shaykh. These days, other 
families who have become rich or politically influential, perhaps through high military 
or government rank, or who gain a reputation elsewhere, often wield as much influence 
as these older titled forms, and often ape their forms, especially in terms of hospitality. 
Together with judges and the heads of extended families these men of influence and 
reputation are known as the kubār, the ‘great’, a relational term that can apply to 
different scales (the kubār among the Dahamshah are lesser than those famous enough 
to be kubār among the Bani Sakhr as a whole). In general parlance, but not without 
resistance form some quarters, the kubār also, and now primarily consists of, those men 
and women who gain influence, reputation and wealth professionally, and thus might be 
in a position to give favours to clients; such as wealthy business owners, officials and 
politicians. As a loosely defined category of notables, these are the people it is worth 
knowing and asking favours from, a form of patronage which extends to business 
dealings.  
 
17 Paramount shaykhs were often largely nominal and historically the largest-level groups have rarely 
ever done anything entirely together, although oral narratives of great inter-tribal wars often centre 
on such figures (see Meeker 1979). 
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 In Madaba, streets, districts and businesses tend to be owned or patronised by 
specific categories of people, who reproduce various wider conceptual geographies 
within the town, as well as reproducing relations of patronage. The centre (wasat al-
balad) is owned mostly by Christian landlords, while the north-east is mostly 
considered to be Bani Sakhr, and thus Bedouin, in character, with shops, coffeehouses 
and services used by these families. The flat where my wife Jennie (who accompanied 
me during fieldwork) and I lived was at the interface of these areas, near a small 
coffeehouse, gahwah al-qurīyah (‘the village cafe’) frequented by my Sukhur friends 
whenever in town. The south-west of the town, meanwhile, contained businesses and 
venues frequented by my Hamaydah interlocutors. In Madaba my interlocutors’ families 
(especially mothers) warned my wife and I against shopping at Carrefour (the largest 
supermarket in Madaba) for our everyday groceries, urging me instead to visit the 
various small family-owned shops with which they had built up a relationship of trust 
and loyalty over many years. Living in Madaba involved occasional and often 
bewildering visions of the different conceptual geographies that made the town and its 
surroundings meaningful but fraught for its inhabitants. 
 Madaba as a modern municipality came into being in the late nineteenth century, 
when families from three Christian ‘ashā’ir fleeing a political feud in Karak to the south 
settled in the abandoned Late Antique site of Madaba, officially registering the ruins 
and surrounding land with the Ottoman Governors in Nablus and Damascus in 1880 
(Abu Jaber 1989), leading to a wave of land registration and villagisation among 
surrounding (mostly pastoralist) populations who feared that if they did not settle on and 
register land, they would lose it (Rogan 2002:79-82).  
 Meanwhile the poorer southern part of the Governorate is dominated by another 
category of Bedouin, the qabīlah of the Bani Hamida. It is a semi-autonomous district 
(nahīyah) centred on the town of Dhiban (population 7,000) and including the scattered 
villages in the mountainous area east of the Dead Sea – called the Jabal Bani Hamida. 
South of Dhiban the deep ravine and escarpments of the Wadi Mujib separates Madaba 
from Karak (although the Bani Hamida dira stretches onto the southern Karaki side). 
 As one travels eastwards out of Madaba, the land slopes upwards in a series of 
low ridges – green in the spring and brown and dusty in the summer and autumn, dotted 
with herds of goats, sheep and the bright orange plastic coverings of the tents of 
pastoralists. Increasingly these slopes are also dotted with pylons, houses, and enclosed 
irrigated orchards and olive trees. This undulating and semi-cultivated steppe-land 
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between two of Jordan’s major highways (the so-called ‘Desert Highway’ to the east 
and the ‘King’s Highway’ to the west) slowly becomes more arid, and beyond the 
Desert Highway and the Airport, settlement and agriculture peter out into the Eastern 
Desert, and eventually more or less cease in the black basalt desert. Throughout this 
area lies a network of small villages, often called the Sukhur or even just the ‘Bedouin 
villages’ (qura badawīyah) by people in Madaba, running in a rough arc over 150 km to 
the south and east of Amman down as far as Wadi Mujib. Most of these were registered 
by Sukhur Shaykhs in the late nineteenth century under the Ottomans or during the 
British Mandate’s registration process in the 1920s and 1930s. They began as 
agricultural estates owned by shaykhs, with seasonal houses for the central lineages and 
populated by slaves and migrant agricultural workers, but as sedenterisation picked up 
pace in the 1950s and 1960s many Sukhur families, now more reliant on government 
salaries and pensions than pastoralism, began to build permanent homes there. As 
tarmacked roads, running water, electricity, schools and medical services arrived in a 
trickle in these villages in the 1960s, 70s and 80s, more Sukhur moved from seasonal to 
permanent village homes. The old, small stone houses of the core have been abandoned 
by their original families, given to poorer relations, and then to hired agricultural 
workers or financially employed shepherds, and finally in many cases repurposed as 
livestock shelters, stores, or just abandoned. Instead over the last three decades a 
profusion of cinderblock and concrete houses has sprung up, sometimes faced in stone 
or plaster, built piecemeal and expanded room by room and floor by floor, each 
crowned with unfinished concrete columns and metal wires proudly declaring more 
floors to come.  
 Pastoralism is still very much in evidence in these villages; a landscape of flocks 
and tents. Trucks and irrigation pumps have made the range needed to support herds 
smaller, and so mobility has become less essential. Though in some ways ‘easier’ now, 
pastoralism has become economically marginal compared to military pensions and 
government jobs, all encouraging settled life. In many of the families I know, life-
history interviews revealed a pattern whereby one brother of the generation born since 
settlement was given the dwindling family flocks, of goats, sheep, and in a few cases 
camels and horses (the latter often share-owned between a number of families, given 
their high value). This brother and his descendants, often chosen because of lower 
educational attainment or a failure to find employment elsewhere, often see a rising gap 
in living standards between them and their wider families employed elsewhere. These 
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flocks, which had once been the main form of wealth, are now a liability, especially 
since feed subsidies have declined, but symbolically and socially they remain important 
for occasions where meat is needed. Now the national market for domestic meat and 
dairy is small and outcompeted by imports (except during the high season of ‘Eīd al-
Adha). Goats and sheep have largely replaced camels as the most economically 
important species, and numbers remain small – apart from a few large commercial herds 
they are generally 10-60 animals. Most production is geared towards the local and 
domestic, with only seasonal excesses sold, though dairy in the spring is sold to 
travelling jaban, milk-traders who collect milk from across wide areas to supply larger 
processing centres. Large commercial herds, some still owned by Bedouin families, are 
managed now by hired shepherds, often Egyptian agricultural labourers, or in recent 
years Rwala Bedouin refugees from Syria.  
 These villages are still usually associated with a key ‘ashīrah or sometimes even 
a single agnatic lineage. In wealth, appearance and land value the Bedouin villages vary 
considerably. In most cases villages have a small independently-owned shop (dukhān – 
lit. ‘smoke’), elementary schools and in larger villages secondary schools (one each for 
girls and boys), sometimes a health clinic and always at least one mosque – usually 
recently built, often with Gulf money. As an area of lightly inhabited and agriculturally 
increasingly marginal land close to the capital, it is a zone of potential urban expansion. 
Among the villages there are also non-village structures; large commercial arboriculture 
farms, occasional light industrial units, riding stables, and near the highway a private 
university (al-Israh) and the international airport. In the north, on a dual carriageway 
lined with shops, malls and drive-in businesses, is the village of Um al-’Amad, 
dominated by the vast dīwān (semi-public guestroom and gathering hall) and gleaming 
mansions of the Fayiz shaykhly lineage, often considered the paramount ‘ashīrah of the 
Bani Sakhr. Further north and east the large village of al-Muwaqqar is associated with 
the Khraisha shaykhs of the wider Ka’abnah and rivals with al-Fayiz for overall 
paramountcy. Further south the villages of Jalul, Huwara and Tunayab are mostly 
inhabited by the Zabn ‘ashīrah. In the centre lie villages of the Dahamshah and Mutirāt 
– two closely related ‘ashīrah regarded as of a broader category of the Gubaīn along 
with al-Faiyz: Um al-Walid, Natal, Hraij, Dulaīlat Mutirāt. These Gubaīn and the Zabn 
together from in turn a still broader category, the at-Twag, who are the main rival 
grouping to the Ka’abnah. Further south, the large village of Um ar-Rassas and its 
surrounding settlements are the home of the Ka’abah and Hagaīsh Bani Sakhr, while the 
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village of ar-Ramma is inhabited by the Salaytah, an ‘ashīrah allied to and now 
registered for electoral purposes as Bani Sakhr, but long regarded as a separate 
independent ‘ashīrah of several thousand people. 
 The categories of named groups in the above description are not the only or even 
necessarily always the most relevant identifiers of people and places. They are widely 
known so that even passing taxi drivers can say ‘this is a Ka’abnah village’, coming into 
their own during celebratory gatherings and political meetings. The overall large 
division of Ka’abneh and at-Twag was once politically central, as a framework in which 
many local alliances and disputes were accommodated. Now such divisions are still 
talked about occasionally, especially genealogically, but for many younger people with 
an interest in such matters, being ‘Bani Sakhr’ or even ‘Bedouin’, as an implied identity 
connected to a noble heritage, has become the emphasised level of categorisation. Yet 
for much of daily life, especially for those living or working outside the village, other 
categorical labels, identifiers and claims on solidarity may well be more important; 
based on age, socio-economic class, employment, religious observance (such as praying 
at a certain mosque or following a certain cleric or theology) or through education or 
work. However this series of names connected to specific places has a discursive, 
political and indeed legal-bureaucratic existence emphasised beyond these others by the 
state, in ways discussed in the next chapter. Crucial for my argument here though is the 
point that like being ‘tribal’, these sort of names and places have often been rendered in 
anthropological and indeed general scholarly discourse as basically defined by 
‘kinship’, with residence, socio-political organisation, and conceptual identity all 
determined by descent and relatedness. Such associations are sometimes, it seems to 
me, behind a tendency in some work to either ignore such settings, or else to explicitly 
deny that concepts like being part of an ‘ashīrah or being Bedouin are relevant in 
contemporary life. I do not intend here to rehearse the well-known anthropological 
critique of such associations. But throughout this dissertation I will show that while 
ideas of genealogy and agnition are conceptually significant, the true significance of 
tribes and Bedouin in this setting lies more in political economy, and especially specific 
socio-political practices and conceptions of sovereignty, and it is these factors which 
best account for the reproduction of notions of Bedouin and tribe in contemporary 
Jordan.  
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Figure 1.1: Map of field site showing main villages. Inset map of Jordan for context. Map 
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Figure 1.2 and 1.3: New houses and old ruins in Um al-Walid, the Dahamshah Bani Sakhr 
village in which many of my interlocutors lived, and where I visited and stayed often. In Figure 
1.2 (top) my friend Hamid (left), who commutes daily to his job at the Ministry of Finance in 
Amman, walks away from his older cousin Abu Ahmed (right), who still works as a herder. 
Photo by Jennie Williams. In Figure 1.3 (bottom) Hamid and his older brother Abdalaziz show 
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1.2 Into	the	Field	
After spending an initial three months establishing contacts and improving my Arabic 
while a scholar at the British Institute in Amman (BIA CBRL) I moved with my wife to 
Madaba. My time in Amman had been spent in language classes, libraries and archives, 
and making and conducting relatively formal introductions and interviews with 
(generally wealthy and highly educated) Amman-based contacts.18 On moving I entered 
a new, less elite world. Through renting a flat from a Christian landlord, we also got to 
know the Christian families of Madaba. I returned to Madaba for two months in the 
winter of 2018-2019, staying with friends, while a research affiliate at the University of 
Jordan’s Centre for Strategic Research, commuting daily to the capital like many other 
students and workers in the towns and villages of Madaba. 
 Given my research interests, the Bani Sakhr villages around Madaba had seemed 
an obvious place to be. I had originally aspired to rooted, intimate ‘village’ 
ethnography. But the young men I got to know spent much of their time outside the 
villages, even if they lived there, and the centre of their social world tended to be 
Madaba. While many older ethnographies look out from a small village towards towns, 
cities and nations, this looks instead outwards from a town towards a periphery of 
villages and semi-arid pastureland which remain the notional social bedrock and origin 
for many inhabitants in the town. Many families I got to know had moved to the town 
from their villages, as a more affordable alternative to Amman but with better economic 
opportunities than the villages (and with a much shorter commute to Amman).  
 In December, while still living in Amman, a friend of mine who had made 
several Bani Sakhr friends whilst he was a student at the University of Jordan invited 
me to come and meet them at a coffeehouse in Madaba. After explaining who I was and 
something of my research I arranged to move to Madaba in the new year after they 
helped me track down a landlord with a flat to rent. In the initial weeks two of these, 
Hamid Dahamshah and Marwan Mutirāt, began to meet with me regularly, initially in 
coffeehouses, and increasingly in my home, which resulted in reciprocal invitations to 
 
18Among these were many figures who feature here as cited sources and as interlocutours. Dr Ahmed 
Oweidi al-‘Abbadi, a key interlocutor of Andrew Shryock, a Bedouin historian and anthropologist, 
as well as an opposition political leader; Dr Raouf Abu Jaber (who died in 2020), a nonagenarian 
historian of land settlement in the nineteenth century Balga, but also a scion of the Abu Jaber family 
who had a key part in bringing this history about; Dr Sara Ababneh, a political scientist working on 
protests and labour movements while also taking part in them, employing other protesters as 
research assistants. I also conducted interviews with various Jordanian and foreign employees of 
NGOs and of the World Bank (see Wojnarowski forthcoming 2021).  
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visit their families. Marwan, who had graduated in 2015 with a degree in English 
Literature from the University of Jordan (the country’s most prestigious and oldest 
University) now worked as a secondary school teacher in the village of Um ar-Rassas. 
Marwan was also deeply interested in history, archaeology and the genealogy and oral 
history of the Bani Sakhr. He was also an administrator for the online ‘Bani Sakhr at the 
University of Jordan’ Facebook group. Marwan’s family, headed by his now-retired 
father Ibrahim, lived in Madaba, where his family had built a house in the Sukhur-
dominated suburb of Hanina. Before that they had lived since settling permanently for 
the first time in the 1950s in the village of Dulaīlat, also called Dulaīlat Mutirāt. Hamid, 
an orphan, lived in an extended compound of concrete houses in the village of Um al-
Walid, with his five brothers. The older two were military officers, (one, Saif, a captain 
in the Royal Guard). Hamid studied at the small, private University of Israh, considered 
less prestigious than public universities. His brothers paid for his studies in business 
administration and law, but as he was not excelling at them, he was under pressure to 
find a job.  
 Through these two initial contacts I slowly entered a wider social world of 
university friends, people who greeted us or sat with us in the coffeeshop, and those 
introduced to me on visits to the villages. I also regularly accompanied Hamid to class 
at Israh University, getting to know his friends and drinking coffee with them while he 
was in lectures. My wife Jennie also began accompanying us on invitations to village 
families. Often young men, who assumed she must want female companionship, 
arranged for their sisters and mothers to invite her to visit, giving her impromptu 
cooking lessons. Most Fridays we either went to visit friends in the villages or met 
friends from Madaba at the Friday market – the suq al-juma’a. One of these, Khalil 
Hagaish, who lived in a village near Wadi Mujib, over an hour south, and studied at 
Israh for an accountancy degree, would take us on extended visits to villages. Hamid’s 
family, under financial pressure, had sold their horses and other animals a few years 
ago, but Hamid and some of his friends, who were keen riders, spent a great deal of 
time hanging around a couple of commercial stables, owned by rich people from the 
capital. By getting to know staff there (indeed the manager Hussein al-Fayiz was a 
Sukhur student from Israh as well) they were able to ride for free out of hours, and also 
drink coffee and cook over fires in the stable yard. 
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Figure 1.4: Bedouin Masculinity; Hamid Dahamshah shows off his equestrian skills, asking us 














Often though, when no activity or entertainment was to hand, these young men just 
wandered around Madaba, greeting people they knew on the street or in shops. Through 
such wonderings I got to know a number of shopkeepers and other denizens of the suq 
and became something of a known entity in the town. We often stopped at a shoe shop 
managed by a distant maternal cousin of Hamid and Marwan, Badr ash-Shammary. I 
started visiting on my own as a place to go and talk with people, and soon Badr, the 
same age as me, began inviting my wife and I to visit his family home regularly. Badr’s 
family, a shaykhly lineage of the large trans-nation Shammar qabīlah, were one of a 
very small number of Shammar in the area, and had close connections of marriage and 
friendship with Bani Sakhr families. They came to the Madaba region following a feud 
in Najd in the nineteenth century, as exiles seeking protection with the Mutirāt. The 
exiles have become permanent residents and are often considered to be Mutirāt 
themselves now, although Badr’s family still proudly called themselves Shammary and 
maintained links to other Shammar groups and organisations in Iraq and Saudi Arabia. 
Iraqi relatives visited often. Badr’s father’s house in Hanina featured a large and 
important dīwān, a semi-public guestroom – described in section 4.5. Badr was often 
uninterested in visiting this space, but sitting and talking here with Badr’s father became 
a regular evening activity for me.  
 On arriving in Madaba, having enquired about leaning better badawy Arabic, I 
was directed to Samer Shuwabkah, who worked as a translator at the Ministry of the 
Image Redacted 
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Interior. Samer lived in the village of Juraynah north of Madaba, and was from a small 
‘ashīrah called Shuwabkah, small enough that this family used it as their family name 
as well. Samer started as a teacher, sitting down for a couple of hours twice a week in a 
coffeehouse or in his parent’s house to drill us on various idiomatic expressions and 
turns of phrase so that our Arabic sounded less stilted. When he found out I was 
interested in history, old proverbs and stories and in talking about politics and 
economics we began to also meet socially to talk. He was interested in my research and 
offered to help. As well as countless acts of both cultural and linguistic translation at 
various points of confusion, Samer also patiently listened and offered his opinion on 
much that I had observed or thought about during fieldwork, becoming a key research 
collaborator and friend.  
 Through a chance meeting while walking in the countryside we also came to 
know the Karaiznah family, from the Salaytah ‘ashīrah. Khalid, an enthusiastic 
Municipal Ministry employee with a side-line working as a fixer and local host for a 
lucrative adventure tourism business offering wadi-swimming and climbing on his 
family’s land to mostly foreign Arab tourists, was smoking beside the road with some of 
his younger cousins when we walked by. An invitation to smoke and drink tea, as so 
often in Jordan, led to an invitation to eat at his home in the village of ar-Rama, where 
we met his older brothers and relatives, including Salah, who became important 
interlocutors. We reciprocated, hosting his wife and children. Over the following 
months we spent many days, weekends and weeks as their guests in ar-Rama, including 
‘Eīd al-Fitr in June 2018. I also spent much time with Khalid’s brother ‘Ali. He worked 
as a shepherd with his family’s small remaining pooled flock, following the pattern 
mentioned above. He did not have a high school diploma and had thus failed to get a 
government or military job. He moved the dwindling flocks across a large range of 
pastures, setting up a small tarpaulin tent where he would spend most of his time, 
though he mostly slept in the village with his family. Every few days, another brother 
who owned a water tanker filled up his troughs and barrels. ‘Ali also worked as a 
professional shepherd looking after the flocks of other people, often in return for 
grazing rights on their land. Khalid died tragically in March 2020. His friendship and 
wise advice have been sorely missed while finalising this text. He was, unlike most of 
my young male interlocutors, able to adopt us into a world of family intimacy, and 
through that into the life of their village, an experience of gracious hospitality and 
intimacy that placed other encounters into a richer context.  
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Figure 1.5: Khalid Karaīznah with his brother ‘Ali’s flock outside the village of ar-Rama. 
















Figure 1.6 Left: ‘Ali’s flock ready for milking. Figure 1.7 Right: B’dul boy looks after goats in 












From early on in 2018 I became increasingly interested in the experiences of those from 
the other major category of Bedouin within the Madaba region, the Bani Hamida. 
During my time in Amman when I explained my research interests, I was often asked if 
I knew about the Hirak protests in Dhiban, and if I would be studying it. This was one 
of a number of popular rural protest groups that had emerged in the 2000s and come to 
prominence during the mass unrest of 2011, with links to broad leftist labour 
Image Redacted 
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movements as well as self-consciously ‘tribal’ political groups. At several meetings 
with Jordanian political scientist Sara Ababneh, she encouraged me to take an interest in 
labour politics and protests, and introduced me to a number of contacts in the Dhiban 
Hirak, who she had worked with in her own research on gender and political protest (see 
Ababneh 2018). Key among these, Osama al-Hīsa, a young man from a Bani Hamida 
family from Dhiban but now living in Madaba with his parents and sisters, facilitated 
my introduction to the Dhiban Hirak and its main figures and spokesmen. I also took an 
increasing interest in the rural Jabal Bani Hamida area, which was the site of a 
community development NGO (The Bani Hamida Weaving Project) which included a 
women’s weaving cooperative. This area, with a history of poverty, insecure land 
tenure, and failed developmental initiatives, seemed to present a very different political 
environment from the Sukhur villages and Madaba itself, and although connected by 
close family ties to the town of Dhiban, this rural setting had seen little involvement in 
Hirak.  
 Through the Bani Hamida NGO’s manager, Halima Abu Qa’ida (who also sat as 
a local councillor) I was introduced to a wide range of families, both beneficiaries and 
those unconnected to the project. My wife Jennie, who accompanied me for this element 
of fieldwork (facilitating access to female-centred spaces) and I had many enjoyable 
days with Halima driving from house to house, meeting the women weavers of Jabal 
Bani Hamida, as well as their families, and the key local dignitaries, the shaykhs and 
mukhtars. Halima throughout helped answer questions and explain my presence to these 
interlocutors, as well as filling me in with genealogical and local knowledge between 
visits. Halima also talked about her own role in local politics on the local council, and 
the slow extension of state services into the area since the 1990s. Beginning with these 
house visits, I began to develop a set of questions and interests around life histories and 
social change, examining experiences of sedenterisation, house-building and changing 
modes of subsistence and resource sharing among older, often female interlocutors, 
which I ended up repeating in Sukhur villages and in the Shuwabkah village of 
Juraynah. I thus pursued these two separate but interconnected lines of ethnographic 
enquiry in the Hamaydah areas. These, and my research with young Sukhur men in 
Madaba came together frequently at various points of connection, through people whose 
networks extended between these settings, and through the town of Madaba itself, a 
place where I regularly bumped into people from all three strands of fieldwork. More 
broadly, certain similarities and illuminating differences in the experience of the 
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political economy emerge from considering these as two, or rather perhaps three 
interconnected network-settings; Sukhur villages, Hamaydah villages, and Hirak 
activists.  
 I had settled upon Madaba early in my research and although other options 
presented themselves in the early months of fieldwork, it remained my focus.19 As a 
setting it seemed at once important and understudied; a central but peripheral place 
within Jordan, neither north nor south. The north of the Balga region had been the 
ethnographic subject of Andrew Shryock’s (1997) significant monograph, and 
Shryock’s student Geoffrey Hughes has continued to conduct ethnographic work there 
and in Amman. Meanwhile, the south of Jordan (where I conducted research for my 
Master’s) has a very different political economy and relationship to the state, and the 
disrupting dynamic of well-established ‘desert’ tourism, which has already been given 
considerable ethnographic attention (Chatelard 2005, Bille 2012). The governorate of 
Madaba seemed to concentrate in a small area a particularly interesting set of historical 
and ethnographic issues. It is an area at once close enough to the capital to function as a 
dormitory settlement and economic periphery, and yet at the same time many places 
remain discursively ‘tribal’.  
 When conducting my Master’s fieldwork on a community of Bedouin resettled 
in the 1980s to make way for the establishment of Petra as a major tourist site, I passed 
through Um al-‘Amad, a village near Madaba on my way back to Amman in 2012. I 
witnessed pro-government supporters of Faisal al-Fayiz, a former Prime Minister who 
had made a speech calling for loyalty to the king during the widespread protests then 
sweeping the region. Faisal intervened, I was told, not as a former minister, but in his 
role as a member of the shaykhly lineage of an important Bedouin tribe, and grandson 
of the shaykh of shaykhs Mithqal al-Fayiz. His intervention was taken seriously because 
of its potential to mobilise people via a broad category of over a hundred thousand 
people – the Bani Sakhr. Reflecting on this quite different manifestation of the 
‘Bedouin’ in contemporary Jordan, I began to think the Bani Sakhr might prove an 
interesting topic for further research. In 2016 the historian Yoav Alon published a 
biography of Mithqal al-Fayiz, which gave an account of his family’s rise to national 
prominence (Alon 2016). Meeting Alon later that year, we talked about the nature of his 
evidence, and the importance, but also limitations, of his work’s ‘shaykh’s-eye’ view. 
He suggested to me the analytical use of a project that considered how the same history 
 
19 Including an offer of residence in Sawaya, the ‘Abbadi village of Dr Ahmed Oweidi al-‘Abbadi.  
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and political positionality looked to non-elite, younger individuals from other less 
prominent lineages still considered ‘of’ the Bani Sakhr. This project informed my 
research when beginning fieldwork, and has remained in the background throughout.  
 Yet predictably, my focus was rapidly transformed through fieldwork. In 
particular, the increasing focus on the experience of youth and protest in rural settings 
came to the fore. I came to see various types of demonstrative collective action to be 
key to my interests in how and why claims to solidarity are made and contested. I also 
came to realise how much my research was underlain by changing relationships to land 
ownership. I thus began to turn towards archival and oral historical sources.  
 
1.3 Locating	Gender	
I have mentioned that most of my interlocutors are male and that the conceptual 
geography I have sketched above is a gendered one. This has serious implications for 
my work, both theoretical and methodological. The ‘ashīrah as a concept turns around 
the shared honour of certain inter-related older men from important lineages. This is in 
some ways and in some places changing rapidly, as we shall see, but nevertheless this 
remains a significant fact, and intersects with wider dynamics of gender in Jordan. Yet 
the gendered dimension is not a timeless constant. The emphasis on men and male 
honour, and male protection of (and thus sovereignty over) female bodies, has persisted 
throughout periods of history in which actual lived experiences of gender and the 
expectations placed on women have varied considerably. In the early twentieth century, 
my interlocutors told me, women owned and built the tents which were the main type of 
accommodation, worked outside the home as herders, farmers and occasionally traders, 
and ran the home and hosted guests when their male relatives were away (often for 
months at a time). Now land and houses are mostly male-owned in the Bedouin 
villages. Ideals of gender segregation in settings of hospitality have remained, and in 
practice increased. It was common for most women in Madaba go to different places at 
different times to men, frequently make decisions based on the criteria of avoiding 
gossip or bringing shame to their family, and keep much of their social lives segregated. 
Even though many women work, the semi-private social world of hospitality and 
entertaining is, as we will see, still segregated in many households. My young 
unmarried interlocutors tended, with time, to introduce me to their female relations, but 
cautiously and slowly. Older women with a large degree of control within households 
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often led in hosting and welcoming us and formed the core subjects of my life-history 
interviews. However given the underlying social expectations inherent in this setting, 
my time, as a young male stranger, was largely spent with other young men. The 
younger women I knew best were usually those from wealthy, well-travelled, urban or 
Christian households. My wife Jennie had access to the female-centred guestrooms and 
domestic spaces of some of my interlocutors’ homes, and through her and Halima, as a 
well-respected public figure and gatekeeper, I was able to sometimes cross gendered 
thresholds and meet the women of households on their own terms.  
 All of this may suggest that these gendered boundaries were fixed and obvious 
structures. In fact they were contested, fluid, contextually redefined and blurred by 
individual practices and (for me) often unpredictable.20 I met with and got to know 
many women even in self-consciously ‘conservative’ or pious families. In other 
settings, visiting the families of young men who in talk often espoused revolutionary 
and emancipatory political opinions, including around gender and sexuality, I would 
witness rigid segregation in front of guests and extreme secrecy regarding the presence 
of women in the household. In some households I never saw or knew the name of any 
women, in other families husband and wife would eat and host guests together, and yet 
in one of the latter I didn’t even know of the existence of unmarried daughters until my 
wife told me that whenever I visited they either had to leave the small house for a 
neighbour’s or hide in their bedroom. The role of Islam here is significant but not 
straightforward. Many more overtly pious and Islamic families did not practice this sort 
of ostentatious social segregation when at home, and had female members (wearing 
hijab but not niqab) in work and university, often espousing a belief in (an Islamic form 
of) social equality for women. Many Bedouin families that were strictly segregated 
were less overtly pious, and some young men who supported secular political causes 
were among the most sensitive to the potential shame that could befall them via their 
sisters. Such family differences are not easily reducible to class, origin or social setting.  
 Yet in Jordan, as everywhere, gender, class and colonialism intersect. 
‘Liberated’, unveiled women are associated by many rural Jordanians with the socially 
atomised lives of self-consciously American emulating rich suburb dwelling West 
Ammanis who live in large, secluded houses behind high walls and drive everywhere in 
cars, isolated from the reputational risks of gossip but also the warmth and protection of 
 
20 A small example was the uncertainty Jennie and I faced whenever greeting across genders – people one 
imagined might prefer not to, went in for a handshake and vice-versa. 
Unsettling Times: land, political economy and protest in the Bedouin villages of central Jordan 
28  Frederick Wojnarowski –April 2020 
social intimacy. The immediacy and intimacy of life in villages and in crowded poor 
suburbs are also associated with the strong normative power of gossip, female 
reputation and deeply patriarchal values.  
 Equally, for many women current practices of piety and Islamic gender norms, 
especially veiling, are interpreted as a retightening following the period of change and 
opportunity for some (but not all) women in the 1960s and 1970s. Both this period and 
subsequent patriarchal counterturn were largely urban innovations. Both have had 
delayed effects in more rural areas, where though conceptual emphasis on the 
subordination and control of women was strong, until recently female seclusion was 
minimal given open domestic spaces and agricultural needs. As secular nationalist 
politics on Nasserist or Baathist lines has fallen out of popularity (or, depending on who 
you talk to, been driven underground), attempts to reform gender relations or 
‘secularise’ popular life have seemingly become less grand and forthright, while to the 
consternation of some, the state enforces conservative patriarchal laws.21 Other types of 
grand scheme (to borrow Samuli Schielke’s 2015 term) have come to inform people’s 
lives and lived experience of gender, and a form of pious and qualified female 
autonomy is now often talked about by young educated women.22 More overt (and more 
Euro-American) forms of feminism and women’s movements have become associated 
with colonial and post-colonial authoritarian penetrations and performative modernity, 
leaving structures of patriarchal power largely unchallenged, and later the rule of quasi-
secular autocrats who often pushed certain visions of secular feminism using women of 
their own families. More broadly, even among leftists and activists of the sort I spent 
time with, there is a widespread sentiment of ‘My Arab brother before my Western 
sister’; a phrase used to close down certain dialogues which might distract from the 
supposedly more important struggles against colonial, imperial and racialised 
oppression (and thus also to some degree closing down the topic of intersectionality).  
 Too much talk about gender in Arab countries can seem problematic in this 
discourse, providing ammunition for racist and interventionist views (Abu-Lughod 
2013). Anthropology’s own role in such topics is ambivalent; ‘the field is continually 
 
21 Especially egregious examples that have been subject to protest include Article 308 (finally repealed in 
2017), which allows for sentences to be waived where a rapist agrees to marry his victim, and the 
restriction of the transmission of citizenship via patrilineal descent only, further naturalising the 
concept of political communities being determined by agnition. The debates around repealing these 
laws reveal something of the problems encountered by feminist activism in Jordan, where legal 
terminology does not distinguish between kidnapping and elopement (both primarily dishonouring 
male kin) as discussed by Werner (2004, cited in Hughes 2015:130).  
22 This is a topic beyond the scope of this dissertation – see Ababneh (2009). 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Frederick Wojnarowski –April 2020   29 
marking and moving away from stigmatized difference’ (Shryock and Scheele 2019:12) 
and towards the inclusive, socially just and politically relevant, yet the ethnographic 
material with which to do so is often shaped by interlocutors with ‘understandings of 
gender, religion, politics, kinship, and sexuality that do not conform, and are sometimes 
flagrantly at odds with, European and American models’ (ibid). Many accounts 
influenced by Said’s Orientalism tend to avoid criticism or negative portrayals of such 
practices out of a concern that such criticism may contribute to maintaining cultural and 
civilizational hierarchies. The result, as Navaro-Yashin (1999) discusses, often tends 
towards portraying returns or reinventions of ‘Muslim’ gender roles as authentic 
‘prediscusrive “truth”’, and as such beyond moral evaluation or critique. These works 
risk othering their Muslim subjects and tend towards rendering them as flat and lifeless. 
 For these reasons and others, gender is a topic I enter awkwardly and at times 
with discomfort. This is perhaps inevitable for a non-religious white European male 
from a comparatively privileged position with pretentions to sympathetic dialogue, 
coming to a setting where gender relations exist upon a markedly different (though not 
unrelated) pattern. Ideas of male corporate honour resting in the control of female 
bodies are both repellent and to some degree historically recognisable to Euro-American 
intellectuals. Scholarship on this topic tends towards a fetishised, partial, critique which 
obscures both the recognition implicit in it, and all that is excluded by the partiality of 
the focus. The question is at least partially one of emphasis; to ignore this difference in 
values is condescending, distorting, and misleading, while to over-emphasise or to 
emphasise it in a context of moral judgement is othering. This is not to say all my 
interlocutors and friends in Jordan or in the villages around Madaba were appalling 
misogynists. Nor do I wish to portray the women I knew ‘as silent shadows or as 
hapless victims’ as Chatty (2000:241) characterised older scholarly accounts of ‘Middle 
Eastern women’. I spoke to many successful, professional women, who contested and 
confounded the norms of a deeply patriarchal state and some local disapproval around 
which women from which backgrounds should work or take part in public life (see 
sections 5.4 and 6.4). 
 Nevertheless, there were areas of heightened mutual sensitivity, which I learned 
to enter only with caution. At the root of many relationships and interactions I had with 
Bedouin families was a profound divergence in views and experience of gender. 
Practices of female exclusion, seclusion, pressurised marriage, cheated inheritance, and 
what seemed from my perspective invidious masculine hypocrisy were on display, traits 
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criticised not only by secularists but also Islamists. As Abu-Lughod (2013) reports, 
many Bedouin women blame corruption and immorality for these woes (which affect 
men as well), not ‘Islam’ or Bedouin culture, while other young women seek to find 
ways of recasting flawed elements of these schemes as wrong interpretations. As too 
with Abu-Lughod’s analysis, an idea of rights is central to gender discourse in Jordan, 
but this also serves to further cement the idea of inflexibly-established gender roles with 
certain (divinely-ordained) rights and characteristics. 
 My discomfort was greatest when dealing with utterances and behaviour I found 
abhorrent. As an example, a boy of fifteen told me he would shoot his sister if she tried 
to move out of the home before marriage to work. This statement was immediately 
criticised by some (but not all) his friends as morally wrong, as well as contrary to 
Islam. I could grasp enough of the context of this utterance to understand that this boy 
was making an exaggerated and dramatic claim to honour and masculine virility, 
showing off a cultivated prickliness and sensitivity to matters of honour that will be 
discussed in the next chapter, and, at least in part aware of and acting up to his 
expectations of a foreign audience in me. Less horrifying but still problematic was the 
casual misogyny and gendered moral double standard that many who I regarded as 
friends employed. Young men who regularly drink and who talked in a sexually explicit 
way about women in the street and in the media, would express mingled disgust and 
desire at unveiled women or women in tight jeans. Some would comment on what they 
would do if their sisters behaved thus. But to obsess over this field of difference has its 
own dangers of distortion and of reproducing a privileged gaze.  
 This account of discomfort might suggest the sort of ‘anti-relativism’ which 
Clifford Geertz (1984) famously opposed. Nissim-Sabat (1987:937) responded to 
Geertz’s defence of methodological relativism as ‘trivially true and profoundly false’.23 
While recent engagements with notions of the good and with ethics often do call for a 
more intimate and sustained examination of areas of ethical disagreement within the 
ethnographic process than the Geertzian ‘weak’ methodological relativism might 
normally be compatible with, this is not the approach I adopt. Often in fieldwork I felt 
 
23 Nissim-Sabat observes that in Geertz’s Islam Observed (1971) a woman is never the subject of a verb. 
This he blames on a ‘thou-shalt not judge’ attitude – if you can’t say something good about women, 
it is best to say nothing; ‘their [womens’] exclusion from these spheres of Muslim life is well-
known... Discussing it would be like discussing Navajo seafaring’ (Nissim-Sabat 1987:937). I do 
not endorse either Geertz’s supposed evasion nor the call to judgement from his critics, and am far 
from convinced the ‘well-known’ exclusion of women in ‘Islam’ that both Geertz and Nissim-Sabat 
seem to start from is a useful generalisation across varied times and places. 
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pushed towards declaring strong opinions, and my attempts at open, evasive remarks 
which did not carry judgement were often met with derision and frustration. People 
wanted to push me, in short, because they wanted me to reveal something of myself, 
perhaps indeed something of how I as a foreigner and a ‘Christian’ differed and how I 
was similar. Gender and women was often the crux of such talk. It raised for me the 
possibility (following Paul Rabinow (1977)) that contra to anthropological orthodoxy, 
bracketing away may not always be the only or best approach, and that there are times 
when self-revelation may be necessary for social intimacy. Equally, in other settings 
learning not to be too open, too forthright, or even too agreeable may be essential (as it 
certainly was for me) in demonstrating one’s social personhood, trustworthiness and 
indeed masculinity. I thus neither pretend objectivity nor offer a fully worked critique of 
lived gendered practices or everyday experiences of gender. Rather, I focus on the 
intersection of gender and other forms of hierarchy, especially at the level of state 
discourse. 
1.4 Outline	
The rest of this introduction seeks to set out the historical context of these themes, as 
well as the ways in which these histories are disputed in, and constitutive of, 
contemporary politics.  
 Chapter 2 continues the theme of exploring different, and often competing, 
historical narratives, as I set out the discourses and social theories surrounding tribe and 
Bedouin in contemporary Jordan. I seek to re-appraise the legacy of segmentary theory, 
suggesting that while much of this older perspective is problematic and was never an 
adequate way of explaining social practices, ideas of protection and the entanglement of 
reputations and named categories remain as significant social facts, whose continuity 
requires explanation. I go on to consider the infrastructures that give a sense of reality 
and permanence to the categories once interpreted as segmentary, looking at the way 
they are represented in the legal-bureaucratic realm, the electoral system, and through 
the existence of a putatively tribal mode of dispute resolution and law.  
 Chapter 3 considers the historical emergence of the current political economy of 
the Bedouin villages, through the lens of land and land ownership, tracing attempts to 
reform society through reforming land, and the ways such moves are contested and 
adapted in practice. Through this topic, I examine the effects of histories of 
encompassment within the nation-state of Jordan, tracing land through successive legal 
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systems and through changing practices, showing the role it plays in wider 
developments, including the rise of both ‘ashā’ir as socio-political identity categories 
and also of protest movements. I suggest approaching this material through the 
conceptual framework of moral economy, relating various conceptions around land to 
current critiques of the state.  
 Chapter 4 links together the previous two historically focused chapters, 
exploring ethnographically the contemporary practices and dilemmas surrounding 
hospitality, dispute resolution and political spaces in the Bedouin villages. Linking 
Chapter 2’s focus on defining and locating tribes and Bedouin in contemporary Jordan 
through practices of hospitality, honour and everyday politics together with Chapter 3’s 
with land, place and villagisation, I explore the dīwān as a social space and putative 
centre for tribal categories, in which guests are entertained, deals are struck, favours are 
asked, disputes resolved and knowledge of genealogy, ‘awa’id (custom) and narratives 
of the past are demonstrated and instilled. I examine the recent trend in some areas to 
build communal dawāwīn (pl.) and other alternative spaces for sociality in Madaba and 
the surrounding villages and how the politics of the dīwān flows into wider national 
politics. I consider how changing uses and imaginings of the dīwān intersect with 
questions of gender, public/private and civil society.  
 Chapter 5 considers the question of social and economic change and its effects 
upon idealised and valourised social forms and practices around ideas of tribe, Bedouin 
and the social reproduction of these categories (including those of the dīwān). In it I 
attend to the subjectivities of my mostly young, male and unemployed or precariously 
employed interlocutors in the Bedouin villages of Madaba Governorate. I explore their 
dispositions and values surrounding consumption, accumulation and socio-economic 
change, focusing on the central metaphor of eating and subsistence in economic talk. I 
engage with broader anthropological interests around anticipation including imagined 
futures, hope, boredom, and stuckedness/waithood, which have all been deployed as 
analytics by scholars working on youth and protest in the contemporary Arab world. I 
suggest a reorientation to go beyond experiential accounts of notions of temporality, 
reincorporating political economy by focusing on various ‘images of the good’, an older 
and widely critiqued anthropological concept, which I contend might provide useful 
new analytical approaches to youth protest, and link these to social forms with longer 
histories. 
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 In Chapter 6 I continue developing my argument regarding the experience of 
youth and economic subjectivities as I trace the origins of and the discourses 
surrounding a broad swathe of inter-related protests and demonstrations that have 
occurred in Jordan in recent years since the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ and which have 
surprised some scholars and commentators by emerging from rural areas and from the 
supposedly loyalist Bedouin East-Bankers. I analyse the two seemingly dissimilar 
modalities of the ‘tribal clash’ and the political demonstration, and the various 
discourses that seek to keep them separate or to conflate them, showing their tendency 
to collapse into each other. I follow my interlocutors’ opinions on such events and 
movements, alongside a more detailed ethnographic engagement with the Dhiban Hirak 
movement, one of the longest-running and most radical rural protest movements in 
Jordan, within which some of the young interlocutors described in the preceding chapter 
have taken a large role. I show how tribal categories are both contested but also 
reproduced in new forms through current moments of political unrest and protest. I also 
return to the earlier focus on land, to show how the political economic underpinnings to 
the current position of tribes are used to articulate grievances and imagined alternative 
moral economies.  
 Finally, to conclude, I consider the tension between continuity and change 
running through an examination of these categories and concepts of tribe and Bedouin, 
which while clearly historically contingent in meaning and content, draw their potency 
from imagined deep continuities. I return to the question of why and how the Bedouin 
villages of Madaba and their inhabitants continue to be reproduced as ‘Bedouin’. I focus 
here on two increasingly discordant elements. On the one hand the political modality of 
representative sovereignty, and on the other, the use, in fields of mass mediation, of 
socio-political self-identifiers. I consider the trajectories of these two forces, showing 
how even as their divergence changes their meaning, the categories themselves show 
every sign of once again outlasting the events that (re)produced them.  
1.5 History	
The significance of being tribal or Bedouin in contemporary Jordan is not merely a 
stable continuity from the deep past, but a contingent and emergent result of historical 
processes. I intend to place my ethnographic observations around the meaning of tribes 
in my field site in contemporary Jordan into a deeper historical context, utilising a fairly 
well-established and widely accepted version of a historical narrative. By doing so I 
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draw attention to the historically contingent nature of tribes, but also the significant 
ways that they draw their potency from certain ideas of historical continuity. In the last 
century, from late Ottoman imperialism, via British colonial rule, through 
independence, and to recent economic and demographic transformations, the idea of 
tribes, in general and as particular named categories, have meant many different thing. 
They have changed from something like a polity based on protecting economic interests 
and managing disputes in a zone beyond strong government power, with descent 
providing a normative but semi-permeable boundary, to a form of power, representation 
and type of sovereignty existing on an increasingly encompassed and governed frontier. 
In more recent decades, tribes have become implicated in attempts to forge a national 
identity, as well as becoming the field for broad but sub-national and exclusive claims 
to commonality, collective action and distinction, and even shared political and 
economic interests pursued, at times, collectively.   
 Yet the importance of names, persisting over centuries even as the size, 
reputation, and purpose of the referent has changed, is a source of considerable 
continuity. This continuity of names, while hiding a significant degree of historical 
variation, is non-trivial. Even the act of distinguishing names has a conceptual 
significance, in suggesting differentiation from other people. A name is a vehicle for 
reputations and dispositions, and these can long outlast events and historical 
circumstances. Reputation, and in particular ideas of shared, entangled honour, which 
link different individuals and families to various degrees, creates a particular 
understanding of the political, and a way of articulating autonomy and separateness in 
the face of other forms of power, including that of national government. The idea of 
tribes as names, associated places, capable of generating their own (often encompassed) 
form of sovereignty, has persisted to various degrees throughout the historical processes 
mentioned above. Different elements of the idea come to the fore at different times. 
Sometimes, the idea of economic cooperation to manage and protect resources, as in 
times of maximal autonomy and nomadic pastoralism but perhaps also in some of the 
protests over land rights described below, has been paramount. Sometimes, (and, I have 
suggested, more than is often realised) cohesion has instead been based around the 
soveriengty of shaykhs and the kubār, senior men from senior linages who make a claim 
to represent and mediate between their ‘people’ and distant government, and distant 
government and ‘their’ people, and who use such an intermediary position to become 
wealthy and powerful across boundaries. At other times, more localised but related 
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forms of patron-client relationship seem to have been the main practice carried out 
through the category of tribe. Still at other times, (perhaps, as discussed via the 
encounters in Chapter 6, at present), the tribe is a way of forming broad solidarities and 
for articulating political and economic protest, connected to an imagined past of 
communal ownership and social protection. Within this, the idea of differentiation of 
names and spaces from the wider social (and now national) background persists.  
 I now set out a brief and necessarily partial sketch of this history. I do so not 
merely to provide a coherent potted narrative (although some historical scene-setting is 
necessary for the argument to follow), but to show the significance of the difficulties in 
doing so; the ways in which history (or rather histories) ‘constitute the political in 
Jordan’, as Andrew Shryock put it (personal correspondence 2017).  
Deep	History	
The southern Syrian Desert and the pastoralists who have made use of its seasonal 
grazing have been on the margins but connected to systems of urban power and empire 
since the emergence of the first city states in Mesopotamia. This long history, often 
referred to in earlier histories as ‘symbiotic’ or ‘enclosed’ nomadic pastoralism (Rowton 
1974), given new impetus with the domestication and increasing use of the Dromedary 
from, forms a deep grammar to my field site. Early anthropological approaches to these 
settings (mostly functionalist) tended to take a first-principles bottom-up approach to 
explaining nomadic ‘segmentary’ societies, as though what Meeker (1978:11) calls ‘the 
little bands of herders’ found themselves alone in the desert, and worked out a society 
from there, coming into contact with wider forces in time. In fact, it seems the shadow 
of rulers in urban states has fallen onto the steppe and desert lands around them from 
the beginning. Recent reconsiderations of this deep history of state/nomad interaction 
(for instance Scott 2017) have put forward an interpretation stressing the importance of 
desires to avoid state power, and especially taxation, while also being able to benefit 
from urban markets, in encouraging nomadic pastoralism, which while at times 
disputed, presents an interesting resonance to later conceptions of Middle Eastern 
nomads and highlanders as ‘marginal’ (e.g. Gellner 1983) – i.e. able to treat with urban-
based polities at a distance yet without becoming fully subservient to them, a concept 
we will return to in the next chapter.  
 This position has some linguistic support. The term ‘Arab (and its cognate, as 
discussed in Section 1.3, the classical term for nomadic Arabic-speakers ‘A’rāb) has an 
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abundance of potential etymologies in ancient Semitic languages,24 but the first known 
historical usage is in Assyrian inscriptions and later Aramaic sources, where it is used as 
an exonym to describe various pastoralist peoples on the edge of empires (Lipinski 
2001, Webb 2016). It is applied to people who moved around, traded and sometimes 
raided urban centres; peoples who, while sharing some linguistic and perhaps cultural 
similarities with other peoples (in the Semitic language category), were largely 
represented in historical sources throughout antiquity as a form of ‘internal outsider’ 
(Webb 2016:233). That these ‘internal outsiders’ were often capable of straddling social 
worlds, and of being at times very much insiders, is suggested by the involvement of 
Arabic mercenaries, client rulers, soldiers and merchants throughout the 
Roman/Sassanian frontier zone, rising to particular military significance during the long 
Byzantine-Sassanian wars, and often settling in large urban communities, new or pre-
existing, though still retaining links to nomadic pastoralists (Hourani 1981, Webb 
2016). Webb (ibid.) argues that this exonym ‘arab only became a general self-
descriptive category of identity and language with the burst of conquest in the years 
following Islam, and the concurrent linguistic standardisation involved in moving to a 
scriptural creed. From this time, as discussed in the next chapter, many historians and 
scholars see the ‘tribe’ – the qabīlah and ‘ashīrah – in its present form as emerging and 
taking on new significance as these internal outsiders became participants in empire and 
conquest, and rapidly, as we have seen, as atavistic but valourised cultural exemplars in 
certain (largely linguistic and poetic) contexts (Dresch 1991, Crone 1993). 
 Following the period of Arab military conquest across the former Sassanian and 
Eastern Roman empires, a complex process of partial conversion and mutual cultural 
penetration took place in the area of Greater Syria, which came to be ruled by an 
Arabic-speaking elite who, certainly by the eighth century AD, were practicing a 
recognisable form of Islam.25 The area immediately east of Madaba was of particular 
significance at this time, as it lay at the interface between the wealthy Umayyad 
province of Syria and the Arabian Desert, whose nomadic residents were an essential 
component of the new empire’s military (Crone 1993). Rulers built fortresses and 
palaces along this interface which seem to have focussed on entertaining and hospitality 
 
24 Many of these potential etymologies ideas of mobility, desert, and raiding, others of which focus on the 
route meaning of ‘clear speech’ – i.e. Arabic as a language understood and perhaps used in trade 
among various interrelated Semitic-speaking populations living in and around the Arabian Desert 
(Lapidus 2014, Lipinski 2001). 
25 Not until the thirteenth century AD did Muslims likely constitute a majority in Syria (Carlson 2015). 
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and which seem to have had a role in managing relations with the nomadic pastoralists 
(Grabar 1993, Kennedy 2001). But the region also remained home to many competing 
notions of political belonging and ethnic categorisation, which often retained 
distinctions in the face of various attempted encompassments in dynastic empires, 
united primarily by Islam as the dar al-Islam (the house of submission) and the Arabic 
language as the medium of religious scholarship. From the tenth century AD political 
power was largely wielded by military dynasties speaking Turkic dialects and 
increasingly by a court life that drew upon Iranian traditions of sovereignty (Kennedy 
2001).  
 In 1517, the last and perhaps most enduring of these Turkic dynasties, the house 
of Osman, entered into Bilad ash-Shām. The armies of Sultan Selim I conquered Syria 
and Egypt, rapidly defeating the Mamluk sultanate (another polity ruled by a Central 
Asian military elite) and occupying Cairo and Damascus, the traditional centres of the 
Islamic world (Hourani 1981, Rogan 2012), as well as the area’s historical marches – 
including the East Bank of the Jordan River, inheriting a series of relationships with 
important Bedouin shaykhs. Most of this area would remain in some sense under the 
rule of the house of Osman until the First World War, although at various times this 
suzerainty was largely theoretical. The speed of this conquest created a quite different 
dynamic to the slow war of attrition against the Byzantines and did not create the same 
Turkic-dominated society of frontier warriors (Kennedy 2001, Goodwin 2011). These 
were largely lands of dar al-Islam, not the dar al-harb ‘the house of war’ exemplified 
since the first century of Islam by the Byzantine territories in Anatolia and the Balkans. 
In the cities of this vast new territory small numbers drawn from the Askari (military) 
class of Ottoman Governors and military elites settled to rule, drawn from the Turkic 
elite Sipahi (quasi-feudal cavalry) and from slave-soldiers from the Caucasus and the 
Balkans. These existed alongside, and sought legitimacy from, another potential elite; 
the Arabic-speaking Ulama, religious scholars who were appointed to official posts as 
judges and educators, and who in turn relied on the Askari for official patronage and 
promotion to positions in religious trusts (awqif). As Deringil (1998) and Meeker (2002) 
make clear, the classical sixteenth century Ottoman system saw even village-level 
military officials regularly moved between postings, preventing local dynasties 
establishing themselves, but by the eighteenth century many positions in the provinces 
had none-the-less become hereditary and officials sent from the centre were 
increasingly dependent on local elites.  
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Ottoman	decline/Ottoman	modernity	
Recent scholarship tends to question the former orthodoxy of ‘Ottoman decline’ (for 
instance Grant 1999). It is clear that weaknesses on the eve of colonial occupation have 
often been extrapolated backwards, while the degree to which late nineteenth century 
Tanzimāt (literally, ‘re-ordering’) reforms affected life in outlying areas such as 
Palestine has been underemphasised (McElrone 2018). Nevertheless, even 
archaeologists and historians generally sceptical of the narrative of Ottoman ‘decline’ 
interpret the evidence as suggesting a general decrease in population, cultivation and 
permanent settlement in the interior of Greater Syria (Johns 1994, Rogan 2002). As 
Lewis (1987) and Palmer (2002) suggest, it seems clear that during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries the periphery of Bilad ash-Shām saw the movement of Badu 
aggregations, including the 'Anazah (especially the Rwala), Shammar, Bani Sakhr and 
many others from Hejaz and Najd in the Arabian Peninsula, northwards into the settled 
zone. During this time, Lewis (1987) contends, pastoralism increased, and cultivation 
decreased, leading to a redrawing of the interface between ‘desert and sown’. This 
seems to have been a response to increasing decentralisation in the empire, with the rise 
of hereditary military elites and a general de-garrisoning of Syria (Meeker 1979). 
 Evidence of Ottoman concern with the lands in the area now Jordan before the 
nineteenth century is sparse, however the archaeological record suggests a significant 
degree of urbanism and settled agriculture in the pre-Ottoman period (Johns 1994),26 
which declined during the seventeenth century. Some effort was made to maintain 
irregular tax-gathering incursions into the settled areas of Ajloun, Balga and Karak 
(Rogan 2002), but to the south and east in Bādiyat ash-Shām (the Syrian Desert) even 
the pretence of Ottoman authority dwindled. In the interface between settled imperial 
domains and uncontrolled Bādīyah a frontier society of sorts existed. Much of Syria was 
dominated by local strongmen representing different (often sectarian) communities and 
relying upon ‘tactics of sovereignty based on disciplines of interpersonal association’, 
as Meeker (2002:14) suggests was common to this period in many provincial societies 
across the empire. For much of the seventeenth century local military leaders were able 
 
26 Medieval sites in Jordan, including three Crusader castles of the lordship of Oultrejordain centred on 
Karak and the Ayyubid fortress at Ajloun, led to renewed urban life in the eleventh century. The 
disruption from the Crusader occupation on the coast made the inland route to Damascus of central 
importance and thus the emirates of Ajloun and Shobak became vital Mamluk possessions 
(Sinibaldi 2013). The Ghor (the year-round warm lowlands in the depression of the Jordan Valley) 
was also an important region in Mamluk sugar production, although this was already in decline by 
the fifteenth century (Walker 2004).  
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to expand across the Levant while cloaking themselves in the legitimacy of Ottoman 
titles, often presenting themselves as governors. In the northern part of the area now 
Jordan the power of the Ma’anid Druze dynasts of Mount Lebanon was paramount, via 
local alliances with powerful shaykhs. 
 Raids, open warfare and even the capture of towns and fortresses by Bedouin 
shaykhs in this period are still a source of heroic oral historical narratives found in the 
Balga (Shryock 1997); the ‘age of shaykhs’, which were it not for the clear evidence of 
its historical contingency might well seem a changeless world of segmentary systems. 
As the reputations of shaykhs rose and fell, other men sought alliances with them, 
entered their service or accepted their paramountcy, while a failing shaykh might be 
supplanted or abandoned by followers. Far from a deterministic structural feature of this 
history, shaykhly leadership was fluid and thus generative of change within the broader 
structures of name/space categories. Many of the current examples of these categories in 
Jordan relate their current positions and reputations to this period.  
  This period saw the ‘Adwan rise to become paramount shaykhs in the Balga, 
demanding khuwa (tributary protection money euphemistically termed ‘brotherhood’27) 
from the remaining settled communities around as-Salt, only to be drawn into conflict 
with the Bani Sakhr and Rwala arriving from the steppe to the south and east (Shryock 
1997). Many inhabitants of the Bādīyah were reliant on selling camels and livestock at 
markets in Damascus, Nablus and Jerusalem, and on payments for servicing and 
escorting the Hajj caravan on its annual journey to Mecca (Petersen 2008). This, as well 
as the suppression of raiding into settled areas, were the main Ottoman concerns in the 
area.28 The French traveller Volney (1987 [1805]) reports frequent village abandonment 
during his 1785 trip, and that of 3,200 supposed taxable villages in Syria, only 400 
 
27 The khuwa ranged from practices little distinguished from theft and extortion to more genuinely 
symbiotic arrangements of alliance, resource exchange and protection, and often consisted of a 
payment of cereal grains to nomads form cultivators. It sometimes conferred the status of ally or 
associate (hence ‘brotherhood’) on the payer, and in return conferred a relationship of suzerainty, 
but at other times settled communities (as at Karak) paid it to several different groups. The payment 
was generally made to a shaykh who would then distribute it to his followers (Abu Jaber 1989, 
Rogan 2002).  
28 The limits in this relationship are made clear by the still-infamous events of 1756, when the Bani Sakhr 
raided the Hajj caravan after the Ottoman Governor of Damascus failed to pay their usual retainer 
fee to supply, escort and permit its passage through their territory. Frederick Peake (1958) recorded 
that a popular account had it that in response the Wali in Damascus invited leading Sukhur shaykhs 
for a feast and executed them. The next year, when the Hajj was returning from Mecca expecting 
the Sukhur to be cowed, a mass of warriors led by Qa’dan al-Fayiz raided the caravan, killing and 
enslaving thousands. After this dramatic incident, which lead to the execution of the Wali of 
Damascus and the resignation of the Amir al-Hajj, the Bani Sakhr seem to have been left largely 
untouched (Joudah 1987).  
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could still be found and taxed. The Balga, once a settled region, was increasingly seen 
as ‘Bedouin’ land, part of various dira (territories claimed and held by a name/space 
group), and remaining cultivators were forced to pay khuwa. fallahīyn (cultivators) 
often ended up facing demands for khuwa as well as from local Ottoman tax farmers. 
 From the mid-nineteenth century, a slow process of imperial penetration took 
place, as first the semi-independent rulers of Egypt and then the Ottoman Governor in 
Damascus, Rashid Pasha, occupied forts and supressed rebel shaykhs east of the Jordan. 
Rashid Pasha was tasked with bringing the Tanzimāt (literally, ‘re-ordering’) reforms to 
the Syrian provinces (Bilad ash-Shām), parts of which had been near-autonomous for 
centuries (Deringil 1998). This led to what Tariq Tell (2013) characterises as an uneven 
transformation of the loosely-encompassed frontiers of south-eastern Ottoman Syria 
into productive parts of the Syrian grain-export-based economy. As part of Tanzimāt, 
the Ottoman 1858 land code encouraged registration, which in turn required land to be 
cultivated. As will be discussed in Chapter 3, slowly, and at first indirectly, the Bani 
Sakhr and their neighbours were drawn into agricultural village life. Outside of as-Salt 
and Karak (the only urban settlements on the East Bank prior to the nineteenth century) 
new towns were founded, often peopled from elsewhere.29 This was, according to 
Fischbach’s (2006) interpretation, in part a warning and an inducement to the powerful 
Badu shaykhs to register their land or else risk it being registered to someone else. 
 These efforts at imperial penetration into the frontiers and at centralisation 
reached new levels under the ‘Young Turks’ in 1908, with a re-imposition of the 
Tanzimāt-era constitution on the reactionary sultan Abdul Hamid II and the first efforts 
to ‘Turkify’ the Syrian provinces (Kayali 1997). Usama Makdisi (2002) has argued that 
while Said’s (1978) Orientalism largely follows an East-West binary, to the new 
Ottoman elite in Istanbul the inhabitants of Syria, Baghdad and even more so the Hijaz 
formed their own relational ‘Orient’ as stagnated and reluctant subjects of a course of 
Turk-led imperial modernisation. As Makdisi puts it (2002:769-770) the Ottomans 
‘responded to Western Orientalism by embracing the latter’s underlying logic of time 
and progress’ in order to be ‘equal to and temporally coeval with the West but culturally 
distinct and politically independent from it’, while the provinces now defined primarily 
as ‘Arab’ became ‘temporally segregated and ultimately racially differentiated’, part of 
 
29 The Ottoman-Russian wars displaced large numbers of Circassian and Chechen Muslims who were 
resettled throughout greater Syria after long and difficult journeys (Chatty 2010a) and in Jordan 
established the villages of Amman (which became the capital) and Wadi as-Sir.  
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a ‘gradation of Orients’.30 While the Ottoman period cannot comfortably be included 
firmly within the category of the colonial, it sits firmly within most understandings of 
imperial, and so while worth distinguishing from overt European colonial penetrations, 
it together with these comprises an extended imperial interest in the area now Jordan. 
 Calls to reform and attempts to create popular committees to encourage 
modernisation were also heard in the Arabic-speaking areas, where growing educated 
professional classes began to form their own underground societies, such as al-Fatah in 
Syria and al-Ahd in Mesopotamia. The most important intrusion of the state in this time 
was perhaps the construction of railways and telegraph routes, especially the Hijaz 
Railway from Damascus to Medina, which from 1909 onwards largely replaced the Hajj 
caravan as the means of pilgrimage for the empire, devastating the economy of the Bani 
Sakhr shaykhs who had relied on the Hajj subsidy and money from camel sales. The 
route to Hijaz and the holy cities, where the Hashemite Sharifs presided as custodians 
and theocratic Ottoman vassals, ran a series of telegram posts, fortresses and stations, 
from which to project power over the surrounding territory of the Bādīya (Winterburn 
2012).  
 It was during this period of reform that the use of sectarian and ethnic categories 
shifted from ad-hoc and relational labels to systematic tools of imperial power in 
Ottoman lands, although the use of these labels still differed markedly from today’s. 
This is seen most clearly in the emerging genre of ethnographic maps, including the 
map from the 1915 Ottoman manual for imperial officers in Palestine, Filastin Risalesi, 
analysed in detail by Tamari (2011). This included a map block-shaded by millet 
‘people’ (Figure 1.8), listing the majority of the settled areas of Levant, including those 
parts of Jordan where agriculture was practiced routinely, as Suriyeli – ‘Syrian’. Most of 
the modern population in Jordan lives in areas shaded on this map then as Suriyeli. The 
legend ‘arab (the inland purple block on the map) is used only in its original sense, as a 
designator for desert-dwelling nomadic pastoralists.31 The Filastin Risalesi, Tamari 
argues, shows a desire to limit Arabs to areas off the edge of the map. It also shows a 
growing sense of the existence of a people not ‘Turks’ but also not identified yet with 
 
30 Similar discourses in Turkish nationalism regarding Syria operate in the post-Ottoman period too, as 
Navaro-Yashin (2002) points out and was a crucial part of post-Ottoman attempts at creating 
modernist Kemalist ‘Turkey’ – a land of modern Turks defined in opposition to unmodern ‘Arabs’.  
31 In the written descriptions of the Filastin Risalesi, the boundary is not as clear-cut as on the map, but 
based on gradations of nomadism and socio-cultural distance from the Ottoman elite. 
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the nomadic Arabs further inland, and that linguistic-based Arab nationalism was not 
recognised by the map-making official.  
Figure 1.8: Ottoman ‘ethnographic’ map from Filastin Risalesi, from Danforth (2013:n.p). The 
























Increasing attempts at military and economic domination of the Hijaz and the Arabic-
speaking parts of the empire more broadly, forms the backdrop for Jordan’s founding 
myth, ath-thuwrah al-arabīah, the Arab Revolt; an event from which the royal house 
draws its legitimacy to this day via holding anniversaries, commemorative currency, 
and the names of streets and squares. The Hashemite Sharif of Mecca, Hussein, started 
the rebellion in Hijaz, encouraged by British money and promises of post-war 
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statehood.32 His son Faisal expanded it northwards into the area now Jordan, and 
although prior to the war he had been closely involved with urban-based Arab 
nationalist secret society Fatāt, he primarily relied throughout the campaign on Bedouin 
fighters. In the area where I conducted fieldwork, support was mixed, a topic still given 
significance in narratives today. As many of my Hamaydah interlocutors told me, most 
of their shaykhs had declared for Faisal by 1917, while most cultivators and the 
Christians of Madaba were hostile to the revolt. The Sukhur shaykhs were divided and 
equivocating, with al-Fayiz still supporting and taking payments from the Ottomans (a 
fact their enemies frequently recall in historical talk) although others, including the 
famous shaykh Haditha al-Kraishah supported the revolt.  
 With the Ottoman military collapse of 1918 the Hashemites attempted to 
establish a united Arab Kingdom of Syria (which claimed the areas of modern Palestine, 
Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and parts of Southern Turkey) with Damascus as its capital. 
However, in the face of colonial interests and the confused tangle of treaties and 
promises emerging from the Paris peace conference, it failed to achieve wide 
international recognition, allowing the French to swiftly invade, defeat Faisal and his 
allies at the Battle of Maysaloun, and occupy Syria without international protest (Barr 
2011). In the fallout, Britain and France were awarded League of Nation Mandates over 
southern and northern parts of Bilad ash-Shām respectively, but the discourse of Arab 
unity thwarted by colonial interest would prove long-lived, further fed by British 
support for Zionist settlement. Britain proceeded to occupy Palestine and took on 
nominal responsibility for the lands of the East Bank, called in the Paris Conference 
‘Trans-Jordan’. The Mandate, in Arabic the Intidhāb, had come to Jordan, and with it, 
my interlocutors told me the coming of ad-duwala (the state). In popular imagination in 
Jordan today, this is the beginning of the modern nation-state and of the beginning of a 
watershed in the relationship of Bedouin and the government of settled zones. Such a 
position of rupture, as we have seen, is not a straightforward historical fact, and in fact 
many features of late-Ottoman imperialism were moving in a similar direction already. 
The zamman ash-shuyyukh, the age of shaykhs, had come to a close, and with it, in 
retrospect, a type of historical narrative of lineages, genealogies and heroic acts defining 
 
32 Hussein had been vaguely promised Britain would acknowledge Arab Independence and an Arab 
Khaliphate under Hussein, in areas where Britain had made no other commitments in the Hussein-
McMahon Correspondence. This correspondence was thus in some doubt once the Central Powers 
revealed through captured documents the existence of the Sykes-Picot agreement and when the 
Balfour Declaration became public in November 1917. 
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political relationships. The ‘age of shaykhs’ as a concept belongs not, as we have seen, 
to a stateless world of nomadic tribes, but rather to an age of rising imperialism, when 
some shaykhly lineage co-opted and adapted to, as well as sometimes contested, the role 
of state apparati and practices, in order to further their own projects of rulership. Yet the 
Mandate, with its combination of a non-Islamic foreign power with valourised local 
clients, is conceptually the point of rupture in modern historical imaginaries of Jordan, 
and with some reason. Shryock (1997:92) writes of the Balga Bedouin historians’ 
reluctance to tell stories after this point, because with the coming of the zaman al-
hukūma, the Age of Government, ‘they no longer produced the type of history worth 
recording. Their political universe was altered beyond its capacity to generate heroic 
events’. This may be so, but the shaykhly lineages themselves, and their political 
influence, outlived this type of history, as did the discursive power of ideas of being 
Bedouin and of belonging to ‘ashā’ir.  
Colonial	effects	and	nation-building	
In the post-First World War Settlements, various documents, reports, fact-finding 
missions and conferences attempted to categorise and reorder the Middle East, from the 
proto-ethnographic American King-Crane Commission with its emphasis on ill-defined 
self-determination to the Mosul plebiscite, all seeking in different ways to decide upon 
and stabilise post-Ottoman ethnic boundaries (Rogan 2002, Barr 2011). In this ferment, 
few expected Trans-Jordan to survive long as a political unit. It seemed provisional and 
artificial; a small periphery carved off from the areas that might support its progress to 
modern statehood. In 1920 it was still unclear what the legal status of the lands east of 
the Jordan River was. Three complicated and deliberately ambiguous wartime 
agreements were publicly known (Barr 2011); the Hussein-MacMahon correspondence 
(which had promised Sharif Hussein British support for Arab independence after the 
war), the Balfour Declaration (which gave a vague commitment that the British 
Government would look ‘favourably’ upon the establishment of a Jewish homeland ‘in’, 
Palestine) and the Sykes-Picot Agreement (which agreed British and French spheres of 
influence, as well as a later-voided sphere of influence for Russia). The final post-San 
Rem fudge was more or less colonial rule, but under League of Nation Mandates, with a 
suggestion of tutelage and future statehood.  
 Britain occupied Palestine but to the east of the Jordan River the expense of 
occupation did not seem worth the cost. At first, an attempt was made to cheaply 
administer each of the four former Ottoman Mutasharaf (sub-provinces) east of the 
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Jordan Valley (Ajloun, Balga, Karak and Ma’an) via its own local governing 
committees of notables, but these had largely collapsed by 1921 (Alon 2009). It was at 
this point that Faisal’s older brother, Abdullah bin Hussein, made an attempt to restore 
Hashemite power in Syria, travelling north towards Damascus with a small armed 
retinue. Stopping at Ma’an to meet with local allies, he was approached by a British 
envoy, who keen to prevent an embarrassing incident with France, appeased him with 
an alternative: a position as Amir of these Trans-Jordanian territories. Abdullah 
accepted, although it seems likely he still harboured ambitions to gain larger territories 
in Syria, though initially many in the British authorities saw his position as a temporary 
accommodation, it proved a sufficiently successful compromise to be allowed to 
continue (Jevon 2017).  
 Abdullah appointed a government of educated Syrians and Palestinians who had 
administrative experience under the Ottomans, under the enforced supervision of a 
handful of British advisors (Alon 2009). Meanwhile, Abdullah ruled primarily as the 
Sharifs had in Hijaz, by mediating between the British and the local notables and 
shaykhs, touring the latter’s guestrooms and tents to form alliances, doing them small 
favours around land and bureaucracy and in return calling on their political and military 
support. The British complained that Abdullah spent disproportionate time on ‘tribal 
affairs’ (Alon 2009:76). Although now officially a separate government to Palestine 
west of the Jordan, British power in both officially rested on the same Mandate, both 
were headed in theory by a single British High Commissioner, shared a single currency 
and had no border controls between them (Wilson 1987). Abdullah’s government 
gained a promise from the British in 1923 to keep Trans-Jordan separate, and to exclude 
it from the realm of Zionist settlement, although such a promise remained provisional in 
British eyes as late as 1937 (ibid.). The British were also keen to keep a secure land 
corridor to Iraq and a buffer between Syria and the expansionary Saudi state. The early 
years of the Mandate of Trans-Jordan witnessed a devastating earthquake in 1927 
followed by droughts in 1929-1930, the distant shockwaves of the Great Depression, 
and finally violent raids from the Najdi Ikhwan (Wahabi paramilitary raiders, largely 
recruited from among Bedouin, but ignoring their normal practices of raiding and 
warfare, and originally operating under the banner if not the orders of Abd al-Aziz Ibn 
Sa’ud). This series of calamities led to economic collapse in towns, the loss of over half 
the animals in most herds, and ensured that the British hopes for a self-sustaining 
administration were unrealised (Tell 2013).  
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 The Mandate’s largest intervention in Jordan, which I discuss in Chapter 3, was 
land reform. One of the first British establishments in the capital was the Department of 
Land and Survey (DLS) in 1924. The British administration, with little involvement 
from Abdullah or his government, imported their own colonial techniques in order to 
first survey and then settle the land they judged to be worth cultivating in ways which 
ended the multiple, overlapping, communal and usufructuary nature of land tenure pre-
Mandate (Fischbach 2000). Such a policy was one of many intended to loosen ‘the hold 
of the tribal sheikhs on their tribesmen’ as the Department’s first director, G.F Walpole 
(quoted in Layne 1994:42) put it.  
 Another key institution of the Mandate was the Arab Legion, originally a 
locally-recruited and British-officered police force of 200 men, but an increasingly large 
and important military force in the region (Alon 2009). Under the command of British 
officer Frederick Peake, the legion was used to intervene and supress conflicts between 
various powerful ‘ashā’ir, as well as increasingly to compel taxation and obedience to 
government rule. The legion was initially undermanned and throughout the 1920s was 
often unsuccessful in its attempts to maintain order and ‘police the tribes’, as Peake 
(1958) described its intended role. The British and local allies faced down a number of 
rebellions from powerful Bedouin shaykhs, including a serious uprising in the Balga led 
by Sultan Majid al-‘Adwan in 1923 – itself partly the result of perceived 
marginalisation of the ‘Adwan in favour of the Bani Sakhr and Mithqal al-Fayiz by 
Amir Abdullah and the British (al-ʿAssāf 2015). Peake used force to defeat the Adwan 
rebellion, which marked the last conventional major military confrontation between the 
state and a tribal Bedouin army in the country, and which saw the Balga people settled 
and partially disarmed, accelerating the general trend whereby the Balga Bedouin under 
pressure from incoming nomadic Bedouin (like the Sukhur) were becoming settled 
cultivators more subject to state power. Yet the leading rebels, including Majid, were 
pardoned and to some degree conciliated and reincorporated into the new state’s 
governing elite. The standard policy largely attempted to deflect confrontation with the 
most powerful and militant ‘ashā’ir, and those on whom the security of the territory 
rested. In one famous incident still well known to my interlocutors, Frederick Peake 
visited the Bani Sakhr shaykh Mithqal al-Fayiz at his home in Um al-’Amad unarmed in 
order to negotiate a truce, only for Mithqal to arrest him and hold him for several days, 
released only after agreeing to compromise. This and many other stories suggest that 
British colonial rule in Jordan, although at times harsh and coercive, and always backed 
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by a threat of force, was on quite different terms to in other regions, especially in the 
area of focus for this dissertation, always under the protection of powerful shaykhs.  
 In time however, the Arab Legion became more effective both militarily and 
culturally. Within this body, of particular importance was the Desert Patrol under the 
command of British officer John Baggot Glubb, called in Jordan with the Ottoman 
honorific Glubb Basha. Glubb largely recruited from Bedouin, particularly the sons of 
shaykhs, who served both as evangelists for, and hostages to, British policy in the 
Bādīyah. Through a string of forts with attendant services and pension-payment offices, 
Glubb and the Arab Legion executed what Tell (2013:74) terms a policy of ‘military 
Keynesianism’. When Glubb took over the Arab legion in 1938 and later became 
commander in chief of a nominally independent Jordan, he continued to Bedouinise the 
military. Glubb had already largely supressed large-scale Bedouin raiding by 1932, 
coinciding with both economic depression and a livestock reduction, forcing many 
Badu to look for employment elsewhere and to take any help the Mandate authorities 
offered; even if this meant sedenterisation. Army pensions required permanent 
addresses, as did accessing services like hospitals and education, and so places that had 
once been mostly camps for labourers who tilled farms for Bedouin masters became the 
nuclei of ‘Bedouin villages’ – no longer a contradiction in terms as it once might have 
seemed. As will be discussed below, dispute resolution and even social categories (who 
was truly Badu, who was to be subject to ‘tribal law’) also came to be arbitrated by 
Glubb and his colleagues, who controlled a frontier zone spanning all the lands not 
surveyed. 
  At the start of the British Mandate in 1922, the Tribal Administration 
Department reported the number of nomadic Bedouin as 102,120, or around 46% of a 
total Trans-Jordanian population of 225,350 (Massad 2001:56). By 1976 the proportion 
had apparently fallen to less than 3% (Rowe 2006). This does not mean a complete 
abandonment of pastoralism; as I will discuss later, it continues to have a symbolic 
importance, and produced goods for domestic hospitality, but it does show that while 
Jordan has supposedly remained a ‘tribal’ and ‘Bedouin’ country, nomadic pastoralism 
has largely been superseded as a mode of subsistence. In these two ways then, British 
Mandate policies of land survey and desert frontier-zone pacification, although 
generally light by the standards of other colonial regimes, sought to produce and form a 
Jordanian national society, and notions of ‘the tribe’ were key zones in which they 
sought to do so.  
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 Ideas of borders and boundedness were made suddenly important by the 
Mandate and the new trans-national system of nation-states. The creation of a political 
border along the Jordan River had no particular precedent nor was it a colonial 
objective; the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine was ambiguous as to the status 
of these territories but was generally considered to include both banks (Alon 2009, 
Patrick 2018). For centuries, and within living memory for some of my interlocutors, 
the most important links ran not within the main north-south axis of modern Jordan, but 
east-west across the steep mountain valley of the Ghor and the Jordan River to the 
extensive farmland and urban markets of the West Bank. Hamaydah grandparents I 
talked with recollected occasional week-long journeys with donkeys to al-Quds 
(Jerusalem) to sell livestock and to buy metalwork and other goods not available 
locally. The urban centre of as-Salt, the largest in Jordan, was largely an outpost for 
merchants based in Nablus. The peripheral nature of the lands now part of Jordan and 
its sparse population in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, furthered its 
dependence on centres elsewhere, rather than its coherence as a region. Recent historical 
textbooks make connections between Jordanian nationhood and various ancient 
precedents but none of these seem entirely convincing as exemplary ancestors.33 Indeed, 
the idea of a separate history of ‘Trans-Jordan’ would likely have seemed strange to 
many of the region’s historical rulers; again and again the area was a periphery to 
filastīn – ‘Palestine’ in the west and Syria in the north, and conversely from the 
perspective of these more settled regions it was to some degree an extension of Arabia 
to the south. The areas of Ajloun, Balga and Karak were rarely politically unified in a 
meaningful sense beyond general inclusion at the margins of larger empires. This 
seemed weak soil for implanting a particularistic local nationalism, and conversely 
given the Hashemite ruling house and the background to establishment, a potential well-
spring for a larger Arab nationalism. Jordan, then, cannot be taken as a satisfactory 
analytical unit for analysis without considering the contingent nature of its origins and 
the other scales of connectivity and difference which remain obscured by following the 
discourse of the nation-state.  
 
33 These include ancient kingdoms of the Ammonites (from whom the capital Amman takes its name), 
Moab and Edom, as well as mention of Jund al-Urdun, a Provincial unit of the Umayyad Caliphate 
in the seventh century AD, but this province included lands east and west of the River. Later some 
of modern Jordan was part of the Crusader lordship of Oultrejordain, a violent and disputed frontier 
zone, but this was mostly made up of Karak and the south. 
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 As we shall see, in particular, its history cannot be separated cleanly from that of 
the land across the Jordan Valley, the West Bank, both in terms of longue durée 
connectivity and the more recent history of occupation, settler colonialism and mass 
migration. Jordan’s political existence and demographics since independence have been 
entangled with this conflict. The consciousness of this entanglement with another 
potential project of nationhood has given new significance in contemporary discourse to 
the genre of genealogically-structured Bedouin historical thought as building blocks for 
an alternative nationalism. Palestine remains a ‘sore’ and a national ‘shame’ in Nasserist 
and pan-Arab discourses (Suleiman 2004) but also more immediately for Jordan the 
‘significant other’ (Layne 1994:22) in relation to which Jordan and Jordanian-ness has 
been constructed 
Independence	and	development	
In 1946, the Mandate officially ended, Jordan become independent and Abdullah was 
promoted from Amir to king. In the following decades many in Jordan hoped for a 
unified anti-colonial Arab state as Nasserist and Ba’athist politics swept the region.34 In 
1948, the disastrous Nakba (the ‘catastrophe’) war between the newly-declared state of 
Israel and the newly-independent Arab countries of the region erupted. As Syria and 
Egypt were swiftly defeated, Glubb and the well-trained and equipped Arab legion 
occupied Jerusalem/al-Quds and the West Bank. In the aftermath Jordan’s government 
became responsible not only for the 460,000 existing inhabitants of the area they now 
occupied, but also those (perhaps the same number again) who had fled areas now 
occupied by Israel. Following elections for West Bank deputies full union was declared 
in 1950, granting civil rights to these new subjects (unlike all the other Arab states). 
However, the refugees in Jordan were given a differentiated status, and were in part the 
responsibility of the new United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). 
Abdullah throughout this time sought further unions with other Arab nations and did not 
limit his territorial ambitions to Jordan. Abdullah’s actions were treated as opportunism 
 
34 Arab Nationalism, growing out of the general intellectual trend of the Nahda in Egypt and Syria, 
moved leftwards in the 1930s and 1940s. The thinking of Michel Aflaq, a Syrian Christian, who 
wrote the foundational texts for what would become the Ba’ath (‘resurrection’) movement inspired 
a series of political parties across the region. The Ba’ath party was briefly influential in 1950s and 
1960s Jordan (Anderson 2005) but although extant is now politically suspect in the eyes of the royal 
house, and is strictly circumscribed. Nevertheless, many of my interlocutors still sympathised 
deeply with the cause of socialist Arab unity, and admired Ba’athist figures, including Sadam 
Hussein.  
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by other Arab states, and in 1951 rumours began that Jordan and Lebanon were seeking 
a separate peace treaty with Israel. The king was shot dead on the steps of the Al Aqsa 
Mosque in Jerusalem on 20 July 1951 (days after the assassination of the Lebanese 
Prime Minister in Amman) likely at the behest of the influential Husseini family in 
Jerusalem, Ulama who were positioning themselves as alternative leaders for Palestine 
(Jevon 2017). This was a formative event in discourses of East-Banker/West-Banker 
bifurcation. 
 During the first decade of ‘independence’ Glubb, by now not only Commander 
of the Desert Patrol but the entire Arab Legion, retained command of the new national 
Army, and the colonial-era land system and Bedouin Control Laws remained in place. 
This only changed when after a disastrous 13-month reign by Abdullah’s apparently 
mentally-ill son Talal, Abdullah’s British-educated grandson Hussein Bin Talal became 
King at the age of 16 in 1952, ruler of both East and West Banks. Mindful of his 
grandfather’s fate, Hussein did not pursue peace with Israel, and allowed Fedayīn 
guerrilla fighters to operate out of Jordanian territory. Under pressure from rising 
support for Nasserism and facing protests at home, Hussein cancelled his treaty with 
Britain in 1956 and dismissed Glubb from his role as Commander of the Army. He also 
appointed a socialist and Arab Nationalist-leaning government under Suleiman Nabulsi, 
with representatives of the Ba’ath party and Communist Party in cabinet; the only time 
in Jordan’s history when the leader of the party that had won the most seats in an 
election was invited on this basis to form a government (Anderson 2005). Hussein in 
this period feared forced union with Egypt under Nasser, especially in the wake of the 
Suez War. The king thus maintained lukewarm alignment with NATO and the 
Eisenhower Doctrine, while Nabulsi sought to move Jordan into Nasser’s sphere. 
Rioting and violence between royalist and Arab nationalist army units broke out, and 
the king declared martial law. The Arab nationalist officers fled to Syria, Nabulsi’s 
government was dismissed in favour of a royalist one, and Hussein formed a closer 
union with Iraq, ruled by his cousin Faisal II, grandson of Amir Faisal from the Arab 
Revolt, creating a rival block to Nasser’s in what some have called the ‘Arab Cold War’ 
(ibid.). As a consequence, power in this time drifted from officials or elected politicians 
and to the royal house, and its old ‘tribal’ allies. 
 As the only potential ally left among the Arab leaders, the Americans increased 
financial and military support for Jordan. Thus, early in his reign, Hussein sought to 
steer a middle course between America and the USSR, and between Arab Nationalists 
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influenced by socialism (whether Nasserist or Ba’athist) and socially conservative and 
locally-focused interest groups, which did not wish to see major agrarian or social 
reforms, especially regarding Islam and personal status. Hussein also conducted back-
channel diplomacy with the Israelis while still acquiescing to Palestinian groups 
launching attacks from Jordanian territory, and engaging Israeli units when they 
retaliated (Gandolfo 2012). 
 Hussein was forced from his middle ground by the 1967 war with Israel, during 
which Jordan lost the West Bank and Jerusalem. Jordan still issued passports to 
residents there, however, and refused to acknowledge the border-crossing as an 
international border. Further waves of forced migration in the wake of the war led to an 
unprecedented surge of urbanisation within Jordan as a population explosion occurred, 
spurring the development of new suburbs around Amman. The consequences of this for 
the land tenure system and the social role of land would be far-reaching, as discussed in 
Chapter 5. In 1970, following a plane hijacking, Hussein ordered loyalist troops to 
move against the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), along with sympathetic 
army units. In the civil war that followed, now called ‘Black September’, Hussein re-
asserted his authority and martial law across Jordan, driving out the PLO. The popular 
Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tal (still remembered fondly by most East-Bankers) was 
assassinated at the height of the violence, and after this period. Despite making peace 
with Arafat’s reformed PLO, Hussein replaced most senior government and army staff 
of West-Banker origin with East-Bankers, and relied especially on intelligence officers 
from key shaykhly lineages to enforce palace rule, and it was from this time that the 
discourse of bifurcation in origins (between ‘original’ Jordanians and new arrivals from 
Palestine) became embedded (Gandolfo 2012). Throughout these decades, policies of 
sedenterisation and encouraging cultivation over pastoralism continued, the latter 
becoming ‘of negligible importance’ to the economy by 1967, according to Mazur 
(1979, quoted in Layne 1994:44), but under this new bifurcated system existing policies 
favouring military recruitment among some former pastoralists were increased.  
 Jordan and its army were a key strategic interest to post-war Britain in 
maintaining a foothold in the Middle East, and as such Britain was willing to finance 
the new kingdom (Jevon 2017). Over time, as Cold War alignments made Jordan 
important in containing the USSR’s (perceived) allies in Egypt and Syria, America 
increasingly took over this role as funder, still contributing aid making up over 2.5% of 
Jordan’s GDP, and encouraging Gulf allies to invest in Jordan (Peters and Moore 
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2009:259). In 1990, 47% of the workforce worked for the state, also receiving state 
subsidised goods, and this proportion rose to near 90% in southern and eastern 
(Bedouin) areas (Baylouny 2008:285). Foreign donors continued to bear this vast cost to 
keep the peace with Israel and more recently with political Islamism. Despite a lack of 
oil or other primary resource wealth (apart from modest phosphate and potassium 
around the Dead Sea), many economists and political scientists have therefore 
characterised Jordan as a variety of Rentier State, trading peace, security, sovereign 
bases and military cooperation in return for financial and diplomatic support (Beblawi 
1987, Greenwood 2003, Peters and Moore 2009).  
Into	the	Neoliberal:	economic	reform	and	development		
During the 1980s Jordan faced the need for ready capital, acquiring assistance from its 
Western allies (via the world Bank and IMF) and the Gulf Cooperation Council, but 
also from Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. The Iraqi connection gave Jordanians subsidised fuel 
costs, which ended with the Gulf War and a deterioration in relationships with Gulf 
states, leading to many Jordanian workers there losing their jobs (Yitzhak 2018:28). The 
economic downturn that followed led Hussein to seek help from the Bretton Woods 
organisations.  
 With the end of Cold War, as the expense of Jordan seemed less justifiable, the 
Bretton Woods institutions increasingly took over from the State Department, and the 
IMF imposed a series of Structural Adjustment programs on Jordan starting in 1989 
(Harrington, El Said and Wang 2006). The reforms Jordan attempted after 1992 were 
both rapid and far-reaching, including not only removing trade protections but domestic 
taxation, financial regulation, the privatisation of state-supported industries and a 
programme of spending reduction which reduced what Baylouny (2008) has called 
‘militarized welfare’ given to rural East-Bankers.  
 At first Jordan was treated as a model reformer, and IMF/World Bank growth 
forecasts were excellent, however these proved overly optimistic, and were rapidly 
replaced by talk of ‘reform slippage’ in development circles, widespread economic 
pessimism and tighter conditions applied to further liberalisation loans (Harrington, El 
Said and Wang 2006). Following Hussein’s death from cancer and the succession of his 
son Abdullah II in 1999, Jordan came under increasing pressure from its financial 
backers to undertake further economic reforms, as well as pursue peace with Israel, and 
‘democratisation’ (the latter two goals often being in conflict, as the electorate 
overwhelmingly supported maintaining Arab solidarity with Palestine). These reforms 
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have been increasingly out of step with the public mood. Reductions in subsidies on 
bread, fuel and other necessities, and increased taxes on tobacco and imports, have led 
to public protests of increased frequency and intensity, leading to frequent cabinet 
reshuffles but little economic change.35 Meanwhile protests are used to attract further 
foreign funding, to increase ‘security’, and as a bargaining chip with the IMF to delay 
implementation sand repayments (Harrington et al 2006).  
 During these decades of unrests and economic reform, ja’amāt ‘aīlyah (‘family 
associations’) have exploded in number as semi-official registered organisations, with 
memberships often thousands’ strong. Marie-Anne Baylouny (2006) links this to the 
retreat of the state following neoliberal market reforms, and which she sees as 
reinforcing an ideology of genealogically-legitimised association.36 Such groups allow 
some social welfare and sharing of risk, via common funds, but access is controlled by 
certain elite figures along supposedly genealogical lines. The family associations, like 
‘ashā’ir, do not operate at a single scale and genealogy does not prevent other strategic 
concerns creeping into decisions of boundary-drawing. They are especially significant 
in the poorer suburbs of Amman and in Palestinian-majority areas, where they are often 
networks through which electoral patronage is carried out, though they are less common 
and important in my area of study.  
 Jordan is now to some scholars (such as Ababneh 2016, 2018) an egregious but 
not atypical example of neoliberalism in the Global South, as various development 
actors worked with the new king to open Jordan up to the full force of liberal market-led 
economic development, with a campaign of further subsidy reductions and 
privatisations, the effects of which were especially keenly felt by the Bedouin, ironically 
furthering their perceived need for ‘development’ and spawning a host of interventions 
to bring them into the market and the national economy. The loss of an animal feed 
subsidy has made pastoralism uneconomic in recent years (Rowe 2006). Meanwhile 
livestock prices have slumped, and wages in the army and bureaucracy, the mainstay of 
 
35 Of particular social significance, as discussed in Chapter 5,is the rising cost of state subsidised bread 
(Martinez 2018). khubz ‘araby (simple flatbread made with state flour to a set recipe), which rose 
from 22 to 40 qursh per kilogram during my fieldwork (roughly a rise from around 24 pence to 48 
pence GBP). Fuel prices, traditionally kept low by the Gulf states to prevent instability in Jordan, 
have also increased. 
36 Though drawing precedent from the communally-maintained guesthouses of various Hamulah (lineage) 
groups, in Jordan they were originally largely formed by migrant communities and new arrivals in 
the cities who banded together for mutual aid. These have become a category, partially legally 
recognised, through which state and developmental funding is channelled, featuring a common fund 
for emergencies and sometimes a type of unemployment insurance, governed by committees 
reflecting the older and more influential ‘family members’ (Baylouny 2006).  
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employment for Bedouin, have stagnated (Tell 2015). The private sector has not filled 
this gap. While private enterprises have become easier to establish, they still rely on 
patronage networks which often reach up to the royal court. Large court-linked 
monopoly-holders are seen as the beneficiaries of liberalisation, not the country as a 
whole. Foreign investment is channelled through a narrow number of approved firms.  
 The state’s answer to these failures has been ‘development’ – no longer vast 
state-led projects, but apparently-agile grassroots donor organisations partnering with 
local projects. The state, since 2003, has transferred much of its responsibilities to 
former Bedouin communities to the Hashemite Fund for the Development of Jordan 
Bādīyah, which present themselves as choosing the worthiest community projects. 37 As 
such, Jordan, like Ferguson’s (1994) description of Lesotho, has become a 
‘development state’, to the point that development as a category of activity and lucrative 
employment has entered local parlance. Wealthy notables set-up their own projects, 
while much funding is also channelled via the aforementioned ‘family associations’ 
(Baylouny 2006). Much of this development, as Mayssoun Sukarieh (2016) describes, 
seems focused on the creation of ‘neoliberal subjects’ through NGO-delivered 
entrepreneurship classes and microcredit schemes.38 This has been accelerated by the 
post 2012 influx of Syrian refugees, spawning development initiatives in most major 
cities aimed not just at humanitarian relief but community development and capacity 
building (Twight 2016).  
  Even as such reforms and development projects fail on their own terms to bring 
about the desired economic effects,39 funding continues. USAID (n.d) starts its country 
programme on Jordan with the assertion that the Hashemite Kingdom is ‘a voice for 
moderation, peace and reform in the Middle East’. I will explore the consequences of 
these economic transformations at length, in particular regarding the political economy 
uniting East-Bankers with the royal house. For now, the key trend I seek to highlight is 
 
37 With the explicit aim of opening up the Bādīyah for investment, while maintaining and respecting the 
existing culture and habits (Badiyahfund.gov n.d), in effect maintaining the idea of the Bādīya as its 
own separate political space.  
38 Sukarieh’s (2016:1203) central example involves the jaded trainer berating his class of would-be 
entrepreneurs for saying that they would at a pinch choose to use capital saved to start a business to 
help a neighbour in need. Relatedly in Chapter 6 I describe the angry reaction to government offers 
of income generation and business training in Dhiban, as an inducement to stop protesting.  
39 According to UNDP (2016), debt-to-national GDP stands at a record 91% and unemployment is 
officially at 30%, likely actually far higher when the large numbers of migrants excluded from the 
formal economy are considered. Personal remittances alone account for 14% of GDP, while 
unilateral aid from nation-states, mainly US and the Gulf states, account for 9% of government 
revenues (World Bank 2018). 
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an erosion of the post-independence modus operandi of the royal house and a 
destabilisation of relationships between the royal house and the East-Banker land-
holding elites, coupled with a retreat of the state and welfare provision leading to an 
economic and ideological re-emphasise on ‘family associations’, patron-client networks 
and foreign aid. It is in this context that the current and apparently surprising resurgence 
of tribes in political life has taken place. 
 
Unsettling Times: land, political economy and protest in the Bedouin villages of central Jordan 
56  Frederick Wojnarowski –April 2020 
 IN THE MARGINS: HISTORIES, MODELS AND 
INFRASTRUCTURES OF TRIBE 
Ethnicity and tribe begin exactly where taxes and sovereignty end. 
James Scott (2009:xii) 
 
Characteristically the tribe is both an alternative to the state and also its 
image, its limitation and the seed of a new state. 
Ernest Gellner (1983:38) 
 
Places that succumb to the Bedouin are quickly ruined.  
The Muqaddima of Ibn Khaldun (Mufti 2009:391) 
 
  The three epigraphs above suggest several competing conceptions of non-state 
space. They do however all express a common sense of opposition between states and 
settled life on the one hand, and on the other, tribes, with Bedouin and other mobile 
people being in a sense exemplary of ‘non-state’ society. The epigraph from Scott 
applies equally to the conception most Orientalists and earlier anthropologists had, and 
many might add ‘history’ to ‘taxes and sovereignty’ in the Middle East. This a-
historical, kinship-dominated view was consistently applied to so-called segmentary 
societies, of which the nomadic-pastoralist areas of the Middle East were arguably the 
example par excellence. Such settings are historically constituted through marginality; 
they have since the first urban states arose, been represented as geographically and 
culturally marginal. More recently they have also been marginal to anthropology 
(Gilsenan 1990).  
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 By describing my interlocutors as Bedouin and as associated with large 
categories of name/space, it may seem I have done little to refute this reading. Yet the 
link between these two descriptions suggests a way forward. The ‘tribalism’ of Bedouin 
seems to both outsiders and many Jordanians to be particularly strong and perhaps 
ancestral to that of other people, in part due to the associations of both being Bedouin 
and being ‘tribal’, suggestive of a certain relationship or disposition towards states and 
government. It is this political dimension that I intend to focus on in this chapter.  
 This emphasis on the political dimensions of being Bedouin is not novel. Indeed 
it inevitably comes to the fore with the erosion of the economic and lifeway-related 
elements of Bedouin identity, following decades of nomadic sedenterisation. Dawn 
Chatty (2006, 2014) has attended to the factors which have maintained or reproduced 
Bedouin identity in sedenterised contexts, and indeed has sought to decouple ‘Bedouin’ 
from nomadic-pastoralism in the present. William and Fidelity Lancaster (1986, 1987, 
1989), who conducted long-term fieldwork among Ruwala Bedouin in Jordan and Syria 
came to a value-centred understanding of Bedouin. In the Lancasters’ account of the 
Rwala and other North Arabian camel-herding Bedouin, nomadic pastoralism, and 
especially camel-herding in the desert interior, is an economic technique deployed for a 
political end: a ‘political response to centralized authority, a means of avoiding 
domination by settled governments’ (1990:178). As such, the key to explaining the 
continuing importance of Bedouin identity in the context of majority sedenterisation is 
to see it as ‘a political system and a political ideology, which can be expressed by Badu 
in a variety of ways’ (ibid:178-9) of which camel-herding was only one, and one which, 
as it becomes increasingly economically precarious and less generative of political 
autonomy, will clearly wane in importance.  
 The Lancasters’ vision of identity based on values and ideology – autonomy, 
ecological stewardship and strict codes of honour – is undeniably attractive, if perhaps 
romantic. Superficially it seems to align with the more recent work of Chatty’s 
experiential account of contemporary Bedouin identity claims in Syria and Lebanon, 
where despite governmental pressures ‘tribal identity’ has persisted, in part because ‘the 
authority attached to traditional leaders has continued to exist’ (2016:1), but also due to 
acts of political self-representation. Older ways of ‘being Bedouin’ were, in her 
analysis, fading into ‘political solidarity’. Political economy and sovereignty are 
therefore at the heart of Chatty’s analysis, rather than individualistic, voluntary ethical 
choices, as in the Lancasters’ writings. Their account (Lancaster and Lancaster 1986:42) 
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posits the role of the shaykh as being ‘to deal with outside agencies that could limit, 
extend or distort’ the interests and ideology of Bedouin tribesmen, in which role the 
shaykh had ‘no method of imposing his choices or decisions’.1 I will develop a related 
argument but involving a somewhat different understanding of the role of shaykhs and 
men of influence. An immediate objection to the Lancasters’ voluntarist account of 
political formations is that it excludes all those in a subject position; most obviously 
slaves and hired labourers (economically important for most Badu shaykhs in the earlier 
20th century), but also women, men who are not the heads of their own households and 
lesser associate lineages ‘covered’ by, but not quite possessing a name. A particular, 
patriarchal idea of sovereignty is embodied in the shaykhly head of a family, whose 
power flows out through interpersonal associations and genealogical connections (real 
or imagined) to include a wider political sphere. That such relationships are phrased as 
those of qarāba (relatedness) or dam (blood) does not make them any less political. 
Rather than shaykhs existing to prevent a distortion of moral life and social categories, I 
maintain that these categories of relationship and shaykhly projects of sovereignty, are 
co-emergent and co-producing. 
 In the Lancasters’ account and in other works, the shaykh, hierarchies and 
polities are treated as intrusions from the outside world of history and states into the 
Bedouin social universe. In this chapter I contend, following Judith Scheele (2019a), 
that given what we know of history, the people who get called tribal in the Middle East, 
far from being stateless and a-historic, defined by the absence of hierarchy and 
sovereignty and by egalitarianism, are in fact distinguished from the state through 
‘different but mutually intelligible’ forms of sovereignty, morality and political 
economy. Crucially, as well as being potentially antithetical to the state, they can also 
constitute it, since ‘the state’ (which in some ways remains as much a discursive 
resource and categorical claim as ‘the tribe’ does) encompasses these other forms. My 
intention is not merely to rehearse the well-known deficiencies and representational 
issues of anthropological talk of tribes and segmentary societies, but to show that more 
serious problems of political anthropology lurk behind them, which we cannot easily 
dispense with; problematic notions of state and non-state, of public and private, and 
 
1 Bizarrely, the Lancasters (1986:42) also deny the possibility of a shaykh building up ‘patron/client 
relationships through generosity. The shaykh was expected to be generous but the return was the 
dissemination of his reputation rather than ties of dependency.’ How mere ‘reputation’ is prevented 
from becoming ‘ties of dependency’ is not made clear.  
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most importantly of the asymmetrical relations of enaction, protection and hospitality 
that define many ethnographic encounters with the tribe and the tribal in this context. 
 In scholarship and popular discourse, the ‘tribal’ has long taken on a particular 
set of complicated and often contradictory characteristics. Dale Eickleman outlined four 
broad ideological settings in which claims and definitions around ‘the tribal’ are made 
in the Middle Eastern context (Eickleman, 1989:127): 
i. Firstly “native’ ethnopolitical ideologies’ – that is local conceptions used 
explicitly in dialogue to explain a socio-political reality that is felt to exist.2  
ii. Secondly, legal-bureaucratic ideologies; ‘concepts used by state authorities for 
administrative purposes’.  
iii. Thirdly, implicit conceptions of lived reality used in common parlance and for 
practical purposes which are not held to be in the realm of ideology. 
iv. Fourthly and finally, ‘anthropological concepts’ of tribe, informed by various 
understandings of social life from other places.  
I will return to Eickleman’s useful if simplified division later. As Layne (1984) makes 
clear, these broad settings of identity-making are not only overlapping, but each also 
actively affects and constitutes the others.  
 The ‘native ethnopolitical ideologies’ are, as we have seen so far, a topic alone 
of considerable complexity, but most scholars have tended to acknowledge a complex 
web of terms marking position on a gradient of livelihoods and also social role and 
power. For instance in Mary Wilson’s historic account (1987:57); 
tribalism in Transjordan is not limited to nomads; rather the tribes of 
Transjordan filled every economic niche from nomadic camel breeders to 
settled farmers, forming a complex web of integrative social alliances. 
It is the context of this web, which links many different modes of livelihood into a 
continuum, that makes these ideologies so interlinked. Throughout my fieldwork, 
population and electoral representation (forms of Eikleman’s second ideological setting) 
were used by interlocutors to situate their groups and as a boast of their strength and 
significance – for instance ‘the Hamaydah are the second biggest ‘ashīrah in Jordan’ or 
‘the Zaban as-Sukhur often take a seat for the central Bedouin district’. These, in turn, 
are reflections of common parlance but reinforced by administrative categories and 
infrastructures; topics I explore towards the end of this chapter.  
 
2 Eickleman doesn’t define these ‘ideologies’ sufficiently to distinguish between local applications of 
wider nationalist logics and ‘naturalised’ ethno-cultural particularities.  
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 ‘Tribe’ and ‘tribalism’ are English words with a long conceptual genealogy 
within which ethnology and later anthropology have played large roles before largely 
seeking to abandon such terms (see for instance Sneath 2017, Southall 1970). They are 
far more than a neutral gloss for qabīlah/‘ashīrah.3 To assign a culture, a society or 
even a time or a space to ‘the tribal’ is to make certain assertions about its place in a 
hierarchy, or at least on a spectrum, of social types. Other notions of egalitarianism, 
autonomy, acephalous political orders and social relations based on kinship tend to 
creep in, as may troubling ideas of temporal distance (Fabian 2014). As the epigraphs 
suggests, these imaginaries suggest a certain relationship to the state (often one of 
absence). In Jordan, where many speak English, the media-Arabic adjective 
‘ashā’irīyah has adopted many of the elements associated with the English term 
‘Tribal’, though many also use the English term.  
 Yet this is not entirely a bleeding of meanings from English into Arabic. As the 
last epigraph hints, the use of Badu and Arabic terms like qabīlah/’ashīrah (and their 
associate adjectival forms) have often been used in Arabic to convey a meaning 
surprisingly close to the usage of ‘tribe’ that anthropologists often find most 
problematic; as a short-hand for extra-governmental spaces beyond the city. In their 
Ottoman form, bedevi and aşiret, the terms were applied by administrators to nomads 
and various people who seemed to form some sort of political unit outside that of urban-
based authorities (Barakat 2015:105). Similarly, Scheele (2019b:193) points out that 
Bilad al-Qaba’il (Kabiliya) in Algeria, a place of independent villages without strong 
‘tribal’ groupings in the Arab or English sense, was given this name meaning ‘the land 
of tribes’, to reflect not a particular social form based on agnatic kinship, but rather a 
political reality; a lack of central authority and a non-subject relation to Ottoman 
authorities in the city of Algiers. 
 Arabic thought has long been in dialogue with European notions of the non-state 
barbarian, and partaken of parts of the same Classical genealogy that underlies it (Hill 
2019). Ibn Khaldun throughout the Muqaddima uses Badu and ‘A’rāb interchangeably 
but variably, at times to refer to Arabic-speaking nomads, at other times to those who 
lived only a short way beyond city walls, but who were to a degree beyond the authority 
of city-based rulers (Irwin 2019). This usage blends in with his more well-known 
 
3 Tildrick (1990) contends travelogues such as Doughty’s (1888) Arabia Deserta and the writings of 
Richard Burton influenced subsequent European thinking and depictions about the nature of 
nomads as ‘honourable’ and kin-focused while as discussed below, certain (English) readings of 
Arabic sources influenced segmentary theory. 
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concept of ‘asabīyah, a term that at times is used with qabīly – ‘tribal’. Ibn Khaldun 
seems to have conceived of this as a property akin to group cohesion, solidarity and 
mutual trust that was, he argued, necessary for conquerors to form new polities, and was 
strongest among those beyond the realm of cities and states, among nomads and 
highlanders, but which declined within cities when these outsiders managed to establish 
a new dynasty. Through this lens Ibn Khaldun interpreted the cycles of dynasties that 
were so ubiquitous a part of the historical and political landscape of his world. The 
Arabic word for dynasty, duwala, also means a turn or rotation, and has slowly been re-
purposed as the word for ‘state’. While the applicability and historicity of Ibn 
Khaldun’s thought has been debated endlessly within and beyond the social sciences 
(see for instance Mohammad 1998), its vision of the at-times antagonistic but intimate 
relationship between ‘states’ and those at their margins or beyond their control persists 
within and beyond the region. The conceptual frame apparent in the epigraph from 
Gellner which influenced many anthropologists working within what some term 
segmentary theory, clearly partakes in Ibn Khaldun’s historical vision. More recently, 
nineteenth century thinkers of the Arab Nahda adopted classical and European 
enlightenment civilizational hierarchies; for instance Rifa’a al-Tahtawi lists three 
‘grades of civilisation’, placing the ‘Arabs of the desert’ not among the other nomads 
who he considered mutahawashīn (‘savages’) but in the second ‘barbarous’ category 
(ahl al-khushūna al-mutabarbarīn – lit. ‘the rough barbarian folk’), while the possessors 
of cities and states in the third – the mutamaddinīn (a term based on the Arabic root for 
a city) (Hill:2020:163). 
 This antithetical relationship between tribe and state, a central tenant of both 
much Arabic and European writing on the Ottoman-era Levant and Arabia, was 
reproduced and modified under colonial rule, and then decisively reshaped by 
proponents of modernisation theory (Mayhew 1985), where tribes were recast not as an 
alternative or rival to states, but as people and places in need of development. For many 
colonial and post-colonial states, the pacification and sedenterisation of non-state spaces 
became a symbolically charged proof of development and modernity (see Mitchell 
2002, Scott 1998). This once seemed to be the ascendant discourse in Jordan too. As the 
state was subjected to development, many felt ‘tribes’ must wane. Yet here the debate 
took on a particular quality. Even as state services, sedenterisation and settlement 
expanded outwards into formerly ‘tribal’ zones, those who claimed power through 
being the representatives and leaders of ‘tribes’ retained political and military 
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significance, constituents of a network of patronage supporting key elite allies of the 
king. Marginality in Jordan for Bedouin meant something quite different to Syria or 
Egypt where urban elites dominated postcolonial politics and settling nomads was a 
mark of progress, or in Israeli-occupied Bedouin areas, where many Bedouin adopted 
the language of indigeneity to contest settler colonialism (see Yiftachel et al. 2016). 
 Anthropologist Linda Layne wrote that during her fieldwork in Jordan in 1984; 
(Layne, 1994:XIV). 
 a national debate on tribalism was under way. The question I was by that 
point focusing on, ‘what does it mean to be a member of a tribe in 
contemporary Jordan’ was, at least at that time, a question of national 
importance  
That time, only eight years since the suspension of separate ‘tribal law’ by King 
Hussein, and when the wounds of a bloody civil war (Black September) were still raw, 
was one of great importance for attempts at identity formation (Anderson 2005). Since 
then, researching tribes has come to seem a cliché bordering on an anachronism in 
Jordan and indeed the wider Arab world. 4 Scholars such as Leila Abu Lughod (1989) 
and Joseph Massad have formed compelling critiques based on Said, emphasising the 
colonial construction of tribalism, and its role in Orientalising Arab societies, and in 
maintaining ethnic division. Crucially, Massad (2001) argues persuasively that in the 
wake of ‘Black September’, King Hussein’s government moved away from a 
developmental discourse which saw tribes and Bedouin as part of an at best folkloric 
past from which East-Bankers were emerging, and instead adopted a nationalised form 
of ‘Bedouinisation’. This could become a national culture for the now-minority of East-
Bank Jordanians in opposition to Palestinian and wider Arab Nationalisms. The role of 
Bedouin as 'awalad al-balad - ‘sons of the land’ came to the fore, as did the symbols of 
the coffee pot, mansaf (a valorised dish of meat in a yoghurt sauce that is both ‘national 
dish’ and ‘Bedouin heritage’), the red and white shmargh headscarf (as opposed to the 
black and white one made by the PLO into a symbol of Palestine). Within this new 
national culture ‘The Bedouin are seen as carriers of Jordan’s true and authentic culture 
and tradition... Bedouinising all Jordanians [was] a form of inoculating them against the 
Palestinian threat’ (Massad 2001:277).  
 
4 In fact, in a resent discussion among the ‘Researching Jordan’ Facebook group, ‘tribe’ was suggested as 
‘the most clichéd research topic in Jordan’. 
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 Elements of this shift are clearly visible. Back in the 1960s, reformists in Jordan 
were speaking boldly about ending or overcoming tribalism and the tribal ‘mentality’. A 
broad developmental discourse of critique was germinating, inspired by Arab 
nationalism and global post-colonial developmentalism. Influential Jordanian academic 
Kamel Abu Jaber wrote in 1982 that loyalty to new groups such as labour unions and 
businesses and professional associations would replace the ‘automatic’ loyalty to tribes, 
as they were ‘on more rational bases’ (quoted in Layne, 1994;99). Then-journalist and 
later government minister Marwan Muasher was a fierce opponent of the dominance of 
tribal voting blocs in Jordanian elections, describing tribalism as a cultural anachronism 
perpetrated in order to maintain Jordan’s clientelist system. Under the culturalist and 
traditionalist garb there lay ‘an ossified layer of elites seeking to protect their own 
interests’ (Muasher 2011).5  
  In the run-up to the 1984 parliamentary elections, public statements against 
tribalism were widespread, describing it as anti-democratic, and comparing it in 
religious terms to the Jahaliya (the pre-Islamic ‘time of ignorance’). Many felt that 
official recognition of tribalism would be ‘overcome’ through development in the 
coming years. However, such commentators seem to have underestimated the degree of 
entanglement of ideas of large tribes and Bedouin-ness with the imaginary of the royal 
house and of Jordan as distinct from its ‘significant other’ in Palestine. Following this, 
in 1985 King Hussein wrote to Prime Minister Ahmad ‘Ubayda, demanding also that 
his letter be published across the country’s newspapers (Layne 1994:105). The 
Information Minister, Leila Shararaf, tendered her resignation in protest to this course 
of action, but her department published it without her. The letter’s central message was: 
I have noticed some articles have been directed against the tribal life, its 
norms and traditions. I would like to repeat to you what I told a meeting of 
tribal heads recently, that ‘I am al- Hussein from Hashem and Quraish, the 
noblest Arab tribe of Mecca, which was honoured by God and into which 
was born the prophet Mohummad.’ Therefore, whatever harms our tribes in 
Jordan is considered harmful to us… and will continue so forever’.  
 
5 Another journalist, Abdallah al-Khatib’s (Jan 1985) published a diatribe against tribalism in an article in 
the newspaper al-Rai; ‘any student of tribal concepts within our departments will realise that the 
unhealthy phenomena… will certainly prevent any reform or modernisation… [T]o apply the letter 
of the law to someone who has no backers in order that another backed person might jump over all 
kinds of laws and logic… will not only hinder the march of our administrative development… but 
will also ruin the march of our entire country’. 
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Since this intervention, attacks on tribalism have been more muted, and limitations on 
press freedom to report on ‘tribal matters’ have been put in place. This statement shows 
the importance the royal house attached to ideas of tribalism, which had become for 
them not only, as Massad argues, a way of forming a distinct ethno-national entity of 
Jordanians in opposition to Palestinians, but also as a legitimising discourse. 
 How to interpret this dramatic royal intervention? Massad’s critical post-colonial 
reading links the retrenchment of tribalism in Jordan with the position of King Hussein 
post-1970, having faced military failure in Palestine, military and civil conflict with 
Palestinians within Jordan, and an increasing reliance on the post-colonial powers that 
he had once tried to balance against anti-colonial Arab nationalism. Facing this 
delegitimisation of his kingship and of Jordan as a nation-state spanning both sides of 
the Jordan, he and his government used various pre-existing elements to hand to create a 
new exclusionary imaginary of the nation-state.  
 As we have seen, by the 1980s, as the existential threat to the royal house from 
Palestinian resistance fighters faded, the modernist, developmental, critical view of 
tribes and tribalism was again gaining traction, espoused by opponents of what they saw 
as clientelist and rentier politics. Yet by this point, Hussein and his inner circle seem to 
have concluded that the reliance on East-Banker political mediators and brokers, long a 
marked feature of efforts to hold together a state in Jordan, was now too closely 
intertwined with the survival of the royal house to allow a change of direction, and as 
such the legitimising and culturalising language of ‘ashīrah and of a noble, hospitable 
tradition, became key national dogmas. This now favoured ‘face’ of the state (to borrow 
Navarro-Yashin’s (2002) formulation) was patriarchal and paternalistic, presenting 
Jordan as a family-tribe, and the king as father-shaykh, and reproducing and conflating 
at various scales the authority of the king and of the senior male agnate over his 
subordinates. This discourse further strengthened the relationship between the royal 
house and the elite strata of patrons and men of influence, whose own symbolic power 
was also thus buttressed. Being of an ‘ashīrah, and thus to be subject to its senior 
members, became part of being a Jordanian, tacitly excluding those for whom this type 
of identity was less relevant, or forcing them to adopt this mediated and semi-public 
political form themselves, perhaps in the process weakening other types of solidarity, 
for instance along lines of class, occupation or even as Palestinians.  
  This is a compelling narrative, and one I will return to in the final section of this 
chapter, where I consider the infrastructural realities which make such discourses 
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compelling and meaningful. Yet within this narrative, the history of the pre-existing 
elements from which Hussein created this new nationalism are obscured. I wish to bring 
these elements back into focus, whilst not losing sight of the important social critiques 
above. As well as the considerable colonial underpinnings (which I examine below), 
these elements included the longstanding and widespread discourse of ‘nostalgic 
Bedouinism’ (Hill 2020:81)6, (pre-?)Ottoman political techniques based around 
hospitality and protection, and the traditional alliances with nomadic pastoralist warriors 
dating from the Arab revolt or before. This is not to downplay the importance of British 
colonial divide and rule policies which made certain Bedouin tribes a legally distinct 
and militarily favoured category, but merely to suggest that these policies and what 
came afterwards did not spring from nothing more than the colonial imagination.  
 This touches upon the debate between some scholars, exemplified by Massad 
(2001, 2007), who see Jordanian tribalism as a shallow, constructed tool, serving 
specific interests of the state, and others such as Shryock (1997), Hughes (2018) and 
Tariq Tell (2001, 2013) who to varying degrees take ‘tribes’ seriously, generally at a 
level below that of the state or of national discourse, but with important points of 
contact with it. For Massad (2001:277) ‘Bedouinization’ is an ‘imposed colonial 
discourse… Like other post-colonial national identities, Jordanian national identity and 
Jordanian national culture are products and effects of colonial institutions’. This is 
surely true as far as it goes, but seems ethnographically unsatisfactory, and as I have 
already argued, historically extremely limiting, obscuring the reasons why it was this 
particular category or identity label of ‘Bedouin’ that colonial institutions decided to 
make their tool. I therefore aim to take something of a middle-course. I argue that a 
number of diverse phenomena, where state facilitation occurs, act as infrastructures for 
such identity formations. I return to the specifics of these infrastructures later, but for 
now I focus on the role of leadership and power, both recent historical and 
contemporary forms of politics and their conceptual underpinnings.  
2.1 Sovereignty	and	the	Weight	of	Names	
We have seen how, in part for reasons of national and nationalist politics, certain elites, 
with origins in East-Banker, rural constituencies, were able to survive and outlast their 
 
6 Peter Hill (2020) makes clear that Nahda literature from nineteenth century Syria revived various 
classical Arabic literary troupes, including the purity, nobility and simplicity of the Bedouin life and 
culture. 
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modernist and reformist critics, and to ensure the continuation and perhaps 
intensification of a discourse of tribalism on which their positions relied. I will now 
analyse the nature of the power of these elite figures, and how it is reproduced at 
different scales of society. For the scholars and journalists who criticised tribalism in 
the 1970s and 1980s, tribal leaders and law systems were in a sense extra-state or para-
legal. In more recent state discourse they have become a subservient ally to their state 
equivalents, whom they reference, in a manner that fits well with Sally Merry’s (1988) 
discussion of ‘legal pluralism’. However, in many contexts and for many people such 
things are the state, or rather the way in which the state is accessed, mediated and 
interacted with, via shaykhs and other notables capable of tapping into networks 
extending to the summit of the state to get things done. Rather than being a traditional 
set of practices recognised by the State that people may engage with voluntarily, 
allowing for ‘forum shopping’ (Merry 1988), engaging with shaykhs and tribes, but also 
family associations and other forms of patron, are the only way to get things done. 
 These patrons are people who are ‘known’ (m’aruf), said to be ‘respectable’ 
(muhtrim), possessors of reputation which, like the names of categories of ‘ashīrah, are 
thought to carry certain moral characteristics. From the beginning, the rule of the royal 
house has been through something like ‘the exercise of sovereign power through a 
discipline of interpersonal association’, a mode of sovereignty that Meeker (2002:118) 
describes in late- and post-Ottoman north-eastern Anatolia.  
 Meeker argued that the area of Turkey he worked in had been wrongly classified 
as a ‘clan’ society co-opted by the Ottoman empire, which had proven to be too weak to 
replace this power structure in so remote a province. Even his interlocutors, he reports, 
like most historians of Jordan, have assumed that ‘clannishness’ and the rise of local 
dynasts in the late empire was the result of weak central authority; imperialism and 
clan/tribe being ‘two incompatible forms of sovereign power’(2002:21). However, by 
focusing on the heads of lineages, using the honorary title of agha, Meeker argues: 
they were able to do what the proper imperial system could do: to deploy 
the sovereign power of a family line through a following based on a 
discipline of interpersonal association. The rise of regional social 
oligarchies can therefore be understood as coincident with the 
dissemination of an imperial tactic; the exercise of sovereign power by 
means of a discipline of interpersonal association.’ 
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Instead of emerging out of a failure of empire, Meeker argues the appearance of clans 
and lineages were in fact a result and facet of Ottoman imperialism.7 ‘from centre to 
periphery… they were the result of the spread of ethical practices of political authority’ 
(Meeker 2002:349).  
 It is beyond both the scope of this dissertation and my knowledge of Ottoman 
sources to attempt to adapt Meeker’s specific argument about the nature of 
cosmopolitan but also sovereign Ottomanism in North East Anatolia to Jordan and 
Greater Syria (although there is plentiful literature to attempt an Arabic genealogy of 
similar concepts). The broader point is that much that can be interpreted through the 
lens of genealogy, lineage and agnatic kinship can also be seen through the lens of 
sovereignty, power and hierarchy. ‘Aghas create clans, clans do not create aghas’, 
Meeker (2002:342) contends. The same could almost be argued for shaykhs and 
‘asha’īr in contemporary Jordan, where politics also involves enacting and being 
subject to sovereignty via techniques of interpersonal association, a technique that 
mirrors and relies upon the hierarchies of the house, and its age-based and gendered 
divisions of bodies and spaces. This technique of sovereignty has become a key 
imaginary of the state and the royal house, and a method of encompassing such spaces. 
Thus the state presents itself as a family or a house, with a benevolent patriarch at its 
head.  
 Meeker’s use of sovereignty in this dynamic, which I have followed, diverges 
somewhat from the standard usage in social theory or anthropology. While saytarah (lit. 
‘control’) has a roughly similar range of meanings in Arabic, I am not using it here as 
an ethnographic term, but as a comparative heuristic. Even then, I am not so much 
thinking of the Foucauldian concept, nor of Agamben’s state of exception, although the 
ability to not only enact and embody but also to define taxonomies is present in the case 
of shaykhs via hospitality, dispute resolution and offering protection and patronage, as 
we shall see. Nor am I entirely thinking of the common usage of autonomy and self-rule 
or self-subjectivation, although again as we shall see, the idea of certain spaces and 
people forming pre-existing and self-constituted political units and of being inherently 
resistant to outside rule (those that ‘cannot be eaten’ as I explore in Chapter 5) does 
 
7 Meeker himself at times seems conflicted over this argument, acknowledging that the breakdown in the 
17th century of former practices of circulating provincial officials (designed to avoid just such a 
situation of officials developing a local power base and passing on their power dynastically) led to 
the development of such techniques of sovereignty beyond the imperial court. Maybe if not a 
feature of imperial weakness, it is a feature of a certain type of imperial practice.  
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touch upon this also. Rather I am keeping the term open and hovering between its 
various connotations. I find some of this flexibility in Graeber’s (2019:378) broad 
definition of an ability ‘to “lay down the law,” either literally or figuratively’ by both 
being able to break and define accepted rules of conduct, while often being highly 
circumscribed by other rules. This sovereignty does not require the absolute of the 
sovereign in European political philosophy, but can be nested, encompassed and 
limited. Like Meeker I see sovereignty here as interpersonal, but I also wish to 
emphasise its representative quality. This representativeness is two-fold: firstly, they are 
representative in that shaykhs, but increasingly other types of patron, seek to make 
themselves exemplary, to be representative of a valourised cultural tradition. Secondly 
and more importantly, the shaykh claims leadership and a degree of status through an 
ability to represent, mediate and broker between clients and the state. If they can 
convince the state that those they represent are difficult to govern, fierce, and unlikely to 
submit to sovereignty, and convince their own people that the state is hostile, corrupt 
and bureaucratically impenetrable, so much the better for their position.  
 This sense of a technique of sovereignty through interpersonal association is not 
merely of historical interest. In the last three decades state retreat and putative market 
liberalisation have been coupled with a mushrooming of formal and informal kin 
networks and associations furthering the personalisation of politics. This blends almost 
seamlessly with the more general concept found throughout the Arabic-speaking Middle 
East of wāstah (lit. ‘intermediate’), meaning getting things done through interpersonal 
networks and intermediaries, relying on influence and reputation, rather than through 
official channels or formal structures. The term refers to both the process of getting 
things done in this way, and the person who acts as an intermediary or patron to get 
things done. It can also be an attribute, so that people or groups can be said to possess 
‘strong’ wāstah. 
 When asking Hamid Dahamshah one day about how one went about getting a 
government job he told me ‘you need a wāstah. You need someone with a name, y’ani a 
heavy name.’ Though Jordanians generally are quick to distinguish the discourse of 
wāstah from talk of the ‘tribal’ they intersect and share a concern with names. This idea 
of names having ‘weight’, of conferring influence through the way they join the 
reputations of people to those of others with different levels of power and prestige, is 
implicit throughout Jordanian society, and certainly underlies contemporary 
understandings of what being part of an ‘ashīrah means. It is the quality of ‘weight’, 
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and of certain names having more than others, that allows a technique of power to be 
built on interpersonal associations.  
  Wāstah is often the subject of developmental reforms funded by the World 
Bank and encouraged in the IMF’s economic plan for Jordan, and of the ire of some 
anti-corruption activists. Yet for many Jordanians it remains a separate phenomenon to 
corruption (fasād – a term meaning both moral corruption and physical decay and rot), 
especially where the latter is seen as something that happens among the very powerful 
and great at the top of the system. At the same time, my interlocutors often denied the 
immorality of small acts of rule-bending to help friends and relatives. Indeed, even 
Osama, an anti-corruption activist associated with Dhiban Hirak, told me when 
discussing his hopes of a job via a cousin that to fail to help family or associates when 
able to would itself be morally wrong (haram). Meanwhile true ‘corruption’, as we will 
see in Chapters 5 and 6, tends not to conform to common neoliberal notions of 
individual malpractice, but rather is seen as structural and based around issues of 
distribution rather than legality, and as such is often at odds with developmental and 
international definitions. Indeed, one of the main examples of corruption given by 
young men involved in protests was the process of privatisation and investment that had 
happened over the last two decades (discussed in Chapter 6), undertaken under the 
guidance of the IMF and World Bank’s structural adjustment programme. 
 Many interlocutors who acknowledged a crisis of corruption, sometimes even 
linking this to wāstah, suggesting that to treat kin and friends the same as strangers – the 
supposed ideal of neoliberal reformers and anti-corruption specialists – is not only 
immoral but socially impossible.8 For instance, Khalid, who worked in the Municipal 
Ministry, told me that everyone went through training about not showing favouritism, 
and would if asked agree in general terms that, for instance, choosing to bring a relative 
to the front of a queue for a government service is fasād, or at least potentially 
malpractice. Yet it is none-the-less reputation-enhancing and honourable to favour kin 
over strangers, and difficult to refuse to do so, given the potential reputational 
consequences, which could damage future prospects when seeking assistance in turn. 
For my friend Said, a journalist living in West Amman, breaking with his father’s 
relatives, a tribe from Karak, was key to his sense of independence, and in a sense of 
 
8 Sukarieh (2017) makes similar observations in relation to her ethnography of a series of business 
transparency workshops put on by NGOs for the urban poor in Amman, which seek to impart a 
profit-maximising disposition among their attendees, often meeting considerable resistance when 
set against social expectations. 
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self-realisation, the moment when he felt he was ‘strong’. ‘My uncles, after my father 
was dead, would always interfere with us [Said and his siblings], they would say they 
would help, and then if we didn’t want their help, we had offended their honour.’ He 
admitted that they had helped him and his brother get jobs using their contacts, but 
when they tried to determine how and with whom Said lived, and to prevent his sister 
travelling abroad alone for a sporting event, he said ‘I broke all contact, and I haven’t 
seen any of these idiots in years. It is very easy to be in these families, if you obey, 
everything is taken care of. Only the strong can break away, and do things on their 
own… You need wāstah here, but too much is very bad, and it is better to find your 
own contacts than relying on your family’. 
 Ethnographically, talk of wāstah intersects with discourses of corruption, even 
as most people regard the concepts as, at least in theory, separate. A comparison can be 
made with anthropological literature on corruption discourses, especially around how 
these serve at once to critique systems and power structures, offering moral absolution 
for bribe-givers, while at the same time benefiting a class of brokers and intermediaries 
who come to appear through such a discourse to be indispensable. Jonathan Parry’s 
(2000) analysis of broker-ship in getting jobs in a steel works in Bhilai suggested that 
much ‘corruption’ was in fact an ‘optical illusion’; offering little real tangible benefit 
for bribe-givers, sustained by brokers whose entrepreneurial interests are served by 
maintaining a widespread belief in the prevalence and efficacy of corruption. Certainly 
in Jordan both tribal shaykhs and possessors of wāstah more generally benefit from and 
to some extent encourage the perception that their services are indispensable. Equally a 
widespread sense of a crisis of ‘corruption’ coincides with a general sense of ‘realism’ 
about the necessity of wāstah, which allows absolution for individuals who make use of 
such a system to achieve ends they believe can only be achieved in this way. This is 
especially so given the way wāstah intersects with wider ways of reckoning social 
relationships according to names and reputations, including categories of name/space, 
where ideas of debt and obligation also come up against notions of shared honour.  
 As with many anthropological accounts of discourses of corruption and 
patronage (for instance Hart 1985; Nordstrom 2004), clear distinctions and boundaries 
between the official bureaucratic procedures of the public realm and the ‘informal’ 
sphere of wāstah and known-ness dissolve on close inspection. As we will see, the 
‘state’ as an entity in Jordan is inseparable from these other shadow forms. Cunningham 
and Sarayrah (1993:14) refer to government in Jordan as ‘contract-based wāstah’. 
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Names and reputations exist at least partly independently from official offices and titles. 
The quality of being ‘known’ is key to claiming and maintaining shaykhly status, but 
also to a political career. One of the main ways in which the royal house has come to 
encompass name/space categories is by offering recognition to shaykhs and tribal 
judges (discussed later in this chapter), giving them titles and position and granting 
them small favours to keep their clients coming to them, thus not only recognising, but 
decisively adding, to the weight of certain names. 
 The ability to deliver wāstah is deeply entangled with hospitality. The resources 
and skill to successfully enact hospitality, described in detail in Chapter 4, are 
associated more than perhaps any other virtue with shaykhly-ness. As an exemplar for a 
wider type of social agent, the shaykh remains potent. The deeds of shaykhs are the 
stuff of historical narrative among Jordanian Bedouin, and they still provide a central 
point of materialisation for increasingly diffuse networks, attending funerals, weddings 
and other social occasions, and entertaining often. Most crucially they are still treated as 
important representatives and intermediaries with the people within their named groups 
by the Government, and as such, through this access, are also normally able to offer 
wāstah to clients. Through this and in some cases through various processes of land 
registration, many are considerably richer than average. The idealised conception of the 
shaykh, as it was explained to me, was a man who bankrupts himself for his people, but 
also manages to maintain the outward trappings of status, to keep up the reputation of 
his name. In the figure of the shaykh, individual honour and reputation becomes 
entangled with the honour of other bearers of a name. The dynamic of this relationship, 
which I suggest is best described as a patron-client relationship (despite the 
Mediterraneanist baggage (Ben-Yehoyada 2016), the dyadic relational term is a useful 
shorthand), is often much the same as the seemingly less archaic and more generalised 
enaction of wāstah. While increasingly in a world of wealthy business-owners and 
powerful office-holders these names are individual and it is jobs, contracts or 
bureaucratic procedures that wāstah-clients seek, the logic of names is still present. The 
entanglement of individual reputation and honour with that of larger categorical names 
is still also in evidence.  
 When asking Rayan al-Fayiz, a young horse-breeder and trainer of the Bani 
Sakhr’s paramount shaykhly lineage what being of al-Fayiz and Bani Sakhr meant for 
him in practice he told me among other things ‘we are treated with respect. If there is a 
problem with the police, they will not arrest us straight-away. The governor or a 
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minister will call up the shaykh, he will talk, he will ask after him, he will invite him to 
come drink coffee. They will find a solution God-willing. If others make trouble, they 
[the security services] will put them in prison’.  
 I heard a similar answer from Nur, an American-educated acquaintance of mine, 
who worked in a major international development organisation. She expressed doubts 
about my plan to conduct research with the Bani Sakhr, and she warned me most of all 
to keep away from the Fayiz family – ‘they are dangerous, they cause so much trouble.’ 
I asked her what she meant, and was told that some years before, a distant cousin of hers 
had been killed in a hit and run car accident at night by a teenager from al-Fayiz. 
Witnesses saw what happened and he was eventually arrested. Although the family of 
the dead man is large and powerful in Jordan, and includes politicians, Nur told me that 
within three days the driver was released to his family. ‘That’ she said ‘is tribalism… It 
is trouble’ (interview in English).  
 Later, once I had got to know some al-Faiyz individuals, I asked Rayan al-Fayiz 
about this story (without revealing my source or any identifying details). He told me he 
thought it was lies at first and pressed me for a source. I demurred, and he seemed to 
change his mind. ‘Things like this happen, yes. But the story doesn’t tell everything 
truly’. Crucially for Rayan it left out that the Fayiz antagonists would, he felt sure, have 
paid a great amount of compensation, diyyah, in order to attain a truce with the victim’s 
family, even if they avoided criminal justice. ‘What good would it do anyone for the 
driver to stay in prison – it doesn’t help the dead man’s family, and it is shameful for the 
Fayiz to be pushed around by the police.’ This expresses a version of the common 
maxim used by proponents of tribal justice and dispute resolution in Jordan; ‘prison is 
loss’. We will return to the mechanisms of dispute resolution towards the end of this 
chapter, but for now the point is the way such processes deploy and make use of names, 
and how some names are given more weight than others. 
 The idea of being assigned to names on the basis of agnation, which carry with 
them certain relational roles, statuses and oppositions may seem alarmingly close to 
discarded anthropological ideas from the early twentieth century, and in particular to the 
idea of segmentary societies. Clearly names have power in most social contexts, but the 
known-ness of names and their weight are perhaps more a feature of some places, like 
Jordan and in particular rural Jordan, than others. As stated, even taxi drivers from 
elsewhere will say ‘this is a Sukhur village’ and will have certain ideas about what the 
Sukhur are like. As an outsider without much local knowledge, what is more, these sorts 
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of labelling and categorising exercises are an easy way for people to give the 
ethnographer the sort of information they assume they ought to be given. As such, when 
conducting interviews around topics of family history and long-term political 
relationships, my interlocutors often responded to my questions unbidden by drawing 
detailed if often contradictory genealogical diagrams (See Figures 2.1-2.3). The ‘tree’ 
diagram (shajjarah al-nasab), as known in Arabic as it is in European genealogy, has a 
dual role of both recording actual genealogy (often with corroborated accuracy over 
many centuries) but also political relationships (Kennedy 1997).  
 These diagrams can have an explanatory use at quite a granular level. On one 
occasion when I asked my friend Osama about why he did not support a particular 
parliamentary deputy in Madaba, he drew me a rough diagram to explain how the 
family of the politician and his own stood in a relation of antagonism to one another, 
explaining the point at which a disagreement had emerged over the high-handed refusal 
of a marriage in the 1980s, and how successive generations had stoked it as the 
politicians family had become much wealthier and more successful. He padded this 
incident with a far larger story of overweening pride, as the family of the politician 
sought to claim a higher status than they had once (supposedly) had. Yet crucially, such 
diagrams, as this incident shows, can explain events through describing relations; they 
are not a form of segmentary determinism.  
 These diagrams can expand outwards to far greater scales. When a large entity 
like the Bani Sakhr or the Shammar are represented in this form, the status of the names 
becomes increasingly ambiguous, hovering between known individuals, mythical 
progenitors and categorical names for large groups entering into alliances with others. 
At the highest levels often no actual qara’ib (kinship) was known, and the creators of 
such diagrams generally stated bluntly that these were not real relationships of father 
and son between individuals but alliances between larger groups. Most of my Bani 
Sakhr interlocutors acknowledged that there was no single known ancestor uniting all 
the Sukhur. This is common to other groups, such as the ‘Abbad or the Balgawiyah 
alliance, who see themselves as a qabīlah but one bound by shared social and political 
entanglements, not by ancestry (Shryock 1997). Often the split between two names on 
the diagram would be traced to a specific event or character, who disputed leadership 
with a brother, or lead his followers away into a new area, or of a protégé, son-in-law or 
adoptee who usurped their erstwhile host and benefactor. These diagrammatic sketches, 
created for my benefit to explain obvious social realities to ignorant outsider, mirrored 
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the more complex recitations of gas – formal lineage poems, which now only certain 
important older men know and recite. The young men who drew me such diagrams 
would do so while claiming to be unqualified in such matters, referring me always to 
older kin. Often these old men would ask to see what I had been given, and would 
patiently correct them.  
 When seeking for such narratives I was often told that Shaykh X or Hajj Y ‘had’ 
(rather than merely knowing) strong history (‘aindu tarīkh gawy’). I showed one 
Dahamshah friend, Abdalaziz, Hamid’s older brother, my copy of Mithqal al-Fayiz’s 
biography. Abdalaziz took a more active interest in history than most men his age, and 
while he was interested in the old pictures, was scornful of Mithqal and the Fayiz.  
They hold the shaykh mashayyakh because the Government says so. And 
why did the Amir Abdallah say so? Because Mithqal could be bought. He 
was not in Thuwra al-‘Arabiya. [‘the Arab Revolt’]. He was never known to 
be generous, or have victories in battle. He lived where? Not in a baīt sh’ar 
[goat-hair tent – lit. ‘house of hair’] or with his people and the herds, but in 
Amman with his wife. And he helped who? His grandsons, Faisal and 
Ghaleb, he helped Akif his son. He did not help the Sukhur. You should not 
read their history. My uncles will give you the true history of the Bani 
Sakhr, the history of the Dahamshah also. 
How this ‘true’ history (tarīkh sahy), and the history of the Dahamshah from their 
perspective might differ he did not explain. Later he and his older brother Saif sat me 
down to receive this history. They began by drawing me a genealogical tree (shajjarah 
al-nasab) of Sukhur lineages, although as each is in effect represented through an apical 
ancestor, the difference is not always straightforward. Saif then began a narrative, which 
he said he had heard from his uncles, to explain the drawing.  
Long ago, al-Fayiz was an orphan. An orphan in Hijaz. Who took him in, 
and raised him on milk from his own women, and gave to him from his own 
flock? Al-Dahamshah al-Kabir [the old], my ancestor, took him in. The 
Sukhur then had no common roots, their origins were each their own. Then 
in that time the Dahamshah and some others [he listed some other 
noteworthy ‘original’ sections], they came together in war, against the 
‘Anazah, against the Bani Harb, against the Bani kether kether [‘so on and 
so forth’]. Then when they came north, al-Fayiz was given the land in the 
west, not important land, but generous. When the Government came they 
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claimed this land as their own, and farmed it and sold it for money, I mean, 
for profit. All the land, they registered it in their name, and the state 
registered it to them. This was not their land, it was land for all the people, 
not for the Shaykh alone. They intermarried with us, but were never above 
us, except later, when they became rich. The Government called Mithqal 
‘Shaykh Mashayyakh’, not the Sukhur. This [pointing at the book] is all lies. 
This exchange, important for many reasons, ended with Abdalaziz and his older brother 
Saif spending half an hour writing and arguing about a diagram (Figure 2.2) that would 
reveal this scandalous true history, but which neither of them could agree on absolutely.  
Figure 2.1: Tree diagram of the vast international Shammar qabīlah, reproduced from a poster 
in the possession of Hamīd bin Lufān ash-Shammary. The names refer both to (theoretically) 



















Figure 2.2: The Dahamshah brother’s tree diagram and contested lineage list with historical 
relationships for the Bani Sakhr. 
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Figure 2.3: List and annotations (including a tree) of the main sections and divisions of the Bani 












This casts light on the difficulties of working with this type of intensely localised, 
relational and positional history, as Andrew Shryock (1997) has already adeptly 
described. The way such historical reputations work, through hospitality, protection and 
war, suggests something of the core political relationship that lies within the trappings 
of genealogy and tribe. To return to Meeker’s (2002:342) statement that ‘Aghas create 
clans, clans do not create aghas’, I contend shaykhs, sovereignty and large political 
projects have, in some senses, reproduced if not created ‘tribes’. Men able to attract 
followers in turn can claim to others that they represent these followers. Equally they 
can claim to their followers that they are uniquely able to intercede with these others. 
They become specialist intermediaries and representatives. This form of political 
mediation is doubtless far older than the Ottoman Empire. It is intriguing to analyse this 
cluster of meanings in terms of Bourdieu’s concept of ‘practical taxonomy’ or 
Taxonomic power. This is the way in which an elite attempts  
to impose the taxonomy most favourable to its characteristics, or at least to 
give to the dominant taxonomy the content most flattering to what it has and 
what it is. 
(Bourdieu 1984:475-6). But the nature of this taxonomic power, of the politics or 
sovereignty of representation, protection and patronage, exhumes two troubling 
anthropological ghosts. One, as already mentioned, is the assumption of bounded 
groups in an event-determining structure of balanced opposition – segmentation. I will 
deal with that in the next section. The other, as hinted at through the reference to 
Bourdieu, is honour. The idea of honour as a specific type of disposition and a certain 
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project of reputation-making, runs thread-like through the following ethnographic 
chapters. I use it not because of its alien/essentialist connotations, as something 
uniquely ‘Arab’ or even less ‘tribal’ but because, as Shryock (2009) argues for the 
crucial sub-field of honour,‘ hospitality,’ it is a concept that is ‘recognisable’ and indeed 
also runs through European critical theory (for instance Kant and Derrida), as an idea, a 
thought-experiment, and an explanatory tool.9 As a term of analysis it links European 
critical theory with Arabic ideas, in particular the concepts of sharaf (‘honour’) and 
wajah (‘face’).  
 Honour, in Bourdieu’s (1979:211) sense, is ‘the basis of the moral code of an 
individual who sees himself always through the eyes of others.’ Like the units in 
segmentary theory, for Bourdieu it relies on the idea of theoretical and categorical 
comparability, if not quite equality, between individuals or groups in competition, and 
yet the very process of ‘competing’ for honour is generative of inequalities and 
hierarchies; there are tensions within an idea of honour as ‘isotomy’ or ‘competing to 
remain equal’ (Bailey 1971:19). 
 Any discussion of ‘honour’ and its theoretical corollary, shame, is likely to be 
associated with out-dated anthropological projects seeking a pan-Mediterranean cultural 
unit of comparison, especially Pitt River’s (1977) and Gilmore’s (1982) various works. 
Naor Ben-Yehoyada (2016 n.p.) summarises the problem with such work in relation to 
the long deployment of this concept in the context of Mediterranean Anthropology, 
especially the tension over egalitarian and hierarchical readings of honour within a 
society:  
Why should we gloss onore, nif, and egoismos as the English honour? The 
honour and shame complex was defined as a behaviour of ‘competing to 
remain equal’ (Bailey 1971:19); as an ‘emphasis … on the virginity and the 
chastity of women’ (Schneider 1971:2); and as ‘a system of stratification 
[that] describes the distribution of wealth in a social idiom’ (Davis 1977: 
98), to cite only key examples. The first of these definitions makes honour an 
egalitarian struggle up a hill of material or other forms of stratification… 
The second definition explains regional prevalence of an attitude by a 
 
9 In anthropology, hospitality as a topic was treated ethnographically but not theoretically (with a few 
notable, and mostly Mediterraneanist, exceptions, such as Pitt-Rivers 1968), however in recent 
years, Shryock has gained colleagues in this area, as a more theoretical turn to hospitality has taken 
place, with a JRAI special issue (Candea and Da Col 2012) and a Cumulus issue of L’Homme (see 
Sneath 2019). 
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recurrence of a structural feature of its political economy: ‘a highly 
competitive relationship between agricultural and pastoral economies’ and 
‘the absence of effective state institutions’ (Schneider 1971: 2–3). The third 
definition claims the opposite: it reduces a form of behaviour to the social 
standing that it is claimed to mark. 
This plurality of definitions, emerging from various Mediterranean contexts, may seem 
to preclude comparison. It is not just anthropologists, but some educated Jordanians 
who find an analysis in terms of ‘honour’ problematic. There are troubling associations 
with qātil dafa ash-sharf ‘honour killings’ (not that these are a particularly Jordanian 
problem) and thār, revenge or feud. Yet for proponents being honourable or respected is 
not just a matter of fierceness, it is also a matter of being frank and sincere in ones’ 
dealings with others, and for the kubār (the ‘big’ and respected figures of a family or 
tribal category), it is this frank honesty, almost bluffness, combined with mutual respect 
which marks the idealised form of public speech. Hospitality, politics, dispute 
resolution and poetry sometimes require modes of elevated speech and formal polite 
formulas, but speech should never be servile or too flattering, even with shaykhs. This 
egalitarian speech does not preclude hierarchical relationships, especially in interactions 
between host and guest, or the asker and the giver of favours, but is nonetheless 
important for one’s reputation as an honourable subject. 
 I have kept the term honour in play despite these difficulties because many 
things were explained to me through ideas of maintaining or expanding honour during 
fieldwork. The term my interlocutors used for this generally was sharaf (etymologically 
linked to ideas of nobility) but the idea of hurma which Bourdieu’s (1979) analysis is 
based upon, also occurred, mostly in the form of haramat al-baīt – the ‘sanctity’ or 
‘inviolability of the house’, related to the common term muharam to refer to female kin. 
The root of haram – referring to that with is sacred, forbidden, or ‘set aside’ is highly 
suggestive of the uncomfortable ambiguities of honourable-ness, that it carries within 
itself vulnerability to the loss of honour. The idea of ‘ird – the sexualised honour that 
rests in women, and of ‘ayb – ‘shame’ were not as frequently deployed in the kind of 
explanatory narratives I was treated to when I questioned things I had seen or 
conversations I had overheard, but rested behind all sorts of things that were explained 
away to me though utterances of ath-thukafah mukhtalif – ‘the culture is different’ – for 
instance when apologetically explaining situations where my hosts wished to impose 
gendered segregation on my wife and I during visits, or explain a decision they felt we 
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might disapprove of, such as denying a daughter’s request to work away from home in 
Amman. 
 More compelling for my decision to start ‘taking honour seriously’ than 
explanatory usage was my interlocutors’ insistence that I engage with it as a practical 
dimension of my social life. I was constantly being warned of the danger to my 
reputation through gossip, of the need to ration information I gave out, to learn to turn 
aside intrusive questions about my marriage, my salary and my family, as do 
Jordanians. Most intricate of all, the world of giving and receiving hospitality and 
dealing with various types of invitation presented me with the necessity to enter into 
this field.  
 Connected to this, and especially closely associated with ideas of ‘ashā’irīyah 
and of Bedouin, is the idiom of wajah, ‘face’. Faces can be individual or collectively 
held by families, linages, the co-liable group of a khamsat ad-dam and even larger 
concepts, including the nation. They can become, as I will describe later, ‘blackened’ 
(as can a name in English) through insults or slights done against it, and whitened 
through answering such slights appropriately. The face, a site where the reputations of 
selves become entangled, is both a justification for normative judgements on behaviour, 
and a field in which competition for reputation takes place. To have face is about 
keeping one’s home and kin inviolable and protected, but also resolving disputes with 
grace and generosity at the correct time. To not care about these things is to have a cold 
face (wajah bard) – an accusation often levelled at the urban cosmopolitan wealthy. 
This idiom of face, described in more detail in Section 2.3, connects with broader ideas 
of reputation, ‘known-ness’, and the normative power of gossip. If as Shryock (1997) 
maintains, ethnography is a labour of ‘shared objectification’, then the mode of 
objectification chosen by the ethnographic host is revealing. I contend these idioms, the 
language of honour, is more central to the conceptual constitution of categories of 
name/space than that of kinship, blood and genealogy. It involves sensitivity to the 
reputation of names, a type of prickly, fiercely honour-conscious disposition coupled 
with extravagantly generous and well-mannered hosting, all mimicking the forms of 
sovereignty deployed by shaykhs. Honour, then, is about testing and possessing 
sovereignty, and through this, claiming to represent and be able to intercede for others. 
This is the essential conceptual background to what I term representative sovereignty. 
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The assumption that Arabs belong to easily recognizable corporate social 
groups is one that has dogged Middle Eastern ethnography throughout its 
history. 
Linda Layne (1994:5)  
 
As Abu-Lughod (1989) and Layne (1994) have pointed out, the twin models of the 
segmentary triangle and the mosaic were long the favoured lenses through which the 
Euro-American scholarly gaze fell on Arabic speaking peoples. Segmentation is in 
many ways a particularly heavily theorised manifestation of the general idea of the 
mosaic. This term gained popular traction when used by the American adventurer and 
sometime-anthropologist Carlton Coon. Credited by Slyomovics (2013) as introducing 
the Middle East as an area for ethnographic and anthropological study to America, 
Coon wrote in 1958 in the introduction to his popular book Caravan that ‘the most 
conspicuous fact about Middle Eastern civilisation is that in each population the country 
consists of a mosaic of peoples’ (Coon 2011:3). The ‘pieces' of this mosaic are 
variously described by Coon as religious sects, occupational groups, tribes or other 
linguistic-cultural units. He writes that though ‘the old mosaic system and modern 
nationalism are clearly incompatible’, a theme taken up by Gellner (1973:14) who 
referred to segmentation as ‘more honoured in the breach than the observance’. Though 
the current manifestation of the mosaic is disturbed by ‘bits of plastic and broken glass’ 
(his metaphorical description of modernity), close attention to the past, particularly the 
long Ottoman past, can provide a ‘background’ that was apparently ‘relatively constant 
and relatively homogenous’ (Coon 2011:8). Such models, while often acknowledging 
other times (especially the ‘pre-Islamic’ and ‘the Abbasid Golden Age’) are de-
historicising in that they seek to write backwards to a recent (then within living 
memory) period of putative stasis; a procedure justified by Coon’s (ibid.:8) assertion 
that ‘a culture in transition is hard to describe and harder to understand’.  
 The concept of the mosaic gained widespread acceptance among scholars of the 
Middle East prior to the 1980s, reproduced in works by Albert Hourani and Richard 
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Antoun.10 Such grand orientating schemes were destabilised by the twin epistemological 
shifts of Orientalism (Said 1978) and Writing Culture (Clifford and Marcus 1986). 
Given the historical outline presented in the introduction, and given the re-appraisal of 
temporal schemes in anthropology following Fabian's (2014) critique of temporal 
othering, the basis for Coon’s mosaic has come to seem not just politically problematic 
but naive.  
 In their recent edited volume The Scandal of Continuity in Middle East 
Anthropology, an exploration and celebration of the work of Paul Dresch through the 
research of his doctoral students, 11 Judith Scheele and Andrew Shryock state (2019:2): 
The Middle East is a world of part-worlds, of polities and economies that 
are internally differentiated and arrayed in elaborate hierarchies of 
interdependence. It has long been so. This might be one of the reasons why 
the anthropology of the Middle East tends to feel marginal to a discipline 
that historically drew strength from its embeddedness in worlds that seemed 
coherent and freestanding.  
Their co-authored introduction and their later chapters suggest in a theoretically 
sophisticated way something not so dissimilar to the mosaic. They also, it seems to me, 
demonstrate both the inadequacy of segments and mosaics as models, and also some 
important elements in these models worth salvaging.  
 Segmentary theory was for much of the 20th century a ‘prestige area’ in Middle 
Eastern studies, and as Abu-Lughod (1989) argues, a primary theoretical development 
coming out of work in the Arabic-speaking Middle East. Meeker could still describe 
segmentary theory as ‘the lens with which more or less all anthropologists today 
perceive Middle Eastern tribal societies’ (1979:11). This survived a deferral of the 
theory from the level of ethnographic reality to that of discourse or emic political idiom, 
so that, as the Lancasters (1987) argue, pragmatic political decisions are couched in 
terms of genealogical oppositions. Abu-Lughod explains the interest in segmentary 
theory as a response to the problem of maintaining order in acephalous societies, 
resulting in ‘ordered anarchy’ (1989:281). Much of this ‘problem’ disappears if another 
interpretation of the same settings is adopted, and at any rate putting aside the 
importance of a ‘head’ in European state theory, the existence of hierarchy, power and 
 
10 Antoun was an American anthropologist of Lebanese descent who seems to have been the first 
ethnographer to focus specifically on a field site in Jordan. 
11Dresch was a proponent of anthropological attention to large-scale patterns of spatial and temporal 
continuity, bringing Braudel’s concept of the longue durée to greater prominence in the discipline. 
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entanglements with wider political economy in supposedly acephalous or tribal societies 
now seems banal and obvious.  
 The limitations of segmentation as a theory, among them a notable Orientalist a-
historicity, now seem obvious. Anthropologists well into the late twentieth century 
wrote in the ethnographic present of a temporally stable, timeless world of Bedouin 
social life and unchanging genealogical reckonings that muffled all historicity. 
Genealogical thinking amongst segmentary-lineage societies produced a kind of 
‘structural’ time which disposed of that which was no longer socially relevant, keeping 
the number of generations between the founding of a lineage and the present constant 
(Gell 1992), and so local ‘histories’ were only analysed in terms of their meaning in the 
present, and their temporal stability was never tested. Louise Sweet (1970), for instance, 
was one of many ethnographers who continued to write Bedouin monographs (in her 
case of the Ain ad-Dayr in Saudi Arabia) in the ethnographic present, even when many 
of the practices she described, such as camel raiding, and the bisha’a truth ordeal12 were 
already vanishing, while the encroaching power of the Saudi state to compel taxes, land 
registration and religious orthodoxy goes largely without comment. Even more frequent 
is the telling habit of anthropologists in the region to claim that any discrepancy to their 
models (often extrapolated back to pre-Islamic Arabia) is not due to any failure of the 
model but due to recent ‘historical’ changes having obscured the ‘authentic’ version of 
the social form being described. There were also practical reasons for downplaying the 
importance of history; the obvious methodological difficulties of attempting 
Malinowskian fieldwork in the historical, literate and urban Levant and Iraq, coupled 
with the reluctance to contend with professional Arabists and historians with claims to 
specialist knowledge, served to confine anthropology to the imagined geographic and 
political margins of the region – tribes and nomadic pastoralists (Gilsenan 1990). 
Serious ethnographic engagements beyond the idea of segments and mosaics, often led 
by scholars with personal connections to the region only began to shake this focus in the 
later 20th century, and arguably only began to reclaim and re-analyse the supposedly 
tribal in the wake of Edward Said’s Orientalism (1998), upsetting some of the 
civilisational hierarchy and implicit denial of coeval-ness inherent within older works. 
 
12 Once widespread in Arabia, by placing their tongue on a special metal ladle heated in a fire an 
individual could prove the truth of their words. A mubasha’ – an interpreter of religious omens – 
would then assess the level of burning and scaring on the tongue to tell whether a lie had been 
spoken (Ginat 2009). 
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 The influence of Orientalism as well as the intersecting crisis of representation 
within anthropology, has undeniably been generative of important work and correctives. 
In the case of the topic of this thesis, the work of Joseph Massad (2001) on the 
construction of tribes in Jordan under colonial rule and their reification by the 
Hashemites in attempts to forge a new national identity has been especially important. 
However, this argument around constructionism is not one I wish to reproduce. In post-
Saidian Middle Eastern studies, attempts to study social forms (including tribes) often 
seem to conclude by rendering them social (usually colonial) constructs, as an end in 
itself. Any attempt to nevertheless explore their lived significance or the long pre-
colonial history from which colonial constructors selected their materials has often been 
decried as an Orientalist reading of the Middle East. Much thought and practice did 
change under imperial and colonial rule, and it is both worthwhile and academically 
productive to critique the power relations and underpinnings behind much older Euro-
American scholarship. Much of my ethnographic experience and historical reading 
supports Massad’s central thesis in Colonial Effects (2001) – especially that certain 
cultural symbols and ways of being Bedouin have been conflated with a national culture 
opposed to that of Palestinians. Yet the broader collapse of history to a single rupture, 
an unknowable before and a colonial after following an encounter with ‘modernity’, 
does not offer a useful rubric for the ways in which historical continuity remains 
significant, indeed in some ways constituting the political economy of tribes in 
contemporary Jordan. The (partially intentional) decline of nomadism as an economic 
system under the Mandate may have led to an economically novel environment for 
many former herders now working for the army and the government, but pre-existing 
forms of social categorisation and political organisation have been adapted to this novel 
environment as well.  
 In addition to post-Orientalist and post-colonial critiques, there is little 
ethnographic imperative for thinking about my material in terms of segmentation. 
Oppositions are important, certainly, in the accounts of my interlocutors, especially 
oral-historical accounts. The popular Arabic aphorism taken as the definitive statement 
of segmentary principles of ‘my bothers against my cousins, my brothers and cousins 
against the world’ is contextually true, but favouring kin and networks of known entities 
is common to most people in most settings. The use of idioms of agnatic kinship to 
describe political relationships (fatherhood and brotherhood particularly) can hardly be 
seen as representative of a unique category of segmentary society (its use in celibate 
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Christian religious communities where filiation is even more metaphorical is one 
obvious example). In many ways, opposition to the state and to economic reforms 
characterised the key political project of being Bani Hamida for many of the young men 
I knew taking part in Hirak in Dhiban and Madaba, rather than opposition to another 
named group. Origins and historical narratives were important, and often privileged in 
explanations of contemporary politics (as seen in the example of the Arab Spring or the 
Nakba as points of division), but at other times attachment to place, or indeed to certain 
moral characteristics, such as hospitality or keeping sharaf (honour) seemed far more 
central than genealogy.  
 Yet even when not placed at the forefront of analysis, this problematic 
anthropological heritage overshadows work on societies once the subject of its 
theorising, a shadow only deepened when terms like tribe, Bedouin, feud and opposition 
are given an analytical afterlife. Though ‘MENA’13 as an ethnographic area has largely 
fallen out of mainstream discussions in political anthropology, and tribal social 
organisation in particular has ‘practically vanished as a topic of concern for scholars’ 
(as Scheele 2019a:n.p. puts it), a wider policy and developmental discourse on failed 
states, and threats from ungoverned spaces has brought a renewed focus in these fields 
to non-state political institutions, and especially to tribes, which often seem a synonym 
for lawlessness (see for instance Gonzáles 2009 for a discussion of various tribal 
(mis)readings of Iraq).  
 I have already suggested, following Scheele and Shryock (2019) that there 
remain important problems to be accounted for once segmentation is abandoned as a 
model. For one thing, as already hinted at, there is undeniably a long history to ideas of 
balanced opposition in Arabic thought, dating back to writings of Ibn Khaldun, a large 
(if often misread) influence on Orientalists, including Robertson Smith (1969), in turn 
influencing Evans-Pritchard’s (1940) formulation of segmentation. More significantly, 
the language of genealogy is one (but by no means the only) way of talking about socio-
political relations; an explanatory device. As Scheele (2019a) argues, while 
Malinowskian mutualism (as described in Crime and Customs in Savage Societies, 
1928) was premised on the inability of individuals to comprehend or give an abstract 
plan of the (bounded) socio-political system in which they operated as self-interested 
reciprocators, segmentary theorists often seem to describe their interlocutors giving 
them just such social abstractions, as I did in the form of the tree diagrams mentioned 
 
13 Middle East and North Africa 
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above. The hushed and partially obscured alternatives to the genealogical models of 
dominant linages are not usually disputing the broad thrust but rather relative position of 
elements within the system.  
 Such diagrams, which combine literate history with genealogical reckoning, 
conflate individuals with the lineages they supposedly founded, and personal 
relationships with structural ones. However, crucially, they are not the ‘history’ 
themselves, only at most a skeleton. They require narrative explanation and the motives 
of individual characters acting honourably, generously or despicably, making wise or 
stupid choices. The choices are made within a structure, but also have the potential to 
remake the structure itself, which is in one sense a representation of historical relations. 
The tree allowed my interlocutors to show me how parts related to each other, but not 
how these relationships came about, which at larger levels and further back, it is 
generally acknowledged, is not always through descent.14 Rather than descent 
predetermining the structure, as one reading of segmentary theory might have once 
suggested, it is used as a language to talk about often asymmetrical relationships of 
protection and coercion, of patronage; relationships that can and indeed perhaps must, 
exist in the shadow of other political forms, including cities, dynasties and states. The 
kernel of remaining interest in the segmentary model, then, turns upon ideas of 
protection and sovereignty, not blood.  
 The work of Paul Dresch is one of the most recent and sophisticated attempts to 
salvage something from notions of segmentation. Dresch defines segmentation as a 
process where ‘solidary groups form, and then combine and conflict, in predictable 
ways within a system sustained by a balance of power between its elements’ (Dresch, 
1986:309).15 He, like Layne (1994) shortly afterwards, focused on Evans-Pritchard’s 
original relational definition – ‘relations between relations’. Crucially this did not 
necessitate solidary groups that would cohere at a specific level. Following this original 
sense from Evans-Pritchard, Brubaker and Cooper (2002:21-22) describe Evans-
 
14 Descent here is understood to be largely metaphorical outside of the khamsat ad-dam group (of those 
sharing a common agnatic ancestor within five generations) for vaguely important but 
genealogically indistinct relationships that are neither quite those of kin nor of shared subjects to a 
political order. Andrew Shryock (1997:45) describes the largest level categories, which he glosses 
as ‘confederation’, as ‘a nested hierarchy of allied but generally unrelated’ groups.  
15 Layne quotes this as though Dresch’s opinion, however in the context of his source article, it is clearly 
not a position he would take, as he argues that segmentary systems (he spends some time 
dispensing with the connection to lineages entirely) are not predictable, but only provide the 
framework in which claims for legitimacy or attempts to bring about collective action, are made. 
For him there may be a case for the notion of segmentation but not for lineage or for calling it a 
theory. 
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Pritchard’s segmentary account of the Nuer as a ‘distinctively relational mode of 
identifications, self-understanding and social location, one that construes the social 
world in terms of the degree and quality of connection among people rather than in 
terms of categories, groups, or boundaries.’ The Nuer (Evans-Pritchard 1940) remains 
the classic text for proponents of segmentation as an analytical model for supposedly 
acephalous societies, and yet, while focusing on this relational quality is valuable, it 
does not in itself explain the persistence of categories and names, which in the case of 
Arabia, perhaps more so than Nilotic Sudan, can be of extraordinarily long duration.  
 Dresch instead attempts an alternative genealogy for segmentation; to show that 
the original version, the ‘Arabian tradition’, emerging from Robertson Smith’s reading 
of classical Arabic literature, did not contain the later associations with statelessness and 
kinship-based sociality that came to dominate the ‘Africanist tradition’.16 The genealogy 
of this conceptual framework is thus placed not with the ethnographic engagements of 
structural functionalists, but Orientalist scholarly engagements with classical Arabic 
texts. While this orientalist origin presents its own set of representational problems and 
opens the theory up to other forms of critique, the key work it does for Dresch is 
bringing back history and politics. Rather than a social structure emerging from a 
timeless tribal order in interior Arabia, segmentation becomes a political and military 
environment that emerged out of the Arab conquests in the seventh century AD. Dresch 
suggests (1988:53);  
If one were not an Arab tribesman – that is, if one had no place in this 
system, now organized in the idiom of descent – one got no pay; and as the 
conquests proceeded, so the "genealogies" formed a framework in which 
tribal groups (whatever these may have been to start with) became 
regiments in the garrisons of empire. This first segmentary, total genealogy, 
whose form was later to be taken as typical of certain "stateless" societies, 
was thus the product of a growing state. 
While descent at all levels, and real known relatedness at smaller scales, is this central 
to this formation, it is not an explanation for the existence of the Arab ‘tribe’ in itself, as 
a socio-political form or as a claimed category. As a way of bounding a polity or 
 
16 Dresch (1988:52) suggests that while for Appadurai and others segmentary theory came out of the work 
of anthropologists working in East Africa to influence anthropological accounts of Middle East, the 
New Guinea Highlands and other areas, in fact the order should be reversed. Dresch (1988:63) goes 
on to quote Evans-Pritchard’s (1938:123) statement that ‘it was reading Robertson Smith's writings 
that first made clear to me the kinship and of the Nilotic Nuer’. 
Chapter 2: In the Margins: histories, models and infrastructures of tribe 
Frederick Wojnarowski –April 2020   87 
political space of some sort, descent may be an important idea, but this in no way 
explains the polity’s existence or its nature (see Crone 1993). Dresch elsewhere (for 
instance 1989) provides many historical examples to show that Arab tribes were not 
entirely predetermined by patrilineal descent, showing that the mass of people making 
up a tribe contained many non-agnates, and histories quite openly show individuals and 
groups moving between supposedly genealogical categories. People sometimes moved 
between these political spaces, but in doing so, genealogies could only be flexed so far, 
and traces remain for a long time. The normalised discourse may have mostly been 
descent based, but this does not adequately explain why these often large and 
historically stable categories have been significant in large parts of the Middle East for 
long periods of history, while elsewhere ideas of kin and relatedness have been just as 
important without the emergence of similar structures. As already discussed, Kabiliya 
‘the land of tribes’ in Algeria seems not to have especially privileged large level descent 
categories, and yet was seen by urban rulers as ‘tribal’ for reasons of its political 
marginality and autonomy, a use of tribal borrowed to this Berber context from the 
Arabian exemplar. This leads Dresch to a rejection of kinship as the key definitional 
feature of tribalism in the Arabian genealogy of segmentation.17 Instead Dresch 
suggests that ‘were one looking for a single attribute that characterized tribalism,’ it 
would be ‘moral reciprocity that turns on protection’ (1990:255). For my argument the 
key here is protection, and through it, sovereignty. 
 Dresch (2009:1) considered the question of ‘how names and categories are 
perpetuated through time’ having dispensed with bottom-up models which see them as 
‘mere outward expression of common purpose’ or as solely the organic outcome of kin 
relations, and instead focusing on the dimension of power and the inequality of 
relationships. Dresch used Wilkinson’s (1987) idea of ‘summation names’ to account 
for the phenomenon of Arab ‘tribes’ where rather than the older idea of segmentary 
lineages, the focus is on categorical terms; names which are possessed, through 
genealogical claims, by only certain powerful men, while others are said only to 
‘belong’ or ‘follow’ the name. Dresch’s solution, found in several of his essays (1988, 
2009, 2012) is to describe what he means by ‘tribes’ as a phenomenon of ‘name/space’. 
It is the practice of asking for, accepting, contesting and moving between spaces of 
protection – also often of hospitality – that gives rise to the appearance of social 
 
17 Cleaveland (2002) offers an example of the entirely political formation of the Walāta qabīlah from 
non-related people in the western Sahara.  
Unsettling Times: land, political economy and protest in the Bedouin villages of central Jordan 
88  Frederick Wojnarowski –April 2020 
organisation and to claims to group-ness. This recurs at various scales; the zone of 
protection of an influential family is in a sense a name/space, even though through 
contextual claims (for instance an attack or infringement from outside) that family is 
‘covered’ by the name/space group of another with a wider claimed sphere of 
protection.  
 This language of protection could usefully, I argue, be termed sovereignty – it is 
not just a passive protection, but can constitute an active claim. To state that land, 
businesses or people are ‘protected’ by one is in a sense to claim sovereignty over them, 
the power to define, to set aside, to make exceptional. The sacred truce-spots around 
shrines and marketplaces in southern Arabia Dresch describes ultimately required 
protection from those strong enough to offer it to be constituted as such spaces. Such 
protection is based on properties of shared names with known reputations and 
characteristics, tied to claims to a particular space or spaces, both geographical but also 
genealogical and social. What appears at times to be shared categories of identification 
or solidary groups for collective action are in fact primarily made up of unequal, 
hierarchical relationships centred on a lineage or even an individual project of rulership. 
This presents a problem to classic segmentary theory; Dresch (1984:31) makes the point 
that ‘in an autonomous system of “fission and fusion” there would be nothing for 
leaders to do except ornament political alignments... determined by the tribal structure 
rather than by them.’ Dresch refuses to follow this prescriptive logic, showing how 
segmentary structures do not determine the course of events, allowing room for 
strategy.  
 The idealised model of segmentation tended towards an idea of equilibrium and 
temporal stability, in effect to resist not just leadership but history, at least in form if not 
in substance. As Dresch (1986:41) points out in Yemen, the boundaries of the high-level 
named social categories he studies, Hashid and Bakīl, have shifted surprisingly little for 
centuries, despite political conflict and population movements within and across these 
aggregations. These categories are apparently equal to each other, oriented serially, and 
defined by oppositions that work synchronically. It is not possible for a tribe or section 
to describe its own past from an internal perspective; its particularity can be defined 
only in balanced contrast to other tribes and sections. ‘A great deal happens,’ Dresch 
says, ‘but little is conceived to change’ (1989:179). Dresch’s argument obscures who it 
is that is doing this conceiving. Clearly it is not the vast and under-examined mass of 
artisans, labourers (some of whom in Jordan would have been slaves) and religious 
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experts that Dresch places outside of Hashid and Bakīl and yet are vital to wider life 
within this setting.  
 While historical narratives of a similar sort exist in Jordan, and define a 
relational political structure in which events are intelligible to certain actors, the 
dynamics at work in Jordan are less prone to efface transformative change and both the 
scale and the nature of historical relationships are different. As Shryock (2019a:29) 
says; 
In Jordan, the tribal system is oriented toward inequality and diachrony. It 
is replete with client and follower tribes... Groups like `Adwan and `Abbad 
are opposed to each other, but it would be hard to argue that they are 
morally or politically equivalent, and oral tradition is dedicated to proving 
their conflicting claims to distinction… In the Balga, tribes are not defined 
simply by way of balanced opposition, like the white and black squares on a 
Saussurean chessboard.  
Barth’s (1959) largely discredited turn to game-theory to explain the alliance system of 
Swat would argue that the chessboard pattern of oppositions in North Yemen and other 
parts of Arabia is a logical outcome from any game of alliances between multiple 
actors, who will combine with their neighbour’s neighbour against their neighbour, and 
as such be drawn into similar patterns. Such formations can occasionally be observed 
historically, in Jordan as elsewhere,18 but they rarely seem to have here over long 
durations. New structures, claims to association, control, and suzerainty emerge at 
different scales. Hierarchy (or perhaps sovereignty) rather than equality, and historical 
change rather than stability, are the key facets of this system of name/space. This, as 
Shryock (1997) makes clear, emerges from and generates a heroic historicity around the 
‘age of shaykhs’ – a narrative genre and modality of history driven by the heroic actions 
of men, but also of lineages. Shaykhdom is often still described as an ‘honour’ or even 
‘ornament’ to a family or name, suggestive of what Sahlins (1983) might choose to term 
 
18 Examples include the binary divide within the Bani Sakhr, where, as mentioned, two broad factions, at-
Twag and al-Ka’abnah, each with their rival paramount shaykhly lineages, encompassed all sorts of 
local conflicts. Historically and at a much larger scale, something similar can perhaps be observed 
in the broader Arabic pattern of rivalry between Qays and Yaman (and as suggested perhaps 
Guelphs and Ghibellines in Italy). 
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‘hierarchical solidarity’.19 However it is neither entirely a structural vehicle for 
individual glory (as Sahlins describes Fijian chiefhood, and Chadwick (1926) describes 
for ‘Heroic Age’ Western Europe), nor a structure whereby all acts and deeds are de-
individualised through some sort of tribal solidarity. Nor were name/spaces merely 
‘social projections of heroic ambition’, as Sahlins (1983:522) terms the Nguni 
Kingdoms; still less are they held together by Durkheimian solidarity. Where I find 
Sahlins useful here is in the idea of individuals and their heroic actions being able to 
represent and stand for larger structures, reproducing them but not always creating them 
initially. This is not always merely hierarchical and top-down: reputations made by the 
actions of individuals accrue to lineages at various scales – actions themselves informed 
by pre-existing reputations that must be lived up to or overturned. On such structural 
and conceptual foundations is built the project of representation and patronage that has 
come to dominate the modern conception of the ‘ashīrah, thus long surviving the heroic 
modality of history discussed above. From earliest times, herders relied on specialists 
for dealing with external polities, in both commerce and war (often those capable of 
offering protection and hospitality), and though tied up with ideas of agnatic descent, 
which representative specialist is turned to has always in part relied on their success. 
The history Shryock describes, of shifting hegemonic lineages claiming paramountcy in 
the Balga is not only one of conquest and displacement by one tribe of another, but one 
of strategic realignments and the creative reinterpretation of genealogy for new 
alliances. 
 In this sense, the modern abandonment of traditional hereditary shaykhs for new 
holders of wāstah is nothing novel, and indeed need not be the end of the concept of the 
name/space. Concerns with name, lineage and tribe, and their associated honour and 
reputation, have always been backed up by concerns over land and patronage 
relationships which put pressure on people to choose their associations wisely and to 
demonstrate them vocally. This is what I mean by representative sovereignty, which 
though related to Sahlin’s ‘hierarchical solidarity’ and ‘heroic segmentation’ is a 
somewhat different social form. I therefore suggest a further analytical move, focusing 
on the role of shaykhs and key lineages as possessing a representational variety of 
 
19 As with Chadwick’s notion of ‘an heroic age’ an elite vision of the social world informs a certain 
reading of history, which Sahlins, (1983:521-252) suggests creates ‘hierarchical solidarity’ – ‘old 
time students of social structure will appreciate the differences between the heroic modes of lineage 
formation and developmental processes of the classical segmentary lineage system. The segmentary 
lineage reproduces itself from the bottom upwards… however [heroic segmentary lineages] develop 
from the top of the system downwards, as an extension of domestic fission in the ruling family’. 
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limited and circumscribed sovereignty. Yet within this seemingly unstructured power 
play, certain continuities of form are still at work. The way sovereignty is claimed, 
expressed and enacted, the way it is imagined changing hands, and the categories 
through which claims to it are made, all go back a long time in the area now Jordan. 
Some elements of Dresch’s formulation of segmentation seem useful here. In particular 
its focus on the way genealogy and relation can be used to make claims at different 
scales to protection and sovereignty, and its insistence on a relational social, contra to 
much recent ethnography of ‘the state’. The ‘segments’ here are not neatly delineated 
unthinkingly cohering groups, but rather relational and relative entanglements of 
reputation and protection, that come about through a certain type of politics. This 
departs from Barth’s transactionalist model of bottom-up generation, and from Renan’s 
notion of ‘daily plebiscite’ (2009:6). Rather, history, power and relations to supposedly 
external states and empires, are inseparable from what anthropologists once glossed as 
‘tribes’ in the Arabian context. 
2.3 Infrastructures	of	Tribe:	law,	bureaucracy	and	the	state	
I have argued that the various identifiers associated with Bedouin and tribe in Jordan are 
in no sense ‘natural’ or ‘organic’ but contingent and emergent properties of historical 
processes, albeit in part very ancient ones. I have also argued that the socio-political 
environment of ‘ashā’ir is not best described via segmentary theory as conceived of by 
earlier scholars, but that this setting does partake of a mode of history and politics 
connected to but distinct from that of states. Returning to Dale Eickleman’s (1989:127) 
definition of tribe in the Middle East as a concept with four dimensions, I turn now to 
Eickleman’s second ‘legal-bureaucratic’ dimension to tribal terminology, as well as 
beginning to consider the third ‘implicit conceptions of lived reality’, looking at how 
official state-driven practices (re)produce conceptions of tribe and Bedouin. As well as 
considering the clientelist electoral and local politics of rural Jordan, I will outline how 
customary dispute resolution was codified and deployed by the British Mandate and 
later the Kingdom of Jordan in its legally-separate Bedouin hinterland, the Bādīyah.  
 By ‘infrastructure’, I follow anthropologists such as Penny Harvey (Harvey and 
Knox 2012) and Elyachar (2010) in utilising the term beyond transport, waste and 
energy systems, to refer to a wide variety of systems, structures and organising 
principles for sustaining and reproducing life, so ubiquitous as to be almost invisible. 
These are routinised settings or frameworks, in development contexts often considered 
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‘scaffolding’ for human and natural capacities, banal and often beneath the level of 
political discourse, but that deliberately encourage, enforce, and render visible and 
material certain activities and social forms, while obscuring, delegitimising and de-
emphasising others.20 I follow Elyachar (2010) in suggesting that these qualities of 
infrastructure, both as physical systems and as systems of classification, mean that it is a 
fertile ground for anthropology, and that social analysis should thus be a form of 
‘infrastructural inversion’, drawing out and making explicit the unmarked and common-
sensical systems that act as ‘scaffolding’.  
 At the widest level is the state’s metonymic use of the ‘house’ and the ‘tribe’, 
via the royal house/tribe of the Hashemites, to stand for the nation-state. Tribes and 
houses become implicated in efforts by the royal house to create something akin to a 
‘state-revering culture’ to use Yael Navaro-Yashin’s (2002) term. This has been 
reinforced by the way development has been mediated via ideas of hospitality and 
patronage in Jordan. The monarchy in Jordan has generally sought to gain and exercise 
power over Bedouin elites via the same methods by which these elites constructed their 
own positions. In this way the idea of a ‘tribal authority’ runs downwards from the level 
of discourse and national symbolism into the legal-bureaucratic sphere.  
 Bedouin in Jordan hover between minority and core in the national imagination. 
So too in official practices they are inscribed into the state, but in a way reproducing 
difference.21 Official state-published lists of parliamentary deputies lists tribal name as 
well as party affiliation and place of origin, and positions such as ‘shaykh of the Bani 
Sakhr tribes’ under the official register of interests and offices. The areas that were 
historically considered Bādīyah under the Mandate are still represented in Parliament by 
nine special ‘Bedouin’ quota-seats, divided between three Bādīyah districts; north, 
central and south. Rather than being determined by residency the electorate for these 
nine seats consists of only those with specific last names, registered as ‘belonging’ to 
the Bedouin ‘ashā’ir of that list. Suffrage is now extended to women, and indeed one of 
each district’s three deputies must be a woman. The Bani Sakhr, defined exactly if 
sometimes disputedly by last-name and village, form the entire electorate for the central 
seat, guaranteeing them a Sukhur MP. In theory this means that Bani Sakhr people 
living elsewhere cannot vote or stand outside of this quota. 
 
20 By doing so, I do not necessarily accept the wider Marxist concept of ‘infrastructure’ nor the 
associations with a notion of dialectical materialism. 
21 Mirroring in a more valourised way the treatment of other ‘minorities’ like the Christians and 
Circassians. 
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 While Bedouin may hover between exemplarity and marginality, the political 
realities of tribe stretch far deeper into the body politic. Indeed, the idea that the 
‘ashīrah (or equivalent) is a naturalised political community is reinforced at every level 
of the political system. Even when seeming to threaten the state, such discursive 
patterns are implicated in it. In the wake of the protests that I discuss in Chapter 6, a 
new policy was instituted to ensure that gendarmerie suppressing protests were not form 
the same ‘ashīrah as protesters. My protester-interlocutors saw this as an example of 
how the state feared the ‘natural’ sympathies and allegiances of rural Jordanians, who 
would not allow the state primacy over other social forces, but it also shows how the 
state institutionalises and naturalises such forces, dividing and ruling over various other 
potentially rival but co-opted foci for loyalty and power.  
 In electoral politics, patron-client relations abound at every scale, and are quite 
openly transactional at times, but always involve elements of respect and affinity. The 
weakness of political parties is often used to explain why most voters give votes to 
leaders who claim to represent them through shared membership of an ‘ashīrah or 
similar, yet such an outcome has been consistently encouraged by the state, which 
banned party lists for candidates from 1967 until 2016, and even now resists them, 
making funding, registering and joining them difficult (Baylouny 2008). Some urban 
areas are dominated by the Islamic Action Front, the parliamentary arm of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. But outside of this and a few other seats held by members of parties, 
parliamentarians are either independent or ‘tribal’. These tribal candidates and the 
independents in fact overlap considerably and in any case rely on largely the same 
political model. Either gaining a reputation for wāstah or else making a deal with 
another who possesses it, the candidate, whether a wealthy patron or a shaykhly dynast, 
calls in favours and promises advantages to locals on local issues in return for support. 
Meanwhile the candidate often offers support to the Government on legislation, in 
exchange for his candidature being unmolested, ideally delivering his electors/clients 
the promised local favours (Clark 2018).  
 Since the 1980s there have been international and internal calls for 
decentralisation in Jordan, resulting in a series of reforms and local government 
elections and positions, culminating in widespread reforms in 2015. Such reforms, 
supposedly about delivering more ‘democracy’ and more localised policy, have been 
popular with neoliberal theorists and funders at the World Bank and IMF for decades 
(Harmes 2012). Yet in Jordan, local government seems mainly about offering further 
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opportunities for patrons to gain positions and titles, reproducing yet again an 
officialised version of the patron-client dynamic (Clark 2018). In many areas, the 
borders of newly created municipalities were drawn so that they would be dominated by 
a single ‘ashīrah, who sometimes give their name to the municipality, as the World 
Bank (1995), long lobbying and assisting with decentralisation reforms, admitted in its 
own report on the results of decentralisation in Jordan. In a later report, World Bank 
research showed funding was higher per capita among politically sensitive East-Banker 
rural municipalities than those with populations mostly of Palestinian origin, and was, 
they concluded, being channelled towards an established ‘tribal’ base of support for the 
royal house (World Bank 2005). Through making a municipality ‘theirs’, a shaykhly 
lineage or group of allied families control the office of mayor and council seats, as well 
as increased ability to provide services and employment to clients via wāstah. In the 
decentralisation legislation of 2015, local and municipal councils were given few real 
powers by central government, but have nevertheless become significant forces rather 
because of who sits on them. In rural areas, this is most often old men (and increasingly 
women) from shaykhly families, with a smattering of businessmen and local 
professionals (often, as we shall see in my central ethnographic case of Halima Abu-
Qa’ida, people can be all these at once).  
  In the 2013 elections, following the king’s proposed reforms in response to the 
2012 so-called ‘Arab Spring’ protests, the Islamic Action Front boycotted the vote, 
leaving most candidates informally representing named ‘ashīrah, rather than political 
parties, often quite openly (Watkins 2014). This is nothing new. Shryock (1997:287) 
describes the then revolutionary and highly successful decision by Dr Ahmed Oweidi 
when standing for Parliament to adopt the name al-Abbadi, which he still uses, claiming 
to stand for all the ‘Abbad qabīlah – consisting of tens if not hundreds of thousands of 
people in and around the capital. In doing so Dr Ahmed, whose own ‘Uwaīdi family 
have no history of leadership or renown within the ‘Abbad, beat several shaykhs, who 
ran under their own proudly-held ‘Abbad lineage names, gaining votes the shaykhs 
expected, due to their role as representatives of the group in dealings with the outside. 
Thus even when radical change occurs, it often takes place within, rather than 
challenging, the infrastructures of ‘ashīrah.  
 At a still smaller scale, as discussed, the state has infrastructurally reinforced the 
importance of descent and agnation in a time of reduced social welfare and economic 
uncertainty though the ja’amāt ‘aīlyah (‘family associations’) (Baylouny 2006). Though 
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many families have always fallen back on support from kin and shared ownership 
among family members, the infrastructural existence of set ways of registering and 
legally constituting such practices contributes to a rising usage of idioms of kinship and 
blood within Jordan’s political economy.  
 Such political representation and recognition, it might be argued, could merely 
be state realism in the face of a pervasive reality ‘on the ground’. Yet a look at the more 
everyday politics of ‘tribe’ in Jordan, which often tends towards processes of dispute 
resolution, shows too the marks of state intervention, in reproducing and making use of 
infrastructural realities. A particularly significant example is the widely recognised and 
discussed category of ‘awā’id, or ‘tribal law’ (qanun 'ashā’irīy), as it is called in official 
accounts. My interlocutors would instead use the term urf wa ‘āda ‘custom and 
procedure’, a category of practices distinct from but partially recognised by the Islamic 
Shari’a and state law systems. This more than almost anything else came up when 
asking questions around what ‘ashīrah are; I was told that what defined them and made 
them different to other people was possessing codes of this type, and the nature of such 
arrangements were often a key topic of conversation during more formal interviews.  
 It is often in such legal practices that anthropologists too have found the purest 
expression of what they saw as segmentary logics, where cases of revenge and corporate 
honour activated different categories at different scales depending on the relation of the 
parties. Tribal law indeed seems like one area where something like segmentation is 
undeniable; where ‘brothers against cousins, brothers and cousins against the rest’ really 
does apply. Largely constituting a set of precedents around dispute resolution and 
arbitrage, varying slightly from group to group, these practices are extremely common 
in modern Jordan and are widely said by Jordanians to be on the increase rather than 
declining. They continue to be key in mediating between the state and individuals. 
While for Massad (2001) this is a colonial effect, Jessica Watkins (2014) argues that 
‘tribal’ patterns of dispute resolution were already and independently a force too 
powerful for the state to resist, leaving co-option and partial oversight as the only 
options for state-builders in Jordan. Watkins argues, however, that such practices cannot 
be seen as ‘organic’ or ‘natural’ as the role of the police and judiciary in facilitating, and 
indeed expanding the reach of, such processes to deal with social goals of stability are 
central to their function. For my argument, whether state actors and institutions are 
described as having constructed such systems or merely reproduced them in its own 
image is not of central importance; either way, the key point is their historical 
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contingency, and the way they too act as a subtle infrastructure, naturalising certain 
conceptions of the political and of sovereignty. 
  In some senses, this set of legal precedents and processes could be seen in the 
light of the classical colonial and twentieth century anthropological literature on ‘legal 
pluralism’ (see Merry 1988), existing as it does alongside various literate and urban 
based religious and secular systems of written law and interpretation. Certainly in many 
cases people have carefully and strategically decided which system to make use of 
(Barakat 2015). Yet unlike in the standard anthropological cases of ‘system-shopping’ 
analysed through legal pluralism, ‘awā’id, just as much as the Shari’a and state decrees, 
has been a subject of the intervention of rulers, developing in close contact with urban 
states and power, long before colonial interventions. 
  Arab jurists have traditionally considered various local and precedent-based 
models of dispute resolution to be urf (‘custom’) rather than ‘adl, justice, (despite the 
common term ‘adl Badawy; ‘Bedouin justice’). This is a category jurists under Mamluk 
and Ottoman authorities generally regarded as at least partly legitimate in certain areas 
and for certain communities (Barakat 2015), yet since the earliest days of Islam the 
propensity for such systems to diverge from Shari’a has been a source of concern, to be 
supressed where possible and to be reformed, codified and overseen where not (see for 
instance Shabana 2010, Dresch 2012). Proponents of such systems normally argue that 
the emphasis is placed not on absolute or retaliatory justice, but on social and communal 
harmony, through the payment of blood money, which aids the victim and allows 
relations to resume between the family of the victim and the perpetrator to resume. The 
defined goal of such processes is sulh (meaning a type of permanent, positive 
reconciliation), and the restoration of the sharaf of the wronged party, who say their 
honour or their ‘face’ (wajah) has been ‘blackened’ and must be ‘whitened’ though 
either blood split in revenge or through the paying of restitution and reconciliation. 
 In similar fashion to earlier literate legal authorities in urban areas throughout 
much of Islamic history, the British Mandate introduced a codified system of self-
consciously ‘tribal’ law in the 1924 ‘Law for Tribal Courts’, which set down a basic 
framework within which dispute resolution would work, and as a mechanism to 
officially sanction competent judges for such cases (Oweidi 1982). Later the ‘Bedouin 
Control Laws of 1929’ were introduced, defining a separate legal and administrative 
system for ‘Bedouin’. These were defined according to a list of 13 officially recognised 
‘tribes’; those who were or had previously been nomadic camel-herders in the Bādīyah, 
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and still lived seasonally east of what the British considered the frontier of the settled 
land, the Hijaz Railway.22 The aims of the laws were (cited in ibid.:273); 
 the control of the Bedouins and the superintendence of their movements; to 
determine, when requisite, the places in which it is deemed necessary for 
them to camp; to hear actions within jurisdiction of the tribal courts law 
and to give a final decision therein... To investigate raids and give out fines 
of up to £20 per person or 1 year imprisonment for infractions.  
The Bedouin Control Laws contain many features which later became established parts 
of wider state-sanctioned tribal law. They determined the maximum amount of blood 
money for specific offences and gave the state the power to decide in cases where only 
one party was ‘tribal’ whether or not these laws applied. It blurred the restitutive and 
punitive aspects of law by allowing these tribal courts to administer criminal 
punishment to a set fine and up to one year in prison. The remainder of the population, 
including ‘tribal’ East-Bankers, were subject to the Ottoman Penal Code until 1951, and 
Personal Status Laws based upon Shari’a for civil matters (Fischbach 2000, Watkins 
2014). These laws in a broader sense gave official existence and theoretically exact 
meaning to previously relational and flexibly defined concepts, such as a less-governed 
and marginal frontier zone of Bādīyah beyond the ‘sown’, as well as around who counts 
as ‘Bedouin’. Such moves were to have far reaching effects, outliving the law itself.  
 In 1976 tribal law was officially abolished by the king for complex motivations 
which are still disputed, but which likely included a desire to create a single national 
legal framework, increasing central power as actual nomadic potential to resist it waned, 
as well as to signal Jordan’s modernity to the outside world (Layne 1994). This 
particular form of limited frontier-zone tribal law was, as Watkins (2000:33) puts it 
‘incrementally subsumed and then phased out by the state’. However, this was far from 
marking an end to government involvement in this type of dispute resolution, and in fact 
preceded its expansion.  
 Just three years before abolishing tribal law, the king had assembled a meeting 
of Shaykhs and judges from across the largest ‘ashā’ir covered under the Bedouin 
 
22 In practice its inclusion of allies and ‘protected’ tribes, or those who were proving hard to control, 
while excluding others with as much clam to being ‘Bedouin’, meant its application was always 
somewhat flexible. The list (modified in legislation passed in 1933, 1938 and several times informally by 
decree) was determined by policy needs, controlling who should be subject to this separate ‘desert 
administration’, excluding a number of prominent āsīl (‘noble’ known origins) name-space categories on 
the grounds that they were insufficiently nomadic to be true Bedouin.  
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Control Laws (majlus shuyyukh ashā’irīyah) to discuss their future relationship with the 
royal house and to encourage further economic and social development and 
sedenterisation, presided over by the king’s brother and Minister for Tribal Affairs, 
Muhammad Bin Ghazi (Massad 2001). They decided this needed to be widened and 
repurposed to include both fallahīyn and Bedouin. The decision had likely already been 
made to end the Bedouin Control Laws, and thus the legal distinction between Bedouin 
and Hadhar (settled) populations in Jordan, and yet at the same time a re-purposed and 
broader conception of ‘tribal’ heritage could be deployed as a nation-building tool, for a 
nationalism separate from that of Palestinians. 
 The assembled experts and shaykhs agreed a new national unified system of 
dispute resolution, the Mahdar al-Qasr, ‘palace convention’, an extra-legal and extra-
constitutional move that angered many modernisers (Watkins 2014). It was a 
voluntarily-agreed codification, which the state would offer tacit recognition and indeed 
encouragement to in return for certain reforms of procedure, recognition of the primacy 
of civil law, and the limiting of such processes to cases considered to touch on sharaf 
(‘honour’), under the three categories of qātil, ‘ird and taqta’ al-wajah; homicide, the 
violation of female ‘honour’ (normally through rape or illicit sexual activity), and 
‘cutting the face’, cases involving the breaking of truces, which metaphorically ‘cut’ the 
shaykhs or family elders who made the truce and stood guarantee for it as ‘faces’.  
 The convention agreed that where a matter touches on these categories of 
‘honour’, and where both parties wish for dispute resolution to be carried out through 
urf, the state will allow this. However, where applicable, normal criminal and legal 
processes must run in parallel. This convention agreed the terms of a continued 
relationship between the court and lineage-based dispute resolution specialists, allowing 
for an official legitimation of certain approved figures to act as judges, through issuing 
letters of endorsement (musāsdaqa) from the court, even while officially granting no 
‘legal’ tatus to this system. In practice it is widely known that when a serious crime like 
a homicide is decided by the local governorate or police to be ‘ashā’irīyah, law 
enforcement will aid in making sure that supposedly traditional dispute resolution 
occurs alongside criminal prosecution, and judges reduce sentences considerably if it is 
understood that a ‘tribal’ solution has been found, further encouraging people to make 
use of this seemingly extra-legal system of law. 
  The state has continued to interfere, attempting in 1987 to limit mutual 
culpability from five generations of shared descent to two, and reducing blood money 
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(Watkins 2014). My interlocutors stressed that convention reforms have had little 
practical impact, though rather than following ‘timeless’ traditions, dispute resolution 
remains flexible. Beyond endorsed judges, informally Islah (known ‘reconcilers’) with 
a knowledge of urf wa āda continue to operate across the kingdom, including in 
supposedly non-‘tribal’ areas. Many are informally called qādy, ‘judge’, asked to 
resolve and arbitrate in a wider range of disputes than the above-mentioned officially 
recognised cases of sharaf, often keeping a dīwān for such purposes; a phenomenon I 
examine ethnographically in Chapter 4. 
 When it was known I was interested in such cases, a number of friends and 
interlocutors volunteered overviews of the process.23 The general model is always given 
using the example of a ‘homicide’ case (including accidental manslaughter in road 
accidents), in part perhaps due to the convention, in part due to the seriousness of such 
situations making them the most fully worked-out.24 The terms qātil – ‘killer’, and 
maqtul – ‘killed’, are used to describe the two sides in any dispute resolution, the victim 
and the perpetrator. The first step in such cases, once the police, the governorate and the 
parties involved agree the matter is to be subject to dispute resolution, or in some cases 
without any police involvement, is for the families to appoint representatives to urgently 
meet and begin the process. Firstly they must put in place the ‘atwa amnīyah, a ‘security 
truce’ to refrain from immediate revenge while the family of the qātil arranges to go 
into jalwa, a protective banishment or exile, which prevents them becoming a legitimate 
target of thār, ‘revenge’ which they would otherwise be.  
 This communal culpability is generally agreed to extend outwards from the 
individual to agnatic kin back to the shared paternal fifth grandfather, the khamsat ad-
dam. In many cases this includes hundreds of people, many of whom have very little to 
do with the perpetrator, and as such will try to avoid inclusion, often by paying the 
victim’s family off. Others who are not closely related may involve themselves for 
socio-political reasons, so that this rule is never absolute. The general trend is for a 
shrinking of shared culpability, which as mentioned, the Government tries to enforce. 
There is a counter-tendency, however, for genealogically unspecific revenge to take 
place outside of these clear normative lines; sources of great concern for some older 
 
23 These included Dr Ahmed Oweidi himself, my Arabic teacher Samer, and Hamīd bin Lufān ash-
Shammary, a man some called qādy, ‘judge’ for his frequent role in such cases, and a key 
ethnographic subject of Chapter 4. 
24 Descriptions of this basic model can be found in numerous ethnographic works (for instance Oweidi, 
1989, Watkins 2014, Hughes 2018) 
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men invested in the current system. Such cases can spiral outwards into general 
violence and unrest at a national level, and thus state authorities take particular care in 
such cases. This is not then a matter of blind segmentary determinism, and whether the 
dispute stays at the level of khamsat ad-dam for both sides, or whether larger units get 
drawn in (up to the level of nationally known named groups like Bani Sakhr) largely 
depends on the identity of the victim and perpetrator, the political relations already 
existing between their families, and the strategies adopted by the negotiators. Specific 
decisions carry consequences: by not involving oneself in the disputes of those with 
which one is intimately connected, one risks cutting such ties and losing respect; it is 
said that someone who does not care about the honour of their family has a ‘cold face’ 
or ‘cold blood’. Dispute resolution cases are thus one of the main ways in which 
genealogy and the names of specific entities come up in local politics, as wider 
networks take sides in cases. 
 Once the level of the dispute is decided upon, shaykhs and heads of families will 
meet to choose a qādy, a judge to arbitrate the dispute. They will meet, often in the 
judge’s own dīwān, with each party also agreeing a wajah (‘face’), who will act as a 
guarantor of good faith for both parties, and who will be financially responsible should 
the truce be broken. This man is considered to be a figure whose honour and 
impartiality is beyond reproach. Generally there follow a series of meetings with the 
judge to negotiate recompense, sometimes taking months or years, in which time the 
banishment of the perpetrator’s family continues. The judge, using precedent, will guide 
the two sides towards agreeing a level of compensation, normally financial (diyyah) 
which will be paid, as well as any other stipulations, such as the fate of the perpetrator 
who may be handed over to the police for criminal punishment separately, and length of 
the jalwa. The payment falls upon the whole khamsat in theory, though in practice more 
distant kin may refuse to pay. As even for a car accident, payments can be over 100,000 
JD (£118000) culpability is a serious matter. Once an agreement is reached, ‘atwa, of a 
positive type, as peace rather than mere armistice, is declared. At this point, revenge 
becomes unsanctioned, and social relations can resume. Often further ‘atwāt (pl.) have 
to be agreed to prevent lingering animosities from boiling over. Eventually, at some 
point, it is hoped true musalaha – ‘reconciliation’ will exist between the parties, 
allowing normal social relations to resume. In many cases criminal justice will be 
sought alongside resolution, so that the individual will be punished by the state for their 
personal culpability, while the individual’s extended social role, which intersects with 
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others who share honour and responsibility to some degree, will be dealt with through 
this process. Watkins (2014) points out even the police have been known to get 
involved as disputants in such cases, paying blood money and agreeing to truces, 
despite a specific part of the Palace Convention agreeing that violence by the police or 
military in the course of their duties would not be subject to this system.  
 Not all Jordanians approve of tribal law. Massad was not the only intellectual to 
see such sentiments as the product of cynical manipulation by colonial and post-colonial 
regimes, and others, such as Marwan Muasher (mentioned in the last section as a critic 
of state-sponsored tribalism) see it as a tool for entrenching established clientelism. For 
many young urban Jordanians, especially those from Palestinian backgrounds, such 
things are anachronistic signs of a corrupt, unequal society which misdirects people 
from pursuing political and economic reform. As one student told me when I explained 
my intended research; ‘these things are the past, you shouldn’t study them. Study things 
that are useful’; I said I understood these things to be very important in Jordan’s 
politics. ‘Important’ she agreed. ‘They are important, but they do nothing to help the 
nation, they just cause fitnah [discord, chaos, civil war].’ Nevertheless, even people who 
are in a sense opposed to many elements of ‘ashā’irīyah use the channel of dispute 
resolution and the networks afforded them, because they can prove efficacious, resulting 
in lenience from police and judges, and because they often have few alternatives.25  
 These infrastructural expressions of ‘ashā’irīyah and a separate ‘tribal’ sphere of 
social life show both signs of deep historical continuities as well as the repeated 
interventions of colonial and state actors, who have sought to control and make legible 
complicated relational models of sociality, law and crime. A private word over coffee or 
a visit to a shaykh’s dīwān can be an effective tool of policy, far cheaper than police and 
bureaucracy, and making overt resistance harder to crystallise. Equally, such a system 
offers at least the possibility of representation and mediation for those without personal 
wealth or political influence, allowing them to claim upon patrons to resolve disputes 
and to intervene on their behalf. To some, this offers hope for a better outcome than 
could be achieved by going before law courts or government officials as nothing but an 
individual subject; much better to be associated with a fierce category with entangled 
 
25 A friend of mine from an important Karaki family from the south who spoke often about how the 
shaykhs and the qadā ‘ashā’iry (‘tribal judges’) further embedded corruption and a ‘bad political 
culture’ in Jordan grudgingly admitted that when he was dismissed from a job after a fight he only 
got reinstated when his employers found he had been ‘reconciled’ in this way with his combatant. 
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honour. The possibilities offered are perhaps, as Sneath (2007) suggests for various 
legal codes in Mongolia, not so dissimilar to those afforded by being in the retinue or 
household of a feudal noble – and thus under their protection. Yet the protection is not 
just that of the shaykh or patron. Names and their associations, as we have seen, are 
built and maintained through the actions of individuals, but survive and go beyond 
them. The world of nation-states exists now without officially-recognised marches, but 
these states can still contain other forms of sovereignty, encompassing but recognising 
them as in some ways marginal even though encompassed, thus permitting non-state, or 
as Scheele (2019a) calls them ‘state dislike’ spaces and institutions to survive. 
2.4 Conclusion	
In this chapter I have sought to re-examine anthropological treatment of tribe as a 
concept, especially as it pertains to my regional focus. I have suggested that the 
problematic legacy of segmentary theory has obscured the analytical significance of 
ideas of protection and the entanglement of reputations and named categories. By 
looking at the way in which these structures are represented in the legal-bureaucratic 
realm, the electoral system, and the putatively tribal mode of dispute resolution, I 
suggest that we can discern the infrastructures that give a sense of reality and 
permanence to the categories previously interpreted as segmentary. Further, I suggest 
that these categories, following Dresch, are not and were not historically structures 
which predetermine events, but structures within which people act and strategise. In this 
minimal sense, segmentation is stripped down to structures of protection, relation and 
association loosely and variably binding people to names, no longer a ‘theory’ but also 
no longer perhaps so unworkable or so easy a target for demolition.  
 I have argued that the deployment of concepts around tribalism in public life has 
emerged through a set of historical circumstances whereby people and government have 
both relied upon a middle (mutawasīt) level of brokers and patrons, who framed their 
field of claimed sovereignty according to the logic (if not usually the reality) of agnatic 
kinship and genealogical categories. This, I have argued, rests upon partially mutual, 
though often contested, recognition of moral characteristics to do with honour, 
reputation and sovereignty attached to names, which entangle the reputations of 
individuals with those of wider categories. This entanglement of names and reputations 
in turn provides a field within which claims to leadership, and indeed sovereignty, albeit 
of a qualified and nested type, can be made. It is also a channel by which these 
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‘represented’ people, often discursively ‘tribespeople’ or ‘Bedouin’, but potentially 
anybody seeking wāstah make claims on these middle-men for aid and intercession. As 
a form of social organisation, this type of representative sovereignty has the ability to 
adapt and outlast specific events, accommodating and being accommodated by the new 
forms of the nation-state, bureaucratic government, and capitalism, all of which find 
ways of working through it.  
 States have often allied with populations living in spaces who seem less 
potential subjects and more, as Scheele (2019b:201) puts it, subjects of ‘pre-constituted 
socio-political groups’ with their own representatives whose allegiance must be won 
and maintained through a different logic to that of bureaucratically authoritative office-
holder and public-subject (ideally instead that of personal connection) but one no-less 
asymmetrical for that. The appearance of pre-constitution (setting aside its doubtful 
historical reality) is an essential element of the representational strategy of shaykhs and 
more recently of the wāstah, who like Parry’s (2000) entrepreneurial brokers, have an 
interest in representing themselves as uniquely able to understand and work within an 
unchangeable ‘reality’ that resists outside efforts to render it legible. The sovereignty of 
such representatives is thus accepted as co-emergent with but differentiated from the 
state’s, although it may come to reinforce and reproduce the state in various ways, until 
people may see little point in distinguishing between them. This is at once particular to 
this ethnographic context, but also resonates more widely with anthropological theory at 
the intersection of values and ethics with the older traditionally Marxist topics of 
political economy. These meet in the dangerous and productive space of protection, the 
site of generosity but also predation; of commensality but also radical and profound 
asymmetry. I return to this in Chapter 4, where I consider ethnographically a type of this 
protective relationship; hospitality. Firstly though, in the next chapter, I will show how 
asymmetrical these relations can be, and how ideas of protection and of marginal spaces 
at the edges of state reach play out, in the sphere of land. Continuing with the idea of 
infrastructural realities reproducing conceptual ones, and of the historical contingency 
of both, I turn to land as a particularly clear and indeed foundational field of political 
economy.
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 SETTLING LAND, SETTLING PEOPLE; 
SEDENTERISATION, SOCIAL CHANGE AND LAND 
SETTLEMENT IN THE MADABA REGION. 
In the preceding chapter, I built on my historical outline of Jordan, and the place of 
ideas of tribes and Bedouin within it, to suggest the dynamics by which a tribal political 
world of protection and honour is historically reproduced in contemporary Jordan, 
beginning to account for how and why ideas of possessing a name and an association 
with a protected space of partial and differentiated sovereignty retain significance in 
everyday politics and social identification. In this chapter, I will focus specifically on 
how ideas of protected spaces and differentiated sovereignty, but also of growing 
containment and encompassment of such spaces within the nation-state, have emerged 
and been reproduced in my area of study at the more grounded level of land and land 
owning. Here I will explore how past local histories of land registration and settlement, 
and present differences in land value, underlie differences between people and places in 
Jordan, and are essential for understanding the bundle of socio-political associations 
which make ‘ashā’ir as name/space categories distinct from one another.  
Land is also, as I will show, an arena where feelings of profound dislocation and rupture 
are articulated.  
 These associations, and the dislocations emerging out of the creation and 
transformation of the land market, have imbued different groups of people with 
different positions in relation to the nation-state, with varying abilities to capitalise on 
land. Jordan, like most nation-states, has sought to reform society through reforming 
land. The concept of what land is and how it should be used is still evolving in Jordan. 
Land has been central to both state-making and efforts to unsettle and resist the state; 
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from the usufructuary and late-Ottoman system where land had little value, as it was 
plentiful and being tied to the earth was a vulnerability, through the period of British 
colonial domination (1921-1956) where the largest intervention was the imposition of a 
‘rationalised’ system of land settlement, to the rise in more recent periods of speculation 
and urban growth, and concomitant concerns over misuse, degradation, and amoral 
practice. Here as elsewhere in the region, land and property regimes took on special 
significance in modernisation theory as powerful representations and conceptual 
indicators dividing law from custom, individuals from the collective, modernity from 
pre-modern, state from non/pre-state. The economist Hernando De Soto (2000:7) 
frames the problem of development in the ‘Global South’ as one of property).1;  
they have houses but not titles, crops but not deeds, businesses but not 
statutes of incorporation. It is the unavailability of these essential 
representations that explains why [they have not] been able to produce 
sufficient capital to make their domestic capitalism work. 
 Evangelists of free market development argue that full incorporation and participation 
within the global economy depends on turning land into individual and alienable 
productive capital. This incorporation rests upon pragmatic decision-making, rather than 
complex social concerns surrounding land use. I argue that land relations in rural Jordan 
problematise this fable of neoliberalism, raising the possibility that the sort of 
incorporation De Soto sees as essential for development is precisely what people are 
trying to avoid when they refuse to fully accept a single, coherent logic of private 
ownership and land tenure. In short, commodification of land has occurred in Jordan 
because, not in spite, of legal and paralegal ambiguities. 
 To make this argument I return to deep history. James Scott (2010:29) suggests 
parallels between his conception of Zomia (borrowing Schendel’s term for a putative 
socio-cultural region across upland South East Asia) and certain readings of the history 
of Middle Eastern nomads.2 In both cases the current positionality of a recognised 
‘minority’ is built upon a local political history characterised by marginality and 
antipathy regarding urban-based tributary states. In the Scottian view we might see 
pastoralism as purely a technique to avoid ‘being governed’, one rendered decreasingly 
 
1 The titular ‘mystery’ in De Soto’s (2000) book, The Mystery of Capital: why capitalism triumphs in the 
West and fails elsewhere, seems unmysterious for many anthropologists working in places where 
local exploitative conditions seem to be integral components of the West’s ‘triumph’. 
2 Scott (2010:29) connects Zomia to Gellner’s idea of ‘marginal tribalism’ as a ‘political stance’, as 
discussed in Chapter 2. 
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effective by the new technologies of the telegraph, motorcar, aeroplane and modern 
weaponry, and being outcompeted by new modes of production and new types of 
consumer goods in the last century, and turning oscillation between desert and sown 
into ‘one-way traffic’ (Scott 2010:31). However, this has not been the whole story in 
Jordan. As we have seen, ideas of protected if encompassed political forms associated 
with name/spaces have survived technological and economic changes. I instead focus on 
the long, deep interconnections between dawla (‘state’) and Badu and how both formed 
in dialogue with each other. At the centre of this dialogue is the question of who owns 
the land, and who gets to use it. Judith Scheele (2019b) in her discussion of the 
anthropological literature dividing the Bildad al-Makhzan (land of the money box – 
urban, tribute-imposing polities) and the Bilad-as-Siba (centre-less lands of small 
loosely encompassed polities) in the Maghreb points out that relationships between 
them were always intense and intimate, rather than being beyond each other’s reach as 
separate bounded societies or ontological realities. In Jordan too the Bādīyah was 
marginal but within the world of states: urban markets, Ottoman governors and decrees 
from the sultan all feature in Bedouin historical narratives. In both cases, entanglement 
occurs through figures who mediate between both settings, strategically deploying and 
combining techniques and practices form both, and in doing so are able to play a 
political role, often one of leadership. As such, I seek to abandon the implicit ‘bottom-
up-ness’ of group-determination found in Scott’s description of identity formation in the 
Zomia, focusing instead on the relations of power and sovereignty that underlie any 
category of solidarity.3 
   
3.1 Land	and	Moral	Economy:	the	Fayiz	inheritance	
Much of this chapter moves between the ethnographic and the historical, both the broad 
history already introduced, and the specific and history of Jordan’s land regime. This is 
because, when I came across talk of land ethnographically, it was often used to make 
comparisons with the past, express a widespread sense of dislocation and rupture from it 
in the present, and articulate worries about the future. In particular, many Bedouin 
 
3 The question of who it is who decides ‘not to be governed’ is an important one that Scott doesn’t 
satisfactorily answer, though he hints that is may not always be quite so bottom-up and organic as 
in the theoretical model he suggests. Like the English Barons resisting Monarchical authority 
through Magna Carta, talk of freedom from states need not be incongruent with other forms of 
hierarchy and the operation of power over subjects at other (smaller) scales. 
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reliant on selling land (or as we shall see, claims to land) to outsiders feared the long 
term consequences of development and speculation. Desires to create a protected, 
politically and social differentiated tribal and Bedouin space, of the sort discussed in the 
last chapter, are often in tension with the necessities of living and socially reproducing. 
I contend that various discourses around land in Jordan partake of moral as well as 
political economy, mediating the relationship between people and the state, land and the 
market economy. As I will discuss, here and in more detail in Chapter 5, anxieties about 
social reproduction, feckless consumption, and a changing political economy where the 
state is no longer so beholden to East-Banker tribesmen in remote villages, articulate an 
idea of a moral economy in rupture. A morally superior past order, where land was 
socially situated, often communal, and where social goods superseded purely personal 
financial ones (though the two were often one and the same) is felt to have fallen apart. 
The historical reality behind this is, as we shall see, complicated, but nonetheless, many 
Jordanians are finding a discourse of a moral economy resonant. 
  By this I do not mean a unified or single agreed code of economic morality that 
is ‘Jordanian’. Rather, following EP Thompson,4 and Fassin’s (2009) and Edelman’s 
(2012) anthropological adoption of his ideas, I consider how different actors legitimise 
protest and frame dissatisfaction through referencing social norms, obligations, and 
redistributive contracts portrayed as ruptured, broken down or frustrated by an amoral 
elite. I thus use the term ‘moral economy’ to refer to the way various discourses on the 
economy and on the role of the state, and certain dispositions towards economic 
dilemmas that I discuss in more detail in Chapter 5 as ‘images of the good’, inform one 
another.5  
 In the face of mass-migration, and as Jordan’s paternalistic economy is 
subjected to reform, the moral dimension of economic critique becomes heightened. 
 
4 I am thinking particularly of Thompson’s (1963:68) description of rioting ‘legitimized by assumptions 
of an older moral economy, which taught the immorality of…profiteering from the necessities of 
the people’ – assumptions he later described (197:136) as ‘a consistent traditional view of social 
norms and obligations, if the proper functions of various parties within the community’. The use of 
‘assumptions’ here, rather than, for instance, ‘historical memory’ is crucial. The Jordanian past of 
generous shaykhs and interaction and exchange between known and mutually respecting and 
honourable subjects must be taken in the same light.  
5 As Edelman has suggested, Thompson seems to have had two interrelated meanings of ‘moral’ in moral 
economy in mind, at least by his later ‘revisit’ (Thompson 1991). Firstly and most obviously as 
‘mores’, customary and normative values, historically contingent and embedded within a social 
context, and secondly a more future-orientated, even utopian ‘principled stance vis-à-vis society, 
the world, and especially the common good’ (Edelman 2012:55). These two meanings, of both a 
contingent custom and an image of the good, seem very much present when Jordanians talk of 
social contracts and broken bargains.  
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Jordan’s stability is premised on ideas of equitable land distribution and social contract, 
but this contract, ‘written’ in a world of tribes and pastoralists is increasingly presented 
as fraying (Tell 2013) in a nation of 10 million overwhelmingly urban subjects, 6 a 
majority of whom are from other places, driven to Jordan by war and instability.7 
Disgruntled descendants of Jordan’s pre-1948 population, the so-called awalad al-bilad 
(sons of the land) or ‘East-Bankers’ still include major landowners, especially in rural 
areas, but many are also now landless.  
 Talk of contracts broken extends beyond those struggling with economic 
precarity, like graduates in Dhiban, to former-elites under pressure from economic 
reforms (such as income tax changes) who use talk of broken deals and a fairer past to 
build potential broad solidarities. Within nationalist Jordanian opposition politics two 
assumptions have come to the fore: a tribal past with land held for the common good of 
co-members of name/space categories and a social contract between the Hashemite 
regime and the tribes. The vision of the moral economy here is not egalitarian; it looks 
back to a past of customary law portrayed as just or fair, but relying on a claim to 
legitimacy involving notions of social role and mutual obligation – a hierarchical world 
of clear duties and obligations. To recast this as a blueprint for an egalitarian future 
where the means of production are redistributed is a move in tension with its own 
foundations.  
 Certain figures have been particularly adept at handling this tension, and making 
use of such a discourse of moral economy. A pertinent example is that of Hind al-Fayiz. 
When I interviewed the opposition politician and former parliamentary representative of 
the Bani Sakhr’s constituency (the central Bādīyah), she quoted (in English) the popular 
aphorism ‘to the king the Bedouin are a blanket; when he is cold, he pulls us close; 
when he gets hot, he casts us away’. The aphorism reflects the notion that Bedouin have 
been cast as loyal supporters of the king (especially in moments of crisis like Black 
September), and as a reservoir of tradition from which to build a national culture, but 
the king has not rewarded this loyalty, as state employment and subsidies on which they 
rely economically have declined. This sentiment, she said, was why she was able to 
draw upon broad support in Bedouin areas.  
 
6 According to the Jordanian Department of Statistics (2019).  
7 Palestinians in 1948, 1967 and the 1970s, Iraqis in 1991 and 2006, and recently around 1.8 million 
Syrian refugees (UNHCR 2016:4). 
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  Hind’s mighty family, the paramount shaykhs of the Bani Sakhr, benefited 
greatly under Hashemite rule, claiming huge tracts of arid land for development in 
return for political support. Hind’s own position is a complicated one, as despite her 
own opposition politics and close association with leading figures in the Hirak protest 
movements, she owes some of her political capital to her place in one of Jordan’s most 
prominent shaykhly lineages. Her father Hakim was a grandson of Mithqal al-Fayiz, the 
paramount Sukhur shaykh during the Mandate period and a key ‘tribal’ ally of Amir 
Abdullah. Hakim, as the son of Mithqal’s eldest son, was regarded by many as his 
political heir, and inherited large areas of land and several houses in the Fayiz village of 
Um al-‘Amad (described in the next chapter). However Hakim was himself a committed 
Arab nationalist and Ba’ath party member in Syria, and as such a prominent critic of 
British imperialism and, by extension, the Hashemite house. He fell into disfavour with 
President Hafez al-Assad and spent twenty-three years as a political prisoner in 
Damascus, including for most of Hind’s childhood. During this time his inherited lands 
were managed by the wider family, and Akif, a younger son of Mithqal, came to 
dominate family business (although without the title of paramount shaykh). Hind told 
me that at one point the Syrian Government had offered to repatriate Hakim to Jordan, 
but she said, Akif, Faisal and their network, well-placed in government, pushed King 
Hussein to refuse, concerned that if their cousin returned, long-settled questions of 
inheritance and leadership within the Sukhur, and of land ownership, would be 
reopened.  
 When Hakim returned, he remained a left-leaning critic of the Government and 
of his family, and though he tried to stand for parliament in 2003 as a Ba’athist, he was 
blocked by the court; on the grounds that as a Bedouin and a Sukhur he could only stand 
for election in the central Bādīyah, whose electorate is defined by possessing a Sukhur 
name. Hind herself, who continues elements of her father’s activism, also sought to 
stand as an independent radical in an open seat in the capital, but yet again was forced 
instead to stand for her own Bani Sakhr Bedouin seat, which includes a quota for 
women. As discussed later in the next chapter, Hind sees the Bedouin quota seats as 
degrading and problematic, rather than as evidence of influence and patronage, as do 
some other Bani Sakhr with whom I spoke. Hind herself is critical of her wider family 
and its past of violent predatory land acquisitions. However, it is telling that despite her 
profound political differences, her al-Fayiz relatives and other figures of influence in the 
wider Sukhur did come out to support her election in 2013 – presumably prioritising 
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blood, or rather a name, over politics. While thus in some ways resisting the ideas of 
protected sovereignty and Bedouin political identity on which her family’s position 
rests, she told me it was this historical position that allowed her to speak out: 
I have the right, I have the legacy... I told the crowd at Karak in 2016 “the 
king has not bought us as slaves. We took in his family so they could settle 
disputes between us, not sell the country from under us. They came not with 
a sword in their hands but seeking protection”.  
The Hashemite house here are cast as guests who have usurped their hosts; a classic 
trope of Bedouin narratives of power changes following the political logic of hospitality 
described by Andrew Shryock (2019b). The use of ‘us’ in this context, though, is 
significant, invoking solidarity across all East-Banker tribes, including those in Karak. 
In other contexts, talk of ‘us’ might apply only to those who directly benefited from this 
unwritten contract – like Hind’s own family. The ‘us’ who make alliances with the state 
and the king through interpersonal association rather than law or Bureaucratic process, 
and who expect access to the core of the body politic, is defined by lineage, personal 
connection, wealth and power. It extends outwards in theory but not always in practice 
via acts of patronage and representation to Bedouin households living off small 
pensions, government salaries or land sales in small concrete houses in remote villages. 
I argue that it is not the existence of such elites that is an innovation or ‘perversion’ of 
the old egalitarian solidarity of Badu ‘ashā’ir, but rather the idea of undifferentiated 
communality. Yet a dislocation in the field of moral economy remains an important 
discourse, more than a hegemonic manipulation by elites, articulated thorough 
differences in land ownership.   
 
3.2 Historicising	the	Land	System	
Before returning to the nature of this dislocation it is necessary to explain some of the 
historical and legal background to Jordanians’ relationship to land and land ownership. 
This is for three main reasons. 
 Firstly, this is because this history reveals much of the nature of contemporary 
political economy in my field site, and shows in particular how the various associations 
and practices of name/space categories, Bedouin identity, patronage and representative 
sovereignty are reproduced. We see in land the successive marks of imperial and post-
colonial reforms, seeking to create, control, render legible and finally to ‘liberalise’ and 
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marketise, land-as-property; in each case though compromising in the face of local 
political realities, when faced with the marginal gains from complete penetration of 
marginal places. We can see here the limitations of such interventions and processes, as 
the older dynamics they in part transform nevertheless adapt and work through them, 
including notions of name/space protection and representative sovereignty built on 
techniques of interpersonal association. In fact, as already implied in the reference to De 
Soto, it is often through such processes of repurposing and creative ambiguity that such 
interventions take place, and succeed in their aims as far as they do.  
 Secondly, because long-term relations to land are essential to understanding the 
historical contingencies reproducing name/space categories in contemporary Jordan, 
and thus also their positionality in the nation-state. The socio-political and economic 
power of the ashīrah of al-Fayiz rests not on age-old tribal loyalties pre-determined by 
kinship and segmentation, but rather emerges from specific circumstances, whereby the 
shaykhly lineage of al-Fayiz used their position as intermediaries with the Ottoman 
authorities (over matters such as the Hajj escort) to convert their reputation into land 
holdings, firstly through registering large personal estates, then through claiming 
Sukhur grazing land as personal property. As implied, land prices and socio-political 
reputations in the present rest on historical contingencies to do with where nomads 
grazed long before the existence of the capital city of Amman, as well as with the 
settlement policies of successive imperial governments, and the acquisitiveness of past 
shaykhs. This is a theme that I return to in Chapter 6, when considering why it is that 
youths form some names and places, such as the Hamaydah in Dhiban and Jabal Bani 
Hamida, often take part in radical anti-regime political protests, while others, such as 
the Sukhur in Madaba and the surrounding villages, do not, instead demonstrating over 
supposed matters of ‘honour’ and in fact often in strategic ways that seek to ensure 
continued state patronage. Interviewing Muhamad Abu Salih, an important sheep- and 
wool-trader in the poor and remote Jabal Bani Hamida, who is staunchly pro-monarchy 
and opposed to Hirak, I asked why the youth in Dhiban protest unlike the Sukhur in 
nearby towns. He explained that the key was land. The Sukhur land across Wadi 
Haydan was worth three-times as much as his own family’s land. Fayiz land in Um al-
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‘Amad and around the Airport is worth 15,000 dinars per dunum.8 In Jabal Bani 
Hamida un-irrigated pastureland is worth 3-4,000 per dunum. Agriculturally he told me 
the Jabal was better, with richer pasture and more natural water. Distance to Amman, 
development and most intangibly reputation accounted for this difference. This he 
suggested is why Bani Sakhr landowners remained largely behind or neutral towards the 
Government, as land sales shielded them from the impoverishing economic reforms felt 
by the Hamaydah and others. Their reputation and close association with power also 
aided them in land disputes. In this way, both ideas of historical continuity around long-
term reputation, and specific historical events, are essential to understanding current 
relations to land, and therefore the material underpinnings of name/space associations, 
which while always adaptable to historical contingencies, largely turn on the idea of 
protection, and especially the protection by and for those sharing a name of the means 
of production.  
 Thirdly and relatedly, it is through land that we see that the ‘Bedouin Villages’ 
of Madaba are, like al-Fayiz paramountcy, not timeless, naturalised social facts, and 
nor, contra Scott, can they be seen as emerging entirely through processes of state 
refusal and the egalitarian autonomy of nomads – in short, through bottom-up 
processes. Rather this setting, as exemplified in al-Fayiz ownership of vast land 
holdings, is one whose construction bears the mark of power, inequality and hierarchy; 
that of imperial and national rulers, and that of their local intermediaries who have 
grown up around the margins.  
 During the Ottoman period, the area now Jordan was a loosely incorporated 
frontier region, parts of which were nominally within Ottoman provinces. The few 
urban centres and settled communities of cultivators, often living in tents seasonally, 
were often obliged to pay khuwa (tribute or protection money) to locally dominant 
Bedouin polities (often in kind as grains) to ensure their safety. Settled registered 
villages were subject to occasional Ottoman tax collection expeditions. This double-
exploitation of the peasantry discouraged registration, permanent settlement and 
cultivation, so that even many cultivators lived in tents rather than permanent villages to 
avoid tax collectors, and many others seem at least in part relied on the greater mobility 
 
8 The dunum is an ancient Turko-Byzantine measure of surface area retained from the Ottoman period, 
corresponding to roughly one quarter of an acre. This measure is used in all official sources, 
although colloquially for much of the last two centuries people in the region have favoured the 
feddan as a measure for agricultural land – traditionally a non-surface area measure corresponding 
to the land that a single ox team could plough in a day (the term feddan means ‘ox yoke’ in classical 
Arabic). 
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and protectability of flocks (Rogan 2002). It seems that this time saw a general increase 
in the importance of ‘ashīrah categories of name/space in peoples’ lives, as the need for 
protection and mediation in the face of raiders (whether Bedouin or tax-farmers bearing 
Ottoman licenses) became greater.  
 This area had a series of overlapping, competing conceptions of land, in which 
various claims and obligations could be made for usage, rather than absolute ownership. 
Most cultivated land, (in Ottoman legal theory, owned by the sultan who allowed it to 
be cultivated in return for taxes) was managed communally through a system of shares 
called musha’, whereby instead of households owning specific plots of land, they 
owned a number of shares (Fischbach 2000). Shaykhs and the heads of leading families 
would divide up all the land around a village by shares and allocate temporary plots to 
shareholders, rotating them every few years. As well as shareholders many people 
worked as murabaiyin ‘quarter-ers’ – labourers paid with a quarter of what they 
harvested (Abu Jaber 1989:74). 
 Beyond the zone of cultivation, nomadic pastoralists continued the concept of 
dira, had which any member could use for grazing, but which outsiders could only use 
with permission. This concept of territoriality is temporal as well as geographic 
(Lancaster and Lancaster 1986, 1990); dira is also a zone of permitted movement, 
through which pastoralists and their flocks move with the seasons and with rainfall 
responding to economic and ecological circumstances. 9 Generally, small herds of a few 
dozen animals were permitted to use another’s dira even without formal permission, 
and armed groups from very strong categories, such as the Rwala and the Bani Sakhr 
grazed the lands of others by force. Wells and springs, more important than land itself, 
were more closely controlled and associated with the shaykhly lineages, as guardians, 
builders and maintainers of wells. Under the Hima system land was carefully managed, 
normally at the level of the khamsah (those with a common agnate within five 
generations, sharing coilability in matters of honour and disputes), with acknowledged 
ways of setting land aside as a reserve for drought or to allow recovery (Shoup 1990). 
  From the mid-nineteenth century the Ottoman Empire undertook military 
expansion and formalisation of rule in these borderlands as part of the empire-wide 
 
9 Different groups had a customary or acknowledged claim to use grazing lands at different times of year. 
For instance, the lands south of Madaba, towards the village of Ma’in, were originally grazed by 
Sukhur in the summer months when they came west from the Eastern Desert and in the winter 
various Balgawiya ashā’ir, like the Shuwabkah and the Ajarmah, who in turn went north or into the 
Ghor for the summer months.  
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Tanzimāt. Reforming land was central, introducing land registration and a unified 
empire-wide land code (Deringil 1998, Rogan 2002). The land laws of 1858 were 
applied to Jordan by expansionary governors in Damascus in the 1860s-1880s, 
attempting to regularise the existing Ottoman Turkish legal categories for different 
types of ownership and usufructuary rights with local practices. 10 The majority of 
cultivated land was theoretically miri, where final absolute ownership (ruqa’a – ‘the 
neck’) rested with the sultan, but where inheritable usufructuary rights to cultivation 
were gained by enclosing and farming the land, paying tax and a fee for tapu –
registration (Fischbach 2000). Unregistered and uncultivated land, such as steppe and 
desert, but also agricultural land that had fallen out of use was considered mawat 
(‘dead’), but could be claimed as miri if enclosed, irrigated for two years and registered. 
Most of modern Jordan and almost all the Bedouin land fell into this category. If land 
was no longer cultivated, the registration was voided. To encourage registration 
Ottoman governors awarded some unregistered Bedouin land near to ancient, ruined 
cities (to serve as building material) in the Balga to settler-cultivators; Circassians at 
Amman and Christians at Madaba, resettled as a town for the first time in a millennium.  
 The late nineteenth century saw a general expansion of cultivation in the Balga, 
with intensification of cereal cultivation, large-scale ploughing and a return to wheeled 
transport for bulk goods, coupled with military suppression of various bedouin 
rebellions. This period is still referred to by some as fataha al-ard the ‘opening of the 
land’ (Abu Jaber 1989). The old town of Salt expanded with new Nabulsi investment 
and with a thriving business selling ash (collected by Bedouin in the desert) for the soap 
industry, gained Ottoman protection, ceased paying khuwa to the Bani Sakhr and threw 
out their Bedouin shaykhly overlords form the ‘Adwan from the castle (ibid.). The Abu 
Jaber family of Salt were especially active in the Madaba region, establishing the large 
Yadudah estate. By agreement with successive al-Fayiz shaykhs they came to farm or 
provide manpower for much of the cultivatable land within the Sukhur dira. The Sukhur 
rightly feared that if they did not cultivate land they would lose it to those who would 
and so began to register land themselves, especially Fandi and his son Sattam, the 
nominal paramount shaykhs, but soon followed by many other Bedouin in the area. 
With external credit and new techniques, they established a series of large estates, 
 
10 The 1858 Land Code, once seen as the beginning of ‘modernity’ in Greater Syria was more a 
recognition of pre-existing developments than a radical reform, recent historians have argued, and 
in fact ‘neither contradicted co-ownership nor required its dissolution’ (Firestone, 1990:106). 
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farmed by slaves and migrant labourers; the origin of many of the Bedouin villages. 
This period is remembered as the time when the Bedouin villages and current land 
division began, as khirbāt (tell sites and ruined late-antique cores) were registered and 
resettled as the nuclei of new agricultural settlements. For instance, Marwan, my young 
Mutirāt interlocutor from the university of Jordan, told me of the case of his ancestor 
Muhamad Abu Faris of the Mutirāt, who in compensation for the loss of land he 
claimed around Madaba to the Christians, was given permission by Sattam al-Fayiz to 
claim a khirbah on which to build a new agricultural ‘village’ at Dulaīlat, which became 
known as Dulaīlat Mutirāt, still the centre of that ‘ashīrah. This time saw the expansion 
also of the musha’ system into areas where it had not been used previously, sometimes 
formally, but more often informally, as new cultivators looked for local social 
precedents to share resources.  
 Abu Jaber (1989:82) summarises the situation in this dynamic period of 
agricultural expansion: ‘generally a claim was announced by a shaykh either for himself 
or his tribe, to a khirbah or large area of cultivatable land, and if uncontested by any 
stronger shaykh or tribe the acquisition became final [through registering with the 
Turks]’. Sattam al-Fayiz famously rode up to nineteen khirbāt in the area east of 
Madaba and claimed them as his by firing a shot into the air; still sometimes called ‘the 
bullet villages’. This land had previously been rangeland used by his ‘fellow’ Bani 
Sakhr. Displays of force were generally combined with willingness to use official and 
customary forms of legal discourse. Clearly the conceptual value of land, and crucially 
of registering it, had risen. The environment had changed from one where herds and 
those who controlled them had the advantage (imposing khuwa payments on villagers 
and avoiding payments to others, through threat of force or by moving away) to one 
where even the strongest noble camel-herding Badu in the area were at first investing 
and later taking part in cereal agriculture.  
 The establishment of the British Mandate over Trans Jordan led to even greater 
changes. Land reform was to be the largest colonial intervention, taking the Mandate 
‘into literally every village’ (Fischbach, 2000:2), and together with the Arab Legion and 
the Bedouin Control Laws it was part of a central raft of policies aimed at expanding 
cultivation and settling (using the British colonial meaning of sedenterising and 
pacifying) Jordan’s Bedouin. There is considerable literature looking at the colonial 
concern with land, especially in the Arab World, starting with Algeria. Gilsenan (1982) 
follows Bourdieu in arguing for the aesthetics of land domination, which sought 
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‘rationality, linearity, order, visibility, uniformity.’ The French in Algeria remain the 
exemplars, Marshall Bugead famously ordered his administrators to ‘bit by bit, get them 
to use our money’ especially in land sales (Gallois 2017:1). It seems that in Jordan the 
British believed that communal land holdings (to varying degrees both musha’ and dira) 
disincentivised investment, improvement and production increases, and allowed 
shaykhs and notables too much power as custodians and arbiters of land disputes (Peake 
1928, Glubb 1932). 
 Fischbach states that the British applied to land ‘two fundamental assumptions’. 
The first was that all land was owned by someone, the second that land should be 
managed efficiently to maximise its productive potential (2000:79). A British 
programme of cadastral survey sought to institutionalise private property with a 
precision never before attempted. All cultivated land was assigned by the state to 
individuals, while ownership of uncultivated land remained ambiguous and largely a 
matter of precedent. The British-organised survey was limited to areas of rain-fed 
agriculture (Figures 3.1-3.4 - note the survey map corresponds to the area of Jordan 
with sufficient rainfall for irrigated agriculture).  
 The British Mandate appointed in 1926 Ernst MacCloud Dowson, who 
recommended a full fiscal and cadastral survey. He also recommended imposing the 
Torrens System, developed in Australia, and applied in Egypt and other colonial 
contexts. This forced claimants to register the land centrally, with a state body as the 
final arbiter, rather than the British system of keeping personal title deeds that could be 
disputed in court. Though most of the 1858 Ottoman Land Laws and the Ottoman 
categories of land were maintained as precedents, Dowson favoured reform as well as 
codification and standardization. He described tribal ownership and the musha’ system, 
as well as wider forms of ‘socially-controlled’ land as ‘a severe obstacle to 
development’ (Fischbach 2000:81) and areas with low individual ownership were 
targeted between 1927-1933 by the survey teams conducting Jordan’s first fiscal survey.  
 Local teams headed by British trained surveyors armed with theodolite and 
plane table created a 1/10,000 scale cadastral map, followed by hearings to establish 
taswiya, ‘settlement’. Through mapping village boundaries and the division of land into 
hawd, ‘basins’, units of roughly equal value, final absolute ownership was theoretically 
established. The state then issued a sanad, a deed of ownership, with the ultimate proof 
residing in the central land registry.  
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 Though the division of lands by the British is usually remembered as a fair 
process (Fischbach 2000), especially in areas where small-holding predominated, a 
series of political considerations crept into decision making in the Madaba region, 
where a system of plantation and quasi-manorial villages were subject to land claims by 
politically or militarily significant elites like the Bani Sakhr, and where, as we have 
seen, appropriation by shaykhs was common. The Sukhur villages were surveyed 
individually in the early 1930s, before the general survey reached them, as it was feared 
disputes over land had the potential to damage the Government and its tentative alliance  
Figure 3.1-Figure 3.4 (clockwise from top left). 3.1: The original scope of the survey  
(reproduced from Fischbach 2000:56). 3.2: Part of an early 1/10000 Cadastral map of Amman 
(DLS). 3.3: Vegetation and precipitation map of Jordan (reproduced from CIA World Factbook 
2007). 3.4: Photograph of Jordanian survey in progress in the field using plane table, alidade 



















with Mithqal al-Fayiz (Fischbach, personal communication, village notes). Certain key 
shaykhs like Mithqal were awarded thousands of dunum, and thus became complicit 
and reliant on the state for their position. The villages on these lands often still have an 
unclear status, with families within them having paid to register land that might also be 
registered to these shaykhs and their descendants. One interlocutor said ‘the villages 
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around here were unfair from the beginning – the British intended 400 dunum per 
family, whether shaykh or herder. But the shaykh took 6,000 dunum and we got four 
each’.  
 There are many tales of disruption and trickery as families with little experience 
with documentary government struggled to produce (supposedly Ottoman) documentary 
claims to aid their cases. There was, most agree, a steep rise in indebtedness and 
landlessness among normal people who via ‘owning’ land-as-property were suddenly 
able to access capital, as Glubb later noted with concern, fearing the Bedouin would 
become indebted urbanites (Glubb 1933). In the longer term, Fischbach (2000) argues, 
this resulted in a slow but noticeable decrease in the equity of distribution and a rise in 
inequality, though never to the degree of Syria or Egypt.   
 From 1932-1938 Glubb sent monthly reports to the Arab Legion HQ, devoting 
considerable attention to the Bani Sakhr villages. He reported with satisfaction 
increased cultivation as a positive development in Sukhur villages, especially as some 
Sukhur began farming themselves, and soon police stations were established in the 
region, at Ziziya and then at Um al-‘Amad (Glubb 1932, 1938, 1939). Many herders 
had lost everything in the pre-war years due to Wahabi Ikhwan raids from Najd, loss of 
winter grazing when the Mandate surrendered Wadi Sirhan to Najd, drought and a 
general price depression, coming to rely ever more on government relief work and 
military salaries, as well as direct aid from Glubb (Glubb 1932). Simultaneously, as 
Glubb’s forces were increasingly able to suppress raiding and to prevent major attacks, 
the khuwa system of tributary payments from protected cultivators largely ended, and 
this significant channel by which Bedouin accessed goods from the settled zone, 
including subsistence carbohydrates, was blocked off. Thus the Government was in part 
responsible for collapsing the pastoral economy and then alleviating the worst effects, 
creating a long-term relationship of dependency.  
 Larger changes were implied by the enforcement of land principles, which 
though having precedents in Ottoman and Islamic Law, were applied in new ways and 
to new areas. Crucially, as only cultivated or built on land could be registered, wider 
senses of dira, although not directly suppressed, were also not protected by law. While 
summer camps and land holdings were within the bounds of settlement, and often 
involved sufficient planting and watering, and could thus be registered, in general the 
vast areas of winter grazing and the paths taken to them each year were not (Fischbach 
2000). As such, the area previously merely constituting a summer residence for herding 
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families became the centre of their established land ownership, and therefore of ideas of 
dira. Yet, as we shall see, wider claims to land based on older ideals never fully 
subsided, and traces live on, even in legal practices, where nebulous ideas of influence 
and rights form usage are still used in court, as settlement has expanded outwards.  
 In 1952, the first full census was taken listing numbers and types of habitation in 
every known settlement (Fischbach 2000). Um al-Walid had no permanent structures 
beyond animal shelters in the ruins of the khirbāt, despite being settled in 1934 and 
home to 25 families living in tents. The entire Sukhur area had 352 permanent houses, 
and 2000 tents. Only in Huwara, Manja and Um al-‘Amad were permanent buildings 
used by around half the population (DoS 1952). Um Ahmed, Hamid’s elderly great-
aunt, told me that the first houses built in the ruins of Um al-Walid were for storage, 
people found tents more spacious and comfortable. Permanent larger houses were built 
in the 1960s, and by 1970 Um al-Walid was connected to electricity and telephone lines 
with a village school and health clinic. By this time, most families stopped seasonal 
migration, in order to not miss out on these services or pension payments.  
 In contrast to the Sukhur villages, interviewees of similar age in the Hamaydah 
villages of Mukawir and ad-Dīr reported both villages were several decades old by the 
1952 census, though most inhabitants either went into the Ghor (the hot low-lying 
Jordan Valley) or the Bādiyah seasonally with their flocks. Electricity and piped water 
arrived only in the 1990s. Many two-room houses were abandoned slowly in this period 
in favour of multi-room, multi-floor homes for several related nuclear families. More 
common has been the slow addition of rooms, stairways and outbuildings every few 
years when money is available. During a visit to beneficiaries of the Bani Hamida 
weaving NGO in Mukawir, one friend of Halima’s showed me with pride a staircase her 
family had built following a recent windfall, going nowhere, but signalling their 
intention to add another floor for a married son. In similar fashion, villages have 
expanded piecemeal, growing onto land which then has to be re-registered. As this 
process continued, the Bedouin villages in the Madaba region came to be settled, 
permanent habitations; increasingly connected to national systems of infrastructure and 
services, legally owned and lived in by citizen-subjects under national law and market 
forces. But beneath the surface, much remained unsettled. 
 Through successive reforms of the land system, ideas of land being tied in ways 
other than private ownership to name/space entities have persisted. This has both been 
reflected in and shaped by state legal regimes. Since independence in 1946 the 
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Government has offered some sort of recognition to ideas of ‘tribal’ land beyond mere 
technical legal registration, especially in unsurveyed areas where registration remained 
rare, even while maintaining its own pre-eminence as a land-owner. Since then, even as 
older ideas of dira lost tangible and material political and economic meaning and 
become largely discursive, the concept of wajihah - from an Arabic root meaning ‘face’ 
- came to prominence. Originally used to refer to officially-accepted grazing routes 
under the Ottomans, it came now to mean that specific ‘ashā’ir could claim customary 
usage rights over land that was technically miri (i.e. state land), and which was usually 
not legally registered elsewhere, and as such the state would not challenge their usage 
and a general proprietorial claim of interest, without prior consultation (see Al Naber 
and Molle 2016). In practice this worked more in some areas and with some people than 
others. Those form powerful or politically sensitive families (like the Sukhur, and 
especially the al-Fayiz) invested in local land and with reputations were predictably 
better able to make use of this paralegal category than others. The consequences of such 
ambiguities have been significant, as we shall see, especially to efforts to create a 
functioning national land market.  
3.3 The	Consequences	and	the	Limitations	of	Settlement	
As we have seen, attempts to settle the Bedouin villages of Madaba and render them 
legible have met with mixed and often unintended results. By the 1952 land survey, 
changing legal and social infrastructures of land ownership were already transforming 
the agricultural landscape of the area, as well as the social. Central to both 
transformations was access to water. The Sukhur shaykhs who got into plantation 
farming and registration since the 1880s had already taken the best rain-fed land in the 
north-west of the Sukhur dira, while those form humbler backgrounds who settled later 
registered land further east. This put further economic pressure on families to diversify 
out form pastoralism and agriculture and into salaried work in the military and 
government, so that some family members with regular incomes could support their 
families through hard years. In order to claim and register land, families often tried 
some irrigated agriculture. This was not a general expansion of the desert sown line as 
envisaged by Ottoman and colonial rulers, but rather smaller isolated enclosures. To 
irrigate such enclosures in areas ever further east where seasonal rainfall becomes 
unpredictable, required every greater expense. Wells south and east of Madaba regularly 
need to reach a depth of 500 meters to hit water, and even then supplies can be short-
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lived and intermittent. To sink a well for most requires selling land or borrowing 
money. I was told of one Hamaydah army officer who had spent over 50,000 dinars on 
sinking a deep well in the 1980s, which was now producing salty water, useless to his 
fruit trees.  
  Relatedly, the replacement of the musha’ system (where land was owned 
communally via shares) with individual ownership resulted in a surge of tree-planting 
(Palmer 1999), especially olive trees. Planting trees has long been associated with 
inheritance (turāth) permanence and steady income. Trees were considered property of 
families or households, not larger units, even when on communal land (Palmer 1999), 
which made their planting politically difficult in Musha’ villages. Tree-planting 
accelerated post-settlement, as a way of materialising new claims to land, offering the 
chance of larger profits but also requiring considerable water. In particular, the 1970s 
and 1980s saw an explosion of olive-growing in particular in the Jabal Bani Hamida 
(Jones 2006) but also in Sukhur villages. As rain-irrigated land – snapped up earlier in 
registration by those with the political clout to do so – ever greater effort, investment 
and risk was involved in planting trees and irrigating them on land which received 
sufficient rainfall only intermittently. I heard several accounts of men who had been 
convinced to plant trees by several years of good rainfall where neighbours had made 
large profits, only for future drier years to require expensive irrigation. The former 
world of nucleated villages around old ruined khirbāt core, of open cereal strip fields 
has been replaced by sprawling mixture of residences and enclosures dotted with trees.  
 Much Sukhur land (less among the Hamaydah) is by a few rich families, either 
those of shaykhs or also now outside city-dwellers. This land is often farmed by 
Hauranis and Egyptians or else hobby-farmed, and was either registered by shaykhs 
early on or bought from Bedouin selling it off to fund weddings, house-building, 
education and other expenses of social reproduction. Um al-‘Amad, traditionally the 
headquarters of al-Fayiz shaykhs, is now, as we shall see in the next chapter, a 
sprawling mass of mansions and villas, overlooking irrigated enclosures worked by 
foreign labourers. Pastoralists have largely disappeared from the landscape here, at a 
supposed centre of Sukhur Bedouin power. Small-scale freehold farming of the sort the 
Mandate imagined is less and less viable as subsidies vanish, costs rise and irrigation 
becomes unaffordable for those without access to capital. Hind al-Fayiz, in an 
interview, told me that regularly normal shepherds complain to her of the ‘mega-flocks’ 
operated by businessmen, like the international oil magnate Ziyad Manasīr and other 
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rich entrepreneurs, using Syrian labour and expertise, which now dominate the 
commercial domestic meat industry. ‘These men [ordinary Bedouin] often now have, 
three or four animals, and they are trying to sell, but they are being outcompeted by 
Manasīr. This is shameful, how can he compete with these people?’. The few huge 
commercial herds are normally part of diversified financial portfolios, and so can afford 
to truck in water and barley during years with low rainfall, while many ordinary herders 
are forced to sell or decrease the size of their herds. Bedouin pastoralism like olive-
growing is primarily now for consumption and sale within extended social networks, 
rather than to a public market. Pasture-land ironically is relatively plentiful as large 
areas of cultivation are no longer regularly sown except for forage, as cereal growing is 
no longer cost-effective even as the market and feed-price have made pastoralism for 
meat and dairy economically impossible. 
 As the economy of the Bedouin villages moved away from pastoralism, there 
was a corresponding shift in what made land valuable. While once land with good 
grazing and permanent water sources was most valuable for the winter dwelling, with 
the decoupling of economic productivity from the land’s innate properties, new 
concerns emerged, such as nearness to the capital and to major roads . Sukhur villages 
saw military employment become the central economic activity by the early 1950s. 
Every family I knew had at least one member in or retired from the military. Many 
Hamaydah did too, especially those in the Jabal and Mleih and Libb (less from Dhiban) 
and showed me pictures with pride of their service as UN Peacekeepers. These jobs, 
especially for the well-networked among the Sukhur, led to other Government and court 
appointments.11 Pensions required an address and also regular visits to various urban 
offices. While some successful government-employees moved to Amman, it became 
common as roads improved for men to commute daily to Amman from the nearer 
Bedouin villages, often via Madaba – a journey of over an hour. Every morning Hamid 
left Um al-Walid at 5am to take a bus to Madaba, where he would buy a snack and 
coffee and wait for a free ministry bus to take him to the Ministry of Finance. 
 With this shift, the land which Bedouin ‘ashā’ir had historically occupied (based 
on quite different considerations and under different historical circumstances) and had 
 
11 Following King Hussein’s decision in the 1980s to send ‘Government out into the Governorates’, low-
skilled ministerial employment, for instance in the Agricultural or Municipal Ministry became 
significant. This was when Khalid in ar-Rama found work in the Municipal Ministry as a labourer 
and later administrator, allowing him to expand his house with a separate dīwān and invest in a 
tourism business. Workers in these areas rolled out services to remote former-pastoral communities. 
Again, the Jabal was more excluded by its geography than Sukhur villages to the East of Madaba. 
Chapter 3: Settling Land, Settling People; sedenterisation, social change and land settlement in the Madaba 
region. 
Frederick Wojnarowski –April 2020   123 
thus been able to claim during settlement, took on new significance. In particular the 
differences in the political economy of the Sukhur and the Hamaydah, both Bedouin 
awalad al-balad (‘children of the land’) – a phrase meaning ‘original’ East-Banker 
Jordanians, often considered the natural supporters and beneficiaries of the royal house– 
grew much larger. This hints at how ‘ashīrah-type name/space categories come to be 
used to think and talk about the geographical and social landscape, as well as how 
particular cleavages and associations within them are historically contingent. But 
equally, the interior histories of resentment and alternative historical narratives within 
the Sukhur (seen in Section 2.1), suggest other ways in which people categorise and 
think about groups in social life, also based on this realignment of conceptual 
geography. The difference in wealth, and conceptual geography, between the mansion-
lined Fayiz village of Um al-‘Amad and the Dahamshah village of Um al-Walid, where 
I spent much of my time, is as wide in many respects as between Mukawir in the Jabal 
and Um al-Walid.  
 As discussed, ambiguities still haunt the land system. In theory, the legible, 
centralised system of land registration, settlement and arbitration brought in by the 
Mandate is still the basis for Jordan’s land system (notwithstanding some major 
reforms, including ending the status of miri land in 2015). Citizens still interreact with 
the system via the Department of Land and Survey - da’irah al-arady wa al-masāha- 
(DLS), still in its original Mandate-era building on Jabal al-Wabdah. Yet the building is 
entered by appointment only, and access to the registers restricted. I managed to gain 
access to the building through politely asking guards who I might talk to arrange an 
appointment to discuss my research. On the first occasion, I was led to the 
communications official, who over coffee in a vast tiled room showed me various 
photographs and items from the original Mandate survey, as well as on a computer the 
current anonymised cadastral map – items he hoped would satisfy my curiosity. I asked 
if I might see the settlement files, as I knew others, including Fischbach had in the 
1990s. I was told it might be possible, but I would need to see the director, and would 
need various permissions and credentials. I got these together and visited again on 
several occasions. I exchanged pleasantries and swapped business-cards with good-
natured officials to no avail. I was always told to come back later. In the end, Michael 
Fischbach kindly sent me his own notes on the Sukhur villages form his visit. The 
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refusal of my requests to view archival materials shows how sensitive land registration 
remains.12  
 As mentioned above, the post-colonial government in Jordan has equivocated 
about recognising the concept of wajahāt (tribal land claims to miri or state land). Since 
independence however much miri land has been registered, enclosed, cultivated or 
seized. Claims and counter claims have proliferated. In 2011 matters calm to a head 
with mass protests calling for a return of land, to its rightful ‘ashīrah owners, and 
landless unemployed young men blocked major highways to demand redistribution (Al 
Naber and Molle 2016). We will return to these protests in more detail below. The 
important point for now is that while promising on several occasions to re-examine the 
ownership of wajihāt and bedouin land claims more broadly, no conclusive settlement 
or method has yet been found to do so. Since 2011 the king has indeed distributed much 
Miri land to tribal owners, but never in a way which clears up the general legal and 
political situation of this land in a consistent way, but beyond statements that the DLS is 
working on a map of claims and an agreed settlement, little has happened.13 
 Regardless of the interests of other land owners and the benefits the state itself 
gains from maintaining this creative ambiguity, the question of how land even could be 
redistributed to a ‘tribe’ gets at the central problem of what a ’tribe’ is in contemporary 
Jordan. Communal shareholding, redistribution down to the family level or holdings 
registered in the names of a few key figures - likely shaykhs - have all been discussed 
and tried, and each have thrown up insoluble problems, lingering dissatisfaction and 
further legal confusion – much of which, of course, is strategically useful for the 
Government). Al Naber and Molle (2016) describe a number of cases where the 
Government has muddied the water by acknowledging large, extra-registry ‘tribal’ 
claims to land. Several thousand dunum were settled on a Bani Hasan ‘ashīrah during a 
dispute over land seized for a government housing project, distributed as shares to 
various families through not entirely transparent processes. In another instance during 
the 2011 protests, fearing unrest in the south, the king transferred 70,000 dunum to the 
Huwaītāt and others around Ma’an, officially to be distributed equally per household, 
but in practice favouring key elites (ibid.:495). Talking unofficially to a Department 
 
12 Alon (2009, 2016) suggests the sensitivity is partly around evidence that landowners, including Mithqal 
al-Fayiz, considered selling large tracts of ‘tribal land’ to Zionists via the Jewish Agency in 
Palestine in the interwar years.  
13 In 2014 the then-Prime Minister Abdullah Ensour publicly demanded the DLS sort out and standardise 
tribal land claims (Jordan Times 2014), and wajihāt were brought up by Bani Sakhr Shaykh Jamal 
Khraisha in 2015 during a meeting with the king (Jordan Times 2015). 
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member, he admitted the issue was difficult, and many came to the Department looking 
to gather evidence to make opportunistic legal claims. The Department still talks about 
producing a comprehensive map of wajahāt – the acknowledged category of tribal land 
claims - showing every dunum by ‘ashīrah and qabīlah. The official I spoke to 
acknowledged this would be difficult, if not impossible. What would such claims do 
about private ownership? In many conversations I was assured that ‘all Badu know and 
understand the boundaries of their dira’ but this is problematised by the vast number of 
cases and competing claims. Outside of the aesthetic and often illusory power of 
‘maps’, it is hard to see what is ‘settled’ in land settlement. 
 The problems of landlessness, inequality and lack of housing thrown up by 
mass-migration and urbanisation have, as we have seen, made these questions especially 
important. These problems were subjected to international development programming 
in the 1980s when the World Bank, concerned by the increasing permanence of 
Palestinian camps in Jordan, offered the country a raft of projects directed by their 
‘Shelter Unit’ (Hughes 2016). Started in the early 1980s as a squatter settlement 
standardisation programme, as the wider Bretton Woods intervention in Jordan got 
under way in the late 1980s its goals expanded to the creation of a nation of ‘owner 
builders’. The ‘Shelter Unit’ sought to address the problems those Palestinians unable to 
buy property by creating a fluid and functioning housing market, dominated by ‘owner 
builders’ who claimed unregistered land, built houses on and then registered it. While 
owner-builder-occupation was the stated ideal, it was also recognised that some 
speculative development would be useful to increase housing stock, and bring more 
housing onto the market for those who could not access housing through the traditional 
routes of family compound expansion or land gifts on marriage. It aimed to regularise, 
legalise and bring infrastructure to unplanned areas of urban sprawl rising on tribal land 
at the edge of the expanding capital,14 yet it rested on threats of seizure and informal 
channels of communication, so that full market transparency was never a likely 
outcome. Many of these ‘squatter settlements’, by the 1980s densely-built suburbs, were 
rent-farms for certain Bedouin families who claimed land around the capital, and who 
sought payment in return for the right to build, but whose own legal claim to the land 
was unofficial. Clearing up ownership in favour of the occupiers was for them a 
 
14 Especially Zarqa, but in this way some land in Zizia, or al-Jiza as it was increasingly called by non-
Sukhur speakers, also came to be settled by those of West Bank origin. 
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troubling outcome. As standardization made this problem clearer, various schemes to 
compensate shaykhs and even whole tribal sections, to recognise their claims as 
landowners but allow their tenants some form of secondary ownership, and in the face 
of uncooperative shaykhs, seizure, were used at different times by different government 
actors. Rather than clear-cut, transparent and market-based, land ownership remained a 
matter for political contestation and negotiation, in which those with strong names and 
reputations were often best able to come to beneficial accord with the state. Thus even 
as the World Bank has sought to turn Jordan into a nation of ‘owner builders’ Jordan’s 
land policy has increasingly favoured a shrinking segment of its population; those who 
can afford to settle new land and develop it, and those able to claim and hold land that 
has risen in value around Amman. Many others feel they have unfairly been deprived. 
3.4 Contesting	Land:	crisis	and	adaptation		
Efforts to reform Jordan’s land system have sought to create a legible and rationalised 
system of individual subject-owners, but also and sometimes contradictorily, a free and 
liquid market for land-as-commodity. Both aspirations, often in tension with each other, 
have found reasons to compromise with other less official practices, and both been 
blunted by deep continuities, popular expectations around moral economy, and political 
contingency. In particular I have shown how the late-Ottoman shaykhly plantations of 
the Madaba region were based on notions of property often widely seen as communal 
land, but in fact closer to appanage or manorialism, and in many cases converted by 
Ottoman and British officials into claims of individual ownership, in a setting where 
individual ownership encompassed hierarchical types of usage-rights. However 
revisionist notions of what land is, especially ideas of it as communal, misappropriated 
or as open to contestation, have also arisen. In this setting, therefore, land remains 
subject to political contestation and overlapping but distinct meanings. At the same 
time, as far as the latter aspiration for a free and liquid market for land traded as a 
commodity has been achieved, it has been achieved because of, not despite, these 
compromises, continuities and ambiguities. This is not surprising, given the difficulties 
described above in dealing with the Department of Land and Survey, and the 
unwillingness or inability of state actors to provide final, binding clarification. More 
broadly, even when land ownership is established, it is not always easy to use it as 
capital. Although too large and detailed a topic to explore here, bank loans with 
property collateral and mortgages are both difficult to access and religiously 
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problematic for many, and alternative Islamic finance mortgage-like (ista’jar) and loan-
like instruments are exorbitantly expensive and subject to lingering suspicions around 
potentially being ribā, ‘usury’. Thus other ways of raising capital from different types 
of claim and possession of land have come into being. A discourse of crisis and distrust 
around the state’s bureaucratic procedures disguises the way creative practices have 
grown up in its shadows. 
 In Amman during my fieldwork everyone was talking about the city growing, 
the rising price of housing, and the problem of transport as the city grew eastwards. 
Work on a new rapid bus transit route heralded as relieving congestion, was over budget 
and behind schedule, the subject of wry jokes; the only thing it could move ‘rapidly’, 
one taxi driver said, was money into the bank-accounts of developers. In this city of 
rising prices, inequality and gridlock, the phrase āzmah, meaning both traffic 
congestion, but also more broadly ‘crisis’ was ubiquitous. In the Eastern Desert, which 
along with 75% of the country remained unsurveyed and unregistered before 2000 (Al-
Naber and Molle 2016) talk of building a new city in the desert are met with derision 
but also from some, speculation. In the face of mass-migration (78% of the refugee 
population in Jordan lives in cities, especially Amman, not camps (UNHCR 2016)) 
many expect another expansion eastward of cheap housing and development from 
Amman, like those of Zarqa and the Airport area in the 1980s and 1990s.15 This has 
made land worth speculatively claiming even when its agricultural and pastoral value 
has become negligible since subsidies ended. Some Sukhur families with vague 
traditional claims to pasturage in these areas have enclosed pockets of land, irrigated it 
and planted a few saplings to claim ownership (or have sold the right to others to do so), 
in the hope that developers will buy it off them in a few years.  
 The mechanism facilitating this febrile land speculation, alongside practices of 
enclosure and seizure, is the hijjah (lit. an argument or proof), a type of unofficial 
document of cessation. Once referring to contracts or verbal agreements pertaining to 
land sales, in areas where full registration and settlement took place under the Ottomans 
and British, it was largely superseded by the Sanad. Difficulties in registration at the 
DLS has incentivised more flexible ways of profiting from and trading in potential but 
 
15 This process of ribbon development along the Yajouz highway, creating the modern dormitory-city of 
Zarqa (where many more recent refugees from Palestine have settled), by which some Bani Hasan 
become wealthy and others landless protesters, is described in the academic work of the former 
Prime Minister, Omar Razzaz (1994).  
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bureaucratically and legally unclear claims to land, and so the idea of a paralegal 
agreement, colloquially accepted as proving ownership if not challenged, has become 
increasingly important once more.  
 Those with various types of claim on land give up and transfer this claim, 
promising to make no trouble for the holder of the hijjah (through litigation or less 
official means). Only the very strong or foolhardy buy property in tribal areas without 
also buying the hijjah, fearing otherwise they may find their property vandalised or 
worse. The value of a hijjah thus depends on not only the strength of the legal claim, but 
the reputation and potential to deliver bureaucratic difficulties or physical violence. 
Ideas of reputation, name/space, and inalienable sovereignty are thus reproduced 
through and by this practice. A friend and academic colleague told me how his family 
had recently parted with 400 dunum of a larger estate land his Grandfather bought from 
a Bani Hasan shaykh in the north in the 1950s, as despite having bought the Hijjah at 
the time, the shaykh’s grandchildren now disputed it. The family had agreed to part with 
some land in the end to prevent a long legal case or the risk of violent confrontation. 
This new settlement was described as perpetual, but as my friend admitted wryly, there 
is nothing to stop their children or those of their friends and hangers-on repeating the 
process in a few decades, save that gaining a reputation for this sort of thing might make 
a hijjah from them less valuable. Anecdotally such cases are common. It is not 
unknown for both parties in a land dispute to present a rival hijjah, sometimes from 
rival tribal claimants, sometimes from shaykhs at different levels of the tribal system. 
 These documents officially carry no legal weight in Jordan. The DLS publishes 
public warnings that no land sale is valid without registration with them. However, I 
was told during my interviews at the DLS that boundary appeal tribunals were very 
unlikely to find for the plaintiff if a hijjah were later found, showing they had 
voluntarily (if extra-legally) alienated part of their property, and thus though not 
condoned by the law, these documents do come to take on legal force and a legal 
bureaucratic character. Anecdotally some lawyers will take on cases where a hijjah 
contract has been disregarded, suggesting the possibility of legal redress – although 
normally such threats are used only for bargaining. Hijjah documents also mimic state 
documents. Even when handwritten they normally are done on thick, unlined print 
paper with official-looking letter-heads and often feature the royal coat of arms. People 
often pay a small fee to have notaries or other public officials add official-looking 
stamps to the documents (see figure 3.6). Marwan’s father, Ibrahim told me that it was 
Chapter 3: Settling Land, Settling People; sedenterisation, social change and land settlement in the Madaba 
region. 
Frederick Wojnarowski –April 2020   129 
so complicated to sell off his family’s land in Dulaīlat Mutirāt when they moved 
permanently to Madaba, what with uncertain claims, missing papers, legal fees and 
familial disputes, that he eventually just sold a hijjah. They used the hijjah to bargain, 
and to access capital in advance of formal sale. Increasingly though, Ibrahim told me, 
people just sold the hijjah, without ever passing on legal ownership, making this an 
independent attribute to ownership, causing extra-legal chains beyond the land registry. 
Figures 3.5 and 3.6 (left to right): Land documents. 3.5: Reproduction of an Ottoman-era 
contract in the Abu Jaber House, as-Salt. 3.6: Hijjah with ministerial crest and contact details 















Unlike formal market sales, to sell land in this way involves explicitly or implicitly a 
pledge of protection for the buyer from the seller, against future challenges and actual 
attacks from the seller’s wider family, neighbours and tribal categories. Ibrahim and 
other interlocutors said that as chains of sale grew longer the protective promise was 
less acknowledged. 16 In this sense, rather than the individual and commodified 
ownership intended in Jordan’s reforming land legislation, a system has emerged 
allowing trade, speculation and commoditization, while retaining ideas of a wider 
relational social, and the centrality of sovereignty through interpersonal relationships, 
 
16 Razzaz (1994;25) states that in the 1980s it was still common for the contract to contain promises of 
protection from anyone, though from the 1980s the documents included an amended form, excusing 
the seller from protecting the buyer against the state. 
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based around notions of trust and mutual recognition of honour. This system is partially 
independent of the state, but references and relies upon its forms and practices.  
 The use of a hijjah thus allows various types of contested communal 
usufructuary claim to be converted, for those with enough power to do so, into capital. 
Textual authority is thus taken seriously, but the state’s ability to monopolise it is 
contested, and indeed the state has come to accept and expect such contestations. Thus 
whatever the rhetorical claims to settlement being permanent, absolute and creating a 
singular mode of land-claim and ownership, reality remains pregnant with alternative 
schemes. 
 This possibility for flexibility, speculation and the re-assertion of social concerns 
in the realm of land as commodity, is none-the-less concentrated among those with 
money, influence, reputation or often all of these things. Those comparatively poor and 
obscure can usually no more sell a Hijjeh claim than they can act as a guarantor on a 
loan or dispute resolution settlement. These social practices require, in the terms I set 
out in Chapter 2, a certain weight of name, and of purse, that go beyond mere 
purchasing power. Yet even those who are unable to directly and strategically 
manipulate ambiguities around the ownership (and meaning of ownership) of land, can 
make productive use of them. In particular, as already suggested, ideas of land 
alienation form a key part of discourses of a breached social contract between rulers and 
ruled; a moral economy of rupture. The historical transformations explored earlier in 
this chapter are thus still of immediate concern in the present, and are subject to various 
reinterpretations in order to make arguments in the present. Old, superseded notions of 
land, palimpsest-like, re-emerge in new combinations and with new emphases. 
 The use of moral economy type arguments relating to land, especially among 
Bedouin who imagine a land-rich past of communal rights to vast areas, has become a 
key part of protesters’ discourses. I shall discuss these in more detail in Chapter 6, but 
for now a particular example relating to land may be useful. From 2018, the 
aforementioned scholar and opposition politician Dr Ahmed Oweidi al-‘Abbadi began 
to-tour-the country addressing crowds interested in his nationalist, pro-trial message of 
Jordan for Jordanians,-holding-meetings-at which he displayed a map of Jordan based 
on that-in-Frederick-Peake’s (1958:253) book on Jordan’s tribes. 17 This map showed 
rough areas of movement and claimed dira for major tribal categories (see figures 4.6 
and 4.7). Oweidi shows this as a representation of land distribution at the beginning of 
 
17 Frederick Peake was C.O. the Arab Legion (1921-1939). 
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the Mandate. Next to it, a cadastral map shows who owns the land now. The once solid 
and continuous blocks of ‘tribal territory’ imagined by Peake and others as something 
between communal land and a sub-national polity (but as we have seen, in some cases 
really more like aristocratic fiefdoms), are now fragmented; much is state-owned, and 
much is also owned by urban investors and figures close to the court. Oweidi uses these 
maps to explain how the agreement between the 'ashā’ir and the royal house upon 
which Jordan as a nation-state is built, has been exploited. The ‘change’ in ‘ownership’ 
he suggests these two maps show, is presented as proof that the state have stolen Land. 
‘Eighty percent of Jordan is stolen from the Tribes’ he announced recently on a shared 
video (in English). Dr Ahmed Oweidi knows better than most (Oweidi 1982) that the 
way that people ‘owned’ the land over which their categorical names appear on the map 
was very different from the ownership suggested in the Cadastral map. As we have 
seen, dira as a notion contained a great variety of political relationships and forms, 
ranging from varied levels of hierarchically-controlled access to communal grazing and 
resources, to tributary protection and shaykhly appanage. As we have also seen, even 
the supposedly most communal notions of land rights, the so-called mush’a system, in 
fact placed decision-making power and pre-eminence in the hands of certain dominant 
lineages. In this history of land, non-shaykhly families like Dr Ahmed’s own ‘Uwaīdi 
‘ashīrah would have occupied a subordinate position within the ‘Abbadi dira.  
 It might therefore seem that the use of this old ‘tribal’ map has little to offer, but 
on the contrary, its deep historical resonances seem to strike a chord, repurposing ideas 
of ‘the tribe’ as a largely undifferentiated and seemingly egalitarian solidary group, as a 
way of claiming recompense from a state that has taken the land. In this way the elitist, 
shaykhly vision of history espoused whenever Hind al-Fayiz complains that ‘when the 
tribes took in the Hashemites they came as fugitives not conquerors – they did not come 
with a sword in their hands’ – becomes something potentially collectivist, which can 
include everyone, both former masters of the land, and their clients and associates, both 
possessors of names, and those merely covered by them.  
 As we shall see in Chapter 6, these arguments find traction far beyond Dr 
Ahmed’s nationalist movement. In Dhiban too, Hirak activists find common cause on 
the issue of land. The ‘Friday of land return’ protests in 2011, Sabri told me, was when 
he realised the protest were a just case. Those involved believed they ‘owned’ their 
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Figure 3.7: Dira Map. Reproduced from Map 2 from Peake (1958:253). ‘Beni Sakhr’, ‘Beni 
Hamida’ and Dr Ahmed’s own ‘Abbad’ are all marked. 
Figure 3.8: Dr Ahmed Oweidi al-‘Abbadi with his shmargh inside out talks to journalists, tribal 
leaders and protesters in front of a cadastral map of Jordan. Photo by Al Jazeera, from Dr Ahmed’s 
WhatsApp. 
Image Redacted 
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tribal dira, the territories their ‘ashīrah had once been associated with and had claimed 
rights of use over. In the intervening years though, the land had been ‘lost’. The 
unemployment tent, erected on the common land of the town square, was also 
associated with ideas of land ownership and landlessness, he said. The men who took 
part in the unemployment tent cannot be absorbed into herding or agriculture as during 
down-turns in previous generations. Many of them think of themselves as in a sense 
corporate ‘owners’ of the Hamaydah dira, as well as land actually owned by their 
families. Lacking resources to exploit this land, much of which is drying out, and with 
increasing enclosure and sale, such claims may amount to little economically, but still 
resonate. For ‘Ali al-Brizāt, and many of the people in Jabal Bani Hamida, while a 
return to pastoralism is not always the most desirable opportunity for the young, it 
remains ‘the foundation’ (al-assasa) for meaningful social life, and without it, life is 
hard to bear. Muhammad as-Snayd, as manager of the state land near Dhiban, similarly 
felt agricultural development was the only way forward for Dhiban. The specifics of the 
land protests since 2011 have often been extremely localised, even parochial in scope, 
emerging out of relationships between neighbours as well as between big government 
projects. As such, land remains a central and under-utilised lens for examining the 
background to both Jordan’s long-term relative stability (relative to its neighbours), and 
the current ‘unsettling’ of East-Bankers, the supposed loyalist backbone of the Nation-
state 
3.5 Conclusion	
I have focused on land in order to further my general argument about how the 
contemporary political economy of the Bedouin villages, as well as their discursive 
Bedouin-ness and ‘tribal’-ness, is historically emergent; marked by processes of 
imperial penetration, sedenterisation, colonial rule, as well as by wider economic crises, 
policies and the stresses of migration, environment and water. Yet the inhabitants of the 
Bedouin villages are not just passive subjects to these forces. They live within and help 
reproduce a complex political milieu with its own dynamics and notions of land, 
politics, and sovereignty. They often conjure up their own imaginaries of moral 
economy to interpret this experience. The never entirely displaced ideas of dira, 
wajahāt, and of shared village land have been codified and adapted rather than 
dispensed with under Ottoman, colonial and more recent reformist regimes. Hierarchical 
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but socially-accepted ways of claiming, managing and contesting access to land beyond 
outright individual commodified ownership, based around protection, honour and 
techniques of pastoralism, have governed socially accepted land-use, and still influence 
adaptive strategies to contest land. I suggest that these older local notions of land 
entangled with land reforms to produce political economic change dialogically.  
 Crucially, this approach allows for a far greater recognition of hierarchy, 
inequality and sovereignty in these settings, both as long-standing historical realities, 
and as they take on new forms and shapes, countering the flatness in many descriptions 
of tribes and Bedouin as almost single subjects, obscuring internal socio-economic 
differences. It is essential to understand the estate-owning shaykhs who shaped the 
Bedouin villages of the Sukhur lands to understand how the inhabitants of these villages 
have responded to land crises, contemporary land speculation and sale, as well as 
villigisation and enclosure-making further east. Equally, both land inequality and more 
general ideas of moral economy and a tilting of power and influence, as well as land 
ownership, away from the Bedouin, are essential to understanding contemporary rural 
protests.  
 I have sought in this chapter to outline the various, often contradictory, attempts 
that have been made to reform society through reforming land in Jordan. Many of these 
envisaged, to varying degrees, taking a system which functioned as a hierarchy of 
claims on the land, of rights and responsibilities defined as part of a complex wider 
socio-economic environment, and transforming it into one of clear and absolute 
ownership, whether individual or state. This clarity was supposed to lead to an 
expansion of agriculture, investment and tax income. Later, related but distinct 
developmental ideas of liberalising the land market, allowing housing and land to 
become more fluid, encouraged further alienation of land from its social fabric. And yet 
such an alienated system of relating to the land has not fully come into being in Jordan. 
The discussion of the trade and sale of hijjāt shows its limitations, as does the wider 
ways in which the reduction of land to neutral commodity is resisted or rendered 
impractical. What is more, land, as I have begun to explore and will return to in Chapter 
6, is a central cause for rural protest movements, and as a medium for social relations 
and as a materialisation of political relationships and inequalities, land is essential to 
understanding why some people protest and others do not.  
 Discussions of land ownership and registration might seem arcane compared to 
other pressing issues faced by Jordanians during a time of economic crisis, mass 
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migration and regional instability. Land is one of what William Gallois (2017;16) has 
called ‘the banal details of the making of empire’ – but it is exactly this slow, structural 
force to land policy that makes it so important. To the degree that land has become a 
market commodity for sale and speculation, land has done so because of and through, 
not despite, these ambiguous relationships to the social. 
  To return to De Soto’s quote (2000:7) with which I began, many 
Jordanian Bedouin have ‘titles’ in the form of a hijjah to tribal lands even when not 
having full legal title even to their own communal family houses, while many 
Palestinian Jordanians in East Amman live on land whose title is ambiguous or 
contested. The royal house, far from trying to end this ambiguity, has made repeated use 
of it, managing different sectional interests, threatening or revoking the threat of 
seizure, and throughout preventing the full scale of land inequality and misappropriation 
from becoming clear. Creative ambiguity of this sort is not unique to Jordan, and 
perhaps is common to many places where capitalist markets seek to transform but also 
work through local realities.  
 The full impact of reforms may have been mitigated and re-socialised by 
practices ‘on the ground’, but this is not to suggest there has been no change; land has 
become a commodity and a source of wealth, and an arena in which social changes 
caused by the end of nomadic pastoralism are seen most clearly. I have suggested a 
historicised conception of land relations, tracing land ownership back through a series 
of reforms and transformations, each of which was partial, contested, resisted and self-
contradictory, but which nevertheless left a mark. Land first became valuable property 
of a form of shaykhly manorialism or appanage under the late Ottoman ‘opening of the 
land’, before colonial and developmental efforts sought to transform it into an 
individual asset, subject to the market. Finally the colonial and post-colonial 
developmental desires for a nation of property-holding citizens, owner-occupiers and 
improvers, sitting on a meritocratic and equitable share of the nation, has given way to 
the more slippery logics of neoliberal capitalism espoused by the IMF, World Bank and 
others who have sought to influence Jordan’s economic policy. These efforts have 
brought about change, but not necessarily as intended. Land is wealth, but through 
speculation and urban sprawl, not cultivation and improvement. Land is also an area, 
according to many Jordanians, of a broken agreement with the royal house. In this 
context the long-term structural factors behind supposedly exceptional East-Banker 
protests in rural areas become clearer. The question of land, once settled, is becoming 
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unsettling. The consequences of this unsettlement will be a major theme in Chapter 6. 
For now though, in the next chapter, I return to the theme of land, Bedouin villages and 
political economy, through a specific material space; that of the dīwān, and particularly 
to the supposed centre of the Bani Sakhr socio-political category, and of much of the 
history outlined in this chapter: Um al-‘Amad. In examining this space, some of the 
problems of inequality and hierarchy among supposedly egalitarian Bedouin, arising 
from the long history of land settlement, supposed communal ownership, and shaykhly 
estate-building, come more clearly into focus. 
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 IN AND OUT OF THE DĪWĀN: LOCATING HOSPITALITY, 
SOVEREIGNTY AND PUBLICS IN JORDAN 
Driving between Madaba and Amman the main road passes through the village of Um 
al-‘Amad, a ribbon of gleaming, showy villas behind high walls, at the centre of which 
lies a crumbling but grand stone courtyard house and mosque-tomb, overshadowed by a 
vast new hall (Figures 4.1-4).1 Affixed to the outer wall a plaque legible from the road 
proudly boasts ‘In the Name of God, the Merciful the Compassionate, The dīwān of 
Shaykh Mithqal al-Fayiz,’ along with the Qur’anic quote (3:103) ‘Hold on all together 
to the rope of God and do not become divided’ (Figure 4.4), highlighting valorised 
solidarity and group loyalty. Built in 1996 by the children and grandchildren of the 
famous ‘shaykh of shaykhs’ (see Yoav Alon’s 2016 biography), this place is grandly 
called in media sources ‘the gathering place of the Bani Sakhr tribes’, lying at the heart 
of the Fayiz lineage’s area of land ownership and socio-political influence, from which 
their vaguer claims to paramountcy within the Bani Sakhr radiate. The de facto head of 
the family is Mithqal’s grandson, former Prime Minister Faisal al-Fayiz, who along 
with other close descendants, use the dīwān for large gathering, meetings, public media 
appearances, hosting grand occasions and dispute resolutions of national political 
significance.  
 Here, it might seem, is a place where the awkward Dreschian terminology of 
‘name/space category’ comes into its own; the ‘name’ (al-Fayiz, Bani Sakhr) and 
‘space’ connect here through the operation of shaykhly power and prestigious 
 
1 Um al-‘Amad, ‘the mother of columns’ was one of the first villages developed by the Fayiz family in 
their late nineteenth century agricultural expansion, and was the centre of their main estate, as 
discussed in sections 5.2-5.3.  
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hospitality. This sense of centrality is misleading. These buildings lie empty most of the 
time, shunned by those who might be expected to see them as the concrete expression of 
meaningful categorical identification.  
 In this chapter I turn to the dīwān as an exemplary but disputed type of space in 
the social life of large areas of Jordan, where the most valourised forms of hospitality 
and interpersonal association are conducted between honourable subjects, following 
certain rules of guest/host interaction. It is a space intended to project an outward face to 
the house, to host and contain guests. It is therefore woven into Jordanian national 
imagery, from the eulogisation and commodification of mansaf and coffee 
(Wojnarowski and Williams 2020) to furnishings in office lobbies. While most remain 
associated with houses, Mithqal’s dīwān is perhaps the largest and most extreme 
manifestation of a wider phenomenon of group dīwān building that has gripped Jordan 
in the last two decades, raising intriguing questions about the nature of political spaces 
and the role of hospitality in contemporary Jordan. This touches on the common 
(non)sense concepts of public, private and civil society. Anthropological and 
sociological engagement with these notions (Dunn and Hann 1996; Gellner 1994; 
Seligman 1995) largely turns on ideas of relationality, but often under-emphasise the 
role of power and elites in constructing these categories and reinforcing them in 
everyday life via bureaucratic and discursive infrastructure. Whether these powers are 
‘state-like’ or ‘state-dislike’ (Scheele 2019a), defining and reproducing hospitable 
spaces is a key technique of sovereignty.  
 It is from post-colonial scholarship (influenced by the Foucauldian 
understanding of power) that growing awareness has emerged of the exercise of power 
involved in defining and delineating a domestic and private sphere. This work has 
shown the political nature of deferring practices and social schemata for the 
transmission of wealth between generations, houses, gendering and social reproduction 
to the private realm, especially in colonial contexts (Charkrabaty 1994, Stoller 2006). In 
these terms, Gellner’s (1994) classic formulation, whereby human societies choose 
between the tyranny of kings and the tyranny of cousins, seems misleading.2 In Jordan 
as in most times and spaces, kings rule though cousins, and the power of normatively 
defined gerontocratic familial patriarchies are sustained, reinforced and upheld by kings 
 
2 Gellner (1994) himself seems likely to have made the distinction as a thought experiment, recognising 
that in practice they intertwine. However, where his work is used to interpret ‘modernity’, the 
distinction between ‘kinship societies’ and true polities becomes starker than Gellner perhaps 
intended (see Macfarlane 2002). 
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and sovereigns, as they are in other settings by colonial rulers (Chakrabarty 1994). The 
dīwān, a space not open to a general public, but symbolically and practically distinct to 
varying degrees from domestic space, gives a particularly clear example of this 
entanglement. It is a space where hospitality, business and politics sit seamlessly, if 
sometimes uneasily together, where gendered hierarchies are enacted and sovereignty 
proclaimed and tested. While the term dīwān is borrowed in Jordan and throughout the 
Arab-speaking world by various types of governmental and putatively ‘civil society’ 
organisations, one imagines those who argue for ‘civil society’ as central to liberal 
modernity (Macfarlane 2002) did not have places like Mithqal’s dīwān in mind. In this 
chapter I analyse such connections, and how they relate and give form to the elements 
of my broader argument, on discourses of Bedouin identity and political economy in 
contemporary Jordan. I contend that the conceptual binary of public/private, while 
relevant to this context, obscures the multiple modalities of publicness and privateness 
that are claimed and contested in and out of the dīwān. 
 My interest in Mithqal’s compound in Um al-’Amad started after talking to the 
historian Yoav Alon about his visits in 2015. However, to many of my interlocutors it 
was a dead centre. ‘Why do you want to go, there is nothing there, it is empty’, ‘You 
can’t just visit, it is only used for occasions [munāsibāt]’ I was told by Rayan, the Fayiz 
I knew best. Whenever occasions came up for which it might be used a private venue 
was found instead. For some non-Fayiz Sukhur there was a marked reluctance to visit 
even the village, the centre to them not of the Bani Sakhr but of a history whose moral 
trajectory and message they did not agree with (see Section 2.1). Hind al-Fayiz, who 
broke with the wider al-Fayiz over her opposition politics, said that Um al-‘Amad was a 
bad place and that she was not welcome at family gatherings there, and would refuse 
from principle to set foot in the dīwān of Mithqal. To my Dahamshah and Mutirāt 
friends, visiting Um al-‘Amad, especially with a suspicious foreigner, was an 
unattractive prospect. We should not risk angering the powerful by poking around their 
property. Others, especially non-Sukhur, sought to deny the site any special significance 
at all. They told me the dīwān was just an empty room, the palace just an old house, but 
that I should be careful – the house and tombs were known to be haunted by Jinn. 
 I eventually visited alone, and after being accosted by a welcoming caretaker I 
was given a tour. The dīwān hall itself is marble-floored, supported by vast stone 
columns and big enough to seat over a thousand (Figure 4.3). Lavishly-framed portraits 
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of family members, in both suits and Arab dress, line the walls. In the centre, opposite 
the door on the south wall, hangs a portrait of Mithqal himself.  
 The old half-ruined house next door, widely called qasr Mithqal (‘Mithqal’s 
Palace’) (Figure 4.1) and the mosque where Mithqal is buried were also named after 
him, the most famous Sukhur shaykh in Jordan,3 even though both were begun by his 
predecessors, Sattam and Fandi. It is telling that he is the emphasised exemplar; a figure 
not from the heroic age of shaykhs, the imagined time of violence and unbridled 
sovereignty, but a figure from the Mandate, the ‘coming of the duwala’. Mithqal, as 
discussed a problematic figure for many, is often seen as the exemplary ‘government 
shaykh’, a man whose wealth and power were largely generated externally through 
mediating between the Government and his own ‘people’ who he claimed (often 
unrealistically) to represent and influence.4 Even his ancestors, the older al-Fayiz 
shaykhs, were as we saw in the last chapter, men rising to prominence in a new world of 
land settlement, agricultural expansion, and increasing and military imbalance between 
Bedouin and the state. 
 

















3 Rivalled only by Haditha Kraishah and perhaps among the Huwaītat ’Auda Abu Taya. 
4 At several points during the Ikhwan raids in the late 1920s, Mithqal promised thousands of Bani Sakhr 
warriors to defend the Amirate, though only a handful ever materialised (Alon 2016, Jevon 2017). 
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Figure 4.2-4.4: Photographs by the author of dīwān Mithqal al-Fayiz showing (top left 





















The term dīwān comes from a Middle-Persian word meaning a house of records or 
council chamber (Hayyim 1934) and in Arabic the term has associations with 
documentation, government, law and delivering justice. In this context however, dīwān 
refers to the semi-public guestrooms kept by shaykhs and other notables claiming 
influence and reputation. There are other Arabic terms used to describe a variety of 
guestrooms, but dīwān in Jordan at least seems the most common, as well as the most 
evocative and grand. The dīwān is the setting for enacting the most valourised 
expressions of hospitality, termed karām, a term that guests can use to flatter the host, 
but which hosts gracefully refuse to acknowledge. These are the sites of both business 
and instrumental meetings over matters of money, law and politics, and social events, 
although distinctions of this sort rarely stand up to scrutiny. They are usually either 
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attached to private houses (either a room within them or a separate building or tent 
nearby), and are associated with that house and its owner. The communal dīwān, shared 
by and named after an ‘ashīrah is largely a new form.  
 The largest and most important dawāwīn (plural) are kept open regularly to 
receive various (often unexpected) visitors, who come and go to ask favours, seek 
advice or just to meet with friends while enjoying the owner’s hospitality through 
coffee, tea, tobacco and sometimes food. Tied-up with the materiality of the dīwān is 
the taste and smell of gahwah sa’adah (unsweetened cardamom-spiced black coffee, 
served in small cups), and at the greatest occasions mansaf (meat stewed in a fermented 
curd broth); substances that perform the role of ‘bread and salt’ (‘aīsh wa milih).5 
Through these practices of hospitality hosts extend the offer of protection (figurative 
and literal) to their guests, and in accepting this the guest submits to the sovereignty of 
the host. Such resonances evoke the atmosphere of intimate formality that is central to 
the dīwān.  
 Overtly legal business, such as making agreements over land or marriage and 
even negotiating a truce after a slight or revenge attack are often held in the margins of 
social occasions. The more overtly social events include both casual visits from those 
for whom the intimacy of the inner house would be inappropriate as well as formal 
occasions, munāsibāt: weddings, funeral receptions (for several days visitors will come 
to drink coffee and offer set funerary phrases), graduation, retirement and engagement 
parties. Men will use the dīwān for these munāsibāt, while women often use either a 
partitioned section or most frequently in contemporary practice, a separate guestroom. 
Jordanian Bedouin men are often involved in circles of reciprocal feasting, ‘azaym 
(literally ‘inviting’), where a group of perhaps twenty or more older men take it in turns 
to host all the others at their house for a large formal meal, normally a mansaf, 
involving killing and cooking a sheep or goat (Wojnarowksi and Williams 2020). Such 
invitations are often said to be a matter of duty, wajib, not karām, because reciprocation 
is explicit, but hosts will try to outdo each other, serving more and better food than 
expected, to gain a reputation.  
 For my younger interlocutors, even though the importance of such settings was 
widely acknowledged, the practices of serving older kin and guests, sitting quietly 
learning long, complicated histories and genealogies seemed unappealing. Yet these 
 
5 Widely used across Eurasia as a motif of accord and protection between host and guest (Smith and 
Christian 1984). 
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were exactly the spaces I was referred to when I asked questions that fitted with my 
interlocutor’s notions of a dīwān-centric discourse – questions about history, leadership, 
law and land ownership. I needed to listen to the talk of old men who could be visited, if 
the proper introductions were obtained, at their dīwān. I should learn via my position as 
guest, given knowledge as part of the formal presentation of hospitality. 
 In one interview with Ghazi Abu Qa’ūd, an older man belonging to a shaykhly 
‘ashīrah in the small and remote village of ad-Dīr in Jabal Bani Hamida who had 
recently built a new guestroom (Figure 4.5), my wife and I praised his young 
grandchildren for their manners. He tutted and said they were not learning as he had 
when their age as they did not want to sit, learn and serve. He told us that serving in the 
dīwān had been the main way children learned when he was growing up, picking up 
stories, poetry and knowledge of local personages and politics, but perhaps most 
importantly ‘knowing how to serve guests’.  
 Hosts, Ghazi said, must be attentive to guests, preventing them from needing to 
lift a finger, while guests must not wander about or show curiosity about the host’s 
household, making polite general compliments but not complimenting anything 
 
Figure 4.5: Ghazi Abu Qa’ūd shows off his newly-built dīwān with pride (requesting that we 
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excessively. Guests should first refuse and then only accept a little of whatever food and 
drink is offered; a modesty the host must be at pains to overcome with frequent 
invitations to eat more, to take another cup of coffee, to stay a little longer. To act as a 
host is in a sense ‘a display of mastery’ (Shryock 2012:S25) which, as with all forms of 
mastery, must be learned. 
 The aesthetics of these settings vary along a spectrum of furnishings, from those 
considered most ‘traditional’ (taqlīdy), involving rugs or mats on the floor, low 
mattresses and cushions or camel saddles to recline against, to those considered most 
‘Western’ (bishakal amrīky) or ‘contemporary’ (‘asry), with long sofas, arm chairs and 
coffee tables (see Figures 4.6-4.9). Large communal versions often involve rows of 
stackable chairs for convenience. However there are common tendencies. The 
conceptual origin of such spaces in the minds of their users tends to be the baīt sha’ar, 
the goat-hair tent, basic plan has become more elaborate and varied when translated into 
permanent form. 6  
 The basic form is a large rectangular hall, entered from the long side (the 
entrance previously being on the most sheltered side), with a central area or table to 
serve coffee or tea and display coffee paraphernalia, often to the left of the entrance 
referencing the position in the tent original of a hearth, brazier or fire-pit for preparing 
tea and coffee. Seating is around the edges and sometimes there is a central pillar 
(mu’amad) from which weapons and head-dresses may be hung. The tent as a residence 
is generally divided into a raba’a or shigg, the public area for hospitality and men (but 
where women may sometimes host), and the muharam for women and domestic tasks, 
as well as sleeping. Where a tent is used exclusively as a dīwān it is not so divided, and 
larger houses may have a variety of reception rooms; a family living room, a formal 
dīwān-like room for female guests (Figure 4.6), and a private women’s room. A dallah, 
a tall tapering coffeepot and other coffee regalia will usually be on display, with 
Qur’anic verses, daggers, and sometimes poetry on the walls, as well as formal pictures 
of the primary owner, his ancestors, and perhaps the king. The more formal the 
aesthetic, the less personal memorabilia on display – these spaces are inherently 
outwards facing.  
 
6 This particular imagined genealogy, however, should not hide the fact that permanent houses are not, as 
Layne (1994) makes clear, tents-made-stone. They follow their own logic.  
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Figure 4.6: The women’s guestroom in Saif Dahamshah’s house in Um al-Walid. Photograph by 
Fenella Wojnarowska. 
 
Figures 4.7 - 4.9: The dīwān of Hamīd bin Lufān ash-Shammary in Madaba in a studied and 
stylised replica Bedouin Tent. On the left, the north end of the tent features a mu’amad (central 
pillar), riding accoutrements, a satellite TV, and a picture in the centre of his grandfather. On the 
right, the south end of the tent features an antique-looking but conveniently modern gas-
powered coffee-making station, presided over by Ahmed the Iraqi cousin and gahwaji. Below, 
the owner-host presides in the centre of the tent opposite the entrance, flanked by one of his 
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 A more formal dīwān will have a thermos of coffee present to receive guests, 
who should be served on arrival, in order of age and status, often by a son of the host. 
The bitter coffee is poured out in tiny quantities and offered to the guest (after checking 
the temperature – lukewarm coffee is an insult), who will say ‘aysht on receiving the  
coffee, will swirl and smell it before drinking it quickly to free up the cup for the next 
guest. When finished, the guest shakes the cup or covers it with a hand to indicate they 
don’t want any more.7 The guest hands back the coffee cup, saying daīman, ‘always,’ 
indicating they are satisfied, and they hope that it may always be so, that the host will 
always be in a position to provide hospitality and they to enjoy it. Coffee is generally 
followed by sweetened black tea and sweets, dates and fruit proffered at frequent 
intervals.  
 Dawāwīn are not supposed to be places where one is at ease, despite the constant 
utterances from hosts to the contrary, for guests to sit, to recline, and to be comfortable. 
The relationship between host and guest is always one of care, verging on anxiety, as 
the careful negotiation of hospitality is demanding. They are spaces adapted to dealing 
with the problem of strangers and outsiders, partially incorporating them via hospitality 
and commensality as guests and thus instilling within them a certain subjectivity vis-a-
vis the host. Life in the Bādīyah hinterland for men of standing was one of movement 
and fluidity, necessitating travel and interactions with socially distant and even 
unknown others, with inherent dangers.8 The inviolability of homes (hūrmat al-baīt) 
and especially the female kin dwelling within, remain central to honour (sharaf) and its 
corollary, the vulnerable sexual honour of women, ‘ird. However sharaf and 
maintaining a reputation as muhtrim (‘respectable/genteel) and becoming m’aruf 
(known) involves interacting with various degrees of other, in areas historically without 
the developed public institutions of mosque and suq. The political dynamic of the area 
now Jordan until the recent past favoured a quite different type of social and political 
space to these urban institutions – not one of public equality but of sovereignty. The 
space of hospitality, within and yet outside the inviolable home solves this problem. As 
Shryock (2012:S24) puts it: 
 
7 In the past, it was considered necessary to drink three cups to accord guest-rights to a visitor but now 
one cup is often all that is expected or offered. The third of these, the gahwah as-saīf ‘coffee of the 
sword’ was considered to create a binding relationship of protection and accord between host and 
guest while they sat together, and was only drunk in cases of dispute when a resolution had been 
agreed upon.  
8 Judith Scheele (2019b:199) states ‘hospitality was often the best way of dealing with potentially harmful 
strangers’, writing of a geographically distant but in some respects related and comparable setting 
of village guest-rooms in the trade-reliant societies of the Sahara. 
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When a Jordanian says; ‘My house is your house’, he does not mean all of 
it. He means that part of it which forms the stage for hospitality. Here, 
everything is or becomes a prop. even the poorest Bedouin, still living in a 
tent or a two-room cinderblock house, will be able to create the hospitable 
effect by means of language and a deft manipulation of space. 
This analysis turns on hospitality as a kind of totalising space, combining political, 
moral, ethical and material elements and practices, and imposing roles on participants. 
The role of guest and host (daīf wa mudaīyf/mu’azzab), establish mutual obligations and 
relative status. Hospitality can make or break reputations for both, though especially for 
hosts, through the normative power of gossip. A popular Bedouin proverb states lazim 
al-mu‘azzib yikhaf min al-daīf. Luma yig‘ad huwa daīf; luma yigum huwa sha‘ir (the 
host must fear the guest: when he sits he’s a guest; when he stands he’s a poet)’.  
 Given the ‘thickness’ of this space and the relations within it, the relative 
paucity of anthropological theoretical interest in hospitality relationships with and 
beyond the region until recently is perhaps surprising.9 There has been a recent surge in 
anthropological literature on hospitality, indeed almost a ‘turn’ towards it as a topic and 
theoretical comparative concept. Candea and Da Col’s (2012) influential article 
presented the provocative hypothetical of where anthropology might be if Mauss (1924) 
had taken hospitality as his subject rather than gift exchange. They call for greater 
theoretical and ethnographic attention to hospitality as a form of ‘cosmopolitics’ 
(2012:S15) with unusual scalar properties, allowing conceptual movement between 
ethnographic particularity and universal cosmological description.10  
 Ethnography coming out of the Middle East and Jordan (perhaps unusually) has 
been at the forefront of this discussion, in some respects driving wider disciplinary 
theoretical developments (see Shryock 2004, 2008, 2012, 2019; Hughes 2018, 2019; 
Sheldon 2017). Much of this work retouches upon ideas once associated with largely 
superseded Mediterraneanist and segmentary theory discussed in Chapter 2, such as the 
idea of Arab ‘tribalism’ as ‘moral reciprocity that turns on protection’ (Dresch 
 
9 This neglect, perhaps a result of anthropologists’ bravado about getting beyond guest-status and into 
‘real’ intimacy, has not occurred in philosophy, especially work on Kant and Derrida (Shryock 
2008). Anthropologists have always experienced, made use of and described hospitality, but have 
tended at the level of analysis to prefer, for instance, exchange, intimacy, and the narrower category 
of feasting, breaking hospitality down into its constituent parts, or else lumping it together into 
wider cultural systems like gift exchange.  
10 They also suggest a reconstructed genealogy (via Pitt-Rivers, Ortner, Munn and Herzfeld) to 
accomplish this.  
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1990:255).11 Dresch drew attention to the way he felt in certain contexts within the 
Arabic-speaking Middle East (and presumably in many places and contexts beyond it), 
Mauss’s notion of the atemporal and socially-conscious exchange generated by the 
compulsion to give, receive and reciprocate comes up against tendencies towards 
irregular exchange, hoarding, autonomy and occasional self-destructive generosity 
(Dresch 1998) which Shryock (2019b) calls ‘keeping to oneself’.  
  There is much to be gained from engaging with this theoretical (re)turn. But it 
tends, like ‘the gift’ that it is patterned on, to privilege exchange. In terms of my 
argument about central Jordanian Bedouin dawāwīn, there are two obvious reservations 
to applying this logic. Firstly, using such a logic tends to involve losing sight of the 
materiality of hospitality: the foods, drinks, utensils and physical practices of 
commensality that produce, mark and contest hospitality in practice. These are, I argue, 
far more than mere props – the taste and feel of hospitality are connected to historical, 
geographical and economic factors, which have experiential consequences and deep 
resonances for guests and hosts.   
 Secondly, it suggests the teleology of hospitality is based on transaction, while 
as we have seen the performance of the roles of host and guest, and the asymmetries 
between them seem emphasised in this case. David Sneath (2019:67) argues that in his 
field site: 
Mongolian everyday hospitality can be seen to be enactional, rather than 
transactional; its practices are materializations of the roles of host and 
guest … [it] does not imply acts of generosity directed towards any 
particular person; it is an expression of the status of the householders and 
their ability to fulfil a public norm...  
and that often supposedly ‘popular’ or nationalised forms of hospitality are modified 
versions of older codes of behaviour associated with nobles, thus those unable to enact 
the role of host properly are necessarily excluded from this most valourised form of 
sociality. I was told by many, including both my old language teacher Samer and my 
Madaba Christian friend Isam that hospitality was really ‘a Bedouin thing’ (ishy 
badawy) which other Arabs had adopted or maintained since settling. Real karām was a 
value of shaykhs and noble lineages; others were, in a sense, borrowing the form to 
 
11 Dresch (2012) later worked on Yemeni escort-codes on the offering and granting of protection, themes 
which implicitly rely on notions of hospitality. 
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make a claim.12 The eagerness of young men without their own house to try to pay for 
each other in coffeeshops and cheap food places in town, is in some ways an attempt to 
become a host in a time of blocked social reproduction (an idea I return to in Chapter 3). 
To fail to perform hospitality, or to do so poorly, is thus in both Mongolia and Jordan a 
serious matter.  
 The affect of hospitality is reproduced at the level of discourse and state 
imaginary via the metaphor of the royal house presiding over Jordan-as-house. As seen 
in the last chapter’s discussion of moral economies, even those who wish to resist the 
royal house do so within this discourse of hospitality; as in Hind’s speech, they seek to 
reverse the roles so that they as Bedouin East-Bankers become the hosts, and the 
Hashemites the guests. In this discourse, development can take on many of the 
properties of karām. Shaykhs in Jordan now are often the local stakeholders consulted 
by international, national and local development projects, and as such continue to take 
on a representative role.13 Shryock (2004:37) states that karām communicates a 
message of ‘privileged inclusion and (no less pronounced) a feeling of precise 
containment’. It is this very ambiguity between honoured citizen and indulged but 
marginalised objects of nation-making that characterise the Bedouin experience of being 
sedenterised and developed in Jordan. Hospitality, as Lancaster (1995) and others 
argued, was a key way by which Bedouins could survive individual hardships, and of 
meeting needs for food, lodging and security, and so by instead taking over this 
humanitarian duty (which Alon (2009) argues, was the deliberate policy of Glubb Basha 
and the British during the famine of 1931), the Government bolsters its own authority, 
encompassing that of the shaykhly (former) elite. No wonder then that the state has 
appropriated the coffeepot as the symbol of karām as a national symbol, even while 
undermining the very resonance of that symbol, by bringing hospitality into a 
commercial zone where its values are reversed. Nippa (in Chatty 2006:550), asserts that 
‘an act of hospitality is an act of pacification’.  
 
12 The quote from Shryock (2012: S24) hints at this; ‘even the poorest Bedouin… will be able to create 
the hospitable effect’ (emphasis added). 
13 In my Masters fieldwork, I examined the way shaykhs and their vision of their social environment 
dominated in efforts to gain UNESCO and UNDP recognition as indigenous people possessing 
‘masterpieces of oral and intangible heritage’ (see also Bille 2012, Chatelard 2005). I also analysed 
a community development NGO in the West Bank working with the Rashayda Bedouin, which had 
tried to include women as stakeholders, but fearing losing community support, had ended up only 
interviewing the hereditary mukhtar of each village, a tendency to prioritise the shaykh’s-eye view I 
had to constantly work hard to avoid repeating. 
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4.2 A	Protected	Space	and	a	Test	of	Sovereignty	
The dīwān is a space under the protection of its owner as the host, and as such he is 
answerable for both the safety and wellbeing of guests within it, but also for their 
behaviour, including with each other. Guests are supposed to remain polite, contented 
and, most importantly, passive: not lifting a figure or wandering around the house at 
will. They should also refrain from insulting the host or breaking his guarantee of 
protection by insulting or attacking other guests. As such the claim of protection in 
hosting is also a claim to a form of sovereignty (if often temporary and reversable) over 
the guests. This is a claim that can be put to the test.  
 While the discursive deployment of hospitality, and coffee as its metonym, seeks 
to tame and appropriate these symbols to stand for amity, national unity and obedience 
to central authority, this meaning sits uneasily with others. Candea and da Col (2012:9) 
draw attention to ‘a pivotal asymmetry between hosts and guests’, and the potential for 
hospitality and commensality to collapse into their opposites; violence, predation and 
discord. The most ethnographically obvious concern with formal hospitality I 
encountered was with gossip and reputation about people who had done hospitality 
‘wrong’, but this can have larger political significance. Shryock (2012, 2019) explores, 
historical narratives of the changing power and status of lineages and alliances tend to 
pivot on hospitality gone wrong, where it is refused, guests refuse to visit, or worst of 
all where hosts attack guests or guests hosts. Such accounts, Shryock argues, contain 
both the idea that hospitality is the venue for political change and contestations, and that 
it is a moral virtue that transcends the political, providing moral examples of what good 
and bad hospitality is. In my account of oral historical narratives in Chapters 2 of the 
rise of the Fayiz lineage from an orphan adopted by the ‘old man Dahamshah’ in the 
deserts of Hijaz, there is also a sense of the host or patron, of the protection of a host in 
taking in an exile being confounded. In Saif’s narrative, the change came when al-Fayiz 
did not come to eat with his benefactor, claiming sickness, and later holding a feast 
himself. Again, it is through a refusal of hospitality that al-Fayiz rejects the sovereignty 
of another and claims his own.  
 The idea that food can be used to instil bodily dispositions is a widespread one, 
but has particular currency in Arabic; the popular aphorism ‘t’amy ath-thum istahy al-
‘ayn’ (feed the mouth and the eye is bashful) expresses the idea that challenging and 
disrespectful gazes can be turned aside through displays of food and hospitality. 
However, the potential to generate shared subjectivity, and thus acquiescence, can also 
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create hierarchy; the powerful can turn away the gazes of the weak, turning guests into 
clients or even vassals.  
 The asymmetrical, hierarchical, and dangerous nature of enacting hospitality is 
also why it is such a potent political gesture. Shryock (2012: S20) states; 
Hospitality, karam in local dialect, is not simply a matter of offering tea, 
cigarettes, and pleasant conversation to guests. It is also a test of 
sovereignty. The man who is karim (hospitable, generous, noble) is able to 
feed others, project an honourable and enviable reputation, and protect 
guests from harm. Hospitality, as Bedouin describe it, is a quality of persons 
and households, of tribal and ethnic groups, and even of nation-states. At 
any of these levels of significance, failure to provide karam suggests low 
character and weakness, qualities that attract moral criticism. 
I have argued throughout that Bedouin shaykhs, and those pursuing influence, seek to 
articulate a representational claim to sovereignty. This claim is based on the figure of 
the patron, the host, capable of representing other’s interests and speaking for them in a 
wider world, and thus encompassing and protecting their own reputations. Hosts are not 
just metaphors for patrons, they are one of the main ways patronage is enacted. 
 In Meeker’s (2002) description of coffeehouse publics in north-eastern Turkey 
younger men of a lineage leave conversations when their fathers or uncles enter, as to 
do otherwise would be to challenge the right of these men to represent the lineage in the 
‘public’ sphere, and to stay and join in the conversation would be to challenge this 
representational claim and to put forward a counterclaim of independent sovereignty. In 
Madaba too, young men avoid contradicting older men, especially kin, and so will often 
avoid them socially. Meeker stresses that such practices grow out of and in many ways 
mirror the salons of local dignitaries, which impose similar ‘normative performances of 
interpersonal association’ (2002:344) on those taking part. So too, the age and gender 
hierarchies of the dīwān reinforce the host’s authority, which rests on a claim to 
representation as both spokesperson and exemplar. As such dependants and younger 
lineage-members must marginalise themselves, making such spaces at once 
uncomfortable and peripheral to the lives of many of my interlocutors. Meeker 
(2002:347) argues this is not a case of the political reflecting the domestic;  
Older men did not have the privilege… as a consequence of family or 
household structure. Distinctions of gender and age were rooted in public 
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life, and these distinctions in turn had an impact on family and household 
structure. 
This connect with Meeker’s wider points that I have already discussed in Section 2.1: 
‘tribal’ leaders make tribes, not the other way around, and that such leaders often sit 
within wider imperial tactics of sovereign power exercised through interpersonal 
association. This interpersonality involves is not just between public or political 
persons, but is entangled with their domestic lives. The dīwān shows both that notions 
of a public is in play here, but also that it is inseparable from the private and domestic; 
existing as an outwards-looking face on house (using the term in the anthropological 
sense of a social unit as well as a structure) which includes sliding degrees of intimacy, 
protection and privateness, encompassing various forms of inside and outside. 
 Many in Jordan question whether shaykhs still have a future role to play, yet the 
owners of a dīwān (a far wider group of people) at every level serve as gate-keepers to 
real or claimed contact-networks, and as such act as intermediaries, mediating between 
different scales of sovereignty. Ibrahim, Marwan’s father (the seller of hijjah described 
in the preceding Chapter), is not of a shaykhly lineage, nor is he especially rich. 
However as a senior army officer, the first thing he did on retiring was open a dīwān 
and start offering help among his circle to get military and administrative jobs for their 
children. In return, grateful clients have helped him in his business dealings, allowing 
him to invest in a factory, and find a teaching job for his academically able middle son. 
In a more sinister example of this importance, the Mukhabarāt, Jordan’s intelligence 
community, regularly monitor comings and goings at important dawāwīn, and visits to 
those of certain key restive ‘ashā’ir are enough . 
4.3 Which	Public?:	communality,	exclusivity	and	civil	society	
The descriptions of hospitality and sovereignty as practice and discourse above rest 
upon the exemplary case of the dīwān of an individual, attached to a family home. 
However Mithqal’s dīwān is one of many in a new trend of communal dawāwīn. These 
new structures have sprung up over the last three decades across Jordan resembling and 
sometimes doubling as rental halls and private clubs. They do not bear the name of a 
central personage but of a broader category – most often an ‘ashīrah, advertised via a 
large sign.  
 The building of communally owned dawāwīn is one solution to the problem of 
growing networks and rising costs to hospitality. Built and operated either informally or 
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through cooperative or charity law, these are funded and managed not by a socially 
significant individual but by a committee.14 Such depersonalised spaces are problematic 
and many questions remain sources of contention: who is the host? who the guest? who 
has the right to use the space when and for what? The keys of dīwān Mithqal rested with 
the paid caretaker for this reason (although it was rumoured others had sets). The 
feelings of respectful anxiety and deference, described above, lack a clear direction in 
these spaces, and the host’s admonishments to ‘be at home’, always somewhat rhetoric, 
seem especially flat and empty. The increasing use of commercial rental halls (called 
sālah) and even of hotels and restaurants for rich urbanites, is both easier and in some 
cases cheaper, but fraught with other social and reputational risks.  
 The move to communal hospitality in times of economic hardship coincides with 
the rise of the family association (Baylouny 2006, discussed in section 2.1). Baylouny 
(2006:362-363) states that;  
in their conceptualisation of kinship as the idiom of solidarity…the most 
consequential effect of the family associations has been to reinforce the 
declining significance of the national political arena. … Devolving welfare 
provision onto kin associations fragments civil society into particularistic 
blocks and prevents unified demands along economic lines’.  
In Bedouin areas and around Madaba such formalised and committee-run associations 
are both rarer and smaller than in cities, but still present. There is however a profusion 
of smaller and cooperative ownership contracts for families, such as that by which the 
Dahamshah brothers co-owned their houses and car. Crucially this type of association 
contract, based in charity law, are also the vehicles often used for owning a communal 
dīwān.  
 As already hinted, my interest in communal dawāwīn, and why they came to be 
built was not usually shared by my young interlocutors. I usually found that only their 
fathers and grandfathers were particularly enthusiastic to talk to me in detail about such 
things. Younger people treated them with little more enthusiasm than youths in Britain 
for village halls.15 There were at least five communal dawāwīn I knew of in the vicinity 
of Madaba but they were rarely pointed out to me as landmarks, unlike mosques, shops, 
 
14 This arrangement has some historical precedent in the region. Urban guesthouses (madāfa) in towns 
like as-Salt were commonly co-funded by a large family (Antoun 2000). 
15 The hall in the British context has a partially parallel history in that it went from the public-facing part 
of the private residence of a noble or important figure, to an overtly public space, via guild halls and 
church halls to village and parish halls (Thompson 1995). 
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cafes and houses of notable individuals. The only exception was on the road outside 
Madaba to the village of Faysaliah when we went past a blackened fire-damaged small 
hall advertising itself as the dīwān of the Habūsh, a small sub-category associated with 
the Ajarmah ‘ashīrah, which was only noteworthy as a source of speculation about the 
nature of the revenge attack that had seen it burned. The dīwān of a notable local is a 
place where one can visit and expect at the least tea, coffee and conversation. A 
communal dīwān will likely be locked, the key not to hand and difficult to acquire. On 
an occasion that I did attend a funerary reception in such a place my Salaytah friend 
Salah asked me what I thought of it. I responded with something non-committal to the 
effect that they had put on a good show. Yes, he agreed, but a shame they were not rich 
enough to hold it at home. It was not the same in a place like this. The family, he felt, 
could not really ‘host’ (istadaīf). 
 Given this lack of enthusiasm for them, the obvious question is why they were 
built. The reason generally given by my interlocutors was economic. Few now could 
afford or had space for a dīwān capable of hosting all those they might be expected to 
host during important occasions, as the genealogically-significant khamsat ad-dam 
grows exponentially. A large, hired tent is the solution for many, but this is still 
expensive, and as land prices rise and urban areas expand, spaces to erect them 
decrease.16 Instead, costs can be shared over many families, who can then, theoretically, 
host on an equal footing.  
 Cost-sharing is not the only reason for building them, however. They are also a 
powerful public statement; claiming a public face for a name/space category, and a 
claim on the part of the builders to being centrally important to that name. Normally a 
private dīwān is set behind walls or planting within a family compound, and has no sort 
of signposting or inscription (occasionally at most areligious phrase and the builder’s 
name). In contrast it is common for a communal dīwān to have a bold public façade, 
displaying a prominent sign declaring it to be the property of an ‘ashīrah or other sub-
category. Often, as we have seen, local government reforms have allowed ‘ashā’ir to 
monopolise municipal authorities and even to give them their names. In such an 
environment, the dīwān comes to act as a symbol of local control and influence, even as 
it is depoliticised. Yet this symbolic role, while sometimes referred to (and 
demonstrated in the above example of the burning of a communal dīwān during a 
 
16 In Amman it is common to see wedding tents on empty or derelict plots or even on wide but dusty 
verges. 
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dispute), is not reproduced in practice, as we have seen. They are social venues of last 
resort, locked up and subject to endless uncertainties over who has a right to use the 
space for what. Shryock (2004:52) in his description of the ‘Uwaīdi family’s decision to 
build a communal dīwān in Sawaya in 1995 described how his own hopes of finding a 
clear display of sovereignty and of politics in practice were frustrated as he realised ‘No 
one, it seems, quite knows how to make it work. Everyone owns it, so no one owns it’. 
Shrycok (ibid:52-53) admits he was stymied in his aim ‘to portray dīwān-building as an 
alternative form of “civil society,” as an attempt to organize public space by means of 
kinship ties and hospitality.’  
 The link to the notion of ‘civil society’ was one already pursued by the 
Lebanese-American anthropologist Richard Antoun in the 1960s in his fieldwork in 
northern Jordan. Antoun (1965, 2000) was interested in making direct comparison to 
social theory around ‘civil society’, seeing in what he termed ‘village clans’ and their 
guesthouses, and in particular the processes of dispute resolution discussed in Chapter 
2, an alternative to classic formations of civil society as public non-state spaces, and 
instead focusing on their role as intermediary political spaces. He states (Antoun 
2000:442); 
Civil Society is constituted by universal processes of trust and cooperation 
that have separate inflections in different cultures... the inflection in Jordan 
and other tribal cultures in the Middle East is the process of consensual, ad 
hoc conflict resolution within the context of wide-ranging social networks ... 
[and] processes of a civil society form a seamless web with state processes 
rather than a sharp dichotomy with them. 
For Massad (as Watkins 2(014:34) argues), Antoun’s focus on the small-scale localised 
processes within a bounded village community obscures the role of the colonial and 
post-colonial state in producing a category of ‘tribal’. A valid criticism, it misses 
Antoun’s own rejection of a ‘sharp dichotomy’ between state and tribe.  
 The political implications of notions public and private as they pertain to ‘civil 
society’ also resist sharp dichotomisation. On the one hand, the more public, 
ostentatious communal dīwān – a demonstration of sovereignty open to the road – 
remains strangely peripheral to everyday politics, even while becoming a political 
symbol. On the other, the ‘private’ dīwān, despite their symbolic sense of being part of 
the ‘house’ buzz with friends, clients, and the bored who can find an excuse to visit, to 
talk, ask for advice or favours, and take part in everyday politics. 
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 There is an irony that these spaces thrive in part because they are de-jure 
apolitical. The documents of incorporation for communal dawāwīn usually explicitly 
ban their use for political meetings or electoral campaigning. The state has cracked 
down on other forms of public organisation and mobilisation, permitting ever fewer 
forms of group and throwing up barriers to registration for new ones, including unions 
and even sports clubs. The state meanwhile permits and indeed tacitly encourages 
family associations, communal ownership and association at the level of ‘ashīrah and in 
various ways reinforces an infrastructural reality to tribal visions of society, as we have 
seen. In doing so, it seeks to rigorously portray the tribal sphere as apolitical, traditional, 
loyal and quietist; a pillar of support. So far, so typical of how states, especially 
authoritarian ones, make use of ‘civil society actors’ (see Clark 2015). It is no surprise 
that development literature and English-language pro-government publications 
increasingly refer to individual shaykhs or members of shaykhly lineage blandly as 
‘community leaders’ while only a couple of decades before in English they were ‘tribal 
chiefs’. The writers of such reports seem unable to avoid referring to them at all due to 
their political heft, but are keen to find a way of naturalising and explaining away this 
influence without dwelling on its problematic, seemingly premodern, hierarchical 
overtones.17 The ‘civil society’ label has the potential both to render modern and 
developmental, but also to defang such leaders. Yet the ‘tribal’ is rarely fully 
successfully placed within the brackets of ‘community’ or ‘civil society’, just as the 
dīwān is never solely emptied of politics, even when only of the most everyday sort. 
Shryock (2004:39) summarises the importance of this type of sociality in a way that 
explicitly rejects this conflation with civil society;  
More so than the mass media or the embryonic realm of “civil society” —
which are effectively controlled by the state—feasts, visits, and the 
“standing invitations” of prominent households are contexts in which 
Jordanians can discuss current affairs, do business, argue history, 
communicate with leaders, build reputations, resolve (or rejuvenate) 
disputes, and otherwise renegotiate the boundaries between market, 
government, and society, subjecting these domains to the logic of karam.  
 
17 See for instance Jordan Times (2015) where Jamal Khraisha, of one of the main Sukhur shaykhly 
lineages, is described as meeting with and advising the king as a ‘local community leader’ for his 
domain. 
Chapter 4: In and Out of the Dīwān: locating hospitality, sovereignty and publics in Jordan 
Frederick Wojnarowski – May 2020   157 
The vitality, symbolic resonance and political relevance of the ‘private’ dīwān, as a 
space where mediation and representation of an intensely political nature can take place, 
is opposed here to an anaemic and muzzled world of officially sanctioned civil society, 
which to some degree might include official associations such as those which allow the 
construction and operation of a communal dīwān. Yet though a profoundly political 
space, the central imaginary of the nation, as a house and as made up of houses and 
families, of nested and encompassed protected domestic spaces and lineages, 
necessitates its coexistence with the private dīwān. 
 The multi-scalar nature of this type of political space, spanning from the house 
to the nation might seem to place it squarely within definitions of ‘civil society’ (for 
instance Seligman 1995). Yet the associations with ideas of kinship generally defer it to 
a zone of lack or weakness in ‘civil society’, a deficient reflection or shadow. Rather at 
most the Arab ‘ashīrah can be cast as the organic and proto form from which ‘real’ civil 
society emerges, the ‘community’ – as shown in the tendency to rebrand tribes and 
shaykhs as ‘communities’ and ‘community leaders’. Numerous reports from 
development organisations and thinktanks writing in or on Jordan consider where ‘civil 
society’ might be found, and how it might be strengthened or turned to serve 
developmental purposes (El Said and Harrington 2009). Civil society’s weakness and 
absence is bemoaned as a causal factor for instability and authoritarianism in the region 
(which from a historical or anthropological perspective seem far more to do with 
imperial and colonial histories than innate regional tendencies), and yet the power of 
non-state actors, from the Muslim Brotherhood to ‘tribes’ is almost always seen as a 
security threat.  
 As an example, the neoconservative British thinktank the Henry Jackson 
Society’s report on the Arab Spring in Jordan (Libdeh 2012) concludes that reforms fell 
short of the demands of ‘civil society actors’ at one point, only to state at another that 
the Muslim Brotherhood, via its political wing the Islamic Action Front (IAF) has 
benefited from the near-absence of these same ‘civil society actors’. The Muslim 
Brotherhood itself is thus implicitly excluded from being a ‘civil society actor’ however 
much its activities may resemble what in other contexts analysts call ‘civil society’. 
Likewise ‘Tribes’, it states, have persisted because of the absence of other forms of civil 
society.  
 The legitimate actors in this civil society space are then by definition not 
‘Islamic’ or ‘tribal’. Rather they are the very small number of permitted and approved 
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institutions, charities, societies and clubs allowed to exist in a highly circumscribed 
political environment, almost always via a royal patron. The Jordanian Women’s Union, 
for instance, is often described in development organisation literature as a civil society 
feminist organisation, but was founded and still relies upon the patronage of a female 
member of the royal family, and avoids campaigning on issues which could cause its 
patron embarrassment, and so cannot hold the Government to account in any serious 
way (UN Women 2017). As Chatty (2000) points out, both conservative and socialist 
revolutionary regimes have since the 1970s shared an antipathy towards allowing 
women to mobilise independently from the state and its patriarchal oversight.  
 The dīwān is deeply implicated in the binary of public/private, a distinction 
significant in local idiom as well as academic discussions of modernisation theory, but 
in different ways. In Arabic the political associations of public and private differ and 
have their own historical genealogy, with distinctive hierarchical elements.18 The use of 
the binary to describe government/non-government spheres is largely a Euro-American 
political terminology, but as discussed earlier, the conflation of West-Banker/private 
versus East-Banker/public sector has gained widespread traction. Thus, although this 
distinction in daily speech between khāss and amm (used for such mundane distinctions 
as private or public parking) seems beguilingly close to English private and public 
respectively, its associations are sometimes different. In European but particularly in the 
former Ottoman lands the seat of power is associated with seclusion, secrecy and 
intimacy rather than public ostentation and visibility.19 The gaze of the sovereign may 
penetrate one’s own privacy but cannot be returned except through invitation to 
intimacy, and then in a carefully controlled way. In this environment, intimacy and rank 
are symbolically enacted through the degree to which one may pass into the private 
sphere of the powerful. To afford a set on which to enact the formal intimacy of 
‘private’ hospitality is itself a powerful statement. This conceptual genealogy, I suggest 
 
18 The historian Ira Lapidus (1984) draws attention to how this distinction came in the Mamluk Sultanate 
to describe socio-political and hierarchical relationships; al-khassa, the ‘private ones’, came to be 
associated with the Mamluk elite in the major Egyptian and Syrian cities, while al-amma – ‘the 
public’ referred to subjects. Privateness, and an ability to maintain it, remined in many cities 
something associated with the governing elite in the Ottoman period. Lapidus makes clear that in 
practice which category particular groups were placed within was dependent on context and the 
perspective of the writer; for instance soldiers below the officer corps, non-Mamluk soldiers, and 
the religious, judicial antibureaucratic elite of the Ulama religious scholars could sometimes be 
described as al-khassa and sometimes as al-amma. 
19 Meeker (2002) discusses this in a phenomenological account of the Ottoman palace of Topkapı Sarayı; 
visibility and publicness is carefully controlled and rationed; the gaze of the sultan simultaneously 
ever-suggested through towers, windows and lattice screens, but withdrawn and invisible to all but 
those closest to power. 
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lies behind the state encompassment of but also respect for, the private dīwān, and for 
the particular type of exclusive (private?) public it assembles. 
 To be invited into the dīwān is to enter more than a formal or transactional 
relationship with the owner, as one might in an office or coffeehouse. It is to become (or 
enact the role of) a guest. Rather than a rigid public/private binary per se, the significant 
distinction or variable at play here is the size of public, and therefore the degree of 
intimacy or private-ness, in question. Even though economically many are being priced 
out of the ability to create their own constituent public sphere through hospitality, the 
number of private dīwān is still rising, and as a cultural form its influence has seeped 
into a wider social milieu. Several interlocutors, when discussing the nature of 
contemporary leadership, mentioned that more people now called their guestroom a 
‘dīwān’ than would have in the past, when terms still used today such as ghurfat daīf – 
‘guestroom’, ghurfat istaqbal – ‘welcoming’ or ‘receiving room’ or for a grander more 
formal room salah were favoured. To use the term dīwān suggests more than just 
private hospitality, but specifically draws attention to the potentially-political nature of 
such hospitality, that what goes on in such a space is in a sense to do with reputation 
and influence. It suggests at once the separation of the private domestic sphere and the 
public face, but also their inseparability. The dīwān, like the house and the mosque, but 
unlike the office or shop, is somewhere you remove your shoes before entering. ‘Every 
house is a diwan’ these days, Shryock (2004:54) is told by those who criticise the 
arrogance but also stinginess of the new collective versions. It mirrors the common 
phrase I heard ‘every man is a shaykh of his family’. In both cases, the domestic, via the 
symbol of the house, is both a reflection and the discursive exemplar of the public 
political realm, and thus also reproducing and reliant on the gendered and age-based 
hierarchies of the house.  
 An ethnographic example of how public politics and various degrees of 
supposedly private dīwān intersect demonstrates these entanglements. Early in my 
fieldwork the tribal historian and opposition political leader Dr Ahmed Oweidi al-
‘Abbadi invited me to come on a trip with him that he said would be illuminating for 
my research, to attend meetings in the northern cities of Jerash and Irbid. We attended 
meetings with journalists and visited a private dīwān in Irbid, taking off our shoes to 
enter, where a shaykh of the Bani Hāni entertained us to a mansaf lunch. We stayed 
there for most of the afternoon, the talk a mixture of posturing anecdotes, jokes and 
political talk, most aspirational rather than practical. Several times the shaykh declared 
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‘they [the Government] are starving us, really, they are starving us out’ as his gold-
ringed hand descended into the bowl of buttered grains and meat. The key event of the 
afternoon was to be a visit to the Bani Hāni’s communal dīwān in Irbid, where members 
of the local community and neighbouring groups would attend. After the shaykh’s 
children had served us a final cup of coffee, we washed and dried our hands, and had 
the ritual exchanges of thanks, compliments and modest self-deprecating replies.  
 We then drove to the main communal dīwān. The shaykh put a tie on and Dr 
Ahmed his shmargh (red and white Arabic headscarf). We entered a reception line and 
kissed the cheeks and shook hands with the senior men, without removing our shoes. 
Then we sat in a row of large, formal chairs. The senior shaykh started the meeting with 
a formal prayer, and then mentioned that among them was a great scholar and historian 
of the tribes, Ahmed al-Uwaīdi of the ‘Abbad. Dr Ahmed thanked his host. Together 
they offered a short prayer at Maghrib (sunset). Then everyone got up and, forming 
another line to shake hands and kiss the cheeks of the senior men of the Bani Hāni, 
departed. The two spaces, in only one of which shoes were removed – the usual marker 
of entering a domestic space – contained markedly different publics and the type of 
conversation and politics that can take place in these two settings was markedly 
different.  
 In the communal meeting Dr Ahmed said on our way home, ‘I came to be seen 
and to be received’. The real meeting had taken place in the private dīwān over the 
meal. He explained (in English) ‘it is different, it was his home, he felt comfortable. 
Really, I would not talk about anything he was not comfortable talking about... You 
were maybe surprised at how bold his talk was?’ The point he wanted to teach me for 
my research was that he had widespread support and many men willing to talk openly in 
critical terms of the Government. Yet it was the difference between these two 
experiences of the dīwān that came to seem most revealing to me. The exclusivity and 
in particular the operation of protection inherent in a private dīwān permits a kind of 
public life, and a type of politics, impossible in larger, opener, and therefore more 
neutral, types of public, where both the degree of formal equality and the social distance 
between actors is greater. 
4.4 A	Gendered	Place	
The description thus far has implicitly shown the dīwān and the sociality that takes 
place within to be highly gendered, premised on patriarchal and gerontocratic 
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principles. The segregation of genders during formal hospitality, even for women with 
public lives outside of the home and in homes where the family normally eat together, is 
one of the ways of enacting hospitality and creating the ‘hospitable effect’ of intimate 
formality. Hospitality is ‘given’ by older men, but it is produced by women and the 
young, who as Hughes (2018:58) says are subsumed and erased ‘as mere extensions of 
these “senior men” who are the centre of attention.’ Women in the past, many of my 
older interlocutors felt, had generally had a larger role in the dīwān, if a distinctly 
subordinate one, as the main servers of guests, and as the owners and makers of goat-
hair tents. Now these spaces are either built by men or bought commercially, and having 
a wife or daughter serve is a sign of poverty or meanness. Younger male relatives, 
children or best of all, hired domestic workers (usually non-Arab women) are now more 
prestigious.20  
  Hierarchies of gender are thus inherent to hospitality, but in ways which change 
with the wide political environment. Annika Rabo (1996:166), in a wide-ranging 
discussion of the role of the state in gendering civil society in Jordan and Syria, states 
that in Jordan the royal house has been active not only in preserving but in creating 
‘tribal’ sentiment. The male Arab Bedouin as father and family patriarch is evoked as a 
cultural ideal. Hospitality, honour, independence and fierce loyalty to the father are 
stressed as virtues, both by the royal house and by many Jordanians. Rabo makes this 
argument through a consideration of ideas of honour, and how the state maintains these 
(for instance through criminal and personal status laws). Women, Rabo maintains, have 
honour through men, and their virtue is important to the honour of men. Yet while 
Rabo’s point is well made, it obscures that ‘ird, which Rabo glosses as ‘virtue’, is not 
the same as sharaf or karām, and while important to these other forms it is a largely 
passive and negative property, lost but not won. As such it does not have the same 
potential political power. By reinforcing a ‘tribal’ discourse (partly by default, through 
delegitimising other forms of social organisation), the entangled honours of those who 
share a name come to be politically significant, and given these gendered connotations 
of honour, this also genders the political space of hospitality to a much greater degree 
 
20 This of course intersects with racial discourses. As Rabo (1996) points out, the ideal subject is 
constructed not just as male, but as Arab as well, and as such hiring and showing off non-Arab 
servants is a prestigious claim. Going to meet a wealthy old man of the Fayiz family in the village 
of Um al-‘Amad, he proudly dismissed his son, my contact, who asked if we needed anything, 
saying with evident pride 'if we do, my African will bring it’. Those who are not Bedouin Arab 
males are peripheral not only to such spaces themselves, but the kind of political discourse they 
embody.  
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than the public sphere of positions and office-holders, where women can sometimes 
play a prominent role. 
 Ethnographically, I found practices of gender segregation to be highly variable 
and often more flexible than they at first appear. Young children, boys and girls, come 
and go freely, and often transmit messages between male and female spaces, but from 
puberty, some households impose various degrees of segregation. In more segregated 
households, women remain in the kitchen or in a female guestroom (such as Figure 4.6), 
often next to the male, but with a separate entrance. Yet occasionally, even in relatively 
conservative homes, important female guests may be greeted in the main guestroom, in 
which case men may temporally be banished from the space, or with older married 
women and close female kin the segregation may be relaxed even on some formal 
occasions. In the dīwān of Hamīd bin Lufān ash-Shammary, a tent separate from the 
house (and the subject of the next section), the space is gendered almost entirely, yet 
during the colder winter months where the smaller sitting room inside the house was 
used, a more informal atmosphere prevailed, and women would often sit briefly in the 
room with the men. On one visit, where the men had already eaten and were working on 
decorating an extension, I was taken to the women’s guestroom with my wife to eat 
instead, under a framed picture of Hamīd’s dead mother, mirroring Hamīd’s father’s 
portrait presiding over his dīwān.  
 The Dahamshah families of Um al-Walid were also mostly strictly segregated in 
the presence of guests, and I never met some of my interlocutors’ wives and sisters, who 
I knew of only through my wife’s visits. My Salaytah friends likewise would normally 
invite their wives to eat with us unless many important guests were present, but never 
unmarried daughters, who I only knew of through my wife, and were never talked about 
in front of me. Yet older women often came to talk with the men and sometimes guests; 
grandmothers and great-grandmothers, who in dress and deportment behaved very 
differently from younger women.21 On one occasion my host, who was entertaining a 
number of important guests, called his elderly mother to the dīwān and given a place of 
honour, to the right of the head of the family, though she quickly expressed a preference 
for the company in the female guestrooms where she alone presided.  
 
21 These old women were often marked out by the now discontinued practise of blue tattoos around the 
mouth and use of henna, as well as wearing the older style of abaya and head dress.  
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 In contrast to these various household levels of female seclusion from male-
dominated hospitality, my friend Mohamad Abu Slayih, from a Naqab Bedouin family 
now living in Madaba, invited me to his home for celebratory meals on several 
occasions, and it was his mother, talkative and engaging, who took the lead in hosting, 
rather than his welcoming but taciturn father, and his teenage sisters also joined us to 
eat. Many Ammani families, especially richer ones, are largely unsegregated for normal 
social events outside large traditional weddings, and mostly eat in a Euro-American 
style dining room around a table rather than on the floor in a guestroom. Very rich, 
educated women tend not to veil and to mix somewhat freely with men. However visits 
to the realm of the village and relatives there often involve a return to segregation.  
 This gendering of hospitality is challenged by particular women, who through 
their position as influencers of one type or another, are rejecting the gendered hierarchy, 
sovereignty and centrality of dīwān spaces, finding their own instead. Hind al Fayiz, the 
opposition politician, made a point of carrying out meetings in her formal, business-
style office, which she rents commercially and commutes to from her home. Her 
aesthetic as a ‘moderniser’ and an anti-corruption campaigner is in some ways 
dependant on an ability, in certain contexts at least, to keep the public and private 
separate. Even when she was the Bani Sakhr parliamentary deputy in 2014, and thus at 
the centre of various webs of patronage, she told me proudly she never had a dīwān. 
Others involved in Hirak (women and men) sometimes said similar things, about the 
importance of doing business transparently, escaping the stifling and perhaps corrupting 
web of familial and social connections centred on the dīwān. This was nevertheless 
challenged at other times. As I will discuss in Chapter 6, in 2016 unemployed young 
men taking part in ta sit-in erected an ‘unemployment tent’ in Dhiban, which in its offer 
of hospitality to passers-by, accompanied with political talk, mirrored a dīwān in many 
ways, not least in its tacit exclusion of women, a point Muhummad As-Snayd made in 
relation to his activism in a female-dominated union for day-waged labourers, in order 
to express concern about the limitations of Hirak in its current form.  
 As well as those, such as Hind, in a position to challenge the centrality of the 
dīwān itself, there are also women who have managed to overcome opposition and 
appropriate this space to wield hospitality themselves, through their success in public 
roles. Halima Abu Qa’ida, the female manager of the Bani Hamida Project in Mukawir, 
was able to make introductions and facilitate my meetings with people in the district 
where she was influential and well-known. She could even take me with her to visit the 
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dīwān of a local shaykh. She explained she visited households in the district on business 
often, and sometimes sat in the women’s room, sometimes the men’s, depending on 
who her business was with. This was essential in practical terms for running the project 
and for her role as a local councillor (sitting on the al-majlus al-balady). For instance, 
when a husband tried to prevent his wife working at the weaving centre, she went and 
convinced him to change his mind, sitting for many hours drinking tea and 
remonstrating, flattering him about his reputation and how no one would think less of 
him, and how helpful the additional income would be for their sons. As her influence 
has grown, Halima now has a large guestroom of her own, and indeed hosted my wife 
and I to a large mansaf with her family, where she acted as both preparer and giver of 
hospitality, straddling these discrete roles. To do so acceptably though, Halima has 
taken to wearing hijab, like many women, a practice she said she did not do in the 
1970s and 1980s when first working for the project, but which allows greater ease of 
interaction in public. She sighed as she showed us pictures of her unveiled when first 
working on the project, and said ‘different times’. 
 These individual cases of successful women nevertheless show the various ways 
public life remains (and in some ways is increasingly) gendered. The dominant State 
discourse tends to place women into a subordinated private realm, subject to the state 
primarily only via male heads of family. The practices associated with the dīwān play a 
key role in this. As the above examples of Hind and Halima show, women can and do 
function in the public sphere. Women may own property, vote, and work in important 
jobs, but their ability to take part in the most valourised modes of social reproduction, 
reproducing the house, the state, and the name/space, remains contested. As Rabo 
(1996) makes clear, the State takes an active role in producing and policing the public 
and private in Jordan as elsewhere, although in ways particularised by historical 
circumstances and cultural understandings.22 The State in Jordan portrays itself as the 
protector of the traditional family and its norms, and often therefore a defender of 
patriarchal power. This is shown most clearly in Jordan’s personal status laws,23 based 
 
22 Rabo argues that in Jordan as elsewhere, the State’s definition of ‘public’ and ‘private’ is gendered 
(1996;167-168); with the royal house working to balance the interests of public and private realms. 
She focuses on the colonial origins in Syria and Jordan of personal status laws, 
23 These include; Article 61, whereby a wife who works outside the home without her husband’s consent 
loses the right to alimony; various stipulations whereby violence committed against women is 
decriminalised if family reconciliation is agreed to by (male) kin; the Nationality Laws which allow 
the transmission of citizenship only by fathers (like tribal names); and the widely condoned but 
technically un-Islamic exclusion of women from their allotted (and under normal Sharia’ practice 
already smaller) share of inheritance.  
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on Hannafi fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), which in various ways enforce a dependant and 
subordinated status on women in relation to their male kin, and which are much more 
stringent on (seemingly more private) matters of family life and social reproduction 
than on matters of women’s public and political role, which are theoretically 
constitutionally enshrined. 
 Given this position, women are not merely relegated to a private sphere, they are 
made to constitute and signify it. The power of family heads over women is especially 
central in the dīwān. Successful professional women are still subordinated in such 
settings, and therefore in the politics of patronage and mediation that occur through 
them, which often presents major disadvantages in other areas of (supposedly public) 
life. Their presence, and their seclusion, are both integral to creating the ‘privacy’ of the 
private dīwān and in marking it as a special protected space, encompassed 
by/encompassing, but somewhat separate from, the house, and especially its purely 
domestic areas. This privacy is not the sense of private carried in the Arabic term khass, 
meaning specific to an individual or family, and used in terms such as ‘private’ dīwān, 
but rather that which emerges from descriptions of spaces or situations using terms such 
as ‘aīly (family-ly) dakhaly, (interior/inside) or even hurma (inviolate). The sense of 
‘private’ the presence of women generates is more symbolic than real in many cases, as 
women increasingly can and do function in the ‘public’ realm, going to school, 
university and work alongside unrelated men. This is accepted by many but by no 
means all Jordanians. Yet the presence of women in the dīwān, contextually a type of 
limited and enclosed public, remains for many far more problematic.  
 
4.5 A	Place	of	Accord	
At a practical level, the dīwān is the used as a venues for dispute resolutions (discussed 
in Chapter 2), which can have real consequences. Most of my interlocutors knew or 
knew of people who had been caught up in dispute resolutions, often having to go into 
jalwa, temporary banishment, to another part of the country, or paying blood money, or 
even in one case losing the family business. A detailed ethnographic description of my 
experiences in a particular dīwān is useful for demonstrating how this role as a 
courthouse fits with that already described above. The dīwān in question is that of 
Hamīd bin Lufān ash-Shammary (photographed in Figures 4.7-9), a key interlocutor in 
Madaba, who I knew as Abu Badr. I was invited by my friend Badr, his son, who told 
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me ‘you must speak to my father, he has history. You must come eat with him. We will 
make you a mansaf’. I made the normal refusals, but these were batted away with more 
force than usual, convincing me he was in earnest. I soon heard from others that Badr’s 
father was a well-known poet and dispute-resolver, often called a ‘judge’ for his 
informal role in such discussions. Badr explained on the way that his family was 
‘traditional’, and that I would go with him to his father’s dīwān, while my wife would 
go to his mother’s and sisters’ guestroom. We accepted this, already used to such 
arrangements, even though they are not ubiquitous. He had kin from Iraq staying, as 
well as his relations from the Bani Sakhr, from Mutirāt and Dahamshah, the ‘ashā’ir I 
knew best.  
 Badr proudly told me the dīwān was famous, as it was taqlīdy ‘traditional’ and 
beautiful. He showed me some pictures from Facebook as we walked. As a tribal judge, 
he would post pictures on his Facebook page of satisfied disputants reconciling in his 
dīwān. When I arrived I had been told before-hand to make the popular and archly 
anachronistic Badawy communal greeting ‘strength to the plunder-takers’ (guwah al 
ghanmiyyn) as it would impress and amuse his father and his guests, but then to great 
each guest individually with enquiries as to their health and news, kissing each cheek. 
The dīwān is a studied replica of a Bedouin tent, complete with camel saddles and a gas 
stove done up like an antique Arab fire-pit with coffee regalia, and with electric lights 
and charge-points, a flat screen television and large, imposing pictures of his father and 
grandfather, and a poem he had written on the past glories of the Shammar. Badr sat me 
down near his father and called his visiting Iraqi cousin who acted as the gahwaji, the 
coffee-maker to pour us each a cup of coffee in the small, thimble like cups (finājin) 
used for such gestures, before disappearing, leaving me alone with his father. After we 
had all taken some sweets, Abu Badr began to quiz me on my research, particularly on 
what I knew of the Shammar, correcting some points in my history, and particularly 
asking my views on Glubb Basha, who he told me had lived at Um al-Walid for a time. 
His friends showed some interest in Glubb, but soon lost interest in me, talking instead 
with anger about the war in Yemen and watching the news on Al Jazeera. 
 People would file through during the meeting while children ran in and out 
carrying messages from Abu Badr’s wife. Young men came at various points, greeting 
their host politely, although they barely registered in the conversation, often taking 
photographs of themselves with the dīwān as a pleasing backdrop. I asked Abu Badr 
specifically about his position. ‘Are you a shaykh?’ He smiled ‘that is mujamlah [a term 
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suggesting flattery], my family has had many shaykhs, many men famous in poems, but 
I am not really a shaykh, there are no shaykhs now. The Shammar are not strong in 
Jordan.’ ‘They call you qādy [‘judge’]’ I said encouragingly. He smiled again modestly, 
‘y’ani’ he said, a phrase of equivocation. I insisted, and asked him to explain why he 
was called qādy and what it meant. He modestly said it was just talk, he was no judge. 
There were judges among the Shammar, as among all noble tribes, but his lineage was 
not counted among them. However, he was famous as a poet and knowledgeable about 
genealogy and urf (‘custom’) and as there were few Shammar in Jordan and no 
recognised judges, he was often requested to adopt the role. His reputation meant that 
now others from the Bani Sakhr, whose own legal resolution practices he also knew 
well, would come to him too.  
 There was no jurisdiction in this, the qādy in a dispute resolution may have an 
official document of recognition and/or a hereditary precedent to claiming the position, 
but anyone who is asked by both the parties in a dispute to arbitrate between them can 
fulfil the role. Ibn Lufān hosted men from both parties in his own dīwān in order to 
bring about reconciliation. He told me of various cases of the qātil/maqtūl type (Section 
2.3), but stated he dealt with smaller cases unofficially using these principles. He rarely 
dealt with homicide, although he had settled a car accident leaving a driver badly 
disabled, setting a correspondingly high diyyah (blood money). Small and unofficial 
acts, acting as a broker and guarantor in situations where trust had broken down 
between family members or business partners, were more his usual domain, and as he 
said, were as such not directly under the Palace Convention. It was, he insisted, his 
dīwān that had gained the reputation as a place for resolving disputes, not merely 
himself as a mediator. The materiality of the place therefore is important to its purpose. 
 It might seem that this fairly formal and somewhat abstracted conversation about 
Bedouin law in theory and practice was quite separate to the social-media-friendly, 
almost folklorised surroundings in which it was delivered. But it is in this social and 
legal context, as much as in tourism and heritage, that such an aesthetic seems to recur 
in Jordan. I was encouraged to visit at will and took up this standing invitation often in 
the months to come, often being asked to rehearse or preform some point of poetry or 
genealogy I had been taught the time before, to the amusement of all. The slightly arch 
sense of dressing up and performing (at least for me and perhaps for the younger men 
present) is all part of the place’s appeal and claim to a type of sovereignty. It draws its 
authority in part from a visual and affective appeal to history and to an imagined 
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distinctive and moral past. If younger men and women don’t wholly accept this claim, 
they do not entirely break with it either. Marwan, the administrator of the Bani Sakhr 
Facebook page, was one of the few younger people who sat regularly in his relative 
Hamīd bin Lufān’s dīwān, posting pictures of it on his feed. The Facebook 
administrator and the shaykh are here both making use of the same aesthetic. They are 
both, more importantly, drawing semiotic potency from a particular idea of valourised 
hospitality and sovereignty.  
 In an interview with Marwan, about his role as administrator for the Bani Sakhr 
Facebook group, he broke off suddenly from a series of questions his group’s reporting 
on Bani Sakhr involvement in protests, and told me that the question I should be asking 
was ‘what has happened to the shaykhs’ – when these sort of disputes take place, why 
are they and their pronouncements not more audible? For Marwan the shaykhs and the 
shaykhly culture of the dīwān remain central, worthy of respect and veneration. But for 
many on his and other similar sites on social media, pride in origins and names, and 
even shared political loyalty, have become far more diffuse. The shaykh’s dīwān 
remains as potent symbol and backdrop, but leadership and decision making have 
passed to others. The reason, Marwan told me, that websites and groups like his are 
carefully controlled, is because they have been implicated in insitgating a number of 
violent clashes on university campuses, and organising communal violent collective 
action in relation to wider feuds and conflicts. In the idealised version of shaykhly 
leadership, disputes are deferred to the deliberations of elders in the dīwān, and the 
violent potential of young men, fierce solidarities, and a wish for revenge kept within 
strict limits, and generally diffused. This, in a sense, is the deal shaykhs and tribal 
judges have made with state authorities. Abu Badr’s dīwān shows how the model of 
‘tribal’ dispute resolution has expanded otuwards informally far beyond the limits set 
upon it by the Palace Convention, but beyond even such settings, the politics of 
name/space has taken on new, wider and perhaps less controlled forms. I will explore 
this potential in Chapter 6. 
4.6 Conclusion	
In this chapter, I have sought to link together the previous two historically-focused 
chapters, exploring ethnographically the practices and dilemmas surrounding 
hospitality, dispute resolution and political spaces in the Bedouin villages. I built on the 
concern from Chapter 2 with defining and locating tribes and Bedouin in contemporary 
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Jordan through practices of hospitality, honour and everyday politics, and the ways they 
are reinforced infrastructurally by, for instance, dispute resolution laws. I have linked 
this to the concern in Chapter 3 with land, place and villagisation, in order to suggest 
that the dīwān, as a social space and putative centre for tribal categories, is crucial in 
reproducing the association between names and places, and the idea that certain places 
are politically more than just national subject space. I have argued that in the concrete 
geographical space of the dīwān, and through various practices of hosting and of 
protection, the continuing significance of names and named social categories and of the 
everyday politics of hospitality and patronage intersect. I suggest that these places, and 
the types of public they constitute, are essential for understanding the historical 
reproduction of ideas of tribe and of tribal politics, and a broader politics of patronage, 
interpersonal mediation and representation, sidestepping the official publics of the state 
and ‘civil society’. The dīwān crosses lines between heritage and wāstah, and scales 
from the domestic house to the kingdom itself. 
 Because of this very ability to operate across scales, to resonate symbolically in 
different fields, I also suggest that it is neither possible nor analytically useful to mark a 
firm distinction between the public and the private, the domestic house and the public 
hall or office, the state and civil society. The state, which has been built around a royal 
house which portrays itself as a senior branch of a national family, cannot be separated 
neatly from the dīwān, unless we see the state only through the lens of familiar, 
bureaucratic Euro-American state models, which in practice tend to be similarly 
compromised. I have tried to move beyond the idea of a single or general public in my 
analysis, whose division from the private is a feature of certain currents of 
modernisation theory (Giddens 1992). The idea of creating a specific type of public, one 
of many, is I argue essential to the idea of the dīwān. This is not a single, intermediate 
‘public’ that sits between the state and the family, as civil society is portrayed in many 
accounts, but rather many potential publics existing at a range of scales from Ghazi’s 
small guestroom in ad-Dīr (Figure 4.5), to the huge hall of Mithqal (Figures 4.2-4.4)  
 The emergence of new social-media driven modes of sociality, might, Hughes 
points out, suggest the rules and consensus-seeking of dīwān-based elders are becoming 
marginalised or circumvented. However, he departs from this analysis in arguing that 
these new social forms are through their engagement with exemplary patterns, bound to 
collapse back into them. Hughes states (2018:50); 
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The introduction of a new medium of communication has also intensified 
their engagement with certain pre-existing kinship logics – even if their 
elders view those engagements as illegitimate. 
My argument runs largely along similar lines, except that instead of seeing the pre-
existing, or ‘traditional’, logic that such behaviour engages with (and seems to collapse 
back into) as ‘kinship logics’ I see them as logics of sovereignty, representation and 
patronage; logics which I argue show no sign of withering with the power of 
genealogical elites. Yet despite this continuity of mediation, the increasing 
marginalisation of formal hospitality for many young Bedouin Jordanians, in part a 
response to economic crisis, does have important consequences. Many, as we shall see 
in the next two chapter, feel at once unable to reproduce the social world of their 
parents, and also ambivalent about trying to do so. It also opens up a widening gap 
between practice of patronage and wāstah still regarded as essential but increasingly 
criticised, and the genealogical, socio-cultural and political meaning of identifying with 
‘ashīrah type categories. The two, long held together through claims to represent and 
protect made by linages of shaykhs and kubār, may increasingly drift apart.  
 I make this argument despite it presenting an ethnographic dilemma. Many of 
my interlocutors would place emphasis on dam, ‘blood’ – over power, deference to 
wealth or leadership. However in practice, most visitors to the dīwān are ‘kin’ in the 
sense of having relations with the host that are genealogically ‘known’ not in the sense 
of intimacy or shared substance, still less shared purpose. It is business contacts, 
neighbours and potential patrons and clients who interact here, not just cousins, even 
when the idiom of kinship is used. Moreover, it is through this space that the most 
powerful, often deeply embedded in the state apparatus as ministers, officers or 
parliamentary deputies, can claim to be intermediaries and representatives, for it is here 
they can mediate between the world of officials and offices and their own ‘people’. As 
such, the dīwān as a space makes concrete both the ideas of reputation, honour and 
social reproduction we have seen in previous chapters, and the shadowy notion of 
representative sovereignty as a concept hovering behind the everyday politics of the 
Bedouin villages of Madaba. These settings however also privilege the view of the 
patron and his clients. In the next chapter, I turn to some of those who refuse, contest or 
radically reimagine such settings and the politics they embody. In doing so, the 
pervasiveness of, and the limits to, the representative sovereignty of the established 
order become clear. 
Chapter 5: “You Cannot Eat Us, Our Flesh is Bitter”: dilemmas of consumption, accumulation and 
anticipation in the Bedouin villages of Madaba 
Frederick Wojnarowski – May 2020   171 
 “YOU CANNOT EAT US, OUR FLESH IS BITTER”: 
DILEMMAS OF CONSUMPTION, ACCUMULATION AND 
ANTICIPATION IN THE BEDOUIN VILLAGES OF 
MADABA 
 
 Ma btagdr tāklna lahmna mur. [You cannot eat us; our flesh is bitter]. 
Popular proverb (mithal) among Bani Sakhr young men. 
 
In the age of Shaykhs, the strong ate the weak  
Andrew Shryock (2019b:14) 
 
In this chapter, I turn to the ways my interlocutors talk about consumption and 
accumulation and the role this has in mediating and contesting their positionality within 
the varied moral and political economy of Jordan. The language of consumption, as 
metaphor and mode of analysis, was often deployed by my interlocutors when 
discussing economic matters. The metaphor of consumption hints at political and 
economic positionality (who eats whom); where the verb ākl- literally to ‘eat’ is 
invested with a set of meanings to do with taking, suffering and using up. The ‘strong 
eat the weak’ (al-kubār āklu ad-d’aīf), people and whole groups are ‘eaten’ by the state, 
and in my setting young Bedouin declare a fierce resistance to outside abuse through the 
title phrase, in which they declare that an unnamed outsider cannot eat them, as their 
flesh is bitter – where to be eaten is to be beaten and under the power of others.  
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 This connects to a wider anthropological interest in the use of consumption and 
predation as both a central metaphor and at times key experiential element of political 
economic relations and processes (see for instance Wilk 2004, Graeber 2011 Newell 
2012, Candea and Da Col 2012), what Doukas (in Graeber 2011:503) terms ‘a symbolic 
eating that both destroys and incorporates its object’. This latter point is important; the 
particular cannibalistic image of the title phrase seeks to resist not just destruction, but 
incorporation. It seems to proclaim sovereignty through inedibility.  
 By insisting on the metaphorical quality of talk of consumption I aim to avoid 
objections to consumption as a coherent analytical category of political economy.1 Here 
rather I focus on ethnographic usage of the verb to ‘eat’, and other direct statements 
about using up and consuming, in wider contexts than food. I thereby disassociate this 
usage from both the maximal Frankfurt School use of the term, and consumer culture as 
creative identity-making that Graeber (2011) takes aim at, as well as maintaining 
contact with the Medieval genealogy and etymology that Graber (ibid) puts forward.2 
Even so, wider conceptions of global trends in consumption and a consumer culture are 
entangled with such metaphorical talk. Many of the ethnographic examples I consider 
where people talk of eating are at the interface between everyday life and wider 
transnational economic trends (which Graeber associates with neoliberalism), 
particularly relating to the rise in cultural tourism in Jordan. Among former-pastoralists 
in Jordan, the metaphor of eating from one’s flock or herd (whether actually or through 
selling more animals than the natural rate of replacement) remains a powerful image of 
profligacy and short-sightedness; a practice only to be undertaken in desperation or to 
fulfil honourable obligations of hospitality. This fits uneasily with other powerful (and 
often but not always more recent) images of meaningful economic life and spending, 
 
1 This is not to accept ‘consumption’ as a category of political economy, with the same range of meanings 
and applications it has come to have in twentieth century Euro-American writing. Richard Wilk 
(2004) produced a detailed mapping of the range of meaning and metaphor underlying consumption 
as a category, focusing in particular on the central metaphor of eating; which seems to precede and 
inform all other meanings of the term, as one of the primary experiences of human life. Wilk points 
out that consumption fits uneasily between being a category or a phenomenon, and is neither ever 
quite an analytical nor a ‘native’ category.  
2 And as Graeber rightly points out, ‘these ideas [theories of desire] were very likely developed earlier 
and more extensively in the Islamic World’ (2011:496).  
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not to mention attitudes towards conspicuous wealth, escaping poverty, and personal 
autonomy, the scene for a series of dilemmas I explore in this chapter.3 
 This chapter also returns to the theme of land, analysed in Chapter 3, as a site 
where the demands of social reproduction come into tension with ideas of semi-separate 
tribal or Bedouin protected spaces differentiated from the impersonalised subject 
territory of the nation-state. The ideal of being capable of protecting one’s house and 
providing for family, autonomous from others but with one’s honour entangled with that 
of one’s kin and associates, is hard to pull off in a political economy where living off 
one’s own resources in the villages cannot compete with taking work in the city (which 
mostly involves submitting to networks of patronage). Talk of eating, of salaries, people 
and ‘tribes’ are not merely metaphorical flourishes but suggestive of a certain 
intersubjective disposition towards economic life. This talk brings into focus a set of 
dilemmas around what makes a good and satisfying life, how it should be achieved, 
what its opposites and alternatives might be, and the obstacles faced in pursing it. I 
make a comparison with the largely abandoned anthropological concept of the ‘image of 
the limited good’ (Foster 1965) to look at anxieties over seemingly selfish or a-social 
accumulation and success, as well as economic worries over subsistence, represented by 
bread and meat, and fears of the erosion of sociality. Emerging from this, I consider the 
political consequences of a fundamental dilemma faced by my young (and mostly male) 
interlocutors over money, status and accumulation; between cutting their ties and going 
it alone or submitting to what seems an increasingly marginal but still just survivable 
place within an entangled and constrained social order. 
 I contend that an analysis of the experiences of young and unemployed or 
precariously employed shabāb (a term meaning ‘youth’ applied to an increasingly wide 
age-group) in Madaba both enriches and problematises elements of the current 
anthropological interest in ‘waithood’ and ‘stuckedness’ commonly applied to work in 
Arabic-speaking countries, to talk about the problem of young people facing 
circumstances that make it difficult to transition to social adulthood at the customary 
age. Their ‘waithood’ I argue, can productively be viewed as a feature of a certain 
liminality in their position. Vertical relations of moral patronage between generations 
 
3 Evident here is perhaps something of the clash Graber (and before him Sahlins) explores between the 
discourse of human nature as one of insatiable greed and material gratification, with historical and 
ethnographic observations that show that most people have never behaved in such a way, so that it 
appears that ‘the maximising individual existed in theory long before it emerged in practice’ 
(2011:498). 
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and class remain a powerful force, including those articulated through the name/space 
categories of ‘ashīrah. Older male kin were and to some extent still are expected to find 
a job and eventually a wife for young men, and then to assist in assembling the vast 
social and material capital to host a large wedding (often involving hundreds or even 
thousands of guests and three days of celebration) and then setting up the couple in a 
house or apartment of their own, but close by to kin. This is increasingly unrealistic for 
most Jordanian families. Demographic and economic trends have altered the potential of 
these vertical links to bind individuals together and in particular have limited the 
transfer of wealth and social capital. As a result I argue horizontal age-based solidarities 
have been strengthened, especially as school and university education pulls young men 
away from the household and a model of learning centred on the dīwān, as discussed in 
the last chapter. 
5.1 Who	Eats	Whom?:	the	encompassing	background	
 
Ironically… the artefacts of peoples are sometimes celebrated as examples 
of national heritage at the same historical moment that the people who 
made the objects are being turned into the urban poor or the most menial 
workers… Thus in an utterly Baudrillardian move by national elites, the 
sign replaces the referents  
Sherry Errington (1998:43)  
 
Errington’s analysis seems applicable to Jordan, where the state in its formation and 
drive towards modernisation has consumed ‘ashā’ir (by pacifying them and forcing 
them into the structure of the state), and is now consuming them in another sense, as a 
marketable ‘identity’ product. Bedouin culture is consumed for nationalistic, touristic 
and heritage purposes, via symbols on public buildings and at state occasions, and by 
tourists as part of their experience of Wadi Rum or Petra (see for instance Chatelard 
2005). Those southern tribes who work with tourists most closely, the B’dul and the 
Huwaītāt, are often referred to disparagingly as the ‘whores of the foreigners’ (‘ahārāt 
al-ajānib) but in other contexts, the whole of Jordan is critically seen in this way; a state 
reliant on foreign aid for keeping the peace with Israel against the objections of a 
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majority of their own citizens, where American military bases are permitted, and where 
the Government sides with American soldiers over Jordanian Bedouin in disputes.4  
 Those directly working in tourism – the so-called ‘whores’ – are of course often 
themselves reflective on the consequences of commodification. One Zalaibi Huwaītāt 
man working in Wadi Rum told me his family used to make the bitter Arabic coffee 
over a fire regularly themselves, but had stopped because they had to do it so often for 
tourists during choreographed displays of the ‘Bedouin coffee ritual’ and so they had 
‘become tired’. The actions, one might say, had lost semiotic potency through 
commodification and alienation from their context. Friends shared on Facebook a now-
famous cartoon (Figure 5.1) showing a traditionally-dressed gahwahjī (coffee-maker) of 
the type large hotels and businesses pay to serve a coffee of welcome (gahwah ad-daīf – 
which once offered guests who drank it the protection and hospitality of the host). As he 
serves tourists who photograph him he receives a call from his wife, to tell him his 
cousin is visiting. He tells her the cousin will only want money, and to give him only tea 
instead of coffee and to refuse him meat. The message, it seems, is that in the context to 
a society that which demands a performance of hospitality, its reality and its associate 
dispositions, are undermined. 
Figure 5.1: Cartoon by Emad Hajjaj – 16 March 2013. Retrieved on 6 September 2018 from 












4 In November 2016 a Huwaītāt Bedouin guard had killed several American servicemen in a firefight 
outside the gates of an American Airforce base in Jordan; the Americans saw this as a case of 
Islamist terrorism, while the Huwaītāt protest organisers maintained the Americans had been drunk 
and refused to identify themselves at the compound gate – the case thus rapidly became about both 
the Huwaītāt’s sovereignty and pride in the face of the Government, but also about wider concerns 
about Jordan’s subservience to America influence (Hamarneh 2003, Hughes 2019). 
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The power of karām (hospitality), following Shryock (2004), is maintained by 
displacing it from the corrupted and commodified present into an imagined heroic past, 
the same past from which the narrative genre of competitive generosity and shaykhs 
bankrupting themselves to host guests emerges from. By making these things 
consumable, their power and authenticity may be consumed too, even used up, and so 
can only be maintained by denying the authenticity of their contemporary 
manifestations.  
 The royal house in Jordan has both sought to turn its Bedouin subjects into 
pacified, sedenterised, consumers subject to techniques of capitalist economy, whilst 
simultaneously consuming and commodifying these same subjects for tourists and 
recasting them as a symbolic source of authenticity, legitimacy and national culture in 
the face of complex and ambiguous claims about the nation. This two-fold move, 
summed up to some degree by the opening quote from Errington, can be seen as 
encompassment. The concept of encompassment is a useful one for analysing the 
relationship between the state/governmental and tribal at the level of discourse. This is 
an expansion on Massad’s argument that by firstly imposing a standardised form of 
tribal law through the Mahad al-Qasr (the Palace Convention discussed in Chapter 2) 
unifying the disparate traditions and dispute resolution systems across the country, and 
then by exempting state security and military personnel from tribal law (even, indeed 
especially, when they are themselves members of tribes) the state gained the ability to 
encompass the tribal. Massad states (2001:62); 
This point is crucial in the modern nation-state’s ability to demarcate the 
borders between the traditional and the modern. Whereas the modern 
nation-state can and should include within itself “traditional” authority 
structures and practices, these are always already subsumed under the 
supreme authority of the modern state’s laws to which they will always be 
subservient. 
 Rather than the tribal being coeval with the modern, it is encompassed by it. In a 
similar way, the term dira – discussed in the introduction as the claimed territory or 
zone of permitted movement associated with a particular ‘ashīrah – has been 
appropriated by the state as a secondary and subordinate synonym for watan 
(‘homeland’), so that the whole of Jordan becomes a single ‘tribal’ territory for the 
Jordanian ‘tribe’– for instance in the popular 1960s nationalist song diratnah – (‘our 
country’). The tribe is thus consumed, repurposed and encompassed by the state, and in 
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particular by the royal house and the court, where the king presides as a sort of 
paramount shaykh. All sovereignty and chains of obligation flows up to this apical 
point, no matter if they are official-bureaucratic in character, based around supposedly 
‘traditional’ authority structures, or even if they are based on the informal patron-client 
relationships of wāstah and the competitive pursuit of honour.  
 This is a compelling conceptual analysis at the discursive level, but at the messy 
level of lived reality this apical unidirectional model breaks down. The Palace 
Convention is flaunted by both the state and the tribal subjects it regulates and produces. 
Police have on several occasions ended up paying blood money to the families of those 
they have killed or injured in their duties (Watkins 2014), while I often heard of revenge 
attacks made outside of its agreed limits. In practice then, a space of equivocation and 
creative contestation emerges, where who eats whom can be disputed, although of 
course within the limits of the encompassing structure of the nation-state. 
5.2 Idealised	Consumption:	house-building	and	feasting	
When visiting the home of Khalid, an interlocutor from the small Salaytah ‘ashīrah in 
the village of ar-Rama to the south-east of Madaba, on the edge of the desert, he walked 
me around his two-story concrete house, pointing out with pride the rising new 
buildings all around the hillside; homes for his brothers, sons and cousins. All this land 
had been grazing for his family’s goats when he was a boy living in a small two-roomed 
stone house in the winter and camping out with the animals in the summer, now it was 
almost a village in its own right, built through the wealth and social capital of his father 
and now through his own pre-eminent position as a government employee and business 
owner. Built slowly, over many years, adding extra rooms and floors as and when 
money has allowed, all with roof columns proclaiming further expansion to come, these 
homes are a material marker of Khalids extensive network of relations within which his 
home remains a focal point for important gatherings and for hosting visitors. ‘I live 
better now than the shaykh in my father’s day’. Khalid had picked me up earlier in the 
day from the roundabout in Dhiban, and asked me on arrival if I had any problems – 
Dhiban he said, was not a safe place, as the young people were making trouble for 
everyone. He positioned himself as removed geographically and politically from Hirak.  
 His father, Abu Salah, now dead, was born in a tent in the late 1930’s, and  
had been the first of his family to become a soldier. Astute and assiduous investment in 
his network and his career had allowed him to find good jobs for his sons and nephews 
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and make good marriages for his daughters, bringing in bride wealth (mahr) and 
forming further connections. He, and his sons in his stead, embody an ideal of 
personhood and self-realisation based around social continuity and reproduction of 
social roles into the future. However, as their reliance on grazing land has been 
supplanted by government salaries and pensions, and the market value of this land has 
risen with expanding demand from the capital, this inherited land has been sold or 
leased by his sons to provide his family with the capital they need to build their own 
homes. Khalid’s brother Aly, who didn’t finish school and so has struggled to find 
employment outside the village, looks after the remaining family flock, grazing them on 
semi-desert waste-land east of the village in the winter and in the summer on farmland 
owned by others with whom he has unwritten reciprocal understandings.  
 Land-as-property, as we have seen in Chapter 3, is a relatively recent disposition 
for people who prior to the 20th century largely saw land as limitless, more a burden 
than a resource for those tied too closely to it, and therefore vulnerable to the extractive 
and coercive powers of urban states. Livestock, offspring and water were valuable and 
limited, not land. Yet even as land has become valuable, there has been a slow 
contraction of land ownership among Bedouin, often in favour of businessmen or 
business ventures expanding outwards from the capital. His two oldest sons married and 
were given money to help them build their own homes by selling land, increasingly 
valuable in this area not far from the Madaba-Amman road, where a new shopping mall, 
university and flats have all recently gone up. As discussed in Chapter 5, one of the 
main consequences of land settlement and registration has been that many with claims 
to land have been able to gain access to capital via sale or mortgage-like sharia’-
compliant ‘leases’ (ista’jar) or even threats to disputing another’s ownership. By 
becoming a commodity, land-as-resource has become something that can be ‘eaten’. 
Facing rising costs to help his kin mary and form households, Khalid told me, sadly, 
that his children were ‘eating him’. 
 This loss of patrimony is a source of concern for some. Again and again, when 
collecting life histories from older interlocutors, stories of land sales and (potentially 
religiously-illicit) loans to get through hard times, to pay for weddings or to set-up 
children, were treated with ambivalence, often represented as exploitative tricks by 
canny outsiders, especially merchants from Nablus. While for many young 
interlocutors, finding themselves without the inheritance of ancestral lands, the 
exchange of land for homemaking and the kind of social expansion Abu Ahmed 
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completed so successfully is increasingly unattainable. The ambition of many older 
Jordanians was to use one’s wealth to extend one’s own sphere of sovereignty 
legitimately, through established and married adult sons, through daughters marrying 
upwards, through expanding social relationships and networks of patronage. Yet to do 
so through using up land is problematic, like eating from one’s herd. As mentioned in 
Chapter 3, tribal claimants to land were shocked to find that what they regarded as 
communally held dira was in fact registered as sold to others – outsiders – long ago. 
When discussing the ruined fortress of the Adwan Shaykhs at Tal al-Hisban with a Bani 
Sakhr friend he said ‘this was all ‘Adwan land in the time of the famous Shaykh ‘Ali 
Dhiyab, but it was sold over many years to Nabulsi merchants and the Ajarmah too.5 In 
the end it was all gone. His sons asked where their patrimony was and the father said, it 
has been eaten (al-turāth mākul)’.  
 To ‘eat’ (ākl) in the context of wealth or money means to consume unwisely, 
foolishly or greedily, in a way that does not steward but depletes. It is also used in the 
context of being fined where people will say ‘I ate a parking ticket’ – to consume in the 
sense of accommodating a misfortune. To ‘eat’ one’s salary (ākl al-rātib) means to 
spend it all on transient things, without benefit. My Dahamshah Bani Sakhr friend 
Hamid was often in conflict with older male relatives who accused him of eating his 
salary in reference to his excessive smoking habits (getting through three boxes of 
cigarettes a day). An interlocutor who had long been saying he was saving his money to 
buy a car, told me he had become demoralised – ‘perhaps I should just got to Egypt and 
have sex with a prostitute’ he said, only half joking. He already spent much of his salary 
on alcohol. Unproductive transient consumption is connected to many of the social 
anxieties relating to young male sociality outside of the home or the dīwān, especially in 
relation to gathering to drink alcohol or smoke cannabis. The religious sin of these 
practices and the way they consume money in a way without leaving social benefit are 
deeply linked in this and many other contexts – alcohol was haram, one religious 
interlocutor explained, because it made people forget about their duties, to others and to 
God.  
 In a less extreme way, accusations of eating salaries on smoking cigarettes and 
the coffeehouse were used by older men to brow-beat their sons, using fears of feckless 
spending to justify keeping their adult sons at home and making them hand over any 
 
5 The Ajarmah are a small ‘ashīrah of mixed origins considered to be mish āsīl -‘non-noble’.  
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earnings, paying them only pocket money into their thirties. From Hamid’s point of 
view, his life was doomed or destined to ‘just go on like this, to go round’ and therefore 
saving seemed pointless. He might as well spend. This sort of experiential account has 
become associated with a wider political-economic argument about the nature of youth 
in the Global South.6  
 Of course, transient consumption can also play a role in projects of social 
climbing and aspiration, and is not always seen as immorally profligate. Consumption 
certainly marks worldly success, especially in Amman, a city full of expats and 
Jordanians who have spent time abroad. Even in the villages around Madaba trips to 
malls and to the country’s single large Ikea on the Airport Road were prestigious 
outings for ambitious university graduates, and often opportunities to take aspirational 
photographs for social media.  
 The consumption of transient experiences or claiming and marking status is 
neither new nor limited to straightforwardly imported forms. Indeed it is entangled with 
valourised practices. Occasions where mansaf was eaten, or where gahwah al-‘araby 
was prepared, or a particularly fine dīwān visited are also emphasise din social media 
feeds, and are also sort out commercially for enjoyment. Both contemporary 
internationalised and individualised consumption and putatively traditional heritage 
products can be used for conspicuous consumption and appealing consumerism in 
carefully choreographed and curated displays. As I have discussed elsewhere (in 
Wojnarowski and Williams 2020) mansaf is treated by the Jordanian tourism industry 
and by the royal house as a symbol of authenticity, unity and a hardy national character, 
but is simultaneously becoming a subject of commercialised consumerism. 
Comfortably-off families show their status by regularly preparing mansaf for everyday 
domestic consumption, often in a modified form using chicken instead of red meat and 
eating off individual plates with cutlery rather than eating communally from a single 
platter (sidr).  
 Entertaining, especially at weddings, must be on a lavish scale including a meat 
mansaf made with freshly slaughtered animals. For all but the poorest families a 
wedding (‘ars) has involved feeding hundreds of guests with meat. One family I spoke 
to, struggling to maintain a certain standard of life on a single military salary, had 
 
6 Of course, narratives of feckless consumerism and a lack of responsibility among young people are not 
limited to the Global South – talk of Millennials spending too much on brunch and avocado toast 
are examples of a related genre, as is the counter-narrative of increasing precarity and rising costs 
making long-term saving goals unrealistic for young people. 
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bought 12 sheep for the marriage of a son (as well as hiring a tent and several hundred 
chairs) costing over 2,000 Jordanian Dinars, more than four months’ income for them. 
Locally produced jamīd (dried yoghurt) and red meat, lahmah balady, are favoured for 
important social occasions, but are increasingly hard to get hold of. They either require 
considerable domestic labour, the employment of social capital, or sufficient money to 
buy these labour-intensive products commercially. In particular domestic red meat is 
ever more expensive, while still failing to generate adequate livelihoods for rural 
pastoralist consumers.7 This has led (as Hughes 2015 discusses) to various moves 
among modernisers and Islamists to simplify the wedding, cutting away its excessive 
expense and reliance on leveraging vast social networks.8 Sally Howell (2003:222) 
notes similarly the sentiment ‘they should be feeding and educating their children 
instead of spending all their money on meat!’  
 Yet simplifications often meet with dismay from older Jordanians. At a wedding 
near Dhiban that a Salaytah friend invited me to attend, guests were hosted in a salah (a 
commercially rented hall, more affordable than hosting at home) and instead of mansaf, 
shop-bought kunafah (a sweet cheese-based pastry) and coffee were served. Our friend 
jokingly remarked at the reception ‘where is dinner?’ and afterwards he expressed his 
dismay and sympathy for the groom’s relatives, who had had the shame of greeting 
friends and affines without meat. Such weddings, generally agreed to be better than 
executing a traditional wedding poorly, do little to intensify and expand social relations 
in the way that a full wedding feast does. I heard much gossip in the village of Naur, 
near Madaba, of a wealthy Shuwabkah family who had held an expensive wedding in a 
hotel, to which only a few of their closest kin were invited. ‘Haram, those with money 
should invite everyone, they can afford to do weddings in the proper way’. Samer, who 
had not been invited, but might have expected to be, told me. In a further break with 
local mores, they had used outside caterers, rather than slaughtering their own animals 
 
7 Domestic red meat has risen from 7JD /Kg for lamb in 2012 to over 12JD. A whole sheep or goat costs 
200JD (£220), over half the average monthly salary. Even those who have livestock face rising 
feed-costs. While for everyday meals chicken (dajaj) is used in the same recipes, so that overall 
meat consumption has risen, chicken is often considered unsuitable for feast dishes.  
8 Hughes (2015) suggests the cost of weddings and their role in privileging marriage-as-familial-alliance 
has driven the growth of the Chastity Society (jama‘iyyat al-‘afāf al-khayriyya), an international 
Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated charity, which seeks to encourage young people to marry, offering 
help to organise mass-weddings as well as classes to prepare couples for Islamic married life 
(Hughes 2015). The Society encourages several practices that are problematic to older traditional 
authorities who use the language of honour and ‘ashīrah; companionate marriage, small weddings, 
low bride-price and an implicit urge to tame excessive masculine passion and forcefulness.  
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and preparing them domestically. Conspicuous consumption is most idealised when that 
which is consumed is produced domestically, locally, and through social networks 
rather than impersonal commercial transactions. 
 This ties into a widespread idealisation of domestic, and at a higher level 
national, self-sufficiency. Literature on the Jordanian ‘national character’ and culture 
often emphasises frugality and work ethic, even calling Jordanians the ‘Germans of the 
Middle East’, differentiated from the conspicuous consumers of Lebanon and the Gulf 
(see for instance Nasser 2004). This stereotype is clearly misleading in many ways, 
especially for rural Bedouin families and most of all for older men. Frugality in personal 
matters (when eating, in dress, and in home furnishings) was often described by older 
Bedouin as a mark of being muhtrim (respected) and, counter-intuitively being m’aruf 
(‘known’). Famous and popular shaykhs of the past, like Haditha Kraishah and Auda 
Abu Tayi (but noticeably not Mithqal) are remembered as perennially impoverished by 
their hospitality and generosity, acting as a river to their relatives and friends. Frugality 
in personal matters must always be tempered with outward generosity and indeed a 
carefully cultivated disdain for cost. The host should provide an excess of (modest, 
domestically-produced) food for guests while eating little himself, and I was often told 
that Bedouin guests would also have always tried to eat little, needing much 
encouragement from the host to take their fill. To eat sparingly ‘like a hawk picking’ as 
one older interlocutor put it, was the mark of good manners and deportment.  
 All this serves to highlight the moralisation of consumption; dividing that which 
is socially productive from that which is not. In this way certain narrow types of 
excessive consumption to do with hospitality (often referred to as ‘the Arab madness’ in 
a popular aphorism) sit alongside a vision of domestic self-sufficiency and personal 
frugality. Displaying a certain outward modesty and contempt for money and selfish 
individual accumulation, even on occasion a bravado of financial carelessness and 
generosity, was often explained to me as a part of ‘Bedouin culture’ (thukāfah 
badawīah). In this sense personal frugality and communal conspicuous consumption 
come together as two elements of a single ethic or economic logic.9 During my Master’s 
fieldwork in Petra in 2012 I heard tell of Bedouin men burning money at a wedding 
feast, apparently to demonstrate their wealth, but also to show that money had no hold 
over them. Most of my interlocutors around Madaba had a much more careful attitude 
 
9 As they doubtless do in many times and places – for instance see Pepper et al’s (2009) analysis of the 
values of socially progressive and environmental conscious consumer choices in the US. 
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to wealth and managed their finances assiduously, but distaste for public meanness is to 
be avoided at all costs. This disposition towards wealth was explained by some as 
emerging from a nomadic past, where life was physically hard but also effortless. Once 
when making polite conversation with one of the few remaining pastoralists around 
Madaba, he asked me ‘isn’t the life here beautiful? Better than in the town’. I replied 
politely that his life was ‘beautiful, but it must be very hard’. He scoffed ‘not hard, very 
easy!’ He had many worries and physical discomforts, but little labour, he said, and 
most of that was to do with arranging sufficient water and animal feed, things he told 
me were only necessary because of land appropriation and the loss of water to the city. 
Most of the day he sat watching his animals, drinking tea and talking. In his and many 
others’ historical imagination the nomadic past was physically precarious but required 
little input or enterprise, and still less repetitive toil – the work of peasants and slaves. 
Herds and households flourished or failed with the will of God, or more prosaically the 
vagaries of climate and fluctuating prices dictated by distant forces. Wealth, where it 
was made, came from daring raiding, extracting khuwa payments from villagers, taking 
tolls from and escorting/extorting travellers, and from trade; all of which relied on 
building and managing a reputation or name. The maintenance of life depended on not 
eating too greedily from the herd, and for the most part meat was only eaten during 
occasions of hospitality (Palmer 1999, 2002).  
 This picture of nomadic life obscures the degree of stewardship and labour 
needed to support such a life; especially women’s labour, in milking animals, weaving 
tents, making furnishings, cooking, baking and often growing animal fodder. As 
William and Fidelity Lancaster (1987) point out, managing a herd successfully also 
involved considerable enterprise, carefully judging investments in new animals, from 
which stocks to breed, how many to sell etc., not to mention directing the labour of 
children, dependants and hired shepherds. Furthermore, any sense of a pre-market or 
anti-capitalist past of egalitarian and generous shaykhs must contend with the rise of 
slave-plantation-owning Shaykhs in the late nineteenth century (discussed in Chapter 3). 
Pastoralism and agriculture are now seen by many in nostalgic terms. These historical 
realities notwithstanding, in the popular imagination a ‘return to the land’ (the title of a 
particular 2011 protest in Amman discussed at the end of Chapter 6) seems to offer the 
potential for a life where the young can eat without ‘eating up’, and can progress into 
social adulthood. 
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5.3 Problematic	Accumulation,	‘Whales’,	and	the	Problem	of	
the	Shabāb	
Passing on the bus through Um al-‘Amad one day with Hamid, he pointed to the vast 
mansion built by a prominent Sukhur military officer who had since gone into business 
– ‘his cousins still live in a two-room house, and he has done this for himself’. For 
many Bedouin, showing wealth through grand buildings and adornments is a direct 
refusal of normative social mores. Linda Layne (1994) writes that during her fieldwork 
in the 1970s and 1980s there was little differentiation in houses between Balga Bedouin 
and houses were not generally seen as expressions or representations of their occupants. 
The sole exception she tells us was the homes of shaykhs, which were representative of 
not just themselves and their reputation as individuals but in a sense the wider 
categories of ‘ashīrah through which they claimed their positions. Now mansions rise in 
Bedouin lands around Amman as pastoral land is sold off, and new smaller private 
homes (like, to some degree, those of Abu Salah’s sons) mimic architectural features 
from these mansions in reduced and simplified form, with pillared porticos and larger 
and ever-more elaborate guest-rooms. These houses are (unlike Khalid’s) often built 
where land is available cheaply, rather than in the natal setting. A friend once described 
an area of particularly grandiose examples as ‘the hill of the little pashas’ (tal bushāt). It 
is often said of such houses that the owners shāyifīn hālhum – ‘see themselves’ (i.e. are 
self-regarding, self-important or arrogant).10 To become rich also requires becoming a 
social entrepreneur, carefully growing and accumulating a network of patronage 
through which to give and receive wāstah. But once rich, the power is gained to 
disregard some claims and obligations, to socially differentiate and isolate oneself from 
kin and neighbours. All around Amman, small flocks and tent clusters mark the places 
where Bedouin speculators make a claim to land, waiting to sell it when needed, 
surrounded by built-up land once owned by their parents and grand-parents and now 
sold. ‘It is better’ Samer once told me ‘to sell to outsiders.’ To sell to relatives or 
neighbours was, he felt, shameful. 
 Concerns about the very rich are also often expressed through a metaphor of 
consumption. From the idealised image of the hawk eating lightly, used to refer to noble 
Bedouin shaykhs, the metaphor turns to another animal, the bloated whale. Certain 
wealthy figures are sometimes called ‘whales’ (hutt), men who ‘eat up’ public resources 
 
10 In most contexts, surely, the ideal is to be ‘seen’ by others, while not making it look like one wanted to 
be seen.  
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and national wealth indiscriminately.11 When the latest IMF-induced efforts to reduce 
national spending through a tax rise and subsidy reduction in 2017 ended in an 
emergency loan from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf a contact on social media responded by 
saying ‘I pray it [i.e. the loan] will not all be eaten by whales’. When I asked him 
exactly who and what whales are in this sort of talk he told me ‘they [are those with] 
appetites that can’t ever be filled, they will always be hungry. And there isn’t much in 
Jordan – it is a poor desert country… so in the end, they’ll starve too’. This image of the 
whale in the desert is a striking one. Calling the wealthy and corrupt whales is a 
criticism of asocial accumulation and consumption, but it is not just the scale of 
consumption of whales that is troubling, but its unselective character, hoovering up 
whatever comes into their path. While the shaykh at his feast may well be among the 
corrupt, he is not quite a whale: his consumption is still presented as socially 
meaningful. Hirak protesters sometimes also called business figures whales when they 
wanted to indicate their greed.  
 Hirak protesters would often say that to be very rich in Jordan meant to be 
among the fasādīyn (the corrupt) as legitimate, socially responsible enterprises in their 
experience never flourished to the extent that the owners could build palaces and join 
the international ranks of the super-rich. Figures who own or have investments in 
former state industries, or who have sold such investments to foreign firms, are 
especially targeted. Perhaps as importantly, anyone who gains great wealth should 
leverage it for social ends, acknowledging the many and varied claims upon it by kin, 
friends and would-be clients. To use money for the opposite, to become private and 
isolated, was thus problematic. The roots of such money, especially the money made 
like the fortune of Mithqal al-Fayiz who many said had appropriated communal land for 
his own use, or from merchant-speculators who bought up land cheap in times of 
drought from poor pastoralists are often described as making mal haram (illicit money 
or wealth), which comes ‘without blessings’ and gives no joy.  
 It might seem that the spending of Khalid on securing a family legacy, the 
spending of the mansion-builder on himself and the potential spending of the desperate 
 
11 The origins of this animal metaphor is debated. It is used in the Bedouin poetry of Ahmed Hajaya and 
according to Tamplin (2018;314) it is a ‘traditional’ Bedouin metaphor for greed, liked to the 
Quranic tale of Yunis/Jonah. Meanwhile its use in Egypt (Nile Whales) to refer to businessmen who 
became enormously wealthy under Mubarak is attributed by Chekir and Diwan (2012) to Western 
sources, only then adopted and retranslated to Arabic. Either way, the metaphor of the all-
consuming whale has become well established among Hirak activists.  
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young man without marriage prospects blowing his savings on a trip to a prostitute are 
separated by the different attitudes towards accumulation they portray. For Khalid and 
his family, accumulation tends to be temporary state of affairs on the route to pro-social 
(if hardly altruistic) goals, for the mansion builder, accumulation is an individual ascent 
to luxury, power and status, involving a cutting away of some ties, even as new 
networks are formed, and for the young man eating his salary, accumulation seems an 
impossibility bordering on irrelevance. However, spending wealth frivolously for one’s 
personal pleasure, and accumulating wealth for one’s personal status are both in their 
own ways distasteful, as both see wealth pass out of the social realm without achieving 
any widely acknowledged social ‘good’. Eating and hoarding in a sense both destroy 
wealth and undermine social bonds. Focusing on accumulation on its own is thus 
misleading. Instead, what separates these three cases morally is the emphasis, or lack 
there-of, that they place on social ties and relationships. Bedouin poetry idealises the 
shaykh who is bankrupted by his generosity, pursuing the expansion of his social rather 
than material standing. This form of economic exemplarity obscures or denies 
mercantilist European principles of exchange, focusing instead on the unequal, 
asymmetrical and reputation-making power of the debt of hospitality that cannot be 
repaid (Dresch 1988, 1998). Far from encouraging egalitarianism, this form of exemplar 
encourages radical and persistent status difference. 
 The seemingly self-contained life of my wife and I, living in our own rented flat 
in a foreign country and receiving visitors out of choice rather than obligation was a 
source of fascination to many of our interlocutors, who expected to be living in or next 
to the parental home at our age, even if they had managed to find work and marry. 
Hamid often talked wistfully about moving in with me whenever my wife was away and 
did stay over occasionally. When he suggested he might take up the rent of our flat 
when we left with a friend, halving his commute (over four hours daily to and from 
Amman) his brothers intervened. They had supported him through his student days and 
his long period of unemployment and had helped him get a job. Now he wanted to eat 
his salary living like a foreigner rather than contributing to the family household. 
 All this is not to suggest that pro-social values are accepted unambiguously, 
especially by younger Jordanians. My friend Abdalaziz, manager of a government-
funded youth centre in the Sukhur village of al-Jiza that worked to build employment 
prospects among teenagers and young adults, told me that everyone at the centre 
dreamed of getting rich and moving away from their families, but would never say so. I 
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was constantly surprised when even seemingly ‘made’ young men from respectable 
families expressed in confidence and away from their families that their dearest wish 
was to leave Jordan, at least for a time, and experience life away from their families. 
Yet many of these young men are also reliant economically and socially on the 
patronage of older relatives, and were often shocked when my wife and I told them how 
rarely we saw our own parents and siblings – one man who often nagged me for help to 
get a visa said he could not imagine not seeing his family at least once a week. Moving 
out for him on marriage, like for most Jordanian men meant moving to an upper floor of 
his parent’s house. Women move to their husband’s families, but still expect to visit 
regularly. For a married couple to move away together and rent their own house is still 
considered by many to be shocking, and for most couples would be financially reckless. 
The choice to cut away from extended kin networks, and still more extensive networks 
of patronage, and become a relational self-actualising individual and consumer of 
developmental paradigms, is in practice a doubtful one.  
 The growth of Shabāb (simply meaning ‘the young’) as a category with a 
political meaning (an ever-expanding category as marriage and homeownership are 
pushed later and later in life for men) is noticeable in political, journalistic and scholarly 
sources, increasingly applied to men of 35 and older. Youth unemployment is currently 
nearly 27% in Jordan (OECD, n.d.) and likely to be far higher among those in part-time 
education or living outside the statistical interest of the state in refugee communities. 
Priced-out social adulthood, the political problem of shabāb is portrayed as one of 
social reproduction; a theme of rupture in the social fabric and moral economy, 
connecting seemingly dissimilar experiences of decreasing certainty and stability with 
those of stuckedness and boredom.  
5.4 Economic	Subjectivities:	boredom,	stuckedness	and	
gender	in	the	demographic	bulge	
One day while sitting outside a coffeeshop I often visited just outside Madaba, owned 
by Nayif, Hamid’s maternal uncle (khal), I fell into conversation with Ghaleb, a 
businessman of Palestinian origin, who was curious about my research. After explaining 
my interest in Bani Sakhr political history the man scoffed, telling me I was in the right 
place to talk to Sukhur people. ‘Wallah Badu are always in the coffeeshop’ he 
complained. Nayif looked nonplussed and came and joined us. The businessman 
changed tack, but once Nayif left us he switched to perfect English. He soon reverted to 
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his former theme; in Madaba he said ‘they [Bedouin] don’t want a job. They want a 
chair. A chair in an office to drink coffee and read the paper and to meet and talk with 
their friends and cousins.’ This ‘chair’ he added angrily would then be treated as their 
personal property, to be held for life, providing a permanent pension, and could be 
transferred to or used to acquire another chair for their relatives. In Amman he told me 
he could find city boys, mostly of West-Bank or refugee origin, who would work 10 
hours a day in shops, in the hope of saving up to start their own business, where they 
would work even harder.12 ‘These guys here, they can’t do it’ he said, dismissively 
gesturing out of the coffeeshop to encompass Madaba.  
 Economic attitudes in Jordan are often mapped onto the public/private sector: 
East-Banker/West-Banker bifurcation (Gandolfo 2012). Yet many Bedouin have done 
it, and West-Bankers do not have a monopoly on self-exploitation. For instance, my 
interlocutor Badr Shammary helped manage a chain of co-owned shops in Madaba, 
helping Iraqi refugee relatives in the process by employing them as workers. Many 
Bedouin women also have opened hair and beauty salons in Madaba. In the face of 
structural adjustments and the reduction of the size of the state and the military, the 
developmental ideal is that the surplus labour force should find private sector 
employment, an outcome which the World Bank and others describe as requiring the 
overcoming of ‘cultural factors’ (Harrigan et al. 2006:290). In fact, for most the larger 
obstacle is doubtless access to capital, and in particular a willingness to use capital 
which others (especially close family) might have a claim on, for self-centred aims. 
Badr’s father and uncle had supported his shop as an opportunity to help their Iraqi 
relatives. But though Badr often talked about buying the premises outright he told me ‘if 
I ask my father for the money, he won’t have the money if my brother marries. I must 
wait’. This of course is not what banks, NGOs or economic reformers and advisors in 
Jordan would want him to do. For them, Ghaleb’s logic of selfish self-exploitation is 
favoured, an attitude that various microcredit and entrepreneurship-based development 
interventions aim to instil in their creation of ‘neoliberal subjects’ (Sukarieh 2016). 
Such subjecthood, no matter how enticing or desirable, is often in conflict with other 
imperatives, in many cases more practically essential for maintaining vital relationships. 
 
12 This justification of exploiting the most precarious by dangling the slim hope of entrepreneurial success 
might well seem a compelling argument for the existence of powerful networks of patronage to 
mediate between the individual and the national economy.  
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 The opposition activist and former Bani Sakhr parliamentarian Hind al-Fayiz 
positively encouraged a transformation of Bedouin employment into private sector jobs 
and entrepreneurism – a perspective more often held by those with sufficient capital to 
make the process less daunting than it might be for others. For her, the private sector 
represents an escape from this economic dependence on the vicissitudes of the 
Hashemites and their entourage; a return, in a sense, to sovereignty. But where state- 
and kin-patronage are entangled, these jobs seem the only option and inescapable. 
Hamid said to me that to move out or away for a non-secure job would never be 
acceptable to his family, and would not allow him to marry. ‘I know I won’t go hungry’ 
Hamid said sadly, when talking of his brothers, but this dependence is a limbo for him, 
not an end-state.  
 On another occasion Hamid referred to life in his village as aīsh bidun fursa ‘life 
without opportunity’. In the end Hamid did get a government job, in part through 
Sukhur connections, filing in the Finance Ministry. Government work, as Hamid was 
told by his brothers, may pay less but is more honourable than opening a shop, as Badr 
(who was Hamid’s cousin) had done. Many others wait, looking for the elusive 
circumstances that will allow them to find permanent employment, in the meantime 
eating what little they have on smoking and drinking tea and coffee in the coffeehouses 
with friends much of the day, to escape the house. 
 ‘Eating’ in this sense stands in for minimal life-sustaining subsistence, what 
Agamben (1998) terms ‘bare life’, especially talk of eating bread. I have already hinted 
at the metonymic as well as metaphorical quality of bread, standing for subsistence and 
also representing the wider political economic world of the subsidised bread-eating 
public. The language of subsistence remains, in Arabic as in most languages, the 
language through which labour is talked about – winning bread, making bread, sharing 
bread. ‘They are starving us’ was a constantly repeated utterance when the bread price 
doubled in January 2018. Bread, particularly the subsidised and standardised khubz 
‘araby (a cheap, mass-produced flat-bread with a government-set price made with 
subsidised imported flour to a set recipe) as Martinez (2018) points out, is a key 
political symbol. Bread subsidies remains a source of unrest and as such bread and 
bakeries remain at the heart of the social contract and of ideas of just and benevolent 
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government.13 As at once a revered symbol of pious subsistence and a bare necessity, 
daily bread should be abundantly present but almost beyond notice. Historically ‘aīsh –
‘life’ was used as an alternative term for bread and cereal-based food in general (Palmer 
2002). Some, like my friend Abdalaziz treat bread with piety, picking up thrown-out 
stale bread on the ground and placing it on a wall. Yet in contexts of hospitality guests 
are often told to not bother eating bread, to focus their appetites instead on meat.14  
Figure 5.2: Protesters hold slogan-bearing bread in front of the Labour Union offices in 












 As bread-as-life stands for subsistence consumption, it is morally opposed to 
excessive accumulation by the rich. Many Hirak protesters carried pieces of flatbread on 
which is they wrote political messages, such as fasād=jua’ – ‘corruption=hunger’ (as in 
Figure 5.2). Hirak leader Sabri Mash’āllah at one meeting asked rhetorically that since 
bread prices were rising, and so bread consumption decreased, where was the excess 
going? ‘Eaten by the whales’ was his rhetorical answer. The meaning of bread hovers 
then between two polls. On the one hand, a representation of the social contract between 
rulers and ruled, of humble but virtuous sustenance and public life. On the one hand, of 
the life of the depoliticised subject of power, kept alive by the will of the sovereign via 
subsidised grain, and thus rendered permanently dependant. This in in contrast to the 
idealised pastoralist, living off their own herd and grain bought or extorted from 
villagers.  
 
13 Grain riots have a long history in most Islamic cities (Goodwin 2001:114) and ensuring access to bread 
is the basis of benevolent government. To allow the market to determine grain and bread prices is 
thus fraught.  
14 As Mary Douglas (1966) argued, things which symbolise a bare minimum for life can be 
simultaneously sacred and unvalourised. 
Image Redacted 
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 For much of the twentieth century (and indeed before in some Muslim states), 
the ability to deliver subsidised bread to citizens was a marker of both the virtue and 
beneficence of the rulers, and also of their sovereignty, made concrete through social 
welfare given to dependents. As state employment and price subsidies have diminished, 
the state has sought to promote ideas of kinship associations and tribe as alternative 
forms of welfare, but ones that are inherently depoliticising. The opacity of such 
channels of support, where development money is given directly to cooperative family 
and tribal associations with central funds for the benefit of members, has further 
encouraged the generalised discourse and practice of wāstah, not perhaps so much a 
depoliticization, but a deferral of the political to a space outside of legitimate public 
gaze. As even the ‘bare life’ afforded to the urban poor via bread subsidies becomes 
more precarious, other ways of imagining the socio-political structure of the nation-state 
take on increased significance. This is reflected by ethe increased talk of social contracts 
in works of economic analysis. Riad al-Khoury, the Middle East Director of 
GeoEconomica in his 2019 economic brief mentions in the conclusion, after a relatively 
technocratic and quantitatively-focused report, that the positive economic metrics 
considered must be balanced against the fact that ‘Jordan’s existing internal political 
situation is poor and the country’s social contract unsustainable’ (al-Khoury 2019:5).  
 Such reports have been prophesising economic and political ferment in Jordan 
for decades – a revolt of the bread-eaters – and have thus far been disappointed. Like 
many supposedly unsustainable and unbearable situations, the economic situation in 
Jordan has proven surprisingly stable even as it declines. Talk of Jordan as on the brink 
gets at a fundamental tension in Jordan’s contemporary situation, which is consistently 
described as both stable and unsustainable. Public facing media often call Jordan balad 
amaan wa alaamn – ‘a country of safety and security’, and less flatteringly many expats 
and some English-speaking urbanites like to call it ‘the Hashemite Kingdom of 
boredom’, a place where nothing ever happens. Zachary Sheldon (2017) explores 
sentiments around Jordan’s stability among Iraqi refugees, who often describe their 
situation as ‘safe but not settled’ – a situation where bare life is guaranteed but where 
any movement towards permanence, prosperity or social reproduction seems blocked.  
 This sense of impending collapse paradoxically twinned with bored stuckedness 
is not a sentiment confined to the large and precarious refugee population but is found 
to various degrees amongst most people in the country. Ethnographically even quite 
short conversations (for instance with taxi drivers or shop-keepers) would often involve 
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expressions of concern over the economic situation. Khalid’s brother Tariq operated a 
private minibus between the village of ar-Rama in the Bādīyah and Madaba, and after 
the rise in fuel prices meant he had to take on another route as well to stay profitable, 
doubling his working hours he told me ‘there is so much pressure (daghat) on people, 
we can’t follow (lahaq – i.e. ‘cope with’) it. It can’t continue, we can’t live. If one little 
thing happens, if I break down, ‘khalas [finished]’ he said, chopping the air with his 
hand. Equally prominent is talk suggestive of a sense of what Ghassan Hage (2009) 
calls ‘stuckedness’ – a sense of endless repetition without anticipating successful 
transformation. Hamid told me often ‘nothing changes – I will be here [i.e. sitting in his 
brothers’ village house or in the coffeeshop] till I die’. At other times Hamid was 
extremely ambitious in his plans to learn English, to buy a car, to find work or to leave 
the country. There was however a yawning gap between his anticipatory desires, which 
do involve a degree of effortful work to bring the future about, and his sense of the 
potential of his actions to realise his hopes within the current system. The present 
situation is thus described as unendurable and precarious, but also strangely changeless. 
Neither imminent disaster nor any easement seems likely, rather a slowly narrowing 
range of possibilities and opportunities.  
 This is not to say the prevailing discourse is one of changelessness. The scale of 
historical change indeed is widely recognised. Many interlocutors had family members 
who could tell me of a time when money and waged labour were rare, and the idea of 
getting much richer fanciful. On one of my outings with Halima (the NGO manager and 
local politician) in Jabal Bani Hamida we visited the mukhtar (village dignitary() of 
Jadaydah, Rashid Abu Salīh al-Qa’ada. When discussing the problem of young people 
he said; ‘Luck, war and good marriages were the only way things changed. My 
grandfather wanted good marriages for his children, to keep his herd. That is all. Now 
we want so much. But really, what my grandfather wanted, we don’t have even that.’ In 
Chapter 3 we saw how, despite such talk, over a century of land speculation and 
investment have left their mark, dominated by a narrow band of elite actors. The result 
has been disastrous for many. Ambivalent sentiments towards an imagined pre-growth 
past without too much effortful accumulation are important when set against a present 
wherever greater effort is needed to meet ever greater expectations for life and yet with 
decreasing chances of success.  
 As important as a sense of pressure is the widespread talk of boredom. Many 
things and situations were described to me as mamul,‘ boring,’ but for someone to be 
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‘bored’ – malal or zahgān – could contextually mean something far more existential, as 
Samuli Schielke (2015) also describes in his field site in Egypt. As in Schielke’s 
description of life in Nazlat al-Rayyis, I found many young men talked of boredom as a 
lack of belief in the meaningfulness or efficacy of action, and a frustration with the 
hollowness of schemes of improvement, both developmental and religious. ‘It is better 
to be bored in the coffeehouse than the office’ Hamid once told me, after he had just 
found work and had gathered with friends to watch a football match. Hamid’s boredom 
extended to attending prayers and fasting during Ramadan as well. Expressions of 
boredom in the village often precede a trip to Madaba or Amman, but young men there 
also often talk about boredom. When Hamid started working he was initially elated but 
within a few weeks was commiserating with others in such jobs about how boring it 
was. The defining feature of this boredom is not the repetitive quality of life, although 
this is talked about extensively; getting up at the same time, going to the same places, 
never having the money to break routine. Such repetitively familiar existences are not 
always boring, indeed they can be seen as meaningful and happy if they are imagined to 
be following a trajectory (Hage 2015). The problem faced by Hamid and others like him 
is not that life stays the same, but that it stays the same in ways it should not. As 
Ghassan Hage (2009) points out, the colloquial shāmy Arabic response to questions 
about how one is doing is normally mashy ‘walking’ – which also is used to mean 
‘okay’. This motion is not necessarily linear progress and self-advancement, but rather 
at the minimum the unfolding of the different elements of a life in the correct order. In 
this context not being able to get a full time job, to marry, to have children, to buy a car 
and build a house represents an inability to become a full social person.  
 Boredom is not experienced by everyone in the same way or to the same degree. 
Boredom, as Schielke (2015) points out, is always gendered. Once when Osama, the 
Hirak activist, was complaining about how bored he was looking for work and going 
into the University to see his friends and doing a little work as an unofficial ‘research 
assistant’, his sister Samira said ‘you could always help us more at home if it tires you. 
I’m tired, we’re all tired and bored/fed up [farfatāt ruwhi]’ Osama gets paid about 3 JD 
(roughly £4) an hour for his work at the University, which often totals around 6 or 7 
hours a week. After spending money on transport, coffee and cigarettes he has almost 
nothing to contribute to the household. His mother and sister meanwhile both work (as a 
teacher and a shop assistant respectively), and cover most of the grocery costs, while his 
father’s pension covers accommodation. Young men like Osama, who spend their time 
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waiting together outside the house, reproduce a certain youthful masculinity based on 
discontent and anger, coupled with an avoidance of the home.  
 Restlessness and being easily bored are contextually characteristics of 
intelligence and energy, along with joking. To not be bored suggests a lack of vigour 
and ambition. Yet this positive association is rarely extended in public discourse to 
women, implicitly casting these characteristics as masculine. To many Jordanians, long 
spells at home are not considered boring for women in the same way they are for men. 
Unmarried Jordanian women undertake an average of 17 hours of domestic work per 
week, increasing to 37-38 hours per week once married (Assaad et al. 2017:23).15 
Despite the educational attainment of women in Jordan overtaking that of men in recent 
years,16 the burden of running the household limits their ability to take part in the labour 
market or other social activities.17 Efforts to boost female attainment are often treated as 
a threat to male employment.  
 Samira, speaking good English and studying towards a degree in translation, 
works in a menial but reliably waged role in a local relative’s business, while Osama 
pursues work in the capital and in academia. She went on to rebuke him for spending all 
his time out doing nothing but talking and waiting, when she had to not only study and 
work but also help their mother at home. Often women have less opportunity to express 
boredom and face far more censure for saying anything negative in front of male kin 
and even older female relatives, while male friends often talked, even boasted, of their 
boredom and frustration. 
  In the villages many Bedouin young women face a similar set of dilemmas to 
young men, usually with even sharper consequences. Despite often having good 
degrees, options on graduation are limited by family expectations. Moving away, 
forming inappropriate friendships or in some cases even trying to find work meets with 
rebuke from relatives. For the last decade women have outnumbered men in the 
University of Jordan (Jansen 2006: 480) but have far lower employment prospects. The 
way many unmarried women are socially occluded outside their extended families 
 
15This is not to suggest this disparity in housework is uniquely a feature of Jordan – similar levels are seen 
in many European nations. 
16 World Bank statistics for 2017 show that the proportion of women completing secondary school 
education was 61% and for men 60% (World Bank 2019).  
17 World Bank data for 2017 indicates that only 14% of women were engaged in the labour force 
compared to 64% of men, and only 15.4% of seats on the national parliament were held by women 
(World Bank 2019), most of these coming from ‘quota’ seats. 
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makes their dissatisfaction less visible than gangs of unemployed young men hanging 
around the streets, and therefore less overtly ‘political’. Similarly, normative economic 
expectations (like those in many places) cast the contribution of women and particularly 
female children as secondary to that of the primary male provider. Women will, it is 
presumed, stop or pause work once married, and at any rate will after that be 
contributing to another household.  
 The place of women then is often portrayed more as suffering than active 
subjects, experiencing vicariously the precarity of the male provider. However, the 
rising importance of women participating in employment, protest movements, and 
wider opposition politics (Ababneh 2016, 2018) is bringing more focus on the female 
experience of boredom and precarity directly. I had less access to this world of female 
boredom. The young women I got to know best were those with the most public lives, 
often Christians or those living in West Amman, who while often frustrated with 
elements of the patriarchal structures of the state, expected to have careers and to go out 
of the house at will, even after marriage. Even then, it was often arranged so they 
worked with people known to their family, so that they would not be entirely among 
strangers, and so that there would be a male relative on hand to ‘protect’ and to monitor 
them. My wife became friends with a cousin of Hamid’s in the village of Um al-Walid, 
Rashīdah, a chemical engineering graduate from a top university. She wanted to apply 
for a job in the Jordanian Petroleum Board. Her family refused, saying that it was too 
far away from her home (being in a distant area of Amman) and that they had no 
experience or contacts in this institution or area of the economy. She would be with 
social strangers, something they would be reluctant to accept even for a son. The way 
she described it was ‘they want to know there is someone there to watch me’.  
 In a conversation about this situation with our friend in Amman, Said, he said 
‘of course, these sort of families from the Bedouin villages, they won’t send a daughter 
to work in an office unless there is someone to keep their ‘ird [the sexualised honour of 
women]’. This association of Bedouin with especially conservative gender practices is 
to some degree a recent one; as Chatty (2000) and Palmer (2002) point out, while 
women and men certainly had delineated roles among Arab nomadic pastoralists, most 
outsiders viewed women in these societies as relatively independent compared to 
peasant or urban women; owning their own livestock and the family tent, hosting guests 
and, when older, taking part to some degree in political life. Now as being Bedouin 
becomes less about nomadic pastoralism and more about various political and identity 
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claims, this has shifted, and the idiom of honour has if anything become more 
pronounced. For Rashīda’s family her degree was a way of increasing her mahr (bride-
wealth), but as she became unhappy and withdrawn, refusing marriage offers, they 
began to curse her studying. They hoped she would marry within the village of Um al-
Walid and various matches with parallel cousins were presented, which Rashīda often 
discussed with my wife, stating she did not want any of them, but felt she could not 
keep refusing without making trouble for her family. ‘I want to travel, like you and your 
husband, but really I know this is impossible, it will never be for me’.  
 Attitudes to female work are also informed by long-standing associations with 
poverty, where the ability to ‘shield’ the women of a family from visible agricultural 
labour was associated with status. Once a mark of certain elite lineages, merchants and 
Islamic scholars, the nature of the contemporary economy has allowed a far wider 
segment of the population to aspire to female seclusion. ‘People will talk, y’ani, they 
will say “his family is so poor he must send his wife out into the fields”’ Halima told 
me, when explaining why women in her generation had helped a great deal with looking 
after flocks and crops, but that this was declining in recent years. In some contexts, 
women’s economic role has in fact decreased. The women I interviewed through 
Halima in Jabal Bani Hamida were mostly relatively poor older married women 
currently or formerly working for Halima’s weaving cooperative. In some cases these 
women were the primary earners in their households, but they had almost all 
experienced some hostility from their families at first to working, even though the 
weavers (as opposed to dyers, finishers and administrative staff) worked in their own 
homes. The unmonetised labour of women in a subsistence economy shepherding, 
milking and weaving has slowly given way to an ideal of seclusion and inactivity and a 
reality of unrewarded cooking and childcare, even as women are becoming more 
educated than their male counterparts.  
 Halima told me the NGO was still sometimes criticised for only providing 
employment for women. ‘Some men, the older ones, they say, it is the man who 
provides, if he cannot shame on him. So they say, first find jobs for the man, for the 
father, then worry about the mother and daughters later.’ Halima has experienced 
hostility in her own career; ‘at first all was shame... If I drove myself it was ‘shame on 
you’, if someone drove me ‘haram, sitting with a man, when I went to council meetings, 
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haram, sitting with men’.18 In time though, tireless campaigning, visiting families and 
sitting with the shaykhs and mukhtars in the villages has slowly won allies for her 
project, and she is now a local councillor and one of the most influential people in the 
district, visited, as shaykh Ghazi Abu Qa’ūd put it, ‘like a shaykh’ herself, for wāstah, 
patronage and advice. But, as she points out, focusing too much on women in particular 
can still be alienating; ‘All the women weavers who work for the project, most of them 
would say, awal ishy [the first thing] is security of livelihood for the family.’ Some of 
these women, who I was introduced to with my wife, bring in the only money in the 
family, and some of the husbands, as Halima put it would ‘rather have nothing than be 
paid by their wives’. Less public, and so less overtly political, the deeply felt 
frustrations and disappointments of women in the same setting are not merely an 
extension of those of their male kin, but nor are they easily disentangled from the wider 
social and economic setting, especially when state-encouraged prevailing norms 
rhetorically stress the centrality of the extended family.  
 Such boredom also intersects with new types of sociality. Young people meet 
across pre-existing networks at university, even to some degree across gender. While 
many stay in groups based on connections from back home, others do not. During 
leisure time too, escaping not just the family but the sociality of pre-existing networks 
dominated by older relatives becomes desirable. The established coffeeshops are still 
visited, but newer-style cafes and shops are also used, as are video-game cafes. If 
money is tight, just walking around smoking, or going to shops owned by friends is 
common. When I asked Badr why we went to a small, less popular café, away from the 
centre of Madaba, rather than Quriyah where his brother went he said:‘I like to feel free 
you know. I like to talk. There, I have to watch what I say, I have to keep quiet, I have 
to always say “yes of course, you’re right, uncle (lāzim ahky 't’abān ma’k al-hag ‘amy 
)”’. Badr and his friends often spent considerable time in video-game cafes, playing 
various first-person-shooter games together. The experience of new forms of sociality 
are still gendered. Badr’s sisters had no expectation of visiting cafes (although girls 
from families with different practices of gendering sometimes did); rather going to a 
different set of shops and spaces (the houses of friends, hairdressers, occasionally malls) 
often during much more limited windows of free time. The behaviour of leisured and 
 
18 This latter point, about sitting in council meetings with all men has been given as a ‘conservative’ 
justification for women’s quotas – there must be at least two women on such councils, so that no 
woman sits ‘alone’ on them.  
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consuming women, of the sort Sara Tobin (2012) describes going to Starbucks in her 
ethnographic account of the 2011 protests, are seen by many of my Bedouin 
interlocutors as demonstrative of cultural difference between them and the cosmopolitan 
ways of the rich and of West Amman.19  
 Drinking and smoking cannabis are particularly gendered and extreme forms of 
counter-sociality. This largely-male self-consciously transgressive and generally 
secretive activity, for Muslims strictly haram and the subject of state disapproval, is at 
times explained, along with sensations of boredom, as a result of the restlessness and 
excessive appetites of young men, a practice they will grow out of as they age and calm 
down, along with excessive sexual desire. Those concerned about such practices often 
explicitly explain them as a reaction to the boredom and despair felt by the young. To 
be a shārib (drinker) was for most of my interlocutors contextually normal for young, 
unmarried men; a phase they went through and grew out of without it ever being 
witnessed, condemned or condoned by their older relatives, and which while formally 
illicit, is described as stemming from dam khafif – ‘light blood’, an excess of joviality 
and high spirts which was ‘manly’ and to some at least appropriate. Such associations 
are those brought forth by the Bani Sakhr’s occasional epithet of ‘the red-eyed’; 
although actually referring to their tempers and quickness to anger, being red-eyed is a 
widely known side-effect of drinking and taking drugs. While not pious or strictly moral 
behaviour, such activities do carry with them associations of wildness, strength and 
personal autonomy that are not displeasing to some Sukhur men. 
  Madaba, unlike some Bādīyah regions to the south-east, has a large number of 
liquor stores because of its Christian population. Young men would buy alcohol (strong 
beer, araq, whisky and vodka) from stores, often at night when less likely to be 
observed. Then, in small groups, they would drive out to the countryside or the desert, 
and sit drinking, keeping bottles hidden, and throwing them away into fields afterwards. 
Beer cans and old spirits bottles are a ubiquitous part of Jordan’s rubbish, even in 
conservative areas. Drinking is context-dependent. In one case, an interlocutor who in 
another context had warned me against talking to a certain individual as they were a 
drinker, himself drank when a mutual friend turned up with alcohol, for which he was 
the subject of some joking, as he had recently returned from pilgrimage to Mecca. I was 
surprised to find out how many interlocutors had tried alcohol at some point, even when 
 
19 Even in Madaba, certain cafés (normally more expensive ones) were frequented by young women 
drinking soft-drinks and smoking ‘argilah.  
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presenting themselves as serious-minded and pious. Equally surprising was their 
willingness to admit this to me, once a relationship was established and it was known I 
drank occasionally.  
 However this social sphere, widely acknowledged to exist in general, was of 
necessity obscured if not out-right denied in most contexts. Older men who told me they 
knew of drinking and were not overly concerned by it as long as young men were 
careful and circumspect, would always deny any of their sons were involved. There is 
an extensive anthropological literature on all-male drinking, particularly in settings 
where it risks censure from age-based hierarchies, often focusing on its ambivalent 
character in constructions of honourable and respectable masculinity (for instance, 
Marsden 2007, Loizos and Papataxiarchis 1991). For my interlocutors, drinking was 
always done in opposition to the family, a secret from not only fathers but generally 
also older brothers, and most of all, from female kin. Rayan told me it was something he 
did now, and thought his elder brother had done (although they had never talked about 
it) but would stop upon marriage. To drink in front of, or to have one’s drinking 
exposed to, women, especially related women (one’s mahram), would be a very serious 
cause of shame and loss of reputation. For a woman to drink would be even more 
shocking. That upper-class women, even those from Bedouin families, move in social 
circles where mixed-gendered gatherings and drinking is permissible is widely known 
but dismissed as behaviour that does not concern them. ‘The culture is different for 
them’ Abdalaziz told me with a shrug. Some of my closest contacts, drinkers 
themselves, knew that my wife would drink alcohol with me, but this strange behaviour 
was just part of our foreignness. Drinking was an alternative mode of sociality during 
times of boredom, and among regular rather than occasional drinkers in my 
acquaintance, it had less to do with enjoyment or celebrating than dealing with 
disturbing and negative emotional states. Evenings given over solely to drinking were 
treated as palliative than pleasurable. As Hamid once said, when saying he wanted to 
drink: ‘I want to go crazy. I want to forget’. 
 These bored youths are, according to some accounts, the victims of something 
amounting to demographic determinism. Some scholars such as Proudfoot (2017) link 
such discourses, emphasised in many narratives of the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ to the 
broader literature on ‘surplus people’ (see for instance Ferguson 2013, Li 2014). The 
simple notion of often over-educated ‘surplus youth’ entering an economy unable to 
adequately accommodate them, offering neither sufficient new opportunities nor the 
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minimal ability to reproduce the world of their parents, has become a common narrative 
within and especially beyond anthropology. There is clearly some cause for talk of a 
demographic bulge in the region, and with it perhaps the emergence of something of an 
intersubjectivity; a shared experience of trying to become an adult in a time of 
expanding populations and contracting employment. In the last three decades, the 
population of the Arabic-speaking countries has together increased two-fold, an increase 
of 2-2.5% annually (Piven 2010). But as Proudfoot (2017) points out, demography in 
this case should not be treated as an apolitical and natural cause of surplus. The various 
specific situations young people find themselves in are the result of policy decisions. 
 During the initial optimism of the Arab Spring, Samir and Roseanne Khalaf 
(2011:9) saw in the image of youthful protesters a symbol of hope and renewal, 
anticipating in the work of activists and scholars ‘alternative “softer” venues for 
resistance’ to realise emancipatory goals. This marked a shift from pessimistic works, 
treating demography as inescapable doom (Osman 2006).20 For others, such as Roberts 
(in Roberts et al. 2016) demographic determinacy is rejected in favour of institutional 
economics; the demographic explosion, and the list of resulting psycho-social malaises 
Osman (2006) lists are reversed in terms of cause and effect, becoming twin symptoms 
of state failure and stressors in the face wider forces of capitalism or even of modernity, 
and in particular an experience of these forces unmediated by strong institutions 
fostering trust that extends beyond socially-known individuals, and a civil society 
capable of counteracting the state (all propositions as doubtful in putatively-successful 
‘modern’ societies as they are ill-defined in practice; as discussed in Section 4.3). For 
Roberts (ibid.), mass protest and resistance without such institutional foundations for 
reform seems doomed to repetitive failure. Both these narratives, of institutional failure 
and demographic-doom, are clearly hopelessly over-deterministic, and obscure as much 
as they reveal, not least the variety of ways dissatisfied youths envisage their situation 
and their projects to better it. These experiences of anticipation emerge from a specific 
political economy, emerging out of economic crisis and neoliberal reform, not simple 
demography. This political economy is, as we have seen, at least in part pushed by the 
developmental actors who seek to fix the institutional weaknesses Roberts (ibid.) 
focuses on. I therefore abandon these deterministic accounts, and engage with a more 
 
20 Tarik Osman (2006:203) describes the transformation of Egyptian Society into a ‘pyramid – extremely 
narrow at the top and enormously wide at the bottom’ with limited conduits between the 
generations. 
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specific strand of anthropological literature that has largely emerged from work in the 
Middle East and Africa, that on ‘waithood’.  
5.5 	 Waithood	and	the	‘Not-Yet’	
Many casual conversations between young men in Madaba involved questions about 
whether future hopes and events had come to pass; ‘have you found work?’, ‘have you 
opened up your business yet?’, ‘have you got a university place?’, ‘have you got a 
visa?’, ‘have you met with [name of an important wāstah contact from whom a favour 
is expected]?’. More often than not, the reply was a shrug and ‘ma lissa [not yet]’ often 
followed by ‘insha’allah bukra/garīban’ (tomorrow/soon if God wills it). The 
anthropology of the ‘not-yet’, as Möller (2017) points out, is a recurring theme in 
studies of the so-called ‘demographic bulge’ in the Middle East and North Africa. 
Together with ‘waithood’ it suggests a widespread subjectivity or orientation towards 
the future. Such literature engages with, but somewhat diverges from, the general 
anthropological interest in anticipation and the future (see for instance Stephan and 
Flaherty 2019), via its emphasis on the absence rather than the presence of the future in 
the imaginaries of ethnographic subjects. I engage with this analytical concept in order 
to examine what sort of political and historical claims emerge out of using such a term. 
 A portmanteau of ‘waiting’ and ‘adulthood’, ‘waithood’ has become a useful 
heuristic emerging out of sociological and anthropological work on Africa and the 
Middle East, gaining much traction since 2010. Singerman (2007) defines it in the 
context of work on delayed marriage and reduced economic participation in Syria and 
Egypt as ‘a kind of prolonged adolescence’, and ‘the bewildering time in which large 
proportions of youth spend their best years waiting’. Some anthropologists have drawn 
attention to an emergent stage between adolescence and full incorporation into 
adulthood (Masquelier 3013, Hansen 2005, Singerman 2007, and Schielke 2015) 
especially prominent in contexts were IMF-led structural adjustment has reduced state 
support, and where market forces have disrupted the political economic foundations of 
social life. Periods of enforced waiting and passivity are in these accounts no longer 
exceptional but an increasingly anticipated but still problematic period following 
graduation from high school or university without clear end, where normative rites of 
passage, such as marriage, having children, setting up a household and taking over 
family land or businesses are deferred indefinitely. Menoret (2014) in his analysis of 
youth protest and dissatisfaction in Riyadh, expressed through joyriding on the 
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enormous, empty highways of the car-centric capital, begins with explaining why his 
interlocutors kept saying ana tufshān ‘I despair/it sucks’ – also something my 
interlocutors frequently said, influenced in part by Khaliji (‘of the Gulf’) music and 
popular youth culture.  
 As Joseph (2013) and Chatty (2010b) have pointed out, the idea of 
anthropologists studying ‘youth’ for many remains problematic, seeming as it does to 
presuppose a category emerging from the work of demographers and sociologists, 
working within their own specific frameworks, a unicultural idea of adolescence not 
borne out by ethnographic example. To many anthropologists it once would have 
seemed an unwieldy and odd division of the social. However, as Joseph (ibid.) also 
makes clear, the study of ‘youth’ in the Arab world is focused not on youth as a 
universal but within a specific context. The concept of waithood therefore remains 
sensitive to local variations. The use of waithood by scholars working on Palestine 
reflects the more severe restraints on movement and economic participation, 
intersecting with wider analyses of anticipation and stuckedness in daily life under 
conditions of occupation and settler-colonial expansion (Hamman 2011, MacEvoy-Levy 
2014). As Joseph points out (2013:106) many young people across the Arab world have 
also been shaped by a common experience of growing up at risk of violence and 
displacement, making a sense of stability in which to progress illusive and anticipation 
of the future especially difficult. Joseph’s particular question (2013:119) ‘how does a 
society raise children for active citizenship when the state and civil society have been 
shattered?’ has its own problematic analytics which need unpacking (especially around 
the state and civil society), but at least grounds the idea of youth within specific 
historical circumstances. For Joseph waithood has occurred through a failure of the 
nation-state and its economic promises; education and the economy have not prepared 
places for newly economically active youths. In Jordan meanwhile the problem is 
frequently directed at the more localised, interiorised and putatively-cultural forces of 
norms, expectations and family, only tangentially intersecting with the wider concerns 
and pan-regional sentiments, but still grounded in a somewhat shared experience of 
worsening unemployment, economic hardship and instability. 
 For women waithood is often even more internalised, as will be clear from the 
brief account of Samira’s and Rashīda’s frustrations above. Much of the literature on 
waithood proclaims it to be a phenomenon affecting young men and women, but 
implicitly focusses on the normative experience of men (as Singerman 2007 points out). 
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In many instances female participation in agriculture and domestic production has 
become circumscribed in very recent years, in part as a result of a decrease in domestic 
production, and the greater ease of segregation in larger permanent houses (Layne 1994, 
Hughes 2015).  
 Links can and are made to the supposed general crisis of ‘masculinity’ in 
urbanising settings that no longer require the forms of labour often most respected (see 
Menoret 2014). The dark shadow of Khalaf and Khalaf’s (2011) optimistic account of 
youth protest is the horrific image of thwarted masculinity and pride that the media have 
made of Mohamed Bouazizi’s self-immolation in Tunis in 2010. Moral teleologies of 
masculinity no doubt structure the lives of inmates in waithood, as they do those of 
failing would-be patriarchs like Boouazzi. The heuristic ‘waithood’, which is largely 
deployed only in works on the Global South, has some parallels with sociologist 
Michael Kimmel’s (2008) analysis of delayed adulthood and thwarted entitlement for 
some young educated urban men in North America, which he terms ‘guyland’. While 
‘guyland’ is also linked with certain types of brittle masculinity, political dissatisfaction, 
extremism and protest, it is premised upon normative expectations and a political-
economic background that is very different to that in the Arabic-speaking countries. 
That the young men Kimmel studies live together in ‘perpetual college’ defies 
heteronormative partnership and financial and domestic independence, but in other 
ways conforms with expectations that offspring move away after completing their 
education. Hamid, as mentioned already, often talked wistfully of living with other 
young friends in a similar position but was discouraged.  
 Returning to the concept of ‘eating’, the bored, stuck, waiting shabāb as a 
discursive category and type of subject are thus at once greedy, feckless ‘eaters’, eating 
up the patrimony of their fathers through their idleness, and at the same time are 
structurally in the position of the consumed, the ‘eaten’ as exploitable and precarious 
individuals unable to follow a normative path or to forge new ones, more reliant on, and 
vulnerable and fully-subject to, the state (it is imagined) than previous generations. It is 
important though to note that this reading is one among many. It is a reading of, and a 
perspective coming from, the downwardly-mobile but not yet down-and-out, peri-urban 
or rural-dwelling East-Banker youth. The enforced passivity of waithood chimes to 
some degree with Ghalib’s remarks around the desire for a ‘chair’, although for my 
young interlocutors like Hamid to whom the idea of waithood seems most applicable, 
various alternatives to passivity and long-term plans for change were considered if not 
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quite anticipated. Hamid dreamed of a life close to his family, but with money 
independent of them, and the ability to go away or see friends without interference. As 
such independent wealth seemed unlikely to be forthcoming the tension between 
intimacy and individuated independence never had to be resolved. 
  In the private and Sukhur-dominated University of Isra, where Hamid, Omar, 
Khalil and Rayan all went, almost everyone wanted to know if I could get them visas to 
the UK. Emigration is an obvious if difficult solution to waithood. The solution here is 
an exterior intervention to a circular and closed situation. For others, like Osama and the 
Bani Hamida shabāb, protesting was a response and solution to enforced passivity, 
despair and boredom as much as it was designed to bring about specific instrumental 
goals – a theme I will return to in the next chapter. It created amity and a grand cause 
and an extra-domestic social space. I now turn to a further type of response to the 
problem of precarious waithood and dilemma-induced stuckedness; one which like 
immigration or revolution comes from outside the immediate everyday setting, with its 
discursively closed political economy. This is the widespread belief in hidden treasure 
and the pass-time of treasure-hunting. 
5.6 Seeking	Buried	Treasure	
Effortful and entrepreneurial success often seemed a doubtful prospect to young men 
like my friend Hamid, but so did a life of waiting around and subservience to older kin 
and to the dwindling security and prestige of government work. Instead, some people 
dream of sudden, serendipitous wealth. As such, searching land near rumoured ancient 
tombs and known archaeological sites for hidden treasure has become very popular. 
This is despite religious disapproval of treasure-hunting, as both a feckless activity and, 
through association with spirits and the pre-Islamic past, spiritually dangerous.21 Many 
people, especially young unemployed men with time on their hands and a normative 
gendered expectation that they spend much of each day outside of the home, will go 
digging in old cemeteries or under stone walls in the search for gold, sometimes 
deploying metal detectors and even mechanical diggers, but more frequently just with 
shovels.  
 
21 There are a number of hadith that deal with rikāz (hidden treasure), stating that pre-Islamic treasure 
can only be made safe to claim by donating one fifth of its value to charity. At other times hidden 
treasure is used as a metaphor for God and for faith. There are also a number of pious stories, often 
very similar to some known in Europe, about the futility of looking for hidden treasure abroad and 
then finding it at home (sometimes the ‘treasure’ being a ploughed field the feckless searchers dig 
up in their search, which they then plant, learning the benefits of agricultural toil). 
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 It is not only young men who treasure-seek. During an interview with an elderly 
widow in Jabal Bani Hamida, Um Ahmed, she broke off distractedly from talk of 
history to instead say ‘you know about history. There are signs here, from Roman times. 
Do you think there’s gold?’ We responded noncommittally, but were marched out onto 
her land to look at various supposedly Roman oil or grape presses and wells. At each 
one she would ask us if we thought there was gold, and would occasionally ask us to try 
digging. Finally Halima, who had introduced us and now re-joined us became angry. 
‘Yallah Um Ahmed, they are not here for your treasure but to learn about the history’. 
She firmly dragged us away, while Um Ahmed angrily and tearfully begged us to come 
back and help her. We were shocked by this, but Halima shrugged it off. ‘Ah it is a 
curse on people, this treasure business. They cannot get the idea out of their heads. She 
was a sensible woman, a quiet woman… but she had some bad fortune, an accident. 
Now she talks and talks, always about gold’.  
 I personally saw numerous pictures of coins, rusted knives and old jewellery. 
Rumours of such occurrences, however rare, spread extremely widely and quickly. 
When it became known that my wife was volunteering with an archaeological project, 
requests for advice on where to dig became unending and copper Roman coins and bits 
of ceramic were often brought to us, and we were asked to suggest a valuation – we 
politely demurred. Her work, which included assessing the potential damage done by 
looting, put her in an occasionally difficult position, as interlocutors boasted of their 
looting exploits and showed pictures of their finds. Often the goods they sold, they told 
us, made their way to museums eventually, so they did not see the acts as harmful, but it 
also seemed the value of these items beyond their economic worth as precious materials 
or as objects that might attract tourists and collectors, was not rated highly. In Jordan 
things from the Jahaliyah, the pre-Islamic ‘time of ignorance’, are treated with 
ambivalence. The belief in the ubiquity of buried treasure in Jordan – a hidden 
patrimony of wealth from a seemingly devalued past, is entangled with Jordan’s current 
reliance on tourism and use of key sites like Petra as national symbols.  
 For those down on their luck, appealing stories abound of those who made 
sudden unexpected fortunes through finding treasure when they were in need, some of 
which (as Shryock 2019b points out) have been circulating in various forms for 
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centuries.22 More recently, it has become a widespread trope that Bedouin are ‘no good’ 
at business or commerce, and so need to find patrons, or in some other way strike lucky. 
One common belief is that the Turks, when they retreated from Syria in the First World 
War, left stashes of gold currency behind which they couldn’t move out fast enough. 
Other stories involve the gold paid by both Ottomans and British agents to particular 
shaykhs to secure their loyalty, much of which apparently went missing (Saunders and 
Faulkner 2009), as well as ancient gold, from Roman and pre-Roman tombs. These 
stories have become mixed with another genre about magical (dhahab sahary) or cursed 
(dhahab lu’an) gold found in ancient ruined pre-Islamic sites, often associated with 
jinn, snakes and hidden springs of water, revealed through signs on the rocks, about 
which much information circulates but little seems to be agreed. There are stories of 
gold from ancient Israelites, from the ‘disappeared Arabs’ mentioned in the Qur’an, 
from Romans and Crusaders. Some sites like the Umayyad palace ruins in Um al-Walid, 
where the Dahamshah have resisted heritage registration with the Ministry of 
Antiquities, are now dotted with looting pits. Hardly a grave remains unopened in the 
ancient cemetery outside Um al-Walid (despite the fact at least some of the graves there 
are likely to be those of early Muslims).  
 Those interested in such matters share and discuss an entire field of oral 
knowledge. This includes information gleaned from archaeological books and students 
about the location of archaeological sites, as well as recommendations about how to get 
hold of and operate the best metal detectors, how best to excavate or blast with 
explosives without damaging artefacts. It also includes seemingly more esoteric and 
arcane knowledge. In conversations with treasure-hunters, I was told of techniques for 
revealing signs of gold and circumvent its guardians (often in the form of snakes and 
scorpions). Treasure-hunters point to ibār (‘signs’) such as snakes and birds, as well as 
ancient rock symbols.23 There is even, I was told, a small number of professional 
diviners who treasure hunters employ.  
 On one occasion, while eating dinner with my friend Hamuda Abu Slayah, his 
brother and his brother’s friend, Mahmud, arrived from the coffeeshop to join us. 
Mahmud started showing us some pictures on his phone of a pit he had sunk near 
 
22 Volney (1987) also shows examples of European travellers in the nineteenth century being told many 
tails of hidden gold in the region – a theme he links to widespread preferences for wealth extraction 
through predation (raiding, tribute) or good fortune (the increase of herds) rather than effortful toil 
or enterprise. 
23 Rock symbols do exist in large numbers in Jordan, often were where water might be found at different 
times, as well as who used and guarded wells and landscape features (Jobling 1993). 
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Mukawir, a Byzantine religious site, to find treasure. He explained that although he had 
not yet found anything, his friend, who had worked on a construction site, had found 
some old gold jewellery. Hamuda’s brother became excited at the idea, and pointed out 
that through his own work on a construction site he had access to a mechanical digger. 
But before he committed to the project, he wanted to know – is such work dangerous? 
Mahmud told him it could be. Some old graves or burials were protected by jinn. They 
would sometimes whisper to one to stop digging. He had heard of one man who had 
carried on digging after all his companions stopped, who was found dead from a heart 
attack. Sometimes pits and tunnels collapse, he said, sometimes because of jinn. 
However, he said, he knew the correct Qur’anic recitations to make to ward off such 
malevolent interference. After Mahmud left the Abu Slayah brothers remained 
unconvinced about going treasure-hunting. ‘Always, if you work on a construction site, 
people want to get to know you, because you might have heard of a find. By God it 
annoys me sometimes.’ Builders in Abdoun who gossiped recently about a Roman trove 
were, he told me, fired for having done so, as the Ministry of Antiquities seeks to limit 
the huge damage done every year by looters, who commonly break into construction 
sites as well as archaeological sites, to try their luck.  
 This sort of talk, crossing my own notions of the practical and the transcendent, 
also extended into the question of who was likely to find treasure. One day at a 
coffeehouse in Madaba I asked Marwan what made some treasure hunters successful. 
Marwan worked as a teacher in Um ar-Rassas, opposite a large, ruined Byzantine city 
which is often the target of treasure hunters. ‘Those who succeed are those who are best 
able to read the signs’ he said. I pushed him as to what made a good reader of signs. He 
shrugged. ‘I don’t believe in these things, but I do know people who have found gold. 
Some people have haż (luck)’ he said. He’d recently talked to me about the concepts of 
mal m’a al-barakāt wamal harām (‘wealth with blessings and forbidden wealth’); 
categories of money that some believe determine the fate of the owner. I asked him if 
this was related; was haż related to barakāt (‘blessings’ – in this context spiritual gifts 
and abilities coming from God)? He told me that sometimes someone with barakāt 
might find treasure because God wanted to reward them for their good deeds and piety. 
But haż, which like everything ultimately came from God and was willed by him, was 
not always a positive corollary of personal piety, as barakāt tend to be. It was, I began 
to sense, a more ambivalent category, which gave success, vital energy and restlessness 
to those possessing it in large quantities, but which might abandon the same people to 
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their doom at a later date. Haż, in this sense, was a property certain people, like 
treasure-hunters, sought to cultivate and to associate with themselves (often through 
telling stories of their success).24  
5.7 Images	of	the	Good	
I have described how young people I knew talked about and reacted to dilemmas faced 
in reproducing a meaningful social life in current conditions. To conceive of and 
articulate such dilemmas relies upon certain normative understandings of what social 
life is or should be. I have already suggested that boredom and anticipation rest on 
images of what life should be like. Much recent anthropology might see this in terms of 
values (for instance see Robbins 2013). Instead, reflecting the genuine uncertainty 
experienced by my interlocutors about how to realise desired futures, I suggest these 
normative understandings can best be seen as ‘images of the good’. This is a term with a 
complex anthropological history, but which has the advantage of recognising the plural, 
ephemeral, changeable, and often imaginary and unrealisable nature of many normative 
understandings and future imaginings. An image of the good might only be glimpsed 
partially, and might soon fade from view. There are times when interlocutors desired 
marriage and a secure job on their parent’s terms, reproducing a life of social 
obligations and reputation-building in the village and times when they dreamed of 
making a fortune or leaving their villages and Jordan, perhaps forever. Osama 
equivocated between pursuing his dreams of revolution, desiring to retreat into 
agriculture and pastoralism on his family land near the Dead Sea, and seeking clerical 
jobs in the state sector. I contend these changing feelings, which must be common to 
almost all people at almost all times and places to degrees, reflect not quite competing 
but often contradictory and partially exclusive images of what a meaningful, successful 
and/or pleasurable life consists of, and how it relates to others and wider social worlds. 
Fears of senseless eating and of being eaten, of wanting to sell land and become rich 
while cursing land sales, or decrying looting and the fecklessness of treasure hunting 
while secretly hoping for gold, reflect the dilemmas which arise from these images.  
 
24 Haż can also be a property of entities such as a lineage, an ‘ashīrah or even a people – a property that 
may desert the holders, leading to their destructions. Such a process is often imagined as being the 
mechanism by which God destroyed sinful former peoples. The haż of the Thamud, pharaoh and 
the people of ‘Iram of the columns’, mentioned as those destroyed by God in the Qur’an (89:6-14), 
is said by many to have been withdrawn by God.  
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 More importantly than this experiential usage for my analysis, the idea of 
images of the good suggests ways in which people perceive, interact with and reproduce 
wider political and moral economies. Talk of bread, whales and buried treasure suggest, 
in different ways, images of a limited economy with extraneous wealth from outside the 
system of everyday moral economy of giving, exchanging and accumulating. This 
evokes some intriguing anthropological comparisons. Shryock (2019b) in his analysis of 
the potential for a counter-exchange logic of ‘keeping to oneself’ (as opposed to the 
anthropological interest in Maussian rules of exchange and reciprocity) examines a 
series of oral-historical narratives where the ascent of shaykhly lineages is traced to 
sudden discoveries of treasure.25 It is hardly surprising others who have grown up on 
such stories hope such a reversal might happen to them in these precarious and yet 
boring times. It is also, crucially, a way of accounting for an obvious inequality; the 
wealth and power of some shaykhs in a world of mostly poor but ‘prickly’ herders, 
sensitive and resistant to differences in status and in honour. It removes the notion that 
the ‘Adwan has stolen or taken more of their fair share, instead relying on the 
intercession of destiny. Similarly in my fieldwork some like Um Ahmed held a strong 
sense that the seemingly unlikely, unlucky or downtrodden might suddenly find 
treasure.  
 Themes of treasure often turn up in ethnographic examinations of the moral 
economy of certain ‘peasant societies’, correlated supposedly with other values such as 
frugality and distrust of displays of unequal wealth; a moral economy emphasising 
stasis. In Jordan, economic change has been rapid and far-reaching, and many different 
visions of how to react to wealth compete. Yet important points of comparison to this 
older anthropological trope are worth exploring. Notably, George Foster (1965) made 
this connection during fieldwork in Tzintzuntzan in Mexico the basis for arguing for a 
cognitive integrating principle at work among many peasant societies that he terms ‘the 
 
25 Shryock (2019b) focuses on the story of Hamdan, founder of the ‘Adwan, a shaykhly lineage who with 
associated vassals, allies and confederates came to dominate the Balga region from the 17th-18th 
centuries as a qabīlah. Hamdan, a client and protégé of Mahfuz as-Sardi, the then-dominant 
political figure in the Balga, takes part in a raid against the Turks on behalf of the Mahfuz, but he is 
belittled and cheated of his share of the loot by his patron, who awards him only a hobbled she-
camel, laughing at his indignation and indignity. The she-camel, unbeknownst to them all turns out 
to have saddlebags filled with gold, carrying the Turk’s bullion, allowing him in time to usurp his 
ungenerous master, and take his power. The haż of Hamdan falls like thunderstroke, from the 
outside, as unexpected treasure. This story of the breaking-down of a relationship between patron 
and protégée, or host and guest, mirrors the logic of the story Abdalaziz told me of the origins of 
the Dahamshah above, where al-Dahamshah took in al-Fayiz, an orphan in the desert, who 
eventually usurped him founding the lineage of the paramount shaykhs of the Sukhur. 
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image of the limited good’, where all manner of life-sustaining resources are limited and 
unexpandable. Foster (1965:296) contends that ‘peasants view their social, economic, 
and natural universes, their total environment, as one in which all of the desired things 
in life such as land, wealth, health, friendship and love, manliness and honor, respect 
and status, power and influence, security and safety, exist in finite quantity and are 
always in short supply’. As such, signs of success suggest harm to someone else. Where 
this principle becomes widely recognised, Foster argues, belief in extraneous sources of 
wealth and power proliferate as ways of ‘tapping resources outside of the system’ 
(Foster 1972:59). Treasure, like winning the lottery, finding a powerful patron, 
marrying a rich outsider or getting a visa to the United Sates, does not deplete local 
social resources, which seem already overtaxed. It is a form of potency stored away 
from former times, perhaps under different logics (in Mexico hordes of gold from the 
pre-Columbian empires) and thus allowing an alternative explanation for sudden 
success within a ‘closed’ system.26  
 Foster (1965:302) made connections to the Middle East, and particular Egyptian 
‘peasant studies’, where he suggests notions of kinship-centred obedience and deference 
of young men into their thirties to their elders forms the right conditions for a similar 
cosmology to emerge. The shallowness of his engagement with what amounts to a set of 
Orientalist tropes (the sort discussed by Abu-Lughod 1989) has discouraged serious 
engagement with Foster’s wider point in Middle Eastern contexts.27 For Foster, the 
conception of limited good seems to be a psychosocial response to the scarcity of land 
in certain agricultural contexts.28 Yet land scarcity is a very recent phenomena in much 
of Jordan, postdating treasure stories.  
 Foster’s general argument has been unpicked on its own terms, through pointing 
out many accounts in peasant societies Foster thought his theory applicable to of good 
things increasing through effort (Kennedy 1966) and been made redundant as economic 
anthropology has moved away from the quest for general principles (Du Boulay and 
Williams 1987). Yet while the universalism of Foster’s argument may be dispensed 
 
26 Although how closed even Foster saw these systems as having been is doubtful, given his later points 
about exterior goods and comparisons with the Middle East and China. 
27 Ideas of the limited good touched upon ‘ayn al-hasud – the ‘eye of envy’, a set of symbols, beliefs and 
practices then in-vogue as an explanatory tool in ethnology of the Middle East and wider 
Mediterranean (Tillion 1983) whereby covetous glances can cause harm to that which is coveted 
and to mitigate this, praising the coveted thing or person is avoided or rather directed solely to God 
(via the phrase ma-sha’allah – ‘what God wills’). 
28 Kennedy (1966:1213) suggests that what Foster takes as a common principle is ‘usually based on real 
histories of people depriving others of land’. 
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with, the connection in many different settings between certain modes of economic 
thinking and widespread interest in hidden treasure or other forms of sudden felicitous 
wealth remains intriguing. Moving beyond Foster’s reductive and determinist account, 
the idea of images of the limited good, and of the hunt for socially non-destructive 
sources of extraneous wealth does not have to be a facet of bounded ‘peasant societies’, 
but rather is surely one of a number of images of economic life available to most people 
in most settings, coming into keener focus at particular moments; after all many 
textbooks explain money and share-holding with the analogy of sharing a pie. 
Furthermore, in the move towards alternative and pluralist economics, ideas of steady-
state economics and their historical precedents have come in for greater scholarly 
attention, leading to a re-examination of some of the ideas associated with the limited 
good (Trawick et al 2015).29  
 I thus argue that ‘images of the good’ including images of being struck by 
external luck, which does not upset the current social distribution, can prove a useful 
way of engaging with experiential and affective dimensions of economic life. At the 
least, the idea of connecting certain beliefs and practices around luck and fortune, in 
particular finding buried treasure, with broader economic dispositions, including 
anxieties and dilemmas over the social effects of wealth and inequality, seems a useful 
line of analysis. I am not suggesting Jordanian rural Bedouin are operating in such a 
closed system or that most people view their social and economic environment thus. 
However, I am suggesting that images of the good as limited often do crop up, here and 
elsewhere, from time to time and with various degrees of force, often as a result of 
particular historical dynamics. The current crisis of land and land ownership in this part 
of rural Jordan, connected to wider anxieties about social reproduction and what will 
become of younger generations, presents a dynamic where images of this sort come to 
the fore for some people. Foster’s image of the limited good, shorn of its cognitive 
baggage and universal, structural explanatory power, becomes a useful analytic for 
linking waithood, consumption and interests in buried treasure, while in no way 
implying that these things are everywhere and always found together.  
 In the final chapter of this thesis, I describe a very different set of images of the 
good; those to do with transformative political protest. These, I argue, sometimes 
 
29 Of course the idea of the risk-averse subsistence peasant has long outlived Foster’s image. In the form 
of Scott’s (1977) Moral Economy of the Peasant a similar set of assumptions is still taught and 
thought about in contemporary anthropology, as discussed in Chapter 3.  
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partake in another kind of belief in hidden treasure – the belief that if the whales were 
beached, and the court thrown down (or at least diminished in power) Jordan’s 
economic crisis would come to an end, and money would flow freely to infrastructure 
and subsidised goods. Once, while talking to Osama from the Dhiban Hirak about the 
refugee situation, I said that I regretted how my country and other developed nations 
demanded through the IMF that Jordan balance its books at a time when Jordan is 
stretched to the limit trying to provide services to refugees. I argued it was in the 
interests of the European nations to keep these refugees in Jordan, rather than spreading 
into the ‘migrant crisis’ in Europe, and yet Jordan receives little help with this burden. 
‘This is what the Government want you to think. The refugees are not a big problem. 
The king is paid by the UN and others to feed them, and still the money goes into the 
court. Really, I’m telling you, they make money, they don’t cost money…. they cover 
where all the wealth goes, they hide it being eaten’.30 This is far from the primary 
discourse on refugees, but it does present an interesting case of – and perhaps counter to 
– the zero-sum game of limited good; a suggestion that someone else’s loss (of their 
home) might be the host’s gain, but also that taking in newcomers may in fact be a 
source of wealth for some and impoverishment for others. 
 In my first campaign day-trip with Dr Ahmed Oweidi al-‘Abbadi I asked him on 
the way home to explain Harakat al-Urdunia’s economic policy. ‘We don’t need one’ 
he said in English, ‘the political and the economic problems are the same here. If we 
address the political problem – the corruption and the waste – the economy will be 
fine’. I asked him about the latest figures from the IMF. ‘They are lies. Jordan is fine, it 
is rich, you saw the shops in ‘Abdalli mall? The queen goes there, and then she does a 
fashion shoot for Vogue. They take everything. They leave crumbs for the Nation. 
There is no poverty, just corruption’. Whenever the queen indulged in a fashion shoot, 
the various opposition WhatsApp distribution lists would post the price-tags. While 
some, like Hind al-Fayiz, resist this focus exclusively on the queen, the wider point 
remains. The fāsidīyn (the ‘corrupt’) and their foreign patrons, whose wealth, it is felt, 
cannot all be licit or made through normative means, are in a sense like the gold found 
in the ruins; an unaccountable and exterior source of wealth, that can be plundered by 
their former victims without the social consequence of ruining fellow moral subjects 
that one might not wish to harm, but instead actively redresses a social ill. In this sense, 
 
30 In the context of Occupied Palestine, Schnell (2008) specifically makes the link between refugees as a 
moral resource in the struggle to gain international aid and investment, and ideas of hidden treasure. 
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draining the swamp and finding within it the ill-gotten treasures of a cast-down elite 
becomes a most appealing image of the (limited) good. 
 
5.8 Conclusion	
I have attempted an analysis of the intersection of demographic and economic change 
with certain subjectivities around wealth, consumption and the ‘good’, which lead to a 
set of dilemmas for young people about how to live, and what model of accumulation 
and consumption they should follow. The stewardship and conservation of land and 
resources through genealogically defined lines of transmission in order to reproduce the 
social into the next generation (an ever more doubtful prospect, as even minimal social 
reproduction demands the consumption of ever greater capital) is opposed to the 
(perceived) destructive consumption of wealth that seems to be overtaking those parts 
of rural Jordan touching Amman. My interlocutors, I argue, talk about such dilemmas, 
and draw attention to their experiential sharpness, through using consumption 
metaphors; a way of thinking and talking about economic life probably always present 
to some degree, but which comes to the fore in certain contexts. 
  In this setting, dilemmas and contrasts emerge between social continuity and the 
intergenerational breakdown that may, it is feared, follow from individual success and 
freedom of choice. These dilemmas inform new moral economies of suffering and 
effortful aspiration and growth, variously accepted or contested by those in the 
increasingly open-ended generation between school and marriage. Pious forbearance, 
dejected apathy, enforced passivity and restless action might all serve as general 
descriptive terms, despite their inherent tensions. I have avoided focusing on these 
prescriptive moral frameworks, although ethnographically they were undoubtedly 
important in thinking about my interlocutors’ experiences, falling back instead on the 
rather nebulous anthropological heuristic of ‘waithood’. While I find Foster’s 
universalist aspirations reductive and over focused on passivity, I find the idea of 
images of the (limited) good suggestive of certain experiences of these wider forces. It 
provides an insight into the deep grammar of protest movements, desires to punish and 
reform the corrupt, efforts to create and dissolve the social, and in some specific 
circumstances, to hunt for hidden wealth.  
 The linking thread through this chapter has been the verb to ‘eat,’ suggestive of 
a consumable, if not always a limited good. While abandoning the idea of an integrating 
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cognitive principle, it remains that moral economies represented through consumption 
must, to some degree, be imagined as limited: one cannot have ones cake and eat it. 
Similarly talk of the young, the weak, and Bedouin more generally being eaten or bled 
dry by the state represents resistance to the language of growth, where a rising tide 
raises all ships, and where the various parts of the nation benefit together. Instead the 
image of the nation implied is one of (claimed) semi-sovereign parts, where growth for 
one is loss for another. The economic reforms of structural adjustment are not here 
interpreted as preconditions for general growth, nor as a general imperialist penetration 
to be resisted, but as transfer and rebalance of wealth and power between named and 
placed parts of the nation, for instance away from the East-Bankers and the rural, and 
towards the court, the city and the corrupt. When the Hirak protesters shouted ‘who 
rules us? The damned IMF!’ and ‘the people of Jordan know who are among the 
corrupt!’ (as I describe in the final chapter) they did so in light of this ambivalent and 
anguished relationship to the economic vision of progress apparently forced upon 
Jordan from afar. The dilemmas of young people without an obvious role to play or 
economic niche to fill present a ‘case’ of waithood, but one where far older and more 
structural logics also emerge, as they presumably must in all settings.  
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 DEMONSTRATING POWER AND PROTESTING THE 
POLITICAL: MODALITIES OF PROTEST AND 
COLLECTIVE ACTION IN CENTRAL JORDAN 
This final chapter considers various encounters with, and accounts of, protests, 
demonstrations and large-scale, public-facing collective action. These form an 
important ethnographic setting as well as a discursive resource in the accounts of my 
interlocutors, to illustrate explanations of political life and the nature of ‘ashā’ir with 
reference to the potential of collective action and demonstration. Protest movements, if 
not protests themselves, would once have seemed an improbable research topic for work 
in Jordan, a notably stable country in a volatile region. Although large-scale violence, 
rebellion or disorder have not been as evident in Jordan in recent years as in 
neighbouring states, protests are a ubiquitous part of Jordanian political life. I have 
already indicated how dilemmas over social reproduction in rural and peri-urban 
villages, which are cast as tribal and Bedouin, intersect with the wider economic crisis 
and the long-term structural issues around land ownership. I have also described how 
historical imaginaries around sovereign spaces, interpersonal relationships between elite 
families claiming to represent broader categories and state power all overlap. Here I 
bring all these themes together, showing how they each play out in various types of 
protest movement and collective action.  
  Throughout the period of fieldwork, but especially during May and June 2018, 
numerous protests took place across Jordan, including in Madaba and the surrounding 
small towns. These protests marked the largest national uprising since the protests of 
2011-2012, and have continued, to varying degrees, ever since. During these intense 
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months of fieldwork I constantly scanned social media to check how different groups 
and people were reporting matters, and had many uncomfortable and unsettling 
conversations with reluctant interlocutors, in order to keep on top of the bewildering 
array of developments, claims and counter claims that emerged in this period.  
 At the conceptual and often the actual centre of these protests were various 
largely unstructured, independent rural protest groups, broadly affiliated with labour 
movements and calling for economic reform and greater political participation; 
generally termed Hirak ash-shāby (‘the popular movement’). I focus on the Hirak 
(protest movement) of the town of Dhiban, often considered the original and one of the 
most radical and effective of the regional movements. These rural protest movements, 
and particularly Dhiban Hirak, came to such national prominence in 2011 that the entire 
anti-government protest wave came to be called informally Hirak, a term that has also 
come to prominence in Iraq, Algeria and other Arab nations. In these events different 
types of people collected together to demonstrate for a variety of aims. These ranged 
from clear and instrumental, such as demanding the release of a prisoner or lower fuel 
prices, through open-ended demands for change, recognition and respect, to events 
where the main purpose seemed simply the demonstration of solidarity, and the ability 
to mobilise people en masse, in order to form a shared reputation. The focus in this 
chapter is twofold; firstly the experiential and discursive conditions of possibility that 
frame these demonstrative events; secondly, the contests over leadership, sovereignty 
and modes of political representation that such events frame. 
 Many of these events had much in common with a different type of 
demonstrative, collective act that has been the subject of discussion and media attention 
in Jordan; so-called ‘ishtabākāt ‘ashā’irīyah ‘tribal clashes’. This type of event is called 
thus in official statements and media reports, but my interlocutors frequently instead 
used the term hoshah; meaning a skirmish or scuffle. These too are commonly seen by 
those who take part in them as demonstrations of the power of names to mobilise people 
to respond to insults or threats. As Hughes (2018) points out, media condemnation of 
these tends to cast them as not only violent and disruptive, but as parochial and counter-
modern. On some rare occasions, as in Ma’an in the early 2000s and again in 2016, they 
can involve sustained periods of lethal violence, destruction and the rejection, and 
indeed combatting of any efforts by state forces to restore order (Hamarneh 2003). 
These events are seen by both participants and the Jordanian media as driven by matters 
of collective honour shared between agnatic kin-networks, which, it is imagined at a 
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larger discursive level combine to form larger name/space categories of ‘ashīrah. It is in 
these settings, as much as in electoral politics or in legal cases, that claims to solidarity 
made through the language of shared honour are actualised, or fail to be actualised.  
 At first glance, these two types of demonstration seem to share little beyond the 
material fact of collecting together to act and demonstrate collective will. Even this 
gathering of bodies together, as discussed below, is materialised with slightly differing 
aesthetics. However, attempts by state actors and journalists to keep them separate 
inevitably run into difficulty. This chapter considers the ways in which they tend to get 
entangled with each other, so that what may start as a scuffle on a university campus 
between young men from rival ‘ashā’ir over putative insults may become a matter of 
national politics, while protesters demanding a political action from the state may be 
delegitimised by opponents as ‘tribal’ or motivated by factional interest. This is not 
intended as a full political account of the protests, nor an experiential one, but rather a 
consideration of their place within a broader imaginary of collective political 
representations. By considering the conditions of possibility for these types of collective 
action, the wider question explored throughout the earlier chapters of this thesis comes 
back into focus, of how certain kinds of socio-political category come to be reproduced 
and deployed. 
6.1 Hirak	and	Hoshah:	modalities	of	demonstration		
There are many forms that defy easy categorisation as either Hirak or hoshah, as we 
shall see, having elements of both, and categorisation is often a matter of political 
rhetoric. Largely political protest can be dismissed as merely tribal, or legitimised 
through tribal idioms of honour, and likewise activists may seek to make use of 
seemingly tribal matters to pursue political aims. Hoshah or ‘tribal clashes’ most readily 
summon up ideas of spontaneous aggregations bent on answering collective insults, yet 
I use it here in a broader sense, to include a more general type of collective action or 
demonstration conducted on a distinctly ‘tribal’ basis. While the idea of ‘movement’ is 
crucial to the meaning of Hirak (literally and conceptually), a hoshah can have 
extremely narrow or even no instrumental goals. Used in this sense, I suggest there is 
some utility in differentiating these two broad forms, which could crudely be seen as the 
political protest movement and tribal collective action. Tribes such as the Bani Sakhr 
‘ashā’ir also take part in politically-motivated protests which, as we saw in Chapter 3 in 
the case of land, often focus on similar issues to other protest movements, including 
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Hirak. Yet these causes are specific not general, and instrumental, not revolutionary. 
They can rarely be seen as anything like a movement, rather their collective action is 
taken to maintain and benefit the collectivity itself. I will discuss several cases where 
different attempts to entangle and disentangle these forms present real ambiguity, but 
for now an example of both how similar these forms can be, and yet also how they 
generally do differ, is useful.  
 A long-standing dispute over 56,000 dunums of arid land on the edge of the 
desert around the villages of al-Qatana and al-Janab has dragged on for decades due to 
the ambiguities of registration and contested settlement described in Chapter 3: in the 
1940s and 1950s the king, according to the Jabur Bani Sakhr, publicly confirmed this 
area to be owned communally by the Jabur ‘ashīrah, a point his grandson Hussein also 
maintained during a royal visit in the 1970s, and by Abdullah II in front of the council 
of ministers in 2010. Yet despite these royal utterances, at some point in the 1950s some 
of this land was sold to wealthy investor Sattam al-Awad and his sons, although the 
exact area included is disputed. These sons still claim to be owners, and have built 
heavily on the land. During my fieldwork, local shaykhs and men of influence from the 
Jabur Bani Sakhr cooperated with Sukhur Facebook groups to post a statement asking 
for the king to honour the oaths of his house, calling for a three day and night al-wagfa 
al-ihtijājīah – a ‘protesting vigil’, to take place outside a petrol station near al-Qatana, 
and threatening a mass protest if their demands were not heard, or if their activists or the 
lawyers handling their case were harassed by the security services. These vigils, small 
but attended by representatives of most important local families, gained wide traction on 
social media.  
 The use of a statement, issued via Facebook, and its call for fairness in the 
domain of land, based on notions of a more equitable past moral economy, is in many 
ways related to the demands of Dhiban Hirak, the nationalist tribal party of Dr Ahmed, 
and the rhetoric of opposition politician Hind al-Fayiz. It makes mention of the guests 
of the Sukhur. However, the statement itself begins firstly by praising the Hashemite 
royal house, and declaring the loyalty of the Jabur Bani Sakhr to it, as friends to the 
king and as fellow sons of the watan (homeland). The statement has a paragraph listing 
the martyrs of the Jabur; soldiers who died fighting for Jordan in its wars. The claim to 
the land and the call for the royal house to honour its oath is thus grounded in other 
claims to loyalty. This loyalty is not quite that of the subordinate, but of the loyal ally, 
an ally whose suzerainty one may recognise without giving up a claim to being morally 
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equal and potentially sovereign. It is the right of a loyal ally to protest, to bring attention 
to grievances, in a controlled, measured way, under the firm guidance of leading tribal 
authorities who have close links at every level with the court and the Government. Such 
uses of collective action, gathering to respond to a slight or insult to the integrity of the 
tribal name, are a very old form of politics, yet Facebook here adds a new dimension. 
The statement-posters and organisers were not shaykhs, but social media influencers 
with their own names and support, and crucially, they and the shaykhs began to diverge, 
as the former called for calm, and the latter groups continued to push for further 
protests. 
 Hirak protesters, as we shall see, deploy much the same set of tactics and 
discourses in their calls to collective action. They similarly often stress how much the 
populations of the places they come from have given to the homeland, and the language 
of martyrdom is equally ubiquitous. Yet the relationship to the state is represented more 
often than not through a more recognisable discourse of resistance. The corruption, 
abuse of power and downright oppressiveness of authority figures is highlighted, and 
focus is put on acts of coercion and violence by the state. In the Jabur protest discourse, 
and in other similar statements from public demonstrations from among the Sukhur, the 
ability of the state to coerce and to impose itself upon them is implicitly denied or de-
emphasised. In this example, the statement stated that they would escalate if any attempt 
at policing or harassment was made. The assumption behind taking this sort of action is 
that protest will be part of a process of negotiation, begun through public collective 
action but continued once the point is made through interpersonal, perhaps amicable, 
meetings between representatives of the Jabur and the Government. Hirak protest too 
often claim their objective is to bring matters of injustice to the attention of the 
powerful, but in practice their rhetoric, as we shall see, calls for a very different type of 
outcome from the Jabur protests. 
 Such a distinction was not apparent to me when I first started to take an interest 
in protests. One cold winter night in Madaba, while walking down the road with a 
friend, Marwan, towards a sweetshop we wanted to visit for kunafah (a popular sweet 
snack) we saw bonfires in the road, and circles of men gathered round them. It looked 
rather welcoming, like a bonfire-night gathering, and I could hear the low sound of 
voices in conversation. ‘What’s this?’ I asked. ‘It is a mudhaharah’ Marwan explained, 
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a demonstration.1 It certainly didn’t conform to my image of one. It was, Marwan 
explained, more a civil disobedience. Truck-workers were protesting against the 
monopoly owned by Zaīyad Manasīr, a wealthy businessman close to the royal family, 
for the transit of phosphate from the mines in the south to Amman.2 They had blocked 
the highway with their trucks and were now crouching or standing around their fires, 
seemingly in good if mellow spirits. ‘No one can disagree with them, not even the 
police. No one benefits from corruption, it makes us all sick’ Marwan said, explaining 
the sociable atmosphere.3 This was one of the first encounters I had with a growing 
wave of anti-corruption, economy-centred protests. Two months before, many protested 
in the capital outside the US Embassy following Trump’s decision to move the Embassy 
in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. These protests were widely and sympathetically 
reported, including by pro-government media. In contrast, the wave of protest described 
below received little media attention, was treated largely as a simple economic response 
to fuel rises in the international press, and remained disparate and divisive. It is also 
deeply revealing of historical relations and shifting political subjectivities in and beyond 
my field site.  
 Weeks later I visited another Sukhur friend, Omar Hagaish, at the small private 
Israh University; mostly the preserve of middling ability and middle-class rural East-
Banker students. On entering the cafeteria he and his friends showed me with 
amusement some broken furniture. ‘This is from the hoshah’ [the scuffle] they told me. 
I was shown several grainy videos of students shouting and throwing insults at each 
other across a hallway, before a man ran out across the space and laid into those on the 
other side with a chair, beginning a confused melée. The man who had sparked the 
fighting was, I found out, a political science student called Mahmud al-Hasan, from the 
Jama’aīn branch of the Bani Hamida. ‘Listen’ Omar told me ‘you can hear when he hits 
he shouts siyyah!’. This cry is a nakhwah, a poetic attribute and potential war-cry 
 
1 The choice of word is significant. The common Arabic term for a protest, ihtijāj, is suggestive of 
placards and union strikes, and carries a slightly negative, disapproving tone. Mudhaharah, as I 
discussed later with Samer, my Arabic teacher, has a meaning suggestive of peaceful 
demonstration, and is more approving. This was far from a straightforward division between protest 
and demonstration. In some circles when I would call a protest I had seen mudhaharah, I would be 
corrected, and told it was ihtijāj, while sometimes others in the same audience would disagree. 
2 Zaīyad Manasīr is also a Russian citizen and a close associate of President Putin.  
3 I only found out later that Manasīr mainly uses non-unionised drivers, and that the independent 
unionised drivers I had seen were mostly of East-Bank origins – a fact the significance of which 
will become apparent below. 
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associated with a specific name/space category – in this case of the Hamaydah.4 The 
same rallying cry, I was told, had been used by young Hamaydah when fighting with 
police during the protests in Dhiban, the small Bani Hamida-dominated town in the 
south of Madaba Governorate in 2016. The students he had attacked were from the Bani 
Sakhr, which include Omar’s ‘ashīrah of Hagaish. The appropriate answer – the Sukhur 
nakhwah of hamr nuāthar – ‘red eyes!’ (signifying ferocity) could only be heard clearly 
later in the video, although it soon drowned out the other, as the Sukhur student 
numbers swelled. The fight resulted in no serious injuries or consequences. Its cause 
was a complex series of insults and rumours of sexual impropriety which had become 
entangled with broader structures of antagonism between various Hamaydah and 
Sukhur families, who to the south of Madaba are often involved in bitter land disputes. 
As explained below, recent political uprisings have further divided the two tribal 
categories (if not always neatly). It is a fault line for many personal and collective 
antagonisms. Such events are frequent on most Jordanian campuses, although Israh, 
being in the core Bani Sakhr area, is probably especially prone to them. Rarely, they can 
prove deadly; at the University of Petra in 2018 a student was shot dead. They are often 
discussed, recorded and celebrated on social media groups.  
 These specific events clearly do not emerge from primordial structures, but rely 
on affective labour to reproduce dispositions. New students often come knowing a few 
relatives or neighbours, who in turn introduce them to social media groups specific to 
students from a particular ‘ashīrah.5 Those who wish to become visible in such groups 
spend considerable time producing and posting memes celebrating the ‘ashīrah, and in 
particular expressing pride, fierceness and generosity. Both images making deliberate 
connections to an imagined history of desert nomadism and fierceness (horses, camels, 
swords, daggers, nakhwāt, quotes from epic poetry etc) and images of contemporary 
prowess and masculinity (4x4 vehicles, guns, balaclavas) are used, sometimes being 
combined in original ways (see Figure 6.1). Photos posted to such groups tend to be 
expressive of certain ideals of masculinity – men in traditional dress or combat fatigues, 
driving powerful cars, riding horses or camels, shooting guns, and cooking over open 
 
4 The term nakhwah can have various meanings as well as a war cry. More broadly it refers to an idea of a 
code of valourised behaviour, akin to certain ideas of ‘chivalry’ in the European imagination, as 
well as being a synonym in some senses for ‘assabiyah – the ‘group-spirit’ made famous by Ibn 
Khaldun (Lancaster and Lancaster 1986). The meaning of war cry has the specific sense of a phrase 
uttered by someone about to do a brave and often selfless feat for a co-member of a name/space 
group, such as coming to their rescue in battle. 
5 Anecdotally this also occurs when joining military or other state organisations. 
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fires. Opportunities to take such images are keenly sought out.6 Marwan was (though 
graduated) a member and page administrator for the University of Jordan Bani Sakhr 
page, with over 1200 members. He said his policy was to never report on a hoshah, and 
to take down posts that encouraged them. His images were always either professional or 
what he termed ‘traditional’ (taqlīdy). For him, a careful project of content curation, 
bordering on self-censorship is needed to keep the group from being shut down or 
interfered with by University or security authorities.  
 
Figure 6.1: Collection of Bani Sakhr Facebook memes, reproduced with permission from URL 
https://www.facebook.com/groups/371011723387190/  
 
Such groups can also however take on a political role. I came to know a group of 
Hamaydah at the University of Jordan, both staff and students, linked less formally by a 
WhatsApp group. During the 2018 protests they produced their own banners, 
proclaiming ‘the Bani Hamida at the University of Jordan are with the activists and 
against the corrupt’ (Figure 6.2). 
 
6 With access to a good quality camera, my wife and I were often called upon to produce such images – 
indeed when I once suggested I contribute some money towards the stable where Rayan, Hamid and 
I went riding, I was told I could compensate by taking good pictures (see figure 1.4). Meanwhile In 
their public profiles, these students represented themselves through very different imagery, in suits 
and graduation dress, in front of large modern buildings, or in grand offices. 
Chapter 6: Demonstrating Power and Protesting the Political: modalities of protest and collective action in 
Central Jordan 
Frederick Wojnarowski – May 2020   223 
Figure 6.2: Bani Hamida protesters raise a Bani Hamida banner outside the gates of the 
University of Jordan. The Hashtags say ‘Hamaydah youth’ and ‘Jordanian Hamaydah’. Photo 
reproduced from Facebook post with permission. 
 
By these statements these groups linked themselves with the rural Hirak movements, 
and indeed often the same young Hamaydah men were involved in Dhiban Hirak as 
well. These groups are still used to develop wāstah connections, disseminate local and 
national news stories, and to share pious or valourised sentiments of various sorts. More 
than their overt political content, it is their role in hoshah which makes them 
problematic to many Jordanians, and puts their administrators under considerable 
pressure to self-censor. Since January 2019, new laws have made such pages, and 
particularly anything that promotes rebellion or unrest, extremely sensitive. The 
proposed laws include a new definition of criminalised ‘hate speech’ that includes posts 
valorising ‘tribal clashes’ as well as protest organisers (Samaro and Sayadi 2019:n.p.):  
every writing and every speech or action intended to provoke sectarian or 
racial sedition, advocate violence or foster conflict between followers of 
different religions and various components of the nation. 
The vision of a nation of ‘components’ euphemistically touches upon the idea of 
hoshah. The passing of this law against considerable opposition by parliament in 
December 2018 during a period of protests was taken as an assault by Osama and his 
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friends, but others, including Marwan were somewhat in favour, suggesting security 
involvement with social media was inevitable, and at least now people would know 
where they stood.  
 The term hoshah can also refer to more serious forms of violence, often with 
longer histories. The organised pursuit of thār, ‘revenge’, follows transgressions and 
slights to honour so great they have aswadat al-wajah – ‘blackened the face’, a 
condition of humiliation and shame that can only be answered in some cases through 
violence. In some serious cases, or where restitution is refused, only dam – ‘blood’ – 
has the ability to wash and to ‘whiten’ the face. This sort of violence, as seen in Chapter 
2, is bound by a norms and expectations, falling within theoretically precise if often 
contested genealogical limits and involving widely acknowledged procedures, and 
administered by shaykhs and other influential older men. These figures rely on 
acquiring and maintaining a reputation as skilled resolvers of violent disputes. This 
reputation is essential both for acquiring patrons who come to them to have problems 
solved, but also for making a claim of representative sovereignty to the state. Keeping 
violence and disruption within these limits is one of the main justifications given for 
state endorsement of putatively-tribal dispute resolution procedures, resulting in 
reduced or even suspended legal punishments for the parties involved. Omar Hagaish 
called those who operate within the Palace Convention ‘government shaykhs’. 
 Social media driven hoshah tends to lack genealogical exactness and clear 
leadership, instead forming group collectivities through fluid, affective claims to broad 
shared feeling. As Hughes (2018) discusses, Facebook groups are often implicated by 
both concerned shaykhs and journalists in encouraging wider and less controlled 
violence, making revenge attacks more random. Of particular concern is the potential 
for such mobilisations to ignore formal truces, a concern that I observed first-hand 
through my friendship with the Abu Slayah family in jalwa (protective exile during an 
unresolved feud) in Madaba, that had resulted in the family avoiding social media, so 
that their vengeful relatives would not find them. More broadly, where a truce is not 
producing the desired results, these sorts of informal networks of information and 
mobilisation can be used to get people out on the street in threatening, often armed, 
groups, to put pressure on the decision-makers. It is this sort of counter-legal and 
threatening type of collective action that those opposed to the tribal in Jordan find most 
disturbing. 
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 Yet the settings which seem most ‘tribal’, in terms of producing this sort of 
resistance to coercive state power, are also at the forefront of political protest. Hirak as a 
term for a type of movement came to prominence in Jordan in the 2000s to refer to more 
than 40 small protest groups, mostly in rural areas dominated by East-Banker ‘ashā’ir – 
a constituency long thought to be ‘unflagging supporters’ of the monarchy, instead 
delivering ‘raucous and uncontrolled opposition from the heart of tribal countryside 
historically allied with the crown’ (Yom 2014:229-230). This challenged long-held 
assumptions that the main threat came from Palestinians and the urban poor in East 
Amman; and even in East Amman, the Hirak protests came out of the poor East-Banker 
suburb of Hay al-Tafileh. For Yom (ibid.:234) the crucial point is that while East-
Banker constituencies have previously conducted protests over maters of honour or for 
economic restitutions (often to their specific name/space category) the post-2011 Hirak 
was based around youth activists, calling for national political changes; a constitution, 
an elected executive, free speech and secular law. I found these activists were often 
keen to portray themselves as self-consciously leftist, secularist, Pan-Arab and 
revolutionary, tied formally or informally to broader networks of labour unions and 
activists, and offering a type of solidarity that was ecumenical and went far beyond 
‘ashīrah level or even East/West-Banker divisions, although contrary to Yom’s focus, I 
found political liberalisation was often subordinated in hierarchies of aims to issues of 
economic sovereignty and redistribution. One of the most vocal, most successful and 
arguably original rural Hirak is that of Dhiban, dominated almost exclusively by a 
single large name/space category, the Bani Hamida. Indeed within it, many leading 
figures and spokespeople come from shaykhly families. The Sukhur meanwhile, while 
some individuals have been sympathetic to broader opposition politics, are largely 
uninvolved as a social category in this development. 
6.2 The	Dhiban	Hirak	
The groups, calling themselves Hirak ash-sh’aby (popular movements) sprung up 
amongst unemployed Bedouin youth in and around small towns. The most prominent 
rural Hirak movements were in central and southern Jordan, most notably in Dhiban, 
Karak and at-Tafilah, as well as in suburbs of the capital where people from these towns 
have moved. Initially there was apparently little shared purpose except anger at 
unemployment, rising living costs and ‘corruption’. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
corruption here came to mean not just individual depoliticised malpractice (although 
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examples of this abounded), but at structural redistributive issues, that often touched 
upon matters of economic sovereignty, whereby the wealth of the nation had been 
misappropriated from the sh’ab (the people), and given over to foreign imperialists and 
their cronies. Many Bedouin across southern and central Jordan worked in the former 
state industries of potash and cement, and when privatised and opened to foreign 
investment, many lost their jobs (Harrigan et al 2006, Yom 2014). In Dhiban, the state 
cement factory was privatised, with employment decreasing from over a thousand to 
just 60. Meanwhile animal feed subsidy removals in 1996 made pastoralism 
unprofitable, military and government pensions were reduced, and promised service and 
infrastructure rollouts to Bedouin communities – long seen as part of a bargain with the 
state in return for settling – were endlessly delayed.  
 In the mid-2000s a series of important facilitating figures emerged to coordinate, 
join up and encourage a tentative network, asking for protests to coincide on certain 
days and to use similar slogans. As well as well-known Bedouin leaders, this network 
included the Christian journalist Nahid Hattar, assassinated outside the courthouse 
before his blasphemy trial for posting a cartoon of the Prophet in Amman in 2015, and 
union leaders, such as Muhammad As-Snayd, who I return to below. The Hirak activists 
came to form close relationships with several East-Banker-dominated unions; notably 
the Veterans’ Association, the Teachers’ Union,7 the Dockworkers’ Union in Aqaba and 
the Day-Waged Labourers’ Movement (described below). Labour activists often spoke 
in small town squares to the youth movements about nationalisation, subsidies, and job-
creation. As we have seen, the nature of employment in Bedouin areas, and the 
unevenly felt consequences of economic liberalisation, mean that far from being 
opposed social modes, labour movements and Bedouin protestors overlapped 
considerably in aims and composition. This network of informally-led, generally secular 
and leftist rural movements came to so define the 2011 protests that even when the 
attention of the media moved to mass protests in Amman, dominated by urban city-
dwellers and supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood (Amis 2013), the entire period of 
national unrest came to be termed Hirak.8 My focus in this chapter is on the Dhiban 
 
7 The Teachers’ Union was long considered an especially radical and leftist Union – briefly re-founded 
and then crushed in the late 2000s after being banned since the 1960s. 
8 The term, meaning simply a ‘movement’ is of course a general one, and has been taken up in other Arab 
contexts such as Iraq and Morocco. However the concept of Hirak-as-event remains deeply 
associated with the rural-based Hirak ash-sh’aby groups. Protests in the capital after the Friday 
noon prayers, always a feature of life in many cities in the region, had intensified in 2010, but did 
not have a name, identity or momentum of their own in comparison to Hirak.  
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Hirak, but given its centrality to national protests, this at times offers a wider 
perspective. As Osama and his friends proudly told me; ‘across the country, the Darak 
[Gendarmerie] know fear whenever the buses from Dhiban come’. 
 Many of the groups broadly forming Hirak still operate within a wider logic of 
name/space groups, either by implicitly or explicitly reproducing their structure (so that 
Hirak Dhiban is for the Bani Hamida) or through following their forms of 
consubstantiality, mutual care and gathering in new settings, as with the unemployment 
tent and other ‘sit-ins’, which I describe below. Anthropologists have drawn 
connections between labour unions and kinship groups, seeing within unions a process 
of ‘kinning’ resting upon commensality, mutual care, and family-like practices of 
favouring insiders for work opportunities, including Sian Lazar’s (2017) exploration of 
the intersection of kinship and politics in the Peronist unions of Buenos Aires, where 
being of the union is to be in a state of mutual being. In Jordan, where wāstah and 
questions of name and reputation are almost inevitably tied up with any sort of public 
life, the connection to kinship is ubiquitous but less explicit, and instead larger scales of 
relation than the consubstantial family tend to be the key metaphor. As mentioned, 
‘family associations’ (of thousands) have been encouraged as an alternative to unions 
and social welfare (Baylouny 2006) but even within the few explicit labour unions, who 
almost by definition are protest organisations in Jordan, ideas of name/space are never 
far away. Unions and labour movements, like the state, are not only replacements, 
alternatives or rivals for tribal modes of association, but also structures that can work 
with and through tribes.  
 I was first introduced to the Dhiban Hirak ethnographically via Jordanian 
academic Sara Ababneh, who introduced me to a number of student activists, including 
Osama, who arranged to meet me in a café in Madaba known to be ‘Hamaydah’. Here 
he and his friends quizzed me on who I was, what my political agenda might be, where I 
stood on the Iraq War and Israeli Occupation, and if I was a spy. After this interrogation 
they invited me back a few days later. The atmosphere this time was friendly, 
encouraging and welcoming – it seems likely that as well as being encouraged by my 
answers to their interrogation, they had made inquiries about me in Madaba and had not 
found anything too disquieting. He next invited me to meet this family, and be quizzed 
by his father, who introduced himself as a leading member of the local Ba’ath Party, 
(which is legal but persecuted and marginalised in Jordan). Finally, interested in my 
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research and willing to work with me, he arranged a meeting of introduction with the 
main Hirak Dhiban activists.9  
 The two (at that time) leading public figures of the movement attended. They 
were quite familiar with this sort of encounter – I was not the first foreign scholar or 
journalist to interview them. They were ‘Ali al-Brizāt, a tall grey-haired lawyer in his 
fifties, scion of one of the two pre-eminent shaykhly lineages of the Hamaydah, and 
Sabri Mash’āllah, a 29-year old psychology graduate from the University of Jordan. 
Both men had spent much of the last 18 months under security custody. ‘Ali dominated 
proceedings, and focused on anti-imperialism, democracy and legal and political 
freedoms. The meeting was in his dīwān, at the side of his village house, giving him the 
role of host. Drinking ‘Ali’s coffee everyone nodded and murmured agreement when he 
declared ‘the most important thing for us is freedom’. Sabri, and many of the younger 
men were quiet and attentive. Only after the meeting did Sabri say ‘you must also know, 
the most important thing for us all is employment and livelihoods’. Osama on the drive 
home said ‘next time you must speak just to Sabri, he was made shy by ‘Ali today’. So I 
did, and from then on I mostly spent time with Osama and his young friends who 
though from Dhiban spent most of their time in Madaba or Amman, and who looked up 
to and met more often with Sabri. Sabri himself was always absolutely unwilling to 
admit to any contradiction; ‘Abu Hassan [‘Ali] and I are in agreement in all things. We 
are like this’ he said, clasping his hands tightly. Sabri and ‘Ali later cooperated on a 
series of online videos and Facebook groups trying to unite different rural Hirak 
movements They both regularly attended general protests in the capital, and in the 
autumn of 2019 took part in a national campaign of civil disobedience. 
 Before conducting direct ethnography on the Dhiban Hirak, I had many 
conversations where people asked me ‘have you heard about what happened in 
Dhiban?’ What had happened most recently during a decade-long period of unrest was 
the unemployment tent. This involved the unemployed gathering in a large tent erected 
in the town square of Dhiban (see figure 6.3), making visible a problem often hidden 
from public view by kin-networks which hide the shame of unemployed members and 
which provide some support for those out of work. For two months in the summer of 
2016 more than seventy young unemployed men gathered daily. At points a smaller 
number of women also joined although they were eventually excluded, supposedly 
 
9 Osama told me he liked anthropologists – as a social science graduate himself he was keen on the idea 
of activist scholarship. 
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because of the fear of a state crackdown. Participants sat, sang and drank tea and coffee. 
It was, as Sabri put it ‘like a party’. Indeed it mirrored many of the features of 
traditional wedding or munāsibāt (‘occasion’), and reproduced something of the 
enaction of political hospitality and alternative public provided by the dīwān of 
important figures that I described in Chapter 4. The Hirak cooperated with Muhammad 
as-Snayd’s labour movement to support the tent. The protest seemed both effective and 
peaceful, and to be achieving widespread support.10 One day during Ramadan, as Sabri 
and others told me with anger so intense they were sometimes near tears, just as those 
assembled were preparing to break their fast together, the Darak (Gendarmerie) 
descended on the tent, which they pulled down and burned, beating up those inside, and 
arresting 30 men. Generalised fighting broke out in the town, tear gas was fired, and 
several Darak were injured. It was at this moment, Sabri said, that many gave up on 
asking for economic reform – ‘the young turned against the system’. The Government 
called the Dhibanis ‘outlaws’ in official statements afterwards, and suggested that 
Dhiban needed to patiently wait for employment and investment to come. This, it turned 
out, consisted of funding for income-generation training schemes, to help men in the 
town start businesses; following a predictable neoliberal logic (see Sukarieh (2016) for 
an example of this process in Amman). As Sabri said with fury ‘what business is there 
here? People can buy bread only’.  
Figure 6.3: The Unemployment Tent in Dhiban. The text reads ‘the tent of those without work. 
The sons of the corrupt and [versus/in contrast to] the sons of the people at the circle [the 













10 Apparently government officials and police visited peacefully.  
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 Muhammad as-Snayd was among those arrested in the aftermath. Trained as an 
agricultural engineer but underemployed as a local employee of the Ministry of 
Agriculture, he had formed and led the Day-Waged Labourers’ Movement (in Arabic 
Hirak ‘Ummal al-Muyawama) since 2006 (on which see Philips 2019). This movement 
was unusual in the general strikes of 2011 and 2012 in recruting a large number of 
female members, more likely than men to be given daily rather than long-term 
contracts, if they can find any work at all (Ababneh 2018). He led this mixed-gendered 
group of activists in several overnight sit-ins in the capital, shocking some norms but 
receiving widespread attention. Muhammad, who describes himself as left-wing and 
feminist, has become the most popular Bani Hamida Dhiban activist for media, and 
especially foreign media, to approach (Buck 2011, Al Jazeera 2019). He has been at the 
centre of numerous accounts of Hirak, including Ababneh’s work (2016). However, my 
younger interlocutors no longer saw him as central. Osama was happy to set up a 
meeting for me with Muhammad, who he respected greatly but he 
told me ‘before, he was Hirak. Now he is on the edges, y’ani he does his thing, and we 
do ours’. Sabri told me that since his arrest and then release, he had been given 
government work again, and so had been forced to take a less revolutionary line. He 
was now often called dustury – a ‘constitutionalist’ – in that he favoured reform towards 
constitutional monarchy. 
 I came to visit Muhammad for an interview in July 2018. By then he was 
working as the manager of a state land agricultural initiative at Wadi Wala’, a river 
valley just outside Dhiban. He showed me around the farmland, explaining to me that in 
his opinion his agricultural work, making Dhiban self-sufficient and providing 
employment, was as important as his political and labour activism. ‘Everything went 
wrong in Jordan because of Land’ Muhammad told me, ‘we can only have a future if we 
build it from the land’. After a tour and an hour-long account of Muhammad’s 
prominent role in Hirak in the early days we went back to the guestroom of his small 
village house to eat a meal of homegrown produce, under posters of Saddam Hussein 
and Nahid Hattar, who he calls his martyrs. (‘Nahid was my friend, and like Saddam… 
he fought for Arabs.’) Whenever I visited Muhammad he talked as much about self-
sufficiency – his eggs, his vegetables, his honey – as he did about politics, all with 
charm and charisma. He once pointed out to me the new water pipe that carries away 
the water from Wadi Wala to the city of Amman, making irrigation and agriculture 
harder around Dhiban. ‘They are bleeding us’ he said. He told me that he shows people 
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this pipe to demonstrate the problem between Dhiban and the Government – and their 
relative positions. It might seem he and his former union have thus slipped from Hirak. 
Instead his determination to build a new relationship to the land, with high-employment 
and self-sufficient agriculture, is an attempt at resistance to not only the colonial 
underpinnings of the state, but also to the self-consciously neoliberal vision of Jordan’s 
rulers. It also hints at the centrality of issues of land, as discussed in Chapter 3, to 
continued unrest and a sense of unsettledness in Jordan. 
 As mentioned, Muhammad as-Snayd told me that many Hamaydah residents 
look at the Wadi Wala’ pipe carrying their water to Amman as a ‘bleeding’ of the land 
and its potential. It is through such ‘bleedings’ and resistance to them, I contend, that 
the bled subjects have formed a sense of commonality, as I argued in Chapters 3 and 5. 
For ‘Ali al-Brizāt, and many of the people in Jabal Bani Hamida, while a return to 
pastoralism is not always the most desirable opportunity for the young, it remains ‘the 
foundation’ (al-assasa) for meaningful social life, and without state support for it, life is 
hard to bear. Muhammad as-Snayd, as manager of the state land near Dhiban, similarly 
felt agricultural development was the only way forward for Dhiban.  
6.3 	‘Hirak	is	for	the	Young	and	Poor!’:	the	generational,	socio-
economic	and	gendered	dynamics	of	leadership	
When walking back on the summer evening when I had first met the Hirak leadership in 
‘Ali’s house, Osama asked my thoughts on the two leading figures. I spoke candidly 
about the tension between Sabri’s economic-centred vision, and ‘Ali’s preference for 
political freedom, and asked Osama how they fitted together. He said once again ‘Sabri 
is better on his own, you should hear him sometimes, he can talk by God! … he has 
been unemployed now for 6 years, though he has a good degree. Wallah, he has spent 
more time in prison than in a job’. When I next met Sabri he talked mostly of how it felt 
to be a top-performing graduate from a good family who could not work and was so 
poor he had given up smoking. Certain experiences of marginality, stuckedness and 
blocked social reproduction, as well as boredom, seemed to predominate. I asked how 
this fitted with older leaders from shaykhly lineages who sought to speak for the Bani 
Hamida and for rural Bedouin more generally. Sabri refused to be drawn, saying ‘all 
Hamaydah support us’. A friend of Osama’s who was with us spoke up ‘it is not 
important what they [the old] think. Hirak is for shabāb [the young]’. Sabri tutted his 
head at this. ‘It is for all the people’ he said. 
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 A few weeks before, when asking an elderly woman in the village of ad-Dīr her 
opinion on Dhiban Hirak she said almost the same thing, waving her hand in 
annoyance;  
these troubles, stupid boys make them… no one wants ihtijāj [protests] but 
shabāb. Y’ani they are… poor but not the poorest. They have some 
education maybe; some learning and they make trouble. 
There is a tension around whether Hirak is for the young, and perhaps for a particular 
type of young, or for everyone. These tensions, between generational grievances on the 
one hand and attempts to build broad support on the other, and between a strict focus on 
the economy and in particular unemployment, and a more general political project based 
around in some way liberalising or democratising the state, pervade Hirak, preventing 
any single strand coming to dominate. ‘Ali once told me that the reason Hirak had come 
out of Dhiban was because ‘the Hamaydah have a genius for politics’ and have always 
been at the forefront of movements for change. They were, he told me proudly, the first 
‘Jordanian’ (before Jordan existed) tribe to rebel against the Turks. In contrast, for Sabri 
the key to understanding Dhiban’s unrest is its rate of graduate unemployment, which 
he said was the highest in Jordan; ‘we do very well in schools and universities, but there 
are no jobs’. Outside Dhiban, and especially in the Jabal Bani Hamida area, 
unemployment is even higher but there has been little outright support for protests. As 
one young man told me in the village of Jadaydah ‘the trouble is all in the towns. We 
are not like that here. There are many problems but praise God, we keep walking’. 
Some young people in Jabal Bani Hamida, Halima told me in her capacity as local 
councillor, do sympathise with Dhiban Hirak; a few have joined, and all recognise that 
it is ‘a Hamaydah matter’. But the rural setting offers them little opportunity to collect 
into groups, and unlike the Sukhur villages around Madaba, which have regular buses 
into town, those without cars in the Jabal have few options even to get into Dhiban.  
 A further point of divergence has been the role of women. I have already 
mentioned in the last chapter how Muhammad as-Snayd’s and Halima’s prominent 
political championing of poor rural Bedouin women sat uneasily both with Ammani 
‘women’s groups’, and with some locals, although both had made considerable 
headway. Yet most people involved in Hirak are young men. Many rural women do not 
have Facebook accounts, rendering their support less visible. There are women openly 
associated with Hirak. In Amman, I talked (usually in English) several times with 
former parliamentarian, opposition-figure and businesswoman Hind al-Fayiz. For her, 
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mainstream Euro-American feminism is a problematic platform due to its associations. 
When standing for parliament, many advised her to wear a headscarf while 
campaigning, and then drop it later if she liked. She refused, saying that people should 
know how she will act in office. ‘The queen says only she can help women, that she is a 
feminist. She has enlightened us. No, really the position of women was much better in 
the 1960s here than it is today.’ Feminism, for many, was a foreign and possibly 
imperialist discourse, and the queen’s brand was furthering this association. She told me 
that her message is that women do not need the royal house and the queen to be their 
protectors against a patriarchal society, that the position of women has declined because 
of, not despite, liberalising economic reforms. Hind is the subject of a viral social media 
video when a male parliamentarian next to her, Yahya Suad, shouted ‘ugudy ya Hind 
[sit down, Hind]’. This circulated across the region, with the hashtag ‘Hind won’t sit 
down’ (al-Arabiyah 2014). Suad was arguing against the Bedouin quota seats by which 
Hind was then elected to the house, calling them undemocratic. Hind refused to be 
silenced (though she herself has also been a vocal critic of the quota seats); Suad banged 
his desk shouting ‘God curse the quota seats!’  
 For Hind ‘women do not protest at the moment enough. We need to see more at 
the Thursday protests. But the important thing is to get change, to get reform.’ As seen 
women’s employment remains a contentious issue. While some like Muhammad as-
Snayd have sought to raise the visibility of women in Hirak, there is still in the rural 
movements a concern that championing women’s employment and economic 
participation will alienate others, who see families and their patriarchal heads as the 
most important economic constituents, and the correct beneficiaries of reform.  
 Osama’s mother, while he assured me sympathetic to his and his father’s secular 
leftist politics, was instead a committed member of the Ikhwan Muslimīyn – the Muslim 
Brotherhood.11 For Osama, the important point was that when national protests took 
place, the Brotherhood including his mother came out into the street in the capital. I 
asked if I could interview his mother about her politics and experiences of protest. I was 
politely but firmly told that I could not. Samira, Osama’s sister, was (as mentioned in 
Chapter 3), also pro-Hirak. I asked Osama if he had ever tried taking her along to Hirak 
protests. He said it would not work. I asked if the family forbade it, but he told me no, 
 
11 The Muslim Brotherhood’s most visible female spokesperson, Dima Tahboub (now an MP for the 
Islamic Action Front), herself champions women within the movement but has spoken against 
reforms to gendered Personal Status laws (Amis 2013).  
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she was allowed, ‘she is free’. He had brought her along on a couple of marches, but 
told me ‘she gets shy’. The radical nature of female participation of women in the 
overnight sit-ins of the Day-Waged Labourers’ Movement, as Ababneh (2016) argues, 
becomes the more noteworthy given this context.  
 The question of leadership is also contentious. Many young activists would say 
‘Hirak has no leaders, it is for the young and poor’! When I asked what ‘Ali and Sabri 
were, as well as more visible national opposition figures like Hind, they would usually 
call them mumathilīyn – meaning spokespeople or representatives. This term is 
suggestive of another type of representative, the shaykhs and dominant representative 
patrons. The ideal for those seeking influence is that they should be a channel through 
different social strata to their poorer supporters, reinforced through stories of shaykhs 
who bankrupt themselves entertaining their followers. Protests can have a role in this, as 
Martinez (2018) shows in his description of bakery-owners organising protests among 
their clients when suspended for misusing state-subsidised flour in popular sweets. But 
these protests are performative, strategic and instrumental rather than aimed at 
transforming society or the state. They are a demonstration of socio-political capital, but 
aimed at finding an accommodation mutually beneficial to government, protesting 
supporters and themselves. Such a redistributive moral imperative that underlies claims 
to political representation is, according to some, on the wane. The success of the rural 
Hiraks, Sabri and Osama told me, was in making national political demands around 
restored subsidies and wage-rises, rather than just asking for limited benefits for 
themselves and their localities and wider group, akin to the idea of labour solidarity in a 
Union. When Sabri and others were arrested their aim was always to use their 
imprisonment to draw attention to their cause. In other cases of arrest, for instance the 
case of pro-Hirak anti-government academic Faris al-Fayiz, a prominent academic from 
the Fayiz Sukhur lineage (discussed below), the point of demonstrations often seemed 
to be to reinforce and support quiet efforts through shaykhly channels to get members 
released.  
 Sabri and Osama were determined that the old politics of faction and 
representation, of giving Hamaydah special treatment, and in particular their shaykhs, 
was not going to work on them. The demonstrations in Dhiban, Muhammad as-Snayd 
said ‘succeeded in spreading [the Hirak] to the north and the south, because we do not 
belong to anyone,’ said Mohammed. This mode of politics is not rejected in every 
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context by Dhibanis. A young man in Mleih, just outside Dhiban told me, (in a manner I 
heard often, and reminiscent of Rayan al-Fayiz’s statement in Chapter 2) 
The Government keeps out of our affairs. If we have any problem, Abu 
Bisha’ [a local shaykh] he will go and see a minister or a general. He will 
see him directly, no matter if others queue or need an appointment. He will 
be given coffee. 
The same protesters who reject this sort of politics in one setting, in another, as when 
arrested, ask their older relatives to intercede via networks of this sort. Old adages 
though, that the police do not come to Bedouin villages, seem doubtful given the 
suppression of the unemployment tent. The inviolability, and thus sovereignty, of these 
places has limits; limits that have become increasingly clear. 
 In 2011, and again when Dhiban boycotted the 2013 elections, and again in 
2016, the royal house quietly made prominent appointments from among restive 
‘ashā’ir. Muhammad said that they offered a Hamaydah the post of Minister of 
Agriculture. Others in the military received unexpected promotions. These men were 
then supposed to quietly pressure their associates to de-escalate. This did not happen. 
Those like Sabri who were detained for political reasons became a sticking point for 
Dhibanis. The use of appointees as quiet redistributive conduits was rejected. In this 
sense, it might be said that the shaykhly patrons and men of influence who sit near the 
pinnacle of wāstah were also the target of Hirak protest. ‘They prefer businessmen in 
the palace now’ Sabri said one day, while discussing Basim Awadullah, head of the 
Royal Court, a prominent banking executive and a man in the king’s inner circle widely 
said to be corrupt. ‘They are cheaper than us, because you can buy each man on his 
own’. Another interlocutor told me that the muhtrimīyn (respectable generally older 
men, usually in this context Bedouin) struggled in government because ‘honour is 
expensive’ (sharaf ghalīy) success requires redistribution and favours for a large client 
network.  
 Many in the king’s inner circle are indeed people from beyond the world of 
well-known ‘ashā’ir. In particular the queen and her circle are Palestinians who fled to 
Kuwait, later fleeing to Jordan after the Gulf War. When Sabri was arrested, he told me, 
the Mukhabarāt asked him ‘why do you say these lies about Basim Awadallah’. ‘What 
is this?’ asked Sabri, ‘does the Mukhabarat work for the country or for Basim 
Awadallah?’. The agents laughed but said he should be careful in future. Basim is seen 
as part of a new elite, who seek to dominate the economy and yet do not demand the 
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same degree of favouritism for their own broad support base and political participation 
that the old East-Banker families did. Military men and shaykhs are sometimes 
supportive of Hirak, but it is important to note that protesters actively resist the 
implication that Hirak is about serving their interests. To serve these sorts of relational 
and positional interests would risk turning Hirak into hosha.  
6.4 Situating	Protest:	revolutionary	subjectivities	and	the	
‘Arab	Spring’	
Before further exploring how Hirak and hosha become entangled it is necessary to 
orientate these events in relation to broader narratives of protest and uprising. Hirak 
supporters were self-consciously influenced by other protest movements in and beyond 
the region. By 2018 Osama, Sabri and their friends were openly drawing connections 
with and expressing a sense of solidarity with the (quite different and causally 
unrelated) Hirak movements of Morocco, Algeria and Iraq. Others sought to downplay 
these revolutionary and international associations, but even shopkeepers in Dhiban said 
with proud that this is where Jordan’s ‘Arab Spring’ started. While factually debatable, 
the conceptual implications of such narratives need further examination. 
 Methodologically, anthropologists have recognised protests as an important 
setting for mimesis and making connections between localised or even individualised 
subjectivities and national and global scales of political economy.12 Demonstrations of 
collective power or political will, whether treated as ‘tribal clashes’ or political 
activism, were topics many Jordanians and scholars working on Jordan assumed I ought 
to be interested in, not least because of their potential to upset and problematise some of 
the discourses and assumptions around Bedouin, East-Bankers and tribes. When 
explaining my interests to a Jordanian academic in Amman she said ‘ah, you’ve come to 
understand the Jordanian Arab Spring!’. A central question for many scholars working 
on Jordan since 2011 has been why the ‘Arab Spring’ failed to reach a critical mass 
leading to the sort of outright revolution seen in its neighbours (Oden 2011, Tobin 2012, 
Yitzhak 2018). The March 2011 mass protests and strikes remain the exemplary act of 
political protest for many Jordanians. The young Hiraki activists in Dhiban had often 
only started protesting after 2011, but this was still always talked of as the pivotal event 
to return to, a moment of flux and potential to be recreated.  
 
12 Though these connections are often undertheorised.  
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 I engage with the broader narrative of Jordan’s ‘Arab Spring’ primarily to 
contextualise and de-generalise it. The last chapter considered the ways demographic 
change and intersubjectivities have been combined in certain accounts of the Arab 
Uprisings of 2010-2012. Here, I instead consider the role of the Arab Uprisings, and the 
particular globally recognised ‘event-ness’ of the ‘Spring’ label as a discursive resource 
and background, both for those experiencing protest in the region, and for continued 
anthropological engagements with them. The term ‘Arab Spring’, of course, is an 
invention of Euro-American journalism, 13 and implies a particular historical 
comparison – facts of which many Jordanians are aware and make use. The implicit 
parallel with the 1858 ‘Spring of Nations’ in Europe suggests a linear model of 
historical development; the Arab World following the well-worn path of Europe 
towards modernity-as-freedom, democracy and rights-based justice, but a century and a 
half behind. Massad (2011) and others have argued that mainstream discourses about 
the ‘Arab spring’, (a term which has entered Arabic as well – ar-rabiya al-‘arabīy) 
emphasising it’s suddenness and unexpectedness, serve to obscure long histories of 
protest, rebellion and dissent within the Middle East. It implicitly reinforces a common 
reading of Arabs as ‘quietist’ or ‘quiescent’, passively accepting dictatorship and 
tyranny, subjects of what an earlier scholarly tradition termed ‘Oriental Despotism’. As 
Philip Proudfoot (2017:485) makes clear for Syria, this discourse of the Arab Spring 
carries ideological baggage, prioritising formal, civil and political rights over more 
material social and economic demands, which in fact according to Proudfoot 
predominated in Syria and elsewhere among protesters on the streets.14  
 Protest since 2011 has been a background to everyday life in the region. Street 
marches, angry chants, political posters and social media posts were part of the 
landscape and soundscape of my fieldwork. Protests and demonstrations are moments 
with the potential to crystallise otherwise abstract and uncertain relationships. For this 
reason, following Sian Lazar (2012, 2015), I maintain a focus simultaneously on the 
experiential (and therefore sensual) as well as the symbolic elements of collective action 
and protest. I do so without losing focus on how these are generative of and interact 
 
13 The term was seemingly first coined by journalist Marc Lynch in a Foreign Policy journal article 
(Lynch 2011, cited by Yitzhak 2018) entitled ‘Obama’s Arab Spring’ following which Obama 
himself took up the term in addresses. It entered Arabic when the Egyptian political activist and 
former UN official Mohamed al-Baradei began using the term (Yitzhak 2018:6). 
14Proudfoot (2017) has suggested protesters in practice avoid talking about political and constitutional 
questions in favour of the material and economic, because the question of political reform exposes 
fundamental differences between different potential visions of the body-politic.  
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with broader discourses and dispositions operating at a structural level of political 
economy.15 Lazar (2015) shows how in Argentina differing sounds, from rhythmic 
drums to more diffuse clattering of pots and pans, are used to not merely reflect but 
produce and contest different sentiments of spontaneity, collective-ness, and class 
consciousness. Lazar compares the slow rhythmic disciplined drumming of organised 
labour protests to the individualist clatter of the ‘pots and pans’ demonstrations, and the 
way such aesthetic and experiential differences contributed to discourses that the latter 
was a ‘middle class’ type of protest, reflecting wider discourses of individualism and 
neoliberalism. Drumming for labour unions, often from early childhood, is described by 
Lazar (2017) as one of the ways in which amity and mutual being among labour union 
members comes about and is instilled so that it seems to participants a matter of blood. 
 The use of ethnographic work on Latin America in a Middle Eastern setting 
takes place in a broader anthropological trend to reorient research on protest and 
resistance towards lived experience, anticipation and affect, rather than merely 
reproducing at ethnographic scale the analysis of political economy or political science, 
focusing on the politics of interest. In this way, proponents argue, broader analytical 
understandings of the nature of revolutions can be brought into dialogue and connected 
with ‘traditional’ anthropological questions and concerns around cosmology, 
representation and ritual, engaging with and taking seriously the way those caught up in 
such movements make sense of them. Recent anthropologies of protest and revolution, 
especially in the context of the Arab Spring, often focus on temporalities as a way of 
considering the intersection of the experiential with wider political structures, 
particularly focusing on the experiences of those living through these moments who are 
not marching on the street or taking place in revolutionary set-pieces like Tahrir Square 
(Winegar 2012, Hegland 2013, Holbraad and Pedersen 2013, Chertich et al, 2020). 
Holbraad and others have focused especially on the desire of revolutionary movements 
to create new worlds. Many protesters globally share an idiom of generating new better 
ways of being. This ‘cosmogonic’ reading, to borrow Holbraad’s (2018) suggested 
term, borrows from work on Chile, Peru and Cuba, but has gained renewed attention in 
the wake of the Arab Spring. 
  Cosmogonic accounts of revolution rest on an understanding of the normative 
values of the present that inform the world or way of being to be transformed within a 
 
15 I particularly have in mind discourses of corruption and of bifurcation between East and West Bankers 
with their respective economic spheres.  
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particular setting. This connects with other recent trends towards a value-centred 
reading of protest and revolution (see Kurik 2016, Schielke 2015, and for discussion of 
this as a mode of describing resistance, Ortner 2016). These analyses rests on a 
distinction between two types of value, normative and aspirational/transformational (or 
perhaps ‘revolutionary’). Schielke describes how normative values (for instance self-
sufficiency, marriage, homeownership, stable employment etc.) are seen as thwarted, 
disrupted or drained of meaning in the present. These normative values are in in conflict 
with other aspirational values (piety, commitment to grand causes, passionate love), 
which while offering in some senses a dialectical alternative to norms also seem 
thwarted in the present. Such values are made subject to revolutionary transformation. It 
seems then that the job of the ethnographer in both the cosmogonic and value-centred 
approaches to uprisings becomes giving an account of the kind of world their 
participants are hoping to bring about and the tensions and inconsistencies within such 
imaginaries – a world that as Schielke points out, is often experienced during protest 
movements, which are thus both the means and also a model of their own ends; a brief 
moment of ‘lived utopia’ in a world of unfulfilled grand schemes. 
 This type of analysis has obvious strength, particularly in allowing the sort of 
thick description that anthropologists best produce. However, in addition to some 
uneasiness at the political implications of such a mode of analysis, I find it 
ethnographically problematic in my setting, where my interlocutors de-emphasised the 
divisive business of imagining the future in favour of focusing on current frustrations in 
a simultaneously changeless and worsening present. Values are tricky and divisive; 
political economic reality is a much easier thing to find agreement on. Furthermore 
Hirak activists largely refused to use the language of breach and revolution, focusing on 
restitution to imagined former norms (a discourse already touched upon in my 
discussion of moral economy in Chapter 3) and doubted the efficacy of their actions to 
bring about their hopes. The demonstrative acts I describe certainly have their own 
commitments to temporal schemes and future imaginaries, but they are in no sense 
totalising ontologies nor connected neatly to projects of personal transformation, except 
in the general sense of being ‘committed’ (Schielke 2015).  
 The dark protests described by Joseph (2013) and Singerman (2007), driven by 
experiences of waithood, suggest a different dynamic. Their cosmogenesis, like those of 
the female suburban supporters of revolution in Cairo described by Jessica Winegar 
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(2012) remain unrealised.16 Cosmogonic and value-centred analyses, by remaining 
focused on the individual, are compelling for describing affect, but undertheorised in 
their description of effect. My account, influenced by these new turns but unable to 
fully adopt them in the face of the discontinuous, fragmented and partial aims and 
commitments of my protesting interlocutors, is unapologetically directed towards 
historical context and political economy in a sense wider than the experiential. 
 Following Victor Turner’s (1988) notion of communitas – the strong feeling of 
togetherness emerging from the suspension of normal relationships and hierarchies 
during the liminal period of revolution-as-Van-Gennepian-rite-of-passage, this analysis 
focuses on the processes through which demonstrative acts come to reproduce and 
crystallise but also contest and remake the structures and hierarchies from which they 
emerge. I have therefore attended to how the types of events described in this chapter 
intersect with the various ‘images of the good’ discussed in the last chapter. In other 
words, how certain imaginings of the future (anticipatory, fearful or despairingly 
frustrated) come to be expressed through demonstrations of shared sentiment and 




In 2016, during the media storm that surrounded the Dhiban unemployment tent, 
Muhammad Funatil al-Hajaya, a famous Jordanian Bedouin poet (he self-describes as 
such) wrote and published a short piece in the Newspaper al-Ittijāh, which often 
featured him on its ‘Desert Page’ (ṣafḥat al-bādīyah) (Tamlin 2018: 379). The poem 
was called ma humamhum Dhiban – ‘they don’t care about Dhiban’ and it was mostly a 
polemic against the ‘rented pens’ of the media who were provoking further protests and 
politicising the suffering of the Bani Hamida Bedouin, turning them into a national 
revolutionary symbol. These pen-wielding provocateurs and troublemakers are the 
subject of al-Hajaya’s scorn as traitors to the ideal of Arab unity and spreaders of civil 
strife and national unrest, who feign solidarity and sympathy with the residents of 
Dhiban only to serve their own political interests and causes. However, the protesters 
themselves are treated en-masse as ‘Bani Hamida’ in his poems (although most 
 
16 Winegar (2012) challenges the primacy of the image of the (male) public revolutionary in Tahrir 
Square, focusing on the experiences and undertakings of women during revolution. 
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Hamaydah in the villages are not involved with Hirak), glorified in the panegyric style 
of the ancient Arabic qasīdah (long-form poems about heroic subjects, often glorifying 
leaders, lineages and tribes). They are described as ‘the best of men’ and as watchful 
swords protecting Jordan, their women crying in adulation when they go into battle 
crying “siyyah” – the Hamaydah nakhwah described earlier. They are described as loyal 
to the homeland, even if sometimes angered by it, for they have not been treated as 
heroes should be. Much of this will be familiar from the Jabur land protesters’ Facebook 
statement discussed at the beginning of the chapter. The Hamaydah’s ability to criticise, 
it is implied, is a right given them by their loyalty and nobility of character. Conversely, 
the poem by implication delegitimises the anti-government talk of urbanites and other 
non-Bedouin seeking to make common cause. The poet, famous for his fierce 
denouncements of Western imperialism in the region couched in the language of 
Bedouin oral poetry on the topics of love and raiding, is known as a supporter of the 
royal house, of pan-Arab nationalism and also of tribal and Bedouin identity. The 
righteous fury of the residents of Dhiban is recast as a specific matter, tied up with their 
proud, fierce, independent sovereignty; its connection to wider fields of national 
political economy is denied. It is their business, their name, and should not be exploited 
by political agitators for their own gain.  
 Such moves of simultaneous association and disassociation, of in a sense 
tribalising the political and politicising the tribal, are common in Jordan. 
Ethnographically, I encountered many discourses and counter-discourses which 
threatened to collapse the distinction between hoshah and Hirak as modalities, blurring 
the boundaries. On the one hand, a set of discourses supported by many in the capital, 
and by certain state loyalists, casts Hirak as a matter of chauvinistic, anti-modern 
tribalism. On the other, many opposition activists seek to take matters the state might 
seek to label as ‘tribal’, and therefore to some degree not its concern, and to recast them 
as political uprisings driven by unfair or corrupt treatment from the state. In Jordan (and 
many places) the Weberian state exists alongside other semi-legitimised potential users 
of violence.17 Fields of overlapping sovereignty, clientship and mutual protection are 
encompassed at the highest level by the royal house. Antagonism, even revenge, that 
takes place within the limits of the mahd al-qasr can be tolerated to some degree, as it 
 
17 Implicitly most theories of the state still rest upon Max Weber’s famous (1919) definition in his essay 
‘Politics as a Vocation’; ‘a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the 
legitimate use of physical force within a given territory’ (Besteman 2002:3).  
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only confirms the state’s ultimate role as final arbiter. However, this model of 
encompassment breaks down when other projects of sovereignty, couched in the 
language of shared honour, threaten to turn against the state, or at least the people who 
seem to many Jordanians to have captured it. 
 This point will become clearer with an ethnographic example. In late April 2018 
I was working on a friend’s farm in the north when a social media storm broke. Friends 
from many different groups and settings within Madaba and Amman were posting and 
re-posting various strands of commentary about a large hoshah in Madaba between the 
Sukhur and the Shuwabkah. I quickly headed back to Madaba, by which time men in 
pickup trucks with simple homemade painted Bani Sakhr banners had blocked the main 
road and were even firing bullets outside (although not at) the Governorate Office. A 
video was circulating widely on Facebook, showing the origin of the disturbance. 
Grainy mobile footage showed a man, revealed to be Zayid al-Fayiz, of the al-Fayiz 
Shaykhly lineage, at an ATM in Amman, where he was attacked by ten or more men in 
the street (apparently Shuwabkah), before being pushed into the road and beaten with an 
iron bar.  
 I feared this event might place me in a difficult situation. Most of my friends 
were Sukhur, yet Samer, my Arabic teacher and a close friend and important research 
collaborator, was Shuwabkah. He lived with his family in Juraynah, the main 
Shuwabkah village 5 km north of Madaba, the junction of which was now sealed off by 
the police and armoured vehicles to prevent any Sukhur protesters from attacking. I was 
concerned that I would be made to choose on which side of that cordon I remained, for 
the rest of fieldwork. That night I sat down in the coffeeshop with Hamid, Omar and 
Khalil, my closest Sukhur friends and pieced together the story. Then I called Samer, 
my Shuwabkah Arabic teacher, to check his family were safe. I had planned to visit him 
the next week in Juraynah – I asked if the roads would be open. He told me there would 
be no danger to me, but that I should go around the back way just in case, as the police 
would close the main junction as a precaution. When we met he told me the story in the 
empty back room of a coffeeshop, not because it was a secret, but because everyone 
would have an opinion on the story and would inevitably interrupt. ‘But you should 
know’ he said ‘all this is over now. There is ‘atwa [truce]’. Over the coming days I 
heard bits of the story from all sorts of people.  
 The common outline was that in the past ‘Aimad Shuwabkah, an Army officer 
assigned to the queen’s security detail, had accompanied a royal visit to Madaba, where 
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a young Christian woman had tried to give him a petition for the king. He had 
supposedly been attracted to her, and had decided to take her number, arranging to meet 
and discuss the petition another time. He then, over several weeks, put mounting 
pressure on her to sleep with him, even threatening her children, according to the 
Sukhur story. At this point the woman had fled to the house of Zayid al-Fayiz, thinking 
his name and family’s prestige would protect her. 18 ‘Aimad pursued, angry now, and 
demanded she come out of his house. When she refused, Zayid and his supporters 
apparently dragged ‘Aimad away, although according to some Shuwabkah, they 
kidnapped him and beat him. Either way ‘Aimad was humiliated and angry. At this 
point the situation threatened to go beyond the three individuals involved (‘Aimad, 
Zayid, and the unnamed woman) and become a matter for revenge. Therefore, the 
traditional methods of dispute resolution (as described in Chapter 2) kicked in. Two 
senior members of both families met,19 leading to a formal reconciliation, carried out in 
the dīwān Mithqal al-Fayiz, the vast meeting hall erected by Mithqal’s grandson Faisal 
as a self-styled ‘gathering place for the Sukhur’ (as described in Chapter 4). However, 
two days later, ‘Aimad Shuwabkah made his attack in Amman on Zayid, and protests 
broke out in Madaba and beyond. The police arrested ‘Aimad and brought the woman 
into protective custody (I am told by friends in Madaba she eventually emigrated to the 
United Sates). The Sukhur were demanding jalwa and diyyah (exile of the kin of the 
qātil kin and blood-money), as well as criminal prosecution of ‘Aimad, according to the 
parallel civil and ‘tribal’ legal structure outlined in Chapter 2. After a few days of 
immense pressure representatives from both sides met and a new ‘atwa was established 
between both sides.  
 This story, modern in the details of the video, ATM and the social media driven 
response, contained many of the elements of classic Bedouin narratives. The central 
themes of desire, jealousy, revenge, factional discord and, most importantly of all, the 
sacredness and honourable nature of protection were on display. By offering protection, 
or rather accepting a request for it, Zayid was in a sense making a demonstration, or 
even a test, of his sovereignty and that of the various layers of name/space he was 
connected with. He was declaring himself, his house, and those under his protection to 
 
18 There is a long and important precedent for shaykhly families and lineages to be seen to publicly offer 
or accept requests for sanctuary (see for instance Shryock 2004). It is both considered a sign of 
honour and generosity, and also a demonstration of power, in that it shows the granter’s power to 
uphold sanctuary, even potentially against the law and the state. 
19 These were member of Parliament, Zayid Ahmad al-Shuwabkah, and Sukhur politician, Faisal al-Fayiz. 
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be inviolate. It was this notion of protection, tied up with ideas of hospitality, as well as 
the threat of violation, that made the story piquant to a Jordanian audience. The crucial 
point upon which accounts differ was whether ‘Aimad sought to breach this protection 
by attacking Zayid’s house, or if Zayid attacked him outside. Regardless, the later attack 
of Zayid in the street, recorded publicly, demanded answer, and so a ‘tribal clash’ was 
inevitable.  
 I met to discuss the incident with Abdalaziz, Hamid’s older brother. As I have 
already said, he was keen to encourage me to see and write history of the Bani Sakhr 
from a non-Fayiz perspective, and to tell ‘the truth’ about that family. He and his circle 
constantly tried to discourage me from getting to know people from al-Fayiz, or from 
visiting their village at Um al-‘Amad. I was expecting a degree of ambivalence around 
supporting Zayid. However, his focus was on the need to act together, to prevent 
erosion of respect. He explained that the strength of the Sukhur was well known, and 
this was why many of them got good jobs in the military. If they didn’t protest, then 
they might lose the respect of the state against which they were, indirectly, protesting.  
Really, in truth the Shuwabkah are not famous, they have no origins... 
People say, ‘they have parsley in their blood’. But al-Fayiz are known as 
Sukhur, they are famous shaykhs, even though in truth they are not… 
distinguished. It is shameful they became the paramount shaykhs, but now… 
it is shameful for them to be weak. People will say, how can the weak lead 
the strong? So it is a matter of sharaf [honour], and because of this all 
Sukhur feel the same on the matter. 
It is through the operation and practice of claiming to protect, cover, and represent, I 
argue, that the honour of different people and groups at different scales becomes 
entangled. In this case, al-Fayiz is entirely encompassed and defined by the position of 
eminence, and by its widely known claim to leadership held by a few lineages among 
the thousands of families bearing the name. Yet this identification only extended 
problematically and in a limited, self-interested way beyond them into the general mass 
of people and families identified as Bani Sakhr, who might deny any special, permanent 
or substantive position to al-Faiyz, and yet still attach great significance to being Bani 
Sakhr.  
 Ahmad Oweidi took full advantage of the situation. ‘This could be the spark’ he 
explained. ‘Of course it is not good that Shuwabkah and Bani Sakhr should fight. But it 
is not really about this. This dog ‘Aimad, did he act as Shuwabkah, for his blood? No!’ 
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He said the real issue was his misuse of his official position, and particularly the notion 
that the court, and especially the queen’s household, harboured such venal characters. 
He admitted some shabāb from the Shuwabkah helped ‘Aimad in this, but they were 
mere accessories. He added that ‘no one thinks badly of them [Shuwabkah] usually, but 
the true Jordanians know they were never a great tribe, they are not āsīl, ‘noble’ like the 
Sukhur. So the people [an-nās] will not be with them’.  
 In the coming days he sent out a series of messages and statements, which 
focused on the queen’s role in employing ‘Aimad. He suggested that her powerful 
coterie was full of power-abusers, and the issue with ‘Aimad Shuwabkah was 
emblematic. He was effectively turning a dispute between two men, who had already 
pulled in their families and wider kin networks, into a matter of the Bani Sakhr being 
victimised and disrespected by corrupt court figures. In the end, the agreed truce held, 
and Dr Ahmed gave up trying to fan this particular ember. However the atmosphere 
remained palpably disturbed, and the anti-queen sentiment persisted.  
 Dr Faris al-Fayiz (Zayid’s cousin) an outspoken academic at the University of 
Jordan who had been active in the 2012 Hirak released a video on social media 
criticising the queen, and directly referring to her as shaītanah (she-devil). He was 
arrested under the so-called ‘Hashemite Laws’ that makes criticism of the royal family 
illegal. Members of the Fayiz lineage encouraged a general Sukhur demonstration, with 
Facebook groups using collective slogans and talk and a number of physical protests 
organised. Finally an ultimatum was delivered to the Government to release Faris, or 
‘the Sukhur’ would block the main desert highway road connecting the capital to the 
airport and to the south of the country, where it passes close to the central Bani Sakhr 
town of Zizia. Two days later, after sporadic protest, this time less-well attended, it was 
announced that an ‘atwa was in place, and that the Fayiz were satisfied with the 
Government’s response, whereby Faris was released to loose house arrest. His cause 
remained though, and was taken up vocally by the Dhiban Hirak, who started claiming 
him as one of their own (despite the grievance between many Sukhur and Hamaydah). It 
was a statement by Ahmed Oweidi which began to make me consider how hard it is to 
draw firm boundaries between Hirak and hoshah, and how easily contesting discourses 
muddy the distinction. ‘It is all contest’ he said. ‘The basis of the tribal system, it is war. 
The state, it is war. There is no difference’.  
 War and ‘discord’ (fitnah), is also crucial to counter-discourses that delegitimise 
unrest. An old man in the Jabal Bani Hamida told me; ‘maybe the boys in Dhiban have 
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been pressed, y’ani, they have anger. But we are not Syria, we cannot do that here in 
Jordan’. The shadow of state disintegration and civil war falls heavily on protests in 
Jordan. I received many interpretations from my interlocutours of how the spectre of 
authoritarian rule in Egypt, civil war in Syria, and foreign invasion in Iraq had robbed 
the popular movements of support from those with the most to lose, particularly the 
urban middle class.20 Putative opposition leaders go to considerable pains to avoid such 
allegations, often with mixed success. As Sabri told me once ‘the Government tell the 
Americans, if there is an uprising, Islamists will take power. But we are secular, it is the 
Muslim Brotherhood who works with the state. ‘Ali Brizart said it was essential to 
Jordan’s long-term prospects that the West accept change in Jordan and see that the 
protesters were not mutatārif ‘extremist’. There would, he said, be no civil war. ‘We are 
all of us Jordanians, and the qaba’il will not fight among themselves anymore’. I asked 
him about incidents of hoshah, and the way they are used to discredit protests 
originating among Bedouin. ‘These are a product of desperation and ignorance; not a 
true expression of ‘usul ‘ashirī’ (‘tribal’ origins – in a sense akin to an idea of 
‘mentality’). The categories of hoshah and Hirak are thus deeply interconnected but also 
heavily loaded and fraught. To be cast as a ‘tribal’ can alienate support as well as garner 
it. They ways interlocutors present and position different types of collective action is 
therefore always contextual and carefully related to audience sentiments.  
6.6 Materialising	and	Sensing	Protest	
Differences between types of demonstration are reflected in sensual and aesthetic 
markers. Yet these also show how ‘tribal clash’ and ‘political protest’ become 
entangled. The Sukhur hung homemade banners from pickup trucks when closing the 
road to Juraynah – large lengths of black and blue fabric with white painted lettering. 
These looked almost identical to the banners made by students at the University of 
Jordan, going as a group defined by ‘ashīrah to take part in national political protests 
outside the office of the Prime Minister (Figure 6.2). The material and aural markers of 
protest are often confusingly appropriated and redeployed, in ways that allowed a 
variety of discourses to co-exist and compete (much as in Sian Lazar’s 2015 analysis).  
 Many Hirak protesters wore red-and-white shmargh headscarves. For some this 
was a demonstration of the parochial, tribal and chauvinistic concerns of the 
 
20 This discourse of Syria and elsewhere as negative exemplar is noted by others (Tobin 2012, Yitzhak 
2018, Yom 2018). 
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protesters.21 For others it was an expression of national loyalty and even monarchism, as 
these colours are associated with peninsular Arab as opposed to Palestinian origins, and 
thus with the Hashemite regime. In part responding to this latter reading, Ahmed 
Oweidi al-‘Abbadi began turning his red and white shmargh inside out, to differentiate 
himself from regime loyalists. He and his tribal-nationalist supporters in Harakat-al-
Urdunīya (‘The Jordanian Movement’) wore the shmargh on their head in the formal 
manner, while most protesters wore it as a scarf – simultaneously referencing and 
contesting its role as a symbol of tradition. At the University of Jordan, where I was 
affiliated as a researcher during the winter of 2018/2019, I was told by a friend ‘look at 
who brings in a shmargh on a Thursday who doesn’t wear one normally’ to work out 
who the protesters were in the office. The use of the headscarf and its East-Banker 
associations is mirrored by the frequent use of various styles of folk-dance that are 
considered to be culturally ‘Jordanian’ and non-Palestinian at protests. Meanwhile, as 
seen in the last chapter, (Figure 5.2) urban protesters regularly use bread as a symbol 
(and a placard), proclaiming not so much honourable sovereignty, but rather poverty, 
humility and dependence, highlighting the state’s duties to feed and protect its people, 
referencing older traditions of grain protests.  
 The physical form of protests is also a site of appropriation and contestation over 
aesthetic markers. Ahmad Oweidi’s political meetings were set up in a way that 
mimicked a tribal majlis, a meeting of shaykhs and men of influence in a tent, dīwān or 
outside, with rows of chairs for senior members, and with younger supporters standing 
behind with placards in a secondary, supportive role. The Hirak meetings meanwhile 
involved formal semi-public meetings of a similar sort, but also specific forms of sit-in 
like the unemployment tent, and more overt protests, with rings of placard-bearing 
chanters and often a loud-speaker through which one or more central figures addressed 
the crowd. Tents, a new feature in Jordanian protests, proclaimed conviviality, 
commensality and permanence, creating new forms of togetherness bound up with 
protest. Another form is marching through the streets as a demonstration of force, 
whether for overtly politico-economic reasons or as in the case of Faris al-Faiyz, for 
reasons supposedly more to do with collective honour. Several times interlocutors 
referred to this ironically as a zaffah – the large, noisy, celebratory but threatening 
 
21 A West-Banker friend said ‘the black-and-white kuffiyah [now seen as ‘Palestinian’ and associated with 
the PLO], it means something when protesters wear it. The shamrgh though… what can it say but 
“more for us and our families”?’. 
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wedding procession carrying the bride from the groom’s family house to that of the 
bride or to the party. This usually involves a long line of cars, sometimes decorated, 
flashing their lights, beeping their horns and playing music, which winds its way 
through the neighbourhood, sometimes with celebratory gunfire. As an expression of 
masculinity, patrilineal unity and strength, the zaffah certainly does have something of 
the logic of the demonstration.  
 Chanting is a key experiential dimension of protest. Chants circulate nationally, 
partially via shared video footage. The two I heard most were ‘huriyah min allah, mish 
min aindak Abdullah (freedom is from God, not from you, [King] Abdullah)’ and ‘ash-
shab al-irdun ‘arifyn mīn kabir min al-fasidīyn (the people of Jordan know who are 
large among the corrupt)’ the latter often being followed by angrily shouting the names 
of the corrupt, figures close to the court and the queen. Other chants were focused on 
economic reforms directly – ‘mish faqir lakin ifqar, hatha nahjak ya dular (we are not 
poor, but we were made poor, this is your policy, oh dollar)’. Osama told me one day 
that when chanting these phrases he felt ecstatically happy, his heart beating so loudly it 
would drown out everything else. This was very similar to how Omar Hagaish, 
mentioned earlier, described the feeling of fighting as a group on campus. It was 
sensually and emotionally unifying.  
 A further element of the aesthetics and materiality of protest is the venue. 
Protests in Islamic cities in the region have traditionally occurred after the Friday 
communal prayer where crowds gathered to hear the khutbah (a sermon that included 
the name of the sovereign). The small square outside the old Sharif Hussein Mosque in 
the old and run-down ‘downtown’ area of Amman has been the venue for such protests 
since the 1920s, and these are normally tolerated by the state, causing minimal 
disruption to traffic. However more recent protests deliberately break with this tradition, 
holding protests on other days, and in more disruptive and sensitive positions in affluent 
parts of West Amman. The duwar (the roundabouts that have replaced traffic 
intersections and actual squares in most Jordanian towns and villages) have become the 
main venue for protests. I was told often that since 2012, these roundabouts and other 
public spaces across the country, and especially in the capital, have slowly been fenced-
off, benches and other elements encouraging people to linger have been removed, and 
trees and other objects put in to break up clear views. Empty plots near to protests sites 
are routinely fenced off. As space is privatised, the visibility and even possibility of 
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collecting to protest is limited, even as peaceful protest remains theoretically legal. ‘No 
Tahrir Square here’ as Said put it.  
 In Dhiban the initial protests and the raising of the unemployment tent happened 
in the intersection termed by locals duwar al-hurīyah – ‘the roundabout of freedom’. In 
May 2019, Osama told me he had ‘shocking news’. Government contractors had 
demolished the pedestal and decorative tower in the centre of the duwar (Figure 6.4). 
The townspeople were told the façade had been darkened by traffic fumes, and so the 
state was going to replace the stonework. The people of Dhiban were unconvinced and 
took to social media. Many Hamaydah people I knew who were sympathetic to Hirak 
posted pictures of themselves in the duwar with Hiraki phrases, like ‘I am with the 
disobedience’ or ‘corruption means hunger’ (a slogan we saw expressed on bread, in 
Figure 5.2). Osama posted the demolition on Facebook proudly, as a sign of how 
seriously Dhiban and its people were taken; it demonstrated the Government understood 
their symbolic capital. 
Figure 6.4: The demolition of Dhiban’s central roundabout’s tower, below a banner showing the 
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6.7 Duwar	ad-Dakhliya	to	Duwar	ar-Rabia:	Spring	and	Winter	
in	Amman	
The types of protest discussed intersect with broader national, regional and global 
dynamics. As Madaba was engulfed in unrest over the supposedly ‘tribal’ matter 
between the Shuwabkah and al-Fayiz, and the various rural Hirak protests smouldered 
in small towns across southern and central Jordan, national protests and the beginnings 
of broader cooperation began to appear. In January 2018 the bread subsidy had been 
reduced and the price of bread and many other staples nearly doubled in bakeries and 
shops. This mirrored the kind of economic decisions which had prefaced the mass 
demonstrations in March 2011 outside the Interior Ministry on duwar ad-dakhliyah (the 
‘roundabout of the interior’). Then, in the spring of 2018 the Government announced a 
draft new Income Tax Law, as well as a further round of price adjustments, after talks 
with the IMF. The new annual threshold for personal tax was lowered to 10,000 JD. In a 
country where the minimum monthly wage is 211 JD, many would not be affected. 
However, it did expand discontent into a new section of the population; one better 
positioned to make their voices heard in the capital. Once again, a duwar, a roundabout, 
would be at the centre of things. A protest at Ad-duwar ar-rabia’ the ‘Fourth Circle’ 
roundabout in West Amman and the location of the Prime Minister’s Office, grew to 
huge proportions and spread under this name to other towns, including Madaba. 
Protesting at this site, associated with the Government but not, significantly, the king, 
avoided both breaking the law and suggesting an existential threat to the regime.  
 Even while conventional media was silent on the unfolding drama, al-Hirak al-
Shabāby al-Urduny – the Jordanian Youth League formed during the 2011-2012 protest 
– came out in force to support this protest on Facebook, and another Facebook page, 
entitled ma’nash (‘we have nothing’) began to attract large online crowds. My friends 
showed me each new protest with a mixture of anger and satisfaction, often adding that 
‘now the king will listen’. New Facebook pages sprang up every day, but the main 
medium remained the closed WhatsApp group for forwarded content of videos of 
protests, inflammatory slogans, and calls for action. One particular example, which 
circulated for quite some time showed how aware Jordanian protesters have become of 
the structures in which they operate – a message explaining that Jordanians should now 
expect the Government, having accidentally united them with its punitive economic 
policy, to now seek to divide them along the traditional lines, using for instance a 
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football match between Faisali and al-Wahadat (the largest East-Banker and West-
Banker football teams), or talk of northerners versus southerners in the media.  
 Nightly protests after Ramadan prayers formed at the Fourth Circle roundabout. 
The protests reached a peak on 30th May, with thirty three unions taking part in a 
General Strike (Ababneh 2018:n.p.), surprising the Government with its breadth of 
support. The crowds, who often had not yet broken fast, were volatile and angry. Osama 
went most days, but told me he did not like the mood, and feared it could turn ugly. On 
the morning of 1st June the Government announced the increase in fuel prices would be 
suspended, but the crowds did not disperse. While the protest in Amman at Fourth 
Circle remained peaceful (I heard many protesters talking to Darak) in Madaba (and 
also apparently in Irbid and Jerash) the crowds blocked the roads and, like the lorry-
drivers in February, burned tyres, although the atmosphere of this event felt far more 
hostile. The heightened public mood typical of Ramadan where people tend to 
congregate in the streets after eating Iftar with family, became febrile, but proved short-
lived. The ad-duwar ar-rabia’ targeted the unpopular Prime Minister, Hani Mulki for 
the most part, and so when on 3rd June he was sacked and replaced with the relatively 
unknown Education Minister Omar Razzaz, who soon announced a delay to the new 
taxes while they were reviewed, the protests petered out, with many posts celebrating 
having ‘removed’ Mulki. The more restive Hiraki protesters were dismayed, ‘nothing 
has changed! We want new policies not new politicians’ ‘Ali Brizāt said in a meeting in 
Dhiban. The political cartoonist Eimad Hajjaj aptly summarised the situation; a giant 
hand from an unseen body reaches down to unscrew an old burned-out lightbulb in the 
shape of Mulki’s head, while a new Razzaz-lightbulb is lowered into place (see Figure 
6.5). Ultimately, financing from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf was found to satisfy the 
IMF. For Ababneh (2018:1) ad-duwar ar-rabia was ‘ a popular rising against the 
neoliberal path on which the state has embarked.’ Yet for many this protest did not go 
nearly far enough. Criticism of the king remained muted, much to the disappointment of 
more critical voices. Their sentiment was reflected in Hajjaj’s cartoon. This forms part 
of a central discourse among both academics and opposition figures in Jordan, that the 
Prime Minister acts as a ‘shock-absorber’ for the king, to soak up public anger and then 
to be disposed of. There has been a long pattern in Jordan of defusing protest through 
cabinet reshuffles, and in the case of disturbances in Bedouin areas, often appointing 
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local leaders to high office and promising youth employment opportunities (Yom 
2014).22 
Figure 6.5: Political cartoon by Eimad Hajjaj from Al-Araby News. The cartoon shows Mulki, 
the former PM, as a lightbulb, being replaced by a lightbulb in the shape of Omar Razzaz. 
 
It was after this that Hirak began to emerge from media dormancy. No clear leadership 
of ad-duwar ar-rabia’ managed to emerge and the initially-prominent Council for 
Professional Unions caved in early by calling for an end to protests and was 
increasingly marginalised. The people still protesting had something very different in 
mind. Throughout late summer and autumn of 2018 regular protests began in rural 
locations once more, organised via bolder and more inflammatory Facebook groups. 
People were posting things on their public walls on Facebook that previously had only 
been shared on private messages on WhatsApp. In September 2018 a large week-long 
strike and civil disobedience was called for on Facebook by a group claiming to speak 
for all the rural Hirak groups and the labour unions, and many interlocutors placed its 
symbol as their profile picture on Facebook (see Figure 6.6). As one interlocutor put it 
‘the fear is gone’. The Government at this time began preparing a response; new laws to 








22 A discourse which sees protest as alerting a benevolent monarch to the abuses of his corrupt 
functionaries.  
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Protests on Thursday evenings at the Fourth Circle continued most weeks during the 
winter of 2018-2019, when I returned to Jordan. 23 The winter Thursday protests were 
almost entirely without shape or unity, as though separate protests were merely 
coinciding. A plethora of Facebook groups and event pages advertised and advocated 
for the protests, some targeting the urban poor, or those on the cusp of paying higher 
taxes, others targeting those concerned with free speech. Many different groups 
(themselves often unstable alliances of disparate interests) attempted to curate the 
protests, suggesting specific names and titles, from ‘the Thursday March for Dignity’ to 
‘We are not silent’! 
 When I attended in December 2018, I was struck by how different to the Dhiban 
Hirak protests it looked and sounded, and from the protests that June. Travelling to the 
protest by shared taxi with a group of Dhiban Hirak supporters from the University of 
Jordan, we rehearsed protest chants and discussed where best to stand. On arrival 
though, we were met by a cacophony, where no individual chant or voice rose above the 
rest. The Thursday protests, often in bitter cold and rain, have taken on their particular 
form as a consequence of the semi-repressive response they draw from the state security 
apparatus and the divergent desires of those who take part. The roads around are 
blocked, making it hard for the protesters to gather, and the police, while not preventing 
 
23 I returned to take up a position as a research associate working with Dr Sara Ababneh, who has written 
on these protests (2016, 2018) at the Centre for Strategic Research at the University of Jordan in 
Amman. 
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attendance heavily discourage it verbally and through misdirecting those trying to enter. 
By December the roundabout itself was blocked off, and protesters were only permitted 
to gather in a quieter nearby side-street. Here a large hospital carpark served as a venue. 
Reactions to this varied. One contact from the University said ‘we are talking to a wall. 
This is what the Government wants’. For it meant that the opportunity for direct 
confrontation with the security services was limited, preventing matters escalating. ‘The 
fence’ as one student in the crowd told me ‘is our ally’. All around the hospital carpark, 
various different figures, including Ahmed Oweidi and Hind al-Fayiz stood and spoke, 
surrounded by small knots of supporters. It more resembled a political fair, with 
different stalls selling their own visions, than a demonstration.  
 Afterwards Hind’s supporters said she had done well – ‘you had the most 
Mukhabarāt’. Attendance by plain clothes security personnel has become an accepted 
part of these protests. Expressionless hard-looking men in leather jackets stood at the 
front of the crowds around many speakers, videoing everything that was said. I asked if 
the recording would have consequences. Hind’s aides said they thought not but that they 
could be used to bring civil libel charges. She never spoke against the monarchy, 
although many others did. When responses did come, they tended to be unsettling but 
relatively restrained, and most of all utterly opaque. Hind was arrested, she told me, in 
July 2019 for tax evasion. She was held for 24 hours, before being released. ‘This is just 
to shake me’ she said. People are regularly picked up at random, held for a few days, 
threatened, and then generally let out again. Hind now runs a WhatsApp dedicated to 
people who fear they are about to be taken by the Mukhabarāt. If they message Hind, 
she will speak to government contacts, and tell them that, if this person has not 
messaged her back by a certain time to let her know they are safe and free, she will post 
their disappearance on social media.  
 I was asked repeatedly what I was doing there, and on 13th December Police told 
me it was ‘not safe’ for a foreigner and I was sent away, even though I knew colleagues 
and friends from the University would be present. My mistake had been to come alone 
and approach from the wrong direction.  
 In the cold, rainy winter evenings of December, the numbers rarely looked to be 
much over a thousand, but still the Security service attempts to block them brought the 
capital to a weekly gridlock (the avoidance of which had been the Government’s excuse 
for refusing protests at the duwar). The state has resisted any attempts to measure 
numbers. The flyover above the road to Fourth Circle was blocked – the only vantage 
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point from which the scale of the protest might be visible.24 Facebook event pages often 
received more than 5,000 clicks of ‘interested’, but those who clicked ‘going’ numbered 
in the low hundreds. Anecdotally it seemed the June protests had acquired much greater 
numbers. Increasingly the winter protests seemed to be driven by short-lived Facebook 
groups, which often posted statements listing cooperating movements (including the 
regional Hiraks). These same shadowy social media groups started posting YouTube 
videos of ‘Ali Brizāt’s and Sabri’s speeches and chants in Dhiban. In most interviews, 
hints or suggestions were dropped that behind the flood of organisational and 
promotional material on Facebook was the hand of hidden coordinators. Some 
attributed this to members of the Mukhabarāt who opposed the king or Queen Rania. 
Though protests continue and have acquired some mass at various points (especially 
July 2019), the new tax laws and the new social media bill were both passed. In the 
bitter cold of the Fourth Circle protests, it seemed the spring had turned to winter, and 
the message had become lost in its medium. 
6.8 Failures	of	Leadership?	
The Hirak protests, especially in light of their failure to achieve what most activists 
consider their ends, have raised important questions about the nature of leadership in 
rural, putatively tribal central and southern Jordan. Economic norms and the 
reproduction of ‘Bedouin’ as national symbol and cultural exemplar favours the 
authority of elite, mostly older men from certain lineages.25 With economic reforms, the 
privileged inclusion of these men in a governing elite has become precarious (especially 
in the countryside) as they cannot offer social reproduction to their clients or younger 
kin. They have thus started to mobilise the categories on which their positions rest in 
protest, rather than support, of government. This can be seen in figures like Hind and 
Faris al-Fayiz, and ‘Ali al-Brizāt, from leading shaykhly families, with inherited 
reputation and an amplified voice. But alongside the role of some elite figures in 
protests are widespread attempts to criticise and even to render irrelevant shaykhly 
authority entirely, while keeping the structure of ‘ashīrah intact.  
 The source of such dissatisfaction is obvious; patronage fails to provide the 
degree of redistribution and mediation that people believe it should. The very wealthy 
 
24 Private drones are illegal in Jordan. 
25 Not necessarily the hereditary shaykhs, often in fact members of side-lineages or other associate 
families, who have become rich or through one individual gained access to prominent offices. 
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and powerful, like the Fayiz family, seem removed from those they theoretically might 
represent, their wealth allowing them to cut ties that are no longer useful. One Sukhur 
youth from a less powerful lineage in the Village of Natl expressed his problems with 
the leading figures in the ‘ashīrah of al-Fayiz: 
If I have a problem, perhaps I am arrested, or perhaps I have been cheated 
out of money, or someone wants to take a bribe from me, I need to go to 
someone close to me who is also known and respected. Someone of whom it 
is said ‘he is a fixer of problems, he is respectable’… but if I go to Um al-
’Amad and call ‘ya Faisal, [Faisal bin-Akif al-Fayiz, the former Prime 
Minister] fī warta (‘there is a big problem/catastrophe’) he will not say 
‘ibsha (‘go ahead/let me help you’) and pour for me coffee and so on. What 
will happen? His secretary will ask if I have an appointment, and will send 
me away. If I don’t go they will beat me.  
This shows the limitations of the ‘shaykhs-eye’ view of history in contemporary Jordan 
which assumes the collectivities that shaykhs represent are real sources of obligation 
between wide groups of people. It also shows the limits of readings that see the notion 
of a social contract or moral economy as useful for holding the powerful to account. 
Certain families have used such unwritten agreements with the state and their clients to 
forge their own powerbases, built on but increasingly independent from their 
representative roles. However where claims to connection and mutual obligation fail, 
those cut-off from networks of sovereignty begin to turn against them. As seen above, 
and as Hughes argues (2018, 2019) this does not mean the end of significance for 
‘ashā’ir. Rather these categories have taken on new and different forms; indeed their 
Facebook and meme-friendly manifestations are closer to the broad and undifferentiated 
types of solidarity and tendency to cohere that critics of ‘tribalism’ have long had in 
mind. The intermediary role may be changing hands, and the ability of shaykhs to 
represent sovereignty to both the state and their own clients may be waning, but ideas of 
tribal or Bedouin sovereignty, albeit complex and historically contingent ideas, retain 
currency in the new political arena of mass protests. This new sovereignty, more diffuse 
and negatively defined as the absence of full bureaucratic state power, rests not in 
shaykhs, but in far wider collective ideals, of names and places that cannot be eaten.  
Chapter 6: Demonstrating Power and Protesting the Political: modalities of protest and collective action in 
Central Jordan 
Frederick Wojnarowski – May 2020   257 
6.9 Conclusions	
I have argued for a move beyond seeing tribal clashes and political protests as distinct 
forms of unrelated demonstrative act. The ways in which Hirak and hoshah become 
entangled and collapse into each other, and the way different discourses seek to redraw 
the boundary between them, is metonymic for the wider ways in which the politics of 
the state and notions of tribalism reflect and reproduce one another. In another sense, I 
have suggested, both Hirak and hoshah represent a challenge to and a breakdown of the 
established order, through which tribes and the state co-reproduce one another. The 
controlled and genealogically precise disputes of the past, never quite ended, have 
morphed into something new, which touches upon the seemingly dissimilar domain of 
the political protest. The demonstrations of collective power and potential violence 
facilitated by social media and the growing alternative social sphere generated by young 
people interacting with each-other-outside-of-settings-controlled-by-their-older-
relatives-are clearly-both-implicated-in-a changing-pattern-of-everyday-politics.  
 Yet the older modes of political imaginary that I began to tease out in Chapter 2 
retain a conceptual relevance to the shape this change takes: ideas of honour, protection, 
representation and protected, semi-sovereign spaces that may be encompassed to 
various degrees but never quite eaten or digested. The Hirak protesters do not see their 
activism and resistance as being a cause they take part in despite their traditional 
categorisation as Bedouin tribal subjects, with the various culturalist tropes and 
associations such labels conjure up. Rather for them, other meanings of this tribal and 
Bedouin past in fact inform and enable their resistance, and what is more, in ways that 
are recognised and significant to young Bedouin far beyond the limits of those who 
openly support the Hirak movement, including Facebook agitators and Bani Sakhr 
scufflers on university campuses. Being Bani Sakhr or Bani Hamida (and at higher 
resolutions, being part of particular ‘asha’īr and lineages) involves certain perspectives 
on history, as we have seen. Which historical elements are emphasised is to some 
degree contingent. Increasingly, as important as poetry and genealogy, is an idea of a 
fierce, noble and sovereign past, and of a coming of the state bought about through 
alliances and ‘techniques of interpersonal association’, not through mere coercion. From 
such an imaginary emerge not only the idea of people and places that cannot be eaten, 
but also of a moral economy, of a host-guest alliance being usurped and twisted into 
something else. The idea of tribe then, and its associations in Arabic, is important at a 
historical and structural level in accounting for the presence of protests in certain rural 
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districts, and the form these protests take, in creating the conditions of possibility for a 
degree of frank criticism of power without overt fear. Not least, the state has removed 
most other for a for discussion and organisation, through constantly clamping down on 
and limiting unions and labour movements. Ideas of tribal authority have been 
facilitated by the state as a-political and naturalised alternatives. At the level of overt 
ideology tribes may seem a-political, with those who make use of such notions ranging 
on the political spectrum from Ba’athists to right-wing nativist nationalists, chanting 
‘Jordan for the Jordanians’. Yet both at the everyday level of engaging in collective 
action, dispute resolution and mediated negotiations with the state, and at the structural 
level, the political quality of ideas of name/space categories become clear. 
 Breaks with the imaginary of a tribal past are also key to explaining the ways 
different types of collective action are labelled and argued over in public discourse. 
Both Facebook agitators committing acts of violence outside the limits set by ‘awa’id 
and overtly revolutionary Hirak activists tend to be young, underemployed, poor and 
importantly, as we have seen in the last chapter, facing uncertain or blocked routes 
towards social adulthood and reproduction. As such, their part in the imagined bargain 
of the moral economy, and the links that tie them in obedience to older kin, are 
increasingly in question during the long years of waithood, as links through which 
resources necessary for life are shared are stretched to breaking point.  
 The power and wealth of those calling themselves shaykhs rests, and has rested 
at many times across history, upon their ability to mediate between urban-based dynasts 
and marginal populations, claiming to each to be uniquely able to represent and to 
influence the other; to ensure peace in their districts and votes at elections for the state, 
and in turn to promise jobs, services and bureaucratic favours to their own ‘people’. 
Some controlled display of violence and ability to bring together bodies in the street 
might form part of their claims to wield potential force, and to represent volatile and 
fierce people who without them would prove ungovernable. But when violence rocks 
the state too much and crucially without their control as part of a guided strategy, where 
the clients they represent start going over their heads, or where they become more 
closely associated with the Government rather than their own people, their 
representative role breaks down. Those demonstrative acts dismissed as hoshah are so 
dismissed, and are described as random and arbitrary, precisely because they are not 
under the direction of shaykhs. As much as Facebook feud-stoking and ‘tribal clashes’, 
the refusal of the rural Hirak protesters to stop protesting after being offered the normal 
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inducements through wāstah and patronage challenges carefully-negotiated and state-
encompassed projects of representative sovereignty. This system relies at its base on the 
promise of important reputational and material benefits to those who make us of it; help 
finding-work-and-business-opportunities, help with legal problems, bureaucracy, 
support in disputes and other favours. Where patrons cannot or choose not to deliver, 
people-will-go-to-those-who-can, even if they-do-not have-any-acknowledged-
categorical-claim.  
 This has allowed new types of everyday politics and political figures to emerge, 
connected to the broader emergence of the figure of the wāstah holder, the new 
influential intermediary and broker, who relies on his or her own reputation, contacts 
and position. One way to gain such a reputation is through making money or gaining 
important jobs. But another is to claim solidarity and political support through stoking 
grievances. The way Sukhur youths organised via Facebook have led in protests at 
ground level rather than the senior al-Fayiz men, or the Jabur shaykhs’ concern that 
their land protest over al-Qatanah was getting out of control in the hands of ambitious 
Facebook organisers, are examples of this. Even more concerning to traditional 
authority figures and to government officials are cases where a formal settlement 
between old men of leading families is disregarding by young men, who continue 
violence without genealogical precision or guidance from their elders, as in the case of 
the Shuwabkah/al-Fayiz feud. More broadly, as I have described, many Jordanians see 
tribes outlasting shaykhs; a matter of intense concern for some, especially those wishing 
to claim traditional tribal authority. So too in the rise of the agitator par excellence Dr 
‘Ahmed Oweidi, who defeated his shaykhly ‘Abbadi rivals to win election to 
Parliament, do we see a demonstration of the power of new men to win notoriety and 
build political solidarity through tribal categories and using traditional language, but 
dispensing with traditional genealogical sources of authority. Oweidi told me his rivals 
for political dominance among the ‘Abbad, proud of their own shaykhly lineage names 
would never have thought, as he did, to adopt the name al-‘Abbadi as his own name on 
the ballot. Now it is men like Dr Ahmed and his younger associates, not these shaykhly 
families, that are agitating for the restoration of ‘tribal’ land, as we have seen in Chapter 
3, but not as shaykhly appanage or even ‘communal’ land whose usage is directed by 
elder authority figures, but rather a nebulous but concrete sense of individually 
profitable but somehow equitable ‘ownership’. These calls fall on fertile ground among 
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many of my young interlocutors, unable to make progress with their lives and fearful for 
the future.  
 In Chapter 3, I showed how broad solidarities and intersubjectivities of name 
and geography tend to be closely linked to more specific and material interests and 
differentials, especially around the use, ownership and sale of land. This basis to my 
analysis may-seem-like-a move-away-from-recent-trends-in anthropologies-of-protest, 
and indeed broader trends in Middle Eastern ethnography. Nevertheless, I maintain the 
centrality of political economy for understanding and connecting varied and 
contradictory experiential accounts. Conceptions of grievances articulated via a moral 
economy come into focus here, and varied histories of land settlement and of land claim 
strategies provide a deep grammar to much contemporary politics. In the various forms 
of protest I have considered, and the ways in which my Bani Sakhr and Bani Hamida 
interlocutors experienced protest, unrest and the potential for tribal resistance and 
sovereignty differently, this connection to the deep grammar and moral economy of 
land, settlement and the historical dynamics of state encompassment is essential. 
Relationships to imagined histories are conceptualised in part through land as a sight of 
former wealth, mobility and security, as well as present concerns over inequity, 
corruption and seizure, and future dilemmas and unease over inheritance and solidarity. 
These imagined histories in turn shape the conditions of possibility within which actors 
make the decision to answer or ignore calls for collective action, to acknowledge or 
break with traditional precedents and modes of authority, and to continue or to disavow 
the model of representative sovereignty by which Bedouin tribes are tied to the royal 
house and the state. 
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 CONCLUSION: THE STRANGE CONTINUITY OF 
RUPTURE 
Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do 
not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances 
existing already, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all 
dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living. And 
just as they seem to be occupied with revolutionizing themselves and things, 
creating something that did not exist before, precisely in such epochs of 
revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their 
service, borrowing from them names, battle slogans, and costumes in order 
to present this new scene in world history in time-honoured disguise and 
borrowed language.  
Marx (2008:26). 
 
At the core of this dissertation lies the question of why and how the Bedouin villages of 
Madaba and their inhabitants come to be reproduced as ‘Bedouin’ and as members of 
specific ‘ashā’ir (and indeed other levels of name/space category) even as the historical 
circumstances that once rendered such categories significant are transformed. The idea 
of being Bedouin, Bani Sakhr, or Dahamshah, or even of an ‘ashīrah in general, 
necessarily draw on ideas and images of the past, but as I have shown, are only made 
meaningful through specific historical circumstances. They are meaningful through 
being both historically contingent, while also being a property of identity imagined, in a 
sense, to survive the process of history. As such questions of continuity and change 
loom large in this analysis, and as a theme which brings all the preceding chapters 
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together, it is on these questions that I conclude. The epigraph from Marx is to my mind 
among the most evocative expressions of the longstanding and anguished concern in the 
social sciences around balancing continuity and change, event and structure.  
  I have shown how the idea of Arab ‘ashā’ir, and the broader conceptual area of 
the name/space is multi-faceted and contingent. They can and have been considered in 
various ways: as kinship networks, as social or political organisations and categories, as 
economic units of production, as social construction, and as ideology. Clearly each of 
these dimensions of meaning have some utility for analysing tribes, and to some degree 
overlap. Yet the applicability and degree of overlap of these terms is not constant. At 
different historical moments these dimensions come into play and mingle with each 
other in different ways.  
 I began to explore this historical contingency in the introductory historical 
sketch in Chapter 1; mapping out the semantic field of the various terms applied to the 
Arabic-speaking nomadic pastoralists and semi-nomads living in the Bādīyah of Bilad 
ash-Shām, exploring how each left its mark upon the conceptual options open to future 
periods and polities, as well as setting out the ways various branches of occidental 
scholarship have sought to grasp and make sense of this history. I continued this process 
in Chapter 2, tracing firstly the anthropological freight behind ideas of tribes and 
especially Bedouin in the Middle East, as well as how this has intersected with Arabic 
and Ottoman thought. I then went on to consider the ways that various practices and 
institutions, in which the state has been complicit thorough Ottoman imperial, colonial 
and post-independence periods, reinforce and give infrastructural reality to these ideas 
in the contemporary, suggesting a way out of the debates between cultural 
constructivists and those who take tribes seriously as an ethnographic reality. 
 Also in Chapter 2, through mingling historical and ethnographic analysis, I made 
a case for saving certain ideas from the wreck of post-Orientalist critique and especially 
from work on segmentation, while dispensing with much of the focus on descent and 
kinship. Instead, I focused on the importance in contemporary Jordanian politics of 
names, reputation, honour, and networking and asking favours; all especially associated 
with tribes and Bedouin, who are cast as the ancestral origin and exemplars of such 
practices. I explored ethnographically how names, and often associations with places, as 
well as certain dispositions to do with protection, representation and sovereignty, often 
persist over long periods of time and across considerable historical change, and though 
they make use of genealogy and talk of blood, these things are secondary to politics, 
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which over large distances are able to reshape imaginaries of genealogical relatedness 
and shared ancestry. I sought to analyse how the importance of names, reputations, and 
governing through techniques of interpersonal association (via local intermediaries and 
representatives) have long been associated with certain types of marginal political 
space. Moreover, I looked at how this mode of political thought, which I term 
representative sovereignty, has proven surprisingly adaptable to change, creating stable 
socio-political categories, even though the contents of such categories, and the way they 
are deployed in everyday politics, is historically contingent.  
 I went on in Chapter 3 to trace the history of land and conceptions of land 
ownership in my field site through this process of historical contingency. I showed the 
lingering traces of colonial interventions and more recent neoliberal reforms, but also 
how the commodification of land here remains incomplete. As far as a land market 
exists, it relies on the creative redeployment and ambivalent legal space given to older 
ways of relating to land and to others through it, some of which are pre-colonial. 
Furthermore, I analysed the moral economy of how Jordanian Bedouin have been 
settled and rendered subject to the nation-state, as well as the ways this process of 
settlement remains partial and shows signs at times of unravelling.  
 In Chapter 4, I looked in more detail at the Bedouin villages as a type of political 
space. The world of family and genealogical solidarity offers the potential for a sort of 
politics without politics, I argue; a space where obligations to kin are entangled with the 
projects of representation for these few senior men from powerful lineages to whom 
influence is deferred. The politics of wāstah, hospitality and the dīwān occur in a space 
neither public and civil, nor private and domestic, but which remains central to the 
everyday experience of political economy in Jordan.  
In Chapter 5 my ethnographic focus switched from the top of this hierarchical 
politics to its malcontents; the various bored, dissatisfied and restless young Bedouin 
facing dilemmas about how best to socially reproduce and to find a meaningful life, 
explored through the lens of consumption. In this chapter I also show how both 
representative elites and new alternative figures of social significance, some of whom 
challenge the gerontocratic and genealogical leadership of shaykhs, continue to present 
the categories they claim to stand for as name/spaces that cannot be ‘eaten’ by the state.  
 Finally, I examined in Chapter 6 the experiences of rural protest, from the scale 
of the individual up to that of political discourse. I focused on the cultural 
understandings and the conceptual and political economic conditions of possibility that 
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enable everyday collective demonstrations of partially shared purpose, showing how 
broad social categories and names linking thousands of people (behind which lie long 
and significant histories) are used to make claims in the present. Large, powerful 
interest groups like these can be seen as categories through and on behalf of which some 
powerful individuals claim to ‘speak’, but this side-lines the question of how and why 
ordinary people choose to use labels like Bani Sakhr and Bani Hamida — the collective 
significance of belonging to an ‘ashīrah for land ownership, shared honour and 
reputation. I showed both the potential to distinguish between long-standing forms of 
self-consciously ‘tribal’ collective demonstrations and more overtly revolutionary and 
wide-ranging political activism, and the difficulties in keeping these forms apart. New 
forms of social media and youth-driven protest challenge distinctions, while older 
proponents of traditional authority seek to variously conflate or pull apart Bedouin 
identity and protest movements for their own ends. In all this, certain ideas, which I 
began to explore in earlier chapters, around the continuing power of names, of claims to 
protection and to sovereignty, to representation and mediation, and of places marginal 
and not amenable to full bureaucratic state government, come to the fore. Even in 
revolutionary protests, ideas of Bedouin and tribe are reproduced in ways that go far 
beyond their shallow manipulation and repurposing by colonial and post-colonial 
policymakers.  
 Returning more theoretically to questions of continuity and change, keeping 
continuity with a pre-colonial past in mind might at once seem more and less justified in 
the specific case of Jordan and greater Syria. More; because the experience of colonial 
rule was comparatively indirect and short-lived, though impactful, and was preceded by 
a form of imperial rule under the Ottomans which defies easy categorisation as 
‘colonial’. What is more, in both cases very ancient linguistic, legal and institutional 
forms, bearing the marks of past empires, have been reproduced. Yet simultaneously 
less; because of the long and pervasive influence of Orientalist and othering tropes, and 
because of Jordan’s specific context of modernisation and nationalism explored by 
Massad (2001).  
 In broader anthropological terms, an interest in history may be theoretically 
fashionable, but a stress on longue durée continuity is more problematic. Joel Robbins 
(2007), in developing his particular anthropology of Christianity and Christianisation in 
Melanesia, problematises the tendency of anthropologists working in some areas to 
partake in ‘continuity thinking’; accusing these scholars of drawing out examples (often 
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tenuous and highly selective) of continuity, bridging periods of profound rupture, and in 
the process often obscuring or explaining away ethnographic accounts of radical 
change, such as that experienced by recent converts to Christianity, as a ‘thin veneer’. 
However, his proposal to reorientate works towards rupture dichotomises continuity and 
change in a way that when applied to the material of my thesis, I argue would prove 
unhelpful and misleading.  
 A crude reading of my argument might suggest that I see Jordan’s history as one 
of hidden continuities. Under a veneer of modernity imposed by colonial rule and 
capitalist reforms, older tribal dynamics persist, much as do the various practices and 
cosmologies that supposedly survive Christian conversion in the accounts that Robbins’ 
takes aim at. Equally though, there is plenty in this dissertation, especially in the 
ethnographic material, that would support Robbins’ case for an analytical preoccupation 
with rupture: narratives of change, of the decline of pastoralism, the increase in state 
and market power, and the division between the ‘age of shaykhs’ and the ‘age of 
government’ (a conceptual before and after), not to mention the more recent economic 
crisis. In contrast to either of these polarised positions, I contend that the most 
interesting part of the problem is not in deciding whether to emphasise continuity or 
change, but in working out the ways in which they interact. Clearly, elements of both 
continuity and change are present in the ethnographic material I have analysed here, 
both in terms of historical events and in terms of the ways different people reflect on 
and make use of that history, stressing rupture or continuity depending on the context 
and their own position. More significantly, I suggest here that the ways in which 
patterns of tribal association and the politics of patronage in Jordan have changed over 
time only make sense when we consider continuity and change together. How and why 
new developments, ideas and structures are received, and the new forms such 
innovations create, can only be understood in terms of the preceding historical 
dynamics. These historical dynamics in turn only make sense when considered in terms 
of how they have been interpreted by people dealing with specific situations and faced 
with particular events. 
To return to the epigraph, the question that interests me is which pre-existing 
circumstances constrain how people make their own histories, which nightmares press 
upon the brains of the living, which spirits of the past are conjured up, and which 
names, slogans and costumes are made to seem continuous, relevant and essential to the 
contemporary moment. The power of protection and hospitality as organising principles 
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in contemporary Jordan are not merely shallow inventions of the colonial or neoliberal 
state. Forming and maintaining associations to protect scarce and essential resources – 
once wells, herds or tributary farmers; now land, housing, jobs and the less-tangible 
wāstah – is a well-established method of furthering and protecting sovereignty, and one 
that in Jordan and elsewhere has made use of idioms of genealogy and the agnatic 
transmission of wealth and roles between generations. The royal house and the financial 
elite in Jordan may have found ways to work with and through such projects, but they 
are not their authors, any more than are previous dynasties, though in each case they 
leave their mark. This is not to say that these practices and modes of social 
categorisation are native, authentic expressions of a timeless and largely bounded 
culture. The marks of empires and polities run far too deep for that, and it is clear that 
much of this world has been shaped by their presence and intervention, even when 
indirectly. Claims to representative sovereignty, and the type of categories it gives rise 
to, tend to occur at the margins of, and as such in co-production with, urban states. It 
allows a particular type of political project of rulership to emerge. It is a changing but 
recognisably related set of relations to power and to place, bound up with aesthetic and 
even poetic qualities, that persists in talk of being Dahamshah or Fayiz; Bani Sakhr or 
Bani Hamida or ‘Adwan, or of being Bedouin. 
For some scholars, like Massad (2001), the significance of tribal structures and 
discourses of Bedouin cultural identity is primarily as forms of political life that the 
state (and more specifically the royal house) has reinvented, managed and incorporated 
into the body politic, firstly during colonial rule, and since the 1970s as part of a nation-
building exercise in opposition to, but entangled with, that of Palestine. However, 
Massad’s argument, and those of other post-Orientalist proponents of constructivism, 
has little to say on why ‘Bedouinity’ was chosen or was so successful in gaining traction 
compared to other putative cultural assemblages, other than to point out the military 
reliance of British-sponsored Hashemite rule on certain Bedouin military leaders and 
their claims to represent powerful armed communities loyal to them, later reproduced 
due to fear of the Palestinian internal-other. The political and geographical weakness of 
Jordan is used to explain this reliance, when compared to Iraq and Syria. So far, so 
compelling. Yet why then do similar social forms and practices also persist in varied 
ways in Syria, Yemen, Saudi Arabia and across into North Africa, without the same 
degree of state encouragement or valourisation? For all Massad seeks to explain and fix 
a recent origin to these phenomena, implicitly this argument merely defers the problem 
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back further in time; what previous layer of construction was being retooled for new 
purposes by colonial and national rulers? At the other end of the analytical scale, his 
argument has little to say on how people caught up in such categories experience them; 
on why, in a sense, this constructivist effort succeeded, when so many others failed. To 
my interlocutors, the fact that their social thinking and practices have been useful or 
encouraged by the royal house for its own political aims does not make them insincere 
or inauthentic.  
 Continuity, like historical contingency, cannot be taken as a neutral or 
straightforward fact to be read from history. It is always a claim, a perspective and an 
emphasis which carries within it political judgements upon the present. I have suggested 
that tribes are frequently reproduced by history, and that even when categories, names 
or concepts are stable over time, their significance changes rapidly. However certain 
elements, in particular the conceptual or structural relationship between tribes and 
states, seem to be long-lasting, and to survive the profound changes in political 
economy and the nature of tribal authority. Even as nomadic pastoralism declined and 
tribes became untethered from the leadership of shaykhs, ideas about the power of 
names, of patronage and of representation, came to exert an increasing pull in Jordan. 
This is not to say change or rupture are insignificant, but rather to show how change and 
rupture takes place. These elements of continuity are in a sense the mechanism by 
which tribes are historically emergent and reproduced into new historical circumstances.  
  Like earlier debates around ‘legal pluralism’ (Merry 1988) and discussions in 
the 1980s and 1990s around ‘plural’, ‘alternative’ or ‘vernacular’ modernities (Englund 
and Leach 2000), such concerns with continuity or change seem to turn on how 
anthropology should deal with and respond to histories that stretch beyond living 
memory. Clearly one could argue tribes and tribalism are a way for anthropologists to 
see continuity with a pre-colonial past, and indeed a past of indigeneity, where Bedouin 
were autonomous and self-sufficient. It is the potential for such readings, in part, that 
has made the topic of tribes such a critically problematic one for post-
Saidian scholars working on the Middle East (see Abu Lughod 1989). But such a 
reading is hardly sustainable. Even the scholars (like Dresch, Shryock and Scheele) 
stressing continuity are doing so because of a long, literate history of interactions and 
transregional connections, that allowed history writers from tenth century Yemen or 
Ottoman Algiers to reflect on and be aware of how socio-political forms persist and 
change across time and space. The edge of the Syrian steppe in Jordan has never been 
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isolated, never entirely autonomous and has always been exposed to history writ large, 
leaving literate traces behind. The mistake would be to assume, as proponents of 
modernisation theory often did, that these dynamics should always prove conducive to 
literate legal and religious culture, peasant cultivation, powerful states or urban-based 
dynasties. Alternative forms oscillate between sovereignty and encompassment, 
occasionally seizing cities and states, or being forced to settle. Meanwhile certain ideas 
around politics, both at the level of the nation and at the level of the family, have been 
reproduced and reshaped many times, but recognisably relating to what went before. 
This set of ideas, around honour, reputation, protection, association and representation, 
especially as they relate to names and to the ability of names to entangle individuals 
together, is, I argue, the key to understanding both the survival and the re-purposing and 
reinvention of ideas of being Bedouin and being tribal in contemporary Jordan.  
 Throughout this thesis I have made the case for a re-appraisal of tribalism, both 
as a broad anthropological and political category, and as a heuristic or gloss used to 
name and explain certain features of historical and contemporary life in Jordan. I argue 
that the political content of talk of blood and genealogy becomes clearer as it becomes 
less literal, and likewise it becomes more clearly embedded both in specific historical 
events and in longue durée structures. As argued, these facets need not be contradictory, 
and nor is this process of historical emergence and reproduction over. Key to my 
attempts to re-appraise tribalism has been the concept of representational sovereignty – 
a type of limited and often encompassed sovereignty which works through discursive 
claims to representation and to solidarity between hosts and guest, protectors and the 
protected, and at the last, patrons and clients. Yet these elements may, as I have 
suggested, be drifting apart. I have in the preceding chapters considered two 
increasingly discordant dimensions to the political life of ‘asha’ir in contemporary 
Madaba. On the one hand are the uses of such idioms in claims to offer mediation and 
patronage, sustaining shaykhs but also creating new types of patron; made through 
categories of name/space but also through other networks often called wāstah. On the 
other are the use of socio-political self-identifiers in fields of mass mediation and ways 
of claiming broad solidarities in the face of a widespread sense of a bifurcated or 
fractured nation. The idea of a variegated citizenry and a nation of parts, leads to a 
certain understanding of the state, focused on exclusion, sovereignty and protection, of 
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places and people ‘too bitter’ to eat, who must be governed with particular care and in a 
particular style.1  
 To conclude, I now consider the trajectories of these two forces, of 
representation and of solidarity, exploring how as they diverge the meaning of identity 
labels in this setting change too, but the labels themselves show every sign of, once 
again, outlasting the events that (re)produced them in their current form. In so doing, I 
bring into view some of the contemporary pressures, tensions and directions for re-
imagining that will continue the dialogical process of continuity and change described 
so far, as well as reflecting, once again, on history. 
 The area now Jordan passed from being on the margins of an Ottoman imperial 
order to the margins of a British colonial one, and with this shift certain techniques of 
government, legibility and discipline shifted. Throughout this period, the concern of the 
state was to settle a difficult terrain, partially inhabited by nomadic pastoralists, and 
politically fragmented. As Amir Abdullah sought to rule and settle his rebellious 
frontier-polity using British funding and support, his putative sovereignty, like that of 
his Ottoman predecessors, flowed fluidly around seeming obstructions, finding ways to 
make use of or at least live with them. These were name/spaces long considered to be 
resistant to outside rule and to possess their own mode of rebellious and nested 
sovereignty; they could not easily be ‘eaten’. He and his government and successors set 
about loosely encompassing these other semi-sovereign spaces by binding to him those 
who claimed to lead and represent them, through a technique of interpersonal 
association whereby they shared with him in the proceeds of the state. This looser and 
uneven style of state government (in comparison to Jordan’s neighbours), not merely 
permitting but relying on clientelism, was especially pronounced in its rural hinterlands, 
but discursively reflected throughout Jordan through talk of affiliation and wāstah.  
 Tribes and Bedouin in Jordan, as elsewhere, may at this time have seemed to be 
pre-national and pre-modern concepts, soon to disappear, but since the 1980s they have 
increasingly come to the fore; a waxing coinciding with the adoption of certain new 
economic logics, often termed neoliberal. Decades of liberalising economic reform, 
mass migration and a persistent but arguably worsening crisis over land and housing 
(described in Chapter 3) have seen social welfare decrease and most political life 
pushed out of official channels, fostering a widespread suspicion and cynicism about the 
 
1 The focus on incorporation here should not disguise the other side to any act of grouping, the exclusion 
of others, especially Palestinian others, an area on which I intend to work further in future. 
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potential for development. This has left ‘kinship’-based associations, unofficial 
patronage networks, and the idiom of name/space categories as some of the few 
alternatives for political action. As such, talk of blood, family and tribes is reproduced.  
 Ideas, forms and practices emerging (or imagined to emerge) from the context of 
Bedouin or ‘Arāb ‘ashā’ir, back when these were political alliances of semi-sovereign 
shaykhly lineages claiming to represent broad groups of nomadic and semi-settled 
herders, were accommodated by state-building processes, and are now prevalent across 
a very different political environment, sometimes with little connection to this past. Yet 
for those who do (or seem to) have a strong connection to it – modern Bedouin – this 
connection can be a symbolically and politically significant resource. The exercise of 
shaykhly leadership, reputation-building and mediation, not to mention in some cases 
accumulation, may have often been crucial to forming and maintaining ‘ashā’ir, and 
indeed for giving significance to the concept of Badu. But more recently, to varying 
degrees, the idea of the representative patron and his technique of interpersonal 
sovereignty has flown into a wider socio-political field. Meanwhile the significance of 
being Badu and therefore ‘of’ certain powerful named entities coming out of the once-
ungoverned steppe lands, with a reputation for fierce autonomy, cultural distinctiveness 
and the potential to resist, while built on representative patrons and shaykhly power, 
now exists independently of it, as a far wider claim to solidarity. My interlocutors 
indicated this through their social media curation, through the music and cultural 
references they favoured, and through their willingness to answer what they saw as 
slights and collective insults through collective action, thus linking their honour to a 
wider name. These two dimensions of the tribal in contemporary Jordan remain 
precariously linked; the power of the representative patron resting implicitly upon the 
collective force they might be able to call upon through their claims of representation.  
 However, significant changes in the use of tribal idioms are increasingly evident, 
rendering this link increasingly tenuous, and it is possible to imagine a future when 
representative sovereignty and broad categorical claims of name/space exist largely 
independently. As Hughes (2019:5) argues, it has become possible for the first time to 
talk about ‘tribes without shaykhs’ in the current Jordanian political environment of 
‘tribal voting’ and tribal Facebook pages, used to mobilise young, often unemployed 
Bedouin men for the answering of insults and the furthering of collective honour. The 
tribal idiom can be deployed with greater speed and over greater distances than ever 
before through social media, in the process circumventing its former gatekeepers; old, 
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genealogically-senior men from certain lineages with a reputation for leadership, 
arbitration and knowledge of traditional dispute resolution (of the sort considered in 
Chapter 2), allowing new potential gatekeepers to emerge to take their place. As such, 
the history I describe, one that I argue has been defined by fields of representative 
sovereignty on the part of shaykhs and men of influence, is one that is changing rapidly 
into something else (as, arguably, it always has been).  
 Indeed, I have suggested in Chapter 6 that protests and the types of broad 
solidarity they embody often turn against the politics of representation, and the older 
male ‘relatives’ who enact it. On both sides of the representative ‘bargain’ (although, as 
we have seen, it may not have looked much like a bargain from below), mutual 
obligations are called into question as some, especially younger and precarious 
individuals, see little benefit nor a guaranteed path to social reproduction through 
deference to older kin and beyond to wider genealogical authority, as argued in Chapter 
5. Meanwhile, the shaykhs and great lineages of notables exist ever more independently 
of those they once claimed to represent, and are increasingly unwilling and unable to 
acknowledge their obligations to their non-elite rural clients. The current unsettling 
crises in Jordan around land and housing, economic reform, migration, identity and the 
role of Islam2 seem to be reproducing both tribes and something akin to shaykhs, but 
crucially the link between them is becoming less clear. The royal house may have once 
turned to large-scale categories of name/space and the language of blood, genealogy and 
relatedness to legitimise its power, but these forms are also being repurposed to protest 
against it. 
 I have sought, through an exploration of experiences of youth, uncertainty, 
protest and everyday politics in and around Madaba and its Bedouin villages, to make 
this process of continuity/change ethnographically visible, bringing particularity to 
political trends, looking at how, when and why my interlocutors reckoned their social 
world through categories of tribe, in this moment (one among many) of historical flux. I 
have considered imagined futures (both anticipated and feared), as well as images of the 
good, especially as they relate to protest and social change. This has involved a double 
focus, on both continuity and change, considering how each reproduces elements of the 
other; the contemporary reproduction and historically contingent and emergent nature of 
 
2 A promising direction for further research might be the efforts by various political Islamists to capitalise 
on the bored and precarious waiting youths of the Bedouin areas, who have shown themselves 
receptive to grand political schemes and protest, but who often associate political Islam, both 
Salafism and the IAF/Brotherhood, with urban West-Bankers (Wiktorowicz 2001). 
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this ethnographic setting, but also the ‘scandalous continuity’ (as Shryock (2019a) 
following Dresch (1992) puts it) of some of its elements. Thus, even in these unsettling 
times, form may outlast events and ‘events’, like land settlement and protests, may 
perhaps outlast form. The temporality implied here is not one of linear, discrete epochs; 
it is not best conceived of via a series of responses to changes, whether dialectic or 
through Foucauldian before and after genealogies. Rather it implies the quality that 
specific moments in time, history and human memory have to be overlapping and 
interpenetrating, endlessly dialogical and circulatory. 
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